Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy

2. Making the economy more competitive, fair and climate- and future-proof Robust climate action should give compa- nies a competitive edge internationally. We support a more active and ambitious trade policy, which will enable the EU to make attractive offers to its partners. We are calling for ambitious chapters on trade and sustain- able development. We are working to continue aligning the WTO with the Paris Agreement and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. We are 1 Please refer to chapter C1 “Drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, accelerating the global energy transi- tion” / Priority no. 2 for the detailed government position. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 9 also committed to facilitating trade in environmental the Global Diversity Framework, taking into account goods and services. Particularly when it comes to the key role played by indigenous peoples and local the diversifcation of raw materials supply chains, communities. In our approaches, we prioritise we also support local value-added while upholding Nature-based Solutions which simultaneously offer sustainability standards. In the relevant international advantages for climate action and climate change forums, we are campaigning for ambitious climate adaptation, climate resilience, water management, targets and globally binding measures to reduce the biodiversity and other sustainability goals. greenhouse gas emissions in the aviation and mari- time transport sectors. In addition, we are promoting 5. Strengthening resilience, peace and security the economical use of resources and expanding the The climate-security nexus is factored into our circular economy. Through the open, cooperative political strategies and we ensure that projects in the and inclusive Climate Club, we want to help make spheres of humanitarian assistance, stabilisation and ambition possible without market distortions and to development cooperation foster climate resilience establish decarbonised industrial production as the and take climate needs into account. We are working global norm. to ensure that all international organisations, espe- cially the UN, the EU, the OSCE and NATO, focus

3. Acting in solidarity with the most vulnerable: more on climate and security and we are integrating Protecting lives, livelihoods and health climate aspects into our geopolitical risk analysis. We stand in solidarity with the most vulnerable and Furthermore, we are making sure that the Bundes- remain a good and reliable partner in internatio- wehr can fully comply with its mandate under the nal climate fnance. We are working to ensure that changing climatic conditions and that its operational people and states in special need of the fnancial readiness is guaranteed. Germany is playing an active resources required for climate action have grea- part in the debate about the implications of climate ter access to them. We are actively involved in the change under international law. operationalisation of fnancial support mechanisms, including the new fund for overcoming the loss 6. Aligning international fnancial fows with a and damage caused by the climate crisis (Loss and 1.5°C-compatible pathway and climate-resilient Damage Fund) as a key element in the support for development the most vulnerable. We are also further expanding Germany remains a reliable partner in international the Global Shield against Climate Risks. We are climate fnance and is one of the largest contributors promoting ecosystem-based and local approaches to the multilateral climate funds. We have honoured to climate change adaptation. At the same time, the our climate fnance pledges. We are working to gear climate crisis is one of the greatest threats to health, our fnancial fows to our climate and biodiversity especially that of the most vulnerable. We therefore targets. We are fostering internationally sustainable want to use health as a driver for transformation investment and projects that are in line with the Pa- in the feld of climate action and climate change ris Agreement and phasing out ineffcient subsidies, adaptation. which pose a threat to climate and biodiversity. We are actively involved in the discussion about refor-

4. Protecting, restoring and promoting the ming the international fnancial institutions. We are sustainable use of ecosystems calling for the global framework for the necessary We are strengthening our cooperation, especial- mobilisation of substantial private fnancial fows for ly with tropical forest countries, in order to halt climate action to be improved as well as for the base deforestation by 2030, and are working to ensure of contributors to be expanded. the protection, sustainable use and restoration of all ecosystems on land and in the seas in line with 10 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The climate crisis as a challenge and opportunity A. The climate crisis as a challenge and opportunity Curbing the climate crisis and coping with its effects is a key chal- lenge facing humanity this century. The climate crisis is endange- ring lives and threatening human rights, our environment and our resources, thereby jeopardising the chances for sustainable develop- ment. Today we are already seeing how climate change is unravel- ling development progress, exacerbating existing inequalities and conficts over the distribution of resources and driving people from their homes. It fuels conficts and destabilises states – making it one of the greatest security risks of the 21st century. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 11 Swift, ambitious and cooperative action by the inter- national community is vital if the Paris climate goals are to be delivered. Only together will we be able to achieve the necessary worldwide reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Climate action requires closer international cooperation: with the many countries with which Germany maintains strong diplomatic and economic relations, but also with countries where such relations are hampered by rivalry and differences. For no country is in a position to protect itself from the impacts of climate change or curb the crisis on its own. The just transition to a climate-neutral fu- ture offers vast potential for strengthening our societies, for resilience and security, for our future prosperity and for sustainable development in Germany, Europe and worldwide. Investment in the transition to a climate-neutral economy is currently dwarfed by the economic damage which is fore- seeable in the absence of this necessary investment. A climate-neutral economy must not only be more environmentally friendly and resource-effcient but can also help avoid conficts. Working together ef- fectively and effciently on climate action, will unlock We aim to play an active role in shaping the tran- economic success for all of the cooperating coun- sition to a predominantly renewables-based, sus- tries. The felds of sustainability and climate action tainable energy era and, with our climate foreign hold key future growth markets and the promise of policy, help strengthen Germany and Europe as new jobs. Many countries all over the world have competitive business hubs. With the European Green recognised the vast economic potential of an ambi- Deal, the European Union (EU) and Germany have tious and implementation-oriented climate policy set out a strategy for long-term prosperity through and are driving forward the shift to green energy, the the transition towards a climate-neutral and circular decarbonisation of their economies and the develop- economy. A path that will spark new growth, secure ment of climate-friendly technologies. At the same prosperity and create the growth markets and jobs of time, we cannot allow an ambitious climate policy the future. to be a competitive disadvantage which causes key industries to move elsewhere. It must be designed in such a way that it secures prosperity and impetus for growth, also in Germany. 12 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The climate crisis as a challenge and opportunity Bringing together prosperity and economic and The geopolitical framework of our climate social development across our efforts to combat foreign policy the climate crisis is at the heart of German climate foreign policy. As such, our international activities The climate crisis requires joint engagement in a place a special focus on the social aspects of the world of growing tensions and geo-economic shifts. transition. Societal acceptance is vital if international Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its climate and environmental efforts are to succeed. In blatant violation of international law have shaken this context we have a special responsibility towards the foundations of the multilateral order and fuelled the most vulnerable countries and communities, global systemic rivalry. The ensuing impact on the which are particularly affected by the impacts of European security order marks a watershed with climate change. We aim to cooperate with countries far-reaching consequences for Germany, Europe and worldwide in order to achieve a socially just transi- beyond. At the same time, it is not only the emerging tion. Because a just transition is at the heart of main- economies which aspire to exert greater infuence taining and building peace, stability and sustainable on the full range of global issues. In this increasingly prosperity. This means constructively and proactively multipolar, fuid and confict-ridden environment, taking potential public opposition into account. As some states are deliberately exploiting fossil fuel front-runners and bridge-builders we aim to set a dependencies to pursue their power-political goals. positive example, including through navigating the This hampers the cooperation necessary to achieve transition in a way that is also economically success- common goals. Nevertheless, climate foreign policy ful, in order to encourage others to also pursue an thrives on global dialogue and exchange. ambitious climate policy. In this context, our climate foreign policy recognises the interrelated sustaina- Climate cooperation, even and particularly with bility challenges which we collectively face: in order partners that do not share all our values, can often to overcome the impacts of climate change, we form part of a positive agenda and build bridges. This also need to take steps to tackle global biodiversity engagement creates opportunities for us to intensify loss, overuse of resources and global environmental our relations with states, also on issues beyond cli- pollution. mate, and thus strengthen our global partnerships as a whole. The strategic expansion of global partner- ships and the implementation of our National Secu- rity Strategy will enable us to strengthen Germany’s geopolitical positioning and help stabilise the inter- national order. At the same time, a close transatlan- tic partnership with the United States and Canada, which includes our common commitment to climate action and sustainable development, is essential to global security and a stable international order. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 13 In a multipolar world, the transition towards climate neutrality also involves a reassessment of economic strength. Countries which have not been energy exporters to date now have the opportunity to po- sition themselves as shapers of global energy markets. On the other hand, today’s fossil fuel exporters risk suffering a loss of economic clout and thus political infuence if they do not adapt. The transi- tion gives energy importers such as Germany the chance to develop resilient, sustainable and diversifed supply chains and dependable partnerships and to reduce dependencies. Our climate activities can only have maximum impact if pursued in concert with the EU and its member states. Multilaterally, we will cooperate with all partners and are aiming to create targeted incentives for the implementation of ambitious climate targets and acceleration of the global energy transition. This is the only way we can jointly secure the signifcant opportunities offered by this transformation. With our diplomatic weight and in cooperation with the EU, we will also continue to engage less ambitious countries to encourage all nations to meet their international climate obligations. The United Nations Climate Change Conferences remain central to international climate policy. It is here that all parties can decide on universally agreed rules to tackle the climate crisis and where we enable comparability of targets and transparency on mea- sures planned and taken. The conferences also provide an opportunity to build public attention and political pressure to close the ambition and implementa- tion gap in international climate action. The climate conferences are also the venue where non-state actors – civil society, business, the scientifc community and young people – come toge- ther to contribute solutions, while also making demands of their governments. 14 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The climate crisis as a challenge and opportunity Further strengthening this knowledge exchange make a fnancial contribution – in particular the and comprehensive participation is a priority for us. developing nations which are now among the largest The Paris Agreement recognises the special vulne- emitters. The division into industrialised and develo- rability of small island states and least developed ping nations captured in the United Nations Frame- countries. At the same time, the broader structures work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of and groupings within climate negotiations no longer 1992 no longer refects today’s reality and must not refect the geopolitical and geo-economic shifts of be allowed to become a barrier to swift and effective recent decades. Many members of the G20, which climate action. accounts for 80% of the world’s GDP and gene- rates around 80% of global emissions, have been In the spirit of the Paris Agreement, there is also a able to increase their wealth signifcantly in recent need for more pragmatic implementation alliances years. They therefore have a special responsibility to promote international climate cooperation and to implement an ambitious climate policy and make accelerate, in particular, mitigation efforts. This is an appropriate contribution to international climate why the G7, under Germany’s Presidency, esta- fnancing. In order to prevent a free-rider problem blished the Climate Club in late 2022 to achieve and a resulting inadequate level of global ambition, closer international coordination with regard to the the fnancing of the public good “climate” must be decarbonisation of the industrial sector, including borne fairly by all. While industrialised nations have through market-based investment incentives and a special historical responsibility, all countries must common standards for climate-friendly industry. Bringing together industrialised nations, developing countries and emerging economies from all across the world, the set-up phase of the Cli- mate Club was concluded at the end of 2023. We also continue to advocate internationally for the expansion of carbon pricing systems as an effcient and Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 15 technology-neutral instrument, as well as for clear What goals are we pursuing with our climate and harmonised standards and globally compatible foreign policy strategy? emissions trading and pricing systems which should, in the medium term, enable a uniform international Germany is doing its utmost to drive forward the carbon price. This ensures a fair environment for implementation of the Paris Agreement in coope- competition and effcient allocation of investments. ration with its European partners in order to keep the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C within Ambitious climate policy, which goes hand in hand reach and bolster climate-resilient development with research and development on green and sus- and adaptive capacity worldwide. We are striving to tainable technologies as well as the development ensure that investment and global fnancial fows are of sustainable and (climate-)resilient supply chains, aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals as must be designed in such a way that it supports our well as the goals of climate neutrality and climate competitiveness. Fair conditions for competition are resilience. We are implementing global biodiversity coming under pressure worldwide due to fragmented goals and support a socially just transition, while also standards as well as protectionist measures. Within strengthening human rights. Through new and exis- the European Union we are working to promote ru- ting alliances and partnerships, we are injecting new les-based, constructive cooperation and strong stan- impetus into the breadth of our bilateral relation- dards, so that global competition over raw materials ships and multilateral cooperation. In the interests of and technologies promotes climate action without climate justice we are placing a special focus on the jeopardising prosperity or other sustainability goals. states and communities that are especially affected We want to build bilateral partnerships which ad- by climate change, particularly in Africa and the small dress and incorporate climate, energy, raw materials, island developing states (SIDS). security and other foreign, economic and develop- ment policy needs and considerations as a whole. The goal of our climate foreign policy is to anchor These partnerships are an important tool for shaping climate action in all relevant policy felds and inter- the just transition worldwide, for defning ambitious national forums, including the UN, the G7 and the standards for sustainable technologies and fair com- G20. We will actively promote the climate, peace petition and for mitigating supply risks for important and security nexus in the context of the UN Security raw materials and sustainable energy sources. Council and will once again make it a key element of Germany’s candidacy for membership of the Security The geostrategic nature of our international cli- Council in 2027/2028. mate foreign policy also means that we consider our efforts to address climate crisis in the context of our At the same time, we will strengthen Europe’s ca- other foreign policy interests. These include main- pacity to act. For this purpose, we are committed to taining peace and security, sustainable development strengthening European climate foreign policy and and the preservation of natural ecosystems as an intensifying cooperation, both bilaterally and within essential foundation for our livelihoods and our very EU processes. An EU Foreign Ministers “Group of existence, responding to humanitarian emergencies Friends” founded in 2022 by Germany and Den- such as food crises, as well as our engagement for mark aims to become a pacesetter for ambitious EU global healthcare, education and gender equality. climate diplomacy. The goal is to enshrine climate foreign policy as a cross-cutting issue in all relevant EU policies and processes. 16 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The climate crisis as a challenge and opportunity Forums of our climate foreign policy → Multilateral forums include the UNFCCC, multilateral development banks and the United Nations Se- curity Council, as well as international organisations such as NATO, the OSCE, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Inter- national Maritime Organization (IMO). We use multilateral forums to advance ambitious climate action and biodiversity protection and work together with partners on international climate policy. Climate, peace and security is a key element of Germany’s candidacy for membership of the Security Council in 2027/2028. → EU climate foreign policy: We are promoting an ambitious EU climate foreign policy, not least via the Group of Friends for Ambitious EU Climate Diplomacy, which Germany has jointly established with Denmark. → Pioneering alliances: We are a member of the international High Ambition Coalition (HAC) in the inter- national climate negotiations. Germany has been a champion of the climate, peace and security nexus for years – together with the island state of Nauru we co-chair a UN group of friends (see section C5). → G7/G20: We will work within the G7 and G20 in order to agree ambitious climate, energy and environ- mental policy goals and implement them in a just manner. → Further plurilateral formats: We will work with global partners in forums such as the Major Economies Forum, the Ministerial on Climate Action (MoCA) and the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action (CFMCA). This climate foreign policy strategy is a whole-of-go- the European dimension into account at all times. vernment strategy, which lays out the German Go- Germany’s embassies and permanent missions play vernment’s international climate action, coordinated a key role in the dialogue with partner countries and amongst and implemented by the relevant ministries. international organisations. It is consistent with existing strategies, including but not limited to the National Security Strategy, the We ensure the coherence of our international acti- Global Health Strategy, Germany’s Sustainable De- vities by identifying joint priorities (see section C). velopment Strategy, the National Hydrogen Strategy, Our activities encompass the issues of mitigation, the Government’s policy guidelines for the Indo- adaptation, loss and damage, disaster risk manage- Pacifc and its China Strategy. Through our climate ment, support needed for implementation, as well foreign policy, we aim to strengthen the strategic as natural climate protection and its Nature-based coherence within and across German ministries. To Solutions, including the protection and restoration of this end, this strategy establishes a format at State ecosystems. Measures relating to a just energy tran- Secretary level to assist with coordination on cen- sition, industry decarbonisation, health, education tral cross-cutting climate foreign policy issues and and research and development, as well as climate, ensure strategic foresight. We shall continue to take peace and security are also part of this strategy. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 17 Our climate foreign policy toolkit → Climate diplomacy: Climate is a topic of discussion for all of Germany’s missions abroad, but our Core Climate Embassies have a particular responsibility to work closely with European partners to promote our positions on international climate action and policy, as well as to develop and strengthen dialogue and cooperation formats. → German climate fnance: With our contribution to international climate fnance, we are promoting climate action worldwide. Development cooperation is particularly important here. A further instrument is the German International Climate Initiative (IKI), through which we are supporting developing countries and emerging economies in implementing and further developing their climate targets, amongst other things. → Bilateral partnerships and dialogues: We work with partners worldwide within the framework of part- nerships and dialogue formats covering climate, energy and environmental foreign policy issues. → Multi-contributor partnerships: We work with other contributors to pool our resources and together promote the transition toward climate neutrality in partner countries. The Just Energy Transition Partner- ships (JETPs) with South Africa, Indonesia, Viet Nam and Senegal, which are accelerating the expansion of renewable energy and a just energy transition (see section D), are one such example. → Climate Club and other pioneering initiatives: We are committed to accelerating implementation efforts through pioneering alliances. We will forge ahead with the decarbonisation of industry via the Climate Club initiated by Germany. As a member of sectoral alliances and initiatives (e.g. Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership, Methane Pledge, Powering Past Coal Alliance, ENACT Partnership), together with partners we will endeavour to follow through on ambitious commitments. → Promotion of foreign trade and investment: We make targeted use of our foreign trade promotion ins- truments to support the transition to climate neutrality in partner countries (see section C6). Germany’s diplomatic missions and chambers of commerce abroad will play an important role here. We will support the involvement of the private sector in bilateral partnerships such as the JETPs and through Team Europe Initiatives as part of the European Global Gateway infrastructure investment programme. → Carbon pricing and trading: As part of our climate foreign policy, we specifcally support the carbon pricing instrument as one of the most effcient instruments for lowering greenhouse gas emissions while, at the same time, promoting innovation. Moreover, we will pursue the goal of a global emissions trading system which, in the medium term, should enable a uniform and adequate carbon price. Accompanying social policies are an important prerequisite for the broad acceptance of carbon pricing instruments. 18 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The climate crisis as a challenge and opportunity Our climate foreign policy builds upon our extensive, In the context of our feminist foreign and develop- cross-ministerial climate diplomacy activities and ment policy, we will also work to promote the rights, engagement in international climate politics. We resources and representation of women and margi- will build upon the trust these have engendered in nalised groups through our climate foreign policy. our international partners, and Germany’s deserved reputation as a reliable climate partner. However, International climate policy cannot only be im- climate foreign policy goes well beyond our exis- plemented between states. It also depends on the ting climate diplomacy: we intend to use all forums, active commitment of society as a whole: women, instruments and levers of foreign, development and young people, the business sector, civil society, trade security policy, foreign trade and investment policy, unions, the culture sector, the scientifc community trade and international fnance policy, environmen- and subnational actors such as towns, cities and tal, social and health policy, agricultural and forestry municipalities. Germany’s climate foreign policy aims policy and research and education policy to drive for- to involve all of these actors in the necessary political ward the just transition to a climate-neutral future. dialogue (see section D). Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 19 B. The foundations and principles of our climate foreign policy Based on science The fndings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are clear: due to human-induced climate change, the global average temperature has already in- creased by 1.1°C compared to pre-industrial times. If the international community does not immediately and signif- cantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, global warming is expected to reach 1.5°C by the 2030s. The IPCC assumes that global warming will rise to around 3.2°C by the end of the century if countries’ current climate efforts remain the same. According to the IPCC, our choices and actions in the next fve to ten years will have decisive impacts on the climate now and for thousands of years to come. 20 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The foundations and principles of our climate foreign policy Climate change is already causing serious and, in according to the IPCC and the Intergovernmental some cases, irreversible impacts. As the Earth warms, Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Eco- extreme weather events such as heavy rainfall, system Services (IPBES). It is therefore necessary to hurricanes, heatwaves and droughts are becoming develop measures which have positive impacts on more frequent. In an increasing number of areas and both the climate and ecosystems. The IPBES calls, regions, the impacts of climate change are no longer amongst other things, for further research into the manageable, even with preventive measures. Accor- links between the loss of biological diversity and ding to the IPCC, 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in con- climate change and concrete approaches for colla- texts that are highly vulnerable to climate change. boration between the IPCC and the IPBES. Where Half of the world’s population already suffers from climate change deprives people of their livelihoods extreme water shortages for at least part of the year. and endangers their health, it also fuels crises and Around 30% of the world’s population is currently conficts that can destabilise entire regions. exposed to extreme heat, exceeding the temperature threshold which can be fatal, for at least 20 days per The difference in expected climate impacts between year, and this percentage is rising. These vulnerabili- an average rate of global warming of 2°C and 1.5°C ties are further increased by climate change and the is enormous. According to the IPCC, each additional continued destruction of ecosystems and the loss of increment of warming also increases the risk of ab- biological diversity – including through deforestation rupt and irreversible changes to the climate system, and soil degradation. Climate action and biodiver- including through the breaching of tipping points sity protection must therefore be considered in an with consequences for millions of people. These integrated manner, since these twin crises – the loss looming tipping points include the loss of the coral of biological diversity and the climate crisis – are reefs and the Amazon rainforest, the melting of the mutually reinforcing, Greenland ice sheet and the thawing of permafrost soils. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 21 Global and regional risks help guide action (adaptation and mitigation) … reduce risks by keeping global warming below 1.5°C Risk not detectable moderate high very high Change in global surface 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 temperature (°C) Africa Biodiversity and ecosystems Mortality and morbidity due to heat and infectious diseases Mediterranean region Delayed consequences of the rise in sea level Quality and availability of water Health and wellbeing Europe Water scarcity for people in south-east Europe Human heat stress, mortality and morbidity Change in global surface temperature (°C) 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 Source: The above diagram shows that a global warming level of 1.5°C also constitutes a risk threshold in Europe and Africa. With warming below 1.5°C many risks are still moderate, while between 1.5° and 2°C climate risks increase to high or very high in most regions and impact categories. 22 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The foundations and principles of our climate foreign policy In the scenarios which, according to the IPCC, are The IPCC also indicates that the land use sector con- consistent with global warming of 1.5°C, global tributes signifcantly to climate change mitigation greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced on ave- both by reducing emissions from ecosystems and by rage 43% by 2030, 60% by 2035 and 84% by 2050, in sequestering (storing) CO2 in ecosystems, in particu- each case compared to 2019. They would have to fall lar by protecting forests (halting deforestation), but steadily from 2025 at the latest. also through their sustainable management and res- toration, as well as the rewetting of wetlands. Intact To achieve this, we must substantially reduce global ecosystems generate negative emissions by binding emissions and consistently align our economic and CO2, thereby contributing to the goal of greenhouse development models with a 1.5°C pathway. Howe- gas neutrality and even net negative emissions. In ver, the IPCC also shows that affordable solutions to its sixth climate report, the IPCC also points much halve emissions by 2030 are already available in every more strongly than before to the signifcant emis- sector – including energy, water, industry, mobili- sions reductions potential of resource conservation ty, construction and housing as well as agriculture, measures such as circular economy approaches and forestry and land use. The transformation of our material effciency. energy systems has a decisive role to play: accor- ding to the IPCC, wind and solar energy hold the The IPCC also shows that where governments, greatest potential to bring down global greenhouse civil society and the private sector make inclusive gas emissions rapidly and affordably by 2030. In this decisions which prioritise risk reduction, equality context it is important to us to clearly and honestly and justice, climate-resilient development is made identify and weigh up conficting objectives in our possible. own energy transition. In addition to far-reaching, rapid and sustained real reductions in greenhouse gases, the IPCC states that, if net zero greenhouse gas emissions are to be achieved, the use of methods for removing CO2 from the atmosphere is necessary to balance out residual emissions that are hard to abate. Furthermore, these negative emissions can fulfl additional functions globally or at national level: the reduction of net greenhouse gas emissions in the near term and, if deployed at a scale that ex- ceeds annual residual emissions, net negative greenhouse gas emissions in the long term. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 23 Carbon management strategy and long-term negative emissions strategy → Carbon management strategy The Carbon Storage Law (KSpG) constitutes the main legal framework for carbon capture and storage (CCS) in Germany. On the basis of the KSpG evaluation report (2022), a carbon management strategy (CMS) is currently being prepared, as the climate neutrality studies assessed in the evaluation report indi- cate that carbon capture and utilisation/storage (CCU/S) will be required in order to achieve Germany’s climate targets. This CMS is intended to highlight appropriate areas for the use of CCU/S and to develop legal and economic parameters for its ramp-up. It will focus on establishing the necessary legal frame- work for the use of CCS and for safe transport and storage of CO2 within Germany. → Long-term negative emissions strategy for dealing with unavoidable residual emissions In addition, a long-term negative emissions strategy (LTNES) for dealing with unavoidable residual emissions, is being prepared. The goal of this LTNES is to establish a joint understanding of the role which carbon sequestration has to play in climate action in Germany. The LTNES is to be aligned with further strategies of the German Government (including its National Biomass Strategy, the System De- velopment Strategy, the National Bioeconomy Strategy, the Carbon Management Strategy, the Action Plan for Nature-Based Climate Action and the National Moorland Protection Strategy). 24 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The foundations and principles of our climate foreign policy Principles of our climate foreign policy The engagement for peace, freedom, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, social and gender equa- lity as well as sustainability, the protection of our country, the EU and our allies and the promotion of prosperity and social cohesion are indispensable aspects of an effective and credible climate foreign policy for Germany and Europe. We are committed to climate justice in the spirit of an economically successful and socially just transition towards cli- mate neutrality and resilience to climate impacts at both national and international level – in line with the European Green Deal, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable De- velopment, the Global Biodiversity Framework and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Our climate foreign policy is shaped by our values and is in our economic and security interests. Its implementation is based upon the following nine principles: Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 25

1. Transformative and impact-oriented – We prioritise measures and instruments which are effective and effciently contribute to mitigation; we promote progress towards a just transition and, in the case of adaptation and loss and damage, provide support particularly to those who need it most. We aim to help promote global peace, stability and prosperity, while achieving these goals in a socially just manner.

2. Sustainable – Climate action is a key component of the 2030 Agenda and its goals relating to sustainable development, prosperity, participation, gender equality, protection of the environment and preservation of biodiversity.

3. Justice- and human rights-oriented – In the spirit of climate justice, we support structures and develop- ment models which promote a socially and intergenerationally just transition worldwide and protect human rights. This includes a commitment to equal participation in relation to climate policy and protec- tion of the rights of all genders and marginalised groups, the human right to health and equal access to resources. Our climate foreign policy is feminist and inclusive.

4. Peace-building and security-minded – Our climate foreign policy should also strengthen peace and se- curity. We want to prevent climate-induced escalation of conficts, to adapt to the security consequences of climate change, to develop alliances with countries with ambitious climate policy goals and, especially in a multipolar world, to use our common climate interest to strengthen an international order based upon binding rules and norms.

5. Firmly European and coherent – We are building on the Paris Agreement and actively promoting an ambitious European climate foreign policy. Our climate foreign policy is coherent across ministries and closely intertwined with our European commitment. In order to be credible, our climate foreign policy only expects of others what we are doing ourselves in Europe and Germany.

6. Multilateral and collaborative – Our climate foreign policy is rooted in multilateralism. We are working to build a multilateral system which is ft for the challenges of the 21st century. We engage with our part- ners respectfully and pursue equal partnerships.

7. Informed by science and technology-neutral – Our climate foreign policy is based on the best available science. We continuously assess new technologies and solutions.

8. Interest-based – It is in our fundamental interest to accelerate climate action worldwide. At the same time, a just transition offers huge opportunities for the German and European economies. We intend to secure these opportunities, develop markets for the technologies of the future and promote enabling conditions for diversifed and sustainable trading relationships and supply chains. In this way, we want to forge ahead with innovation and prosperity and position Germany and Europe as locations for the busi- ness and investment of the future.

9. Cost-effcient and utilising market-based solutions – We work to establish clear and harmonised inter- national standards and globally compatible emissions trading and pricing systems. 26 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The foundations and principles of our climate foreign policy Our climate foreign policy is based on the implementation. Once fully implemented, these will credible implementation of ambitious German enable us not only to achieve but even to exceed and European climate targets. Europe’s climate target for 2030. Our climate foreign policy will only be credible if we We will turn words into actions and show how so- deliver on ambitious targets in Germany and Europe. cially just climate measures can help secure prosperity Moreover, Germany is constitutionally bound to and resilience. In order for us to be credible, we must pursue intergenerational climate action. In Germany, also recognise that the transition to climate neutra- our commitment to become climate-neutral by 2045 lity will not always be straightforward and at times is legally binding and we have defned interim targets may suffer setbacks. The Russian war of aggression along that path. By 2030, we will reduce our emis- against Ukraine and its impact on the German and sions by at least 65% compared to 1990. A binding European energy supply has made this clear. At the target of at least 55% by 2030 has been set for the same time, the war has shown us how dangerous EU as a whole. Germany already produces around critical dependency on fossil fuels can be, particularly 50% of its electricity through renewable energy. We those in the hands of autocratic regimes. We will aim to increase this share to at least 80% by 2030. therefore move forward with the energy transition With the European Green Deal and its translation even more decisively and diversify all of our energy into concrete legal texts, the EU has embarked on a imports, including sustainable energy imports. path to a climate-neutral future. With the Fit for 55 package, we have adopted concrete measures for Key German and European climate targets → German climate targets: by 2030 at least 65% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions* by 2040 at least 88% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions* by 2045 greenhouse gas neutrality → EU climate targets: by 2030 at least 55% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions* by 2050 greenhouse gas neutrality *compared to 1990 Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 27 The German Government presented the frst German Germany’s missions abroad serve as an important Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change (DAS) conduit for communication of German and Euro- back in 2008 and has continuously updated it ever pean climate policy. Pairing climate diplomacy with since. It forms part of the Government’s strategic internal and external communication, which clearly framework for national climate adaptation policy conveys our goals and implementation instruments and is implemented in the form of regular action to different target audiences, which explains the plans. We are transforming the DAS into an adapta- links between national and international climate tion strategy which plans for the future, with policy and makes them easy to understand, which concrete, measurable targets, and establishing a showcases the entirety of our actions and establishes legal framework via a climate adaptation law. credibility, is a prerequisite for the successful imple- mentation of our climate foreign policy. Sustainable fnance is a key component of Germany’s sustainability policy. The goal is to develop Germany We are therefore making climate foreign policy a into a leading sustainable fnance centre. We will priority issue at our missions abroad, which work therefore implement a sustainable fnance strategy closely with the EU delegations and international with international elements. partners. We have expanded our network of Core Climate Embassies to over 50. 28 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – The foundations and principles of our climate foreign policy Climate as an area of focus for our missions abroad: Core Climate Embassies G20 V20 Others Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 29 O A P E UR The above diagram shows our network of Core Climate Embassies. This network is updated according to our priorities and adapted where required. 30 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy C. Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy We have defned six joint priority action areas in this strategy. These also serve to implement the three goals of the Paris Agreement: 1.5°C-compatible greenhouse gas emissions reduction, strength- ening climate resilience and aligning fnancial fows with these efforts. Where not already underpinned by dedicated budgetary resources, initiatives described in this climate foreign policy strate- gy will be funded through prioritisation within existing ministerial plans and budgets. Due to the signifcant current demands on our public budgets, we will implement this strategy within the scope of our existing budgets. The Federal Government will pursue a joined- up and coherent approach to international cooperation and move forward alongside progressive partners. In doing so, we will build on a broad portfolio of existing climate cooperation and multilateral engagement. It is a priority for us to implement these action areas in a transformative, socially just and gender-equitable manner.

1. Drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, accelerating the global energy transition

2. Making the economy more competitive, fair and climate- and future-proof

3. Acting in solidarity with the most vulnerable: Protecting lives, livelihoods and health

4. Protecting, restoring and promoting the sustainable use of ecosystems

5. Strengthening resilience, peace and security

6. Aligning international fnancial fows with a 1.5°C-compatible pathway and climate-resilient development We already have a wide variety of partnerships across these areas (see section D). Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 31 C1. Drastically reducing green- To achieve a global energy transition consistent with the climate targets, by 2030 renewable electricity house gas emissions by 2030, must account for two-thirds of global electricity accelerating the global energy production. This is achievable, provided that we sig- nifcantly expand the capacity of renewable energy transition sources worldwide – according to IRENA and IEA, from currently approx. 3 TW to more than 11 TW The nationally determined contributions (NDCs) put by 2030 – while also signifcantly increasing energy forward to date under the Paris Agreement are not effciency. This will provide new market opportuni- compatible with a 1.5°C pathway, even if fully im- ties for many, but will also require some countries plemented. In fact, according to the United Nations to reevaluate their current economic strategies and Environment Programme (UNEP) they would lead to policies. Building on the positive experiences with global warming of between 2.4 and 2.6°C by 2100. European emissions trading, we therefore continue In keeping with the Paris Agreement, it is therefore to advocate effective CO2 pricing – ideally with crucial for all countries to adjust their NDCs con- social compensation measures that foster social in- tinuously with a rising level of ambition, at least clusion and build resilience, including by cushioning every fve years, in order to make them consistent costs for low-income households. We also support with the goals of the Agreement. Besides the for- a move towards a global emissions trading system mulation of suffciently ambitious climate targets with a uniform CO2 price in the medium term. for all countries, Germany also advocates for more rapid implementation of these targets and supports The energy transition is leading to disruptive chan- implementation measures. ges. Countries that previously did not have large energy resources now have the opportunity to posi- We are working to accelerate the energy transition at tion themselves as leaders in the technologies and global level, in particular the expansion of and shift markets of the future. Meanwhile, countries whose to renewable energy. We stand by our G7 commit- prosperity largely rested on the export of fossil fuels ment to achieve a phase-out of unabated fossil fuels must adapt their business models. We intend to sup- in a global context and in line with the 1.5°C path- port and promote this transition through our climate ways (see Annex 2). foreign policy – through a cooperative framework of dialogue and new partnerships. 32 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 1: We are working to support the 1.5°C-compatible, ambitious, inclusive update of the 2030 NDCs and corre- sponding long-term emissions reduction strategies by 2050. With the Fit for 55 package, the EU has adopted a comprehensive set of climate policy measures which, according to estimates made by the Commission, may even enable the EU and its member states to exceed the EU’s target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions within the EU by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990. Moreover, following completion of the frst Glo- bal Stocktake under the Paris Agreement in 2023, which reviewed the progress that countries have made in implementing the Paris climate targets, the European Commission will also present an EU climate target for 2040, in line with the European climate protection law. This is also the basis for our 2035 NDC. → We are expanding our support for partner countries that are raising their climate ambition towards 1.5°C. We are strengthening and focusing our bilateral and plurilateral support for more ambitious targets, based on the fndings and decisions of the Global Stocktake, including within the context of the NDC Partnership (see box). The next round of NDCs should cover all greenhouse gases and sectors. → Through dialogue and engagement, we are encouraging all countries to pursue appropriate measures to implement their NDCs and enshrine these measures in their updated and new NDCs. These measures may include market mechanisms such as emissions trading systems as well as targets for the expansion of renewable energy or for other sectors. At the same time, we encourage countries to support the growing number of sectoral implementation initiatives (such as the Alliance for Industry Decarbonization, the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership, the Breakthrough Agenda) – including those of non-state actors – and to use them and take them into account wherever possible when implementing the NDCs. Strengthening the NDC Partnership The NDC Partnership was established in 2016 with Germany’s support in order to assist developing countries and emerging economies with the development, implementation and updating of their natio- nal climate targets for implementing the Paris Agreement (NDCs). It connects the support needs of de- veloping countries and emerging economies to the offers made by various contributor and implemen- ting organisations. Within this framework, governments defne priorities for the implementation of their climate targets and determine the type of support required. On this basis, the members of the Partner- ship offer a tailored package comprising specialist knowledge, technical assistance and fnancing. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 33 Priority 2: We will drive forward the global energy transition and accelerate the expansion of and shift to renewable energy. We aim to achieve a global energy sector predominantly free of fossil fuels well ahead of 2050. A socially just climate policy also means ensuring that all population groups have equal access to energy. → In all relevant forums – in particular the UNFCCC, the G7 and the G20 – we are calling for an accelera- ted global energy transition, the global expansion of renewables and the global phase-out of unabated fossil fuels and a peak in their consumption in this decade. Together with partners, we aim to work towards a fully or predominantly decarbonised global power system in the 2030s, leaving no room for new coal power, since cost-effcient zero-emissions technologies (in particular renewables) are already widely available in this sector and offer numerous benefts, including for sustainable development, human health, air quality, the creation of jobs and energy security. We intend to follow through on commitments already made in relation to the phase-out of coal and other fossil fuels. This includes diplomacy within the context of international alliances (such as the Powering Past Coal Alliance) and initiatives (e.g. the Global Methane Pledge). → Together with the EU and on the basis of the G20’s commitment, Germany therefore calls for world- wide measures to triple installed renewable energy capacities to at least 11 TW and to double the rate of energy effciency improvement by 2030. It supports the G7’s clear commitment to the rapid expan- sion of renewable energy and to bringing down costs by means of concrete joint deployment targets for offshore wind (an additional 150 GW) and photovoltaic capacities (to at least 1 TW) within the G7 by

2030. Together with the EU, we are working towards the adoption and implementation of corresponding 1.5°C-compatible goals and targets for rapidly increasing energy effciency and accelerating renewables. These must go hand in hand with energy savings and the phase-out of fossil fuel energy production and consumption. → We will work with partner countries to accelerate a sustainable and just energy transition, while also improving access to energy for all population groups. Specifcally, we aim, for instance, to improve access to energy, to drive forward the expansion of renewable energy and to promote improvement in energy ef- fciency, the expansion of smart electricity grids and the development of energy storage capacities as well as professional skills and vocational training and energy transition-related retraining measures for skilled employees, particularly women and marginalised population groups. In so doing, we will ensure that mea- sures help foster a pollution-free environment and the protection of biodiversity. Of key concern to us is that the energy transition is just and that requirements for the preservation and restoration of ecosystems and their function as natural carbon sinks and for climate adaptation are systematically taken into consi- deration. The European Commission, multilateral development banks and United Nations organisations are key partners in promoting synergies and achieving a systemic impact. We will continue to support the G7’s goal of increasing the share of offcial development assistance (ODA) aimed at promoting employ- ment in climate- and environment-related economic sectors by 2025. 34 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy → We will step up dialogue with fossil fuels exporters and strengthen cooperation formats for a progres- sive transition to an energy sector predominantly free of fossil fuels: We have a foreign and security policy interest in these countries adapting to an expected decline in demand from Germany, the EU and worldwide well ahead of time and constructively and proactively shaping the necessary transition. In the future, fossil fuels should only be used where no viable alternatives are available and if the related green- house gas emissions are reduced as much as possible. For as long as fossil fuels continue to be used, the associated methane emissions must be drastically reduced. Germany is therefore also supporting this goal, in cooperation with the EU. → Together with partners, we will work for the transparent and responsible use of carbon capture and sto- rage and negative emissions technologies: We will be guided in our international efforts by our planned carbon management strategy and long-term negative emissions strategy. The common EU position is that emission abatement technologies which do not signifcantly harm the environment exist at limited scale and are to be used to reduce emissions mainly from hard to abate sectors. Such removal technologies are to contribute to negative emissions worldwide. It is important to us in this context that these technologies are not used to delay climate action in sectors where feasible, effective and cost-effcient mitigation alterna- tives are available, particularly in this critical decade for the climate crisis. → We will consult even more closely with traditional and new contributor countries, with the involvement of the development fnance institutions and the local and international private sector, and will pro- vide more coherent support offers for an accelerated just energy transition in developing countries and emerging economies. The Just Energy Transition Partnerships (see also section D) are an important instru- ment here. Just Energy Transition Partnerships JETPs are a new and innovative form of international climate cooperation which refect the urgency of the climate crisis: for the frst time, the G7 and other contributor countries are pooling their political and fnancial resources in order to provide ambitious partner countries – in particular, major emitters in the Global South – with joint offers of assistance to facilitate a comprehensive and just energy transi- tion. For their part, under the JETPs the partner countries (South Africa, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Senegal) are committed to clearly and measurably raising their level of climate policy ambition (e.g. in terms of emissions reduction, expansion of renewables) and, together with all of the relevant stakeholders, are preparing investment and reform plans leading to a comprehensive and just energy transition. These include measures cushioning the negative socio-economic effects on vulnerable population groups. Not only states, but also multilateral development banks and international organisations, private banks and investors, trade unions and other civil-society actors are working together on the implementation of JETPs. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 35 Priority 3: We support the development and expansion of effective carbon pricing and emissions trading systems, ideally with social compensation measures. → In order to achieve greater international coherence, we work at an international level to promote greater acceptance and expansion of carbon pricing, including through the Climate Club, the G7, the G20 and the OECD and in close dialogue with international trade partners. We intend to support the development of carbon measurement and pricing instruments in developing countries and emerging economies. → We aim to establish internationally compatible emissions trading and pricing systems which will, in the medium term, ensure an appropriate carbon price which is as uniform as possible. Alongside our bilateral cooperation, through the Climate Club, at the OECD and in the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action we will also work towards a gradual convergence of the various national and regional approaches. → We support sustainable and socially just pricing systems. We do so on the basis of our own experience: through the European Emissions Trading System the EU has assumed a frontrunner role. The EU and its member states are using the revenue generated by the auction proceeds to drive climate action and balance out social impacts and thus to support the transition. The Social Climate Fund, which from 2026 to 2032 will balance out the introduction of carbon pricing on motor and heating fuels in 2027 across Europe, obli- ges the member states to use at least 62.5% of the resources for target group-specifc investment measures (i.e. for lower-income households). A maximum of 37.5% may be used for temporary direct income support. → At EU level, we are committed to ensuring that the opportunities for international climate cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement can be realised, noting that we do so without thereby reducing our own climate efforts. Care must be taken to prevent international double-counting. 36 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy C2. Making the econo- my more competitive, fair and climate- and future-proof Decarbonisation of industry is one of the major systemic transforma- tions required in order to bring our world onto a 1.5°C-compatible pathway. According to the IPCC, this will also require an economic model which does more to conserve resources, e.g. with an increased emphasis on the circular economy. At the same time, industry even more than other sectors is faced with a highly competitive international environment. Thanks to the European Green Deal, its Industrial Plan and national initiatives for decarbonising industry, we are well placed to achieve a successful transition in the EU and Germany and to obtain frontrunner advantages in markets for climate-friendly and resource-effcient products and technologies. By setting clear and harmonised international standards, we want to ensure fair competition in the transition to climate-neutral and resource-effcient processes, and establish green lead markets. At the same time, we are committed to open, rules-based, diversifed and more sustainable trade relations which ensure fair access to the raw ma- terials we need for the socially just transformation towards climate neutrality and climate resilience. We want to build new partnerships without creating new dependencies. Through a more coherent use of our relations in the areas of diplomacy, research, invest- ment and trade, we aim to be a shaper of the future of industry and sustainable trade at a global level. Through German development cooperation and the International Climate Initiative, we are also actively contributing to a just transition to a climate-friend- ly and sustainable economy in cooperation with our partner countries. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 37 Priority 1: Through the open and cooperative Climate Club, accompanying forums and collaboration on research and innovation, we strive for inclusive and just approaches to the decarbonisation of industry. → We are expanding the role of the Climate Club as a key format for the joint transformation of industry: The open, cooperative and inclusive Climate Club established under Germany’s G7 Presidency is, as an intergovernmental forum, intended to contribute to the ambitious implementation of the Paris Agreement. Its aim is to accelerate climate action measures and, in particular, drive forward the decarbonisation of in- dustry. To this end, cooperation is envisaged between all of the industrialised nations, developing countries and emerging economies which are pursuing an ambitious approach to climate action and are prepared to accelerate the decarbonisation of their economic sectors, especially industry, and to make globally decar- bonised production the standard business case for future investments. The Climate Club offers an inclusive framework for the intergovernmental exchange of expertise and discussion. A frst step is joint work on the convergence and harmonisation of methods, standards, sectoral strategies and milestones and the expan- sion of markets for climate-friendly industrial products and basic materials (e.g. cement, steel). An addi- tional objective is to avoid the transfer of emissions to third countries (carbon leakage). → We are also driving forward the decarbonisation of industry in other forums: We aim to underpin our efforts in the Climate Club in other relevant forums – via the Industrial Decarbonisation Agenda, dialogue within the framework of the G7 and G20, the IEA, IRENA and the OECD, incl. the IFCMA, through the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) and Mission Innovation (MI) as well as other international initiatives and processes. → Through collaboration on research and innovation at every level, we promote innovative technologies and assist German companies with their ongoing development and distribution of environmental tech- nologies and services “Made in Germany”. Via our promotion of international research, we also support joint projects to develop resource-conserving technologies which contribute to climate action as well as providing added economic value. Examples of this are the West African and the Southern African Science Service Centres on Climate Change (WASCAL and SASSCAL). 38 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 2: We work with European partners in order to make the EU’s trade and industry policy more climate-friendly, fairer and more sustainable. → We are strengthening Europe as a sustainable centre of industry – in accordance with the principles of open trade and fair competition as well as the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Instead of moving to increasingly protectionist approaches, we are committed to preserving open and rules-based markets as well as strengthening and reforming the WTO. It is important to continue aligning the WTO with the Paris Agreement and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. We are also committed to faci- litating trade in environmental goods and services. This has the potential to increase global availability of environmental and climate technologies and thereby reduce procurement costs. Here, too, free trade can contribute to international climate action and protection of the environment. We support the EU initiative of the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate. → We support a more active and ambitious trade policy, which will enable the EU to make attractive offers to its partners and deepen its economic relations worldwide. We advocate for ambitious chapters on trade and sustainable development in all of the EU’s bilateral trade agreements with third countries. With the goal of ensuring rapid implementation of trade agreements, we are guided in our trade policy by the German Government’s trade policy parameters. We welcome the European Commission’s trade strategy as well as its new approach designed to strengthen and more effectively implement environmental, social and human rights protection, including through mechanisms for dialogue, mediation and response. The EU together with member states should offer partner countries assistance and incentives to implement sustainability standards effectively. → We support the development of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as a WTO- compliant solution to establishing climate policy incentives in Europe and worldwide and countering the leakage of carbon emissions, which is caused by differences around the world in climate policy-in- duced cost burdens for industry operating in a competitive international environment. Initially, re- porting obligations for the CBAM, which was launched on 1 October 2023, must be met. From 2026, an obligation to submit emission certifcates will apply. International enterprises will then be required when exporting certain carbon-intensive products from the electricity sector or the iron and steel, cement, aluminium, fertiliser and hydrogen sectors to the EU to prove that in their country of production they are subject to carbon pricing similar to that of the European Emissions Trading System – otherwise they must purchase CBAM certifcates. To ensure that companies from developing countries are not disadvantaged or excluded from the EU market, we are working with the European Commission and other EU member states to help them fulfl the CBAM requirements and decarbonise their production, expand renewable energy and develop climate-neutral production plants, including via training initiatives for skilled em- ployees, research cooperation and technology transfer. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 39 Priority 3: We promote diversifed sustainable supply chains for technologies of the future and are expanding raw materials partnerships. → We support the diversifcation of raw materials supply chains and the development of partnerships: The energy transition requires a reliable supply of responsibly mined and safe raw materials. As part of this approach, we promote ambitious trade agreements as well as fair raw materials partnerships which provide mutual benefts. For this purpose, we also work to strengthen local value chains while maintaining sustain- ability standards. We likewise promote the equal involvement of all relevant actors, including indigenous peoples and women, who are frequently worst affected by non-compliance with sustainability standards. → We are moving forward with the market ramp-up of green and low-carbon hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives as a key technology for the decarbonisation of industry and transportation: Hydrogen is a suitable alternative to fossil fuels in many carbon-intensive production processes, e.g. in the steel and chemicals industry and in the area of transportation, for use in a fuel cell, or as a renewable fuel. In glo- bal shipping and aviation, synthetic fuels based on green hydrogen and renewable energy are the most suitable alternative to fossil fuels. The German Government aims to ensure a reliable supply of green and permanently sustainable hydrogen for Germany. At an international level, we promote the production and use of hydrogen (also locally) via the H2Global funding mechanism, hydrogen diplomacy offces and energy partnerships. We limit direct fnancial support for hydrogen production to the production of green hydrogen. In order to ensure the rapid development and ramp-up of the hydrogen market and meet the expected level of demand, particularly during the transition phase, and thus facilitate the technological shift to hydrogen, at least until an adequate supply of green hydrogen is available, other hydrogen colours will also be used, in particular low-carbon hydrogen produced from waste (orange) or natural gas com- bined with CCS (blue). On the application side, we also intend to promote the use of green hydrogen and, where necessary during the market ramp-up phase, low-carbon blue, turquoise and orange hydrogen to a limited extent, taking account of ambitious greenhouse gas limits, including the emissions occurring in the upstream chain and compliance with the statutory goal of climate neutrality. A key point is that these projects must be consistent with international human rights, labour and environmental standards as well as standards covering businesses’ due diligence obligations. One essential aspect is the avoidance of water scarcity and pollution. The requirements, rules and assessment procedures relating to water must also be developed for hydrogen production. In some cases, further research is required in this area. The goal is to assess and minimise the impacts on the water supply and aquatic ecology and to avoid competition with other forms of water use. 40 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy → We are establishing or strengthening local Power-to-X (PtX) value chains: We are providing signifcant support for the development of a green hydrogen economy via the PtX Development Fund (270 million euro). Investment in industrial-scale PtX projects will be funded by means of a combination of subsidies and other fnancing instruments provided by the KfW Bankengruppe (KfW banking group). This is contin- gent upon leveraging at least 1 billion euro of private capital. → We are pooling know-how for the development of sustainable hydrogen economies: We promote projects in a European and an international context, such as strategic partnerships with Australia, Namibia and Brazil, in order to establish the foundations required for the development of international hydrogen supply chains. This is fanked by the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda (SRIA) for the European hydrogen economy within the scope of the European Research Area (ERA). → We promote the regional production of nitrogen fertiliser with sustainable hydrogen technology and its application in Africa and South America within the context of integrated soil and nutrient management and thereby contribute to sustainable food security. The expansion of hydrogen production capacities in our partner countries has been mainly export-oriented to date. By promoting the regional production of green hydrogen in accordance with sustainable water resources management for the production of nitrogen fertiliser and knowledge transfer in the area of sustainable agriculture, including sustainable soil management, we make an important contribution to industrial development and the reduction of green- house gas emissions produced by the agricultural sector, to the sustainable transformation of agricultural and food systems and to our partners’ resilience to price volatility and supply chain interruptions. → We use resources sparingly and are expanding the circular economy: An effective circular economy will make a signifcant contribution to climate action. A reduction in the volume of methane produced by the waste sector also has a key role to play here. At the European level, we support the European Commis- sion’s Circular Economy Action Plan as well as the EU Methane Strategy and the EU Methane Action Plan and, within the G7, will push forward with implementation of the Berlin Roadmap on resource effciency and the circular economy which was adopted in 2022 during Germany’s G7 Presidency. We support the Global Methane Pledge initiated by the United States and the EU and also work in cooperation with the Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) initiative established by India. Together with international partners, we are establishing a network of states and institutions dedicated to making increased use of the potential for emissions reductions harboured by the conservation of resources. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 41 Priority 4: At an international level, we press for conditions which make it easier for businesses to meet their climate targets. → We are strengthening reliable planning and investment frameworks: Across the UN climate negotiations, the G7 and the G20 and through our bilateral and multilateral cooperation, we support the establishment of a climate-neutral and climate-resilient infrastructure which also enables the attainment of German businesses’ climate targets in other countries. → We are strengthening the framework for credible climate targets on the part of enterprises: We support companies which set and follow through on credible, science-based targets for their business and for their value chains, including through our engagement at international level. In so doing, we ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises are not overburdened. Alongside our Sustainable Finance Strategy efforts (see section C6), we support the transparency of businesses’ climate targets. Our guiding principle is the implementation of the proposals of the UN Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities. At the same time, Germany supports international processes designed to ensure that businesses give adequate consideration to due diligence obligations relating to human rights and the environment along their supply chains – such as the recently revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct and the EU’s draft Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. Germany will also push for an effective supply chain law at EU level which does not place exces- sive demands on small and medium-sized enterprises. 42 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 5: We support ambitious international aviation and shipping measures in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. → We aim to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality for international shipping: We support the Strategy on the Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in

2023. This requires the sector to achieve climate neutrality at the latest around 2050, in accordance with an emissions reduction pathway which includes interim targets for 2030 and 2040. Germany is actively campaigning for the IMO’s adoption of globally binding measures by 2025 which will ensure implemen- tation of these climate targets. Besides a technical component regulating the intensity of greenhouse gases produced by shipping fuels, these measures are to include a pricing mechanism for greenhouse gas emissions and support a just and equitable transition. → We are also driving forward progress towards greenhouse gas neutrality in the feld of international avi- ation: Given the international nature of aviation, sustainable climate action solutions require coordinated global measures within the context of the ICAO. This organisation has produced a package of measures relating to environmental protection and climate action as well as four international standards regulating and reducing noise and emissions produced by international aviation. These are to be transposed into na- tional and European law. Moreover, the ICAO has adopted a long-term climate target of net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. As well as market-based solutions (the ICAO’s CORSIA offsetting scheme), measures include operational and medium- to long-term technological solutions (in the short- and medium-haul segments, electric and hybrid electric fying, fuel cells, hydrogen), in particular the use of sustainable re- newable fuels. The German Government is very active on the ICAO’s environmental committee. Within the ICAO, we support ambitious measures to achieve the ICAO’s long-term climate target, in order to pro- mote a climate-friendly transformation of international aviation. All of the sector’s greenhouse gas emissions are to be addressed, including by stepping up the level of ambition regarding the reduction in the volume of greenhouse gases produced by CORSIA Eligible Fuels and, in particular, through global frameworks for the use of sustainable aviation fuels and related consideration of power-to-liquid (PtL) kerosene and its sustainability potential. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 43 C3. Acting in solidarity with address the growing need for assistance on the part of the most vulnerable developing countries. We in- the most vulnerable: Protecting tend to remain a reliable partner in tackling loss and lives, livelihoods and health damage and to continue to provide comprehensive support for partner countries. We are also working to In the past years the global temperature rise and advance the implementation of the target adopted the impacts of climate change have become more at COP26 in Glasgow to at least double international evident, be it in the degradation of freshwater re- adaptation fnance by 2025. sources, soil salination, ocean acidifcation, rising sea levels, prolonged droughts or the loss of biological Protecting health is a strong argument in favour of diversity. More frequent and more severe extreme more ambitious climate action and more rigorous weather events such as heatwaves and fooding measures to adapt to climate change, particularly are threatening the protection of human rights and internationally. We therefore want to use health as thus human health and the natural resources that a driver for transformation in the feld of climate form the basis of countless livelihoods. Many small action and climate change adaptation. At the same island states and the least developed countries are time, the healthcare sector is itself contributing particularly negatively affected. The IPCC emphasi- to global warming. For this reason, we intend to ses that in some cases the limits of adaptation have develop ecologically sustainable and climate-neu- already been reached and that a large proportion of tral health systems by no later than 2050 and aim to the world’s population is already living in conditions support other countries in these efforts. We under- which render them vulnerable to climate change, in stand health in terms of the One Health concept. particular already marginalised population groups The impacts of climate change are not only threa- whose human rights are seriously threatened by the tening human health and putting a strain on people impacts of climate change. as they work, alongside other economic and social impacts, they are also adversely affecting the health The countries and population groups least respon- of animals, plants and the various ecosystems. sible for the climate crisis are often hit the hardest by loss and damage. The goal is to help these countries and groups in particular to adapt to climate change, but also in their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As the largest contributor in the feld of climate risk fnance and the second-largest humani- tarian donor, Germany is making a substantial contri- bution to relieving suffering. The decision to esta- blish new fnancing arrangements, including a fund to tackle loss and damage, represents a milestone. We are calling for a broad contributor base, the use of innovative fnancing sources and a programmatic approach in order to 44 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 1: We support partner countries in strengthening adaptive capacities, increasing their resilience to climate change impacts and taking climate action. → We are strengthening structures and capacities for systematic, forward-looking adaptation planning: We promote the development and implementation of gender-responsive National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and the embedding of risk management in national and regional development strategies and relevant sectoral policies. We thereby strengthen the structures for the monitoring, evaluation and sharing of best practices via the UNFCCC, other multilateral processes and the multilateral development banks as well as through our bilateral cooperation. → We promote the mainstreaming of climate adaptation: Via interministerial and whole-of-government approaches, we advocate for the systemic inclusion of climate adaptation in all relevant policy areas and at every decision-making level. This includes the interfaces between climate and sustainable resource usage (see below), climate and water, climate and security (see section C5), climate and migration, climate and health, climate and education, and climate and social protection. For instance, the adaptation projects funded by the German Government in developing countries and emerging economies will also consider the health risks of vulnerable groups. In addition, building on its know-how and acquired expertise in the agriculture and food sectors, Germany is in a position to provide substantial support in the development and implementation of adapted and climate-resilient agriculture and food systems. This includes funding for relevant training measures. → We work to promote greater sustainable development through targeted resource-conserving and income-generating adaptation measures: Our activities are based on the principle of avoiding maladapta- tion. Maladaptation occurs where adaptation measures inadvertently increase the level of vulnerability, have negative impacts on livelihoods and health or obstruct sustainable development. Instead, adaptation must have a transformative impact and aim to contribute to greater resilience, economic and social inclusion, quality of life and sustainability. Education, vocational training and higher education have a key role to play here. In addition, we help to make adaptation more effective by promoting the exchange of knowledge and mutual learning. In line with a comprehensive risk management approach, when implementing measures we consider the impacts on every policy area (e.g. security, health, water, agriculture and forestry, biodiversity) and the various actors within society, including marginalised groups. → We also help the most vulnerable countries to reduce their own emissions and to strengthen their economic resilience through green growth. For example, the German Government is supporting the Ac- celerated Partnership for Renewables in Africa (APRA) created by African heads of state and government as well as the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative (AEGEI) established at the EU-AU summit in 2022. We are also supporting Pacifc Island states to make progress with the decarbonisation of their energy systems. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 45 Priority 2: We are strengthening ecosystem-based and local climate adaptation approaches, including in the context of sustainable land and water use. → We are strengthening approaches facilitating the climate-resilient and sustainable adaptation of agriculture, thereby improving food security: We help our partners to develop sustainable, modern and climate-resilient agriculture and food systems, focusing on preserving and strengthening small- scale farming structures. In the Global Alliance for Food Security, established in 2022 during Germany’s G7 Presidency, we bring together climate mitigation, adaptation and food security. → We leverage the synergies between climate change adaptation, mitigation and biodiversity and promote ecosystem-based adaptation: Healthy ecosystems are more resilient to climate impacts and have a direct protective function. For example, mangroves protect against coastal erosion, mountain forests protect against soil erosion and wetlands play a role as water reservoirs. We support ecosystem-based adaptation measures as a component of Nature-based Solutions, which are often the most cost-effective and the most environmentally and climate-friendly options, bringing together two issues of importance to the Federal Government: climate change adaptation and protection of ecosystems. → We promote integrated management of water resources and improve transboundary water cooperation: We assist our partners with the implementation of cross-sectoral approaches and the improvement of data and early warning systems in order to prevent disasters and to protect water resources. We call for international cooperation on water, global ratifcation of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the establishment of an intergovernmental UN process on water. In March 2023, the German Government adopted its National Water Strategy. Its inter- national component envisages cross-sectoral implementation of sustainable water resource management in order to achieve long-term global water security. → Strengthening local approaches: Climate adaptation will only succeed if it addresses the needs of those affected locally and is supported across the board at all relevant policy levels. Women, children and mar- ginalised groups are worst affected by the impacts of climate change. We therefore promote the equal participation of all relevant groups, thereby also strengthening the inclusion of marginalised groups and communities. → Advancing social protection worldwide: During Germany’s G7 Presidency in 2022, we emphasised the value of social protection, particularly during crises and in the context of climate change and the destruc- tion of the environment. The excluded and most vulnerable people in any society are disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change, which further aggravates poverty as well as economic, gender- specifc and other social inequalities. In order to limit these impacts, the G7 heads of state and govern- ment are seeking to make progress with inclusive social protection for all by 2030, in accordance with the UN Secretary-General’s Global Accelerator on Jobs and Social Protection for a Just Transition, which is designed to expand social protection. 46 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 3: We support partners in preparing for climate change-related disasters and in building back better. → We are expanding early warning systems coverage and providing access to raw and processed climate data (climate services) in partner countries: We are contributing to the UN Secretary-General’s initiative, which aims to secure universal coverage by early warning systems by 2027 in order to improve protection against extreme weather events. Through our research cooperation activities we also support countries, regions and communities to develop planning and analytical capacities in order to collect, process and make available weather and climate data, link them to sectoral data and create climate risk analyses for climate adaptation and disaster preparedness measures. We acknowledge the important role of the aero- space sector and the use of Earth-monitoring satellites in providing reliable data for the identifcation of climate risks and monitoring of biomass and intend to continue to drive forward data comparability and digitalisation. → We aim to address crisis prevention, anticipatory humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and long-term cooperation as a continuum and, in the spirit of the nexus of humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace promotion (HDP nexus), overcome a silo mentality. To this end, we are strengthening the capacity of crisis relief organisations to integrate climate action and climate adapta- tion into their work. We are adopting a climate-resilient approach to our crisis prevention activities – with improved risk forecasting, climate data and vulnerability analyses incorporating humanitarian, security-re- lated and climate data. We support the ongoing development of national systems in order to respond to climate events, particularly through adaptive social protection systems. We intend to share existing instru- ments and information with partner countries as appropriate depending on the context, and promote the international exchange of knowledge. → We advocate for a coherent approach to addressing loss and damage: We are actively involved in the operationalisation of fnancial support mechanisms, including a fund for tackling loss and damage. Above and beyond this, we intend to successfully implement and further expand the Global Shield against Cli- mate Risks initiated by the group of particularly vulnerable countries (V20) in close partnership with the G7 and other contributor countries (see box). We are engaging other major greenhouse gas emitters and all those able to do so in supporting particularly vulnerable countries in a spirit of solidarity. Our aim is for other major emitters such as China and the Gulf states to join the traditional donors in contributing to support (including fnancial support) for the most vulnerable in addressing loss and damage (see section C6). Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 47 The Global Shield against Climate Risks The Global Shield against Climate Risks was initiated by the V20, the group of most vulnerable develo- ping countries (Vulnerable 20, currently 58 countries) and the G7 under Germany’s 2022 G7 Presidency as well as other contributor countries. It was presented at COP27. It serves to provide fnancial protec- tion against climate change-related loss and damage for people in poverty and vulnerable situations as well as marginalised and particularly vulnerable countries. It uses a broad range of protection instru- ments for this purpose and is intended to facilitate systematic, coherent and permanent protection. To this end, the shield mobilises a large number of partners from governments, international organisations, multilateral development banks, the private sector, the scientifc community and civil society. The changeover from reactive ad hoc crisis management to ex ante planning will be supported by the joint preparation of country protection packages. The goal is to implement measures that enable the rapid deployment of funds in the immediate wake of a disaster, for example, via adaptive social protection. We will work for the successful implementation of country protection packages and transnational approaches, as well as the mobilisation of further fnancial resources in order to meet the growing need for assistance. → We are expanding our support for anticipatory humanitarian assistance as an important instrument to minimise the humanitarian consequences of climate change and provide more effcient assistance for affected communities. Every year, we intend to commit at least 5% of the resources earmarked for huma- nitarian assistance to anticipatory humanitarian assistance, where we always take climate resilience into account. We are continuing to strengthen this approach in concert with our partners. The G7 pledged to do so under Germany’s Presidency in 2022. We have also signed the Climate and Environment Charter for Humanitarian Organizations and the related contributor declaration and are working with our partners and other contributors to reduce the carbon footprint associated with humanitarian assistance. One such example is our support for the use of solar energy in refugee camps, which to date have mainly received power from diesel generators. → In our development-oriented transition aid, we particularly promote projects that increase climate resilience, in order to enable vulnerable groups to adapt to climate change and, where necessary, trans- form their livelihoods. In many places, climate change is aggravating existing multidimensional crises. We are therefore integrating climate-sensitive activities into the multi-sectoral approach of capacity-building transitional assistance, in order to ensure the sustainability of investment in crisis management and reduce future humanitarian costs. The World Bank has calculated that a dollar invested in resilience will save at least four dollars in future humanitarian costs. We focus on climate change adaptation and disaster risk management measures in order to reduce potential climate- and weather-related loss and damage. 48 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Anticipatory humanitarian assistance pays off According to various calculations, anticipatory humanitarian assistance has between twice and seven times the impact of the deployment of the same volume of funds only after a disaster has hit. Roughly 20% of all disasters can be precisely predicted. This means that anticipatory humanitarian assistance offers signifcant potential to assist more people through a more impactful use of contributors’ funds. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has calculated that anticipatory measures in advance of a harsh winter in Mongolia (Dzud), e.g. cash assistance, allowed over 7 euros to be saved for each euro spent (FAO, 2018). The United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) has determined that anticipatory measures in preparation for predicted fooding in Bangladesh and Nepal in 2022 reduced the costs of the necessary humanitarian assistance by 50% (WFP, April 2023). Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 49 Priority 4: We are developing a joint understanding that health as defned by the One Health approach is a strong argument in favour of more ambitious climate action and adaptation to the unavoidable impacts of climate change, and are establishing health as a transformational factor driving climate action and climate adaptation. → We are establishing the “health and climate crisis” nexus in climate foreign policy and international co- operation. Protecting the climate means protecting health. We are focusing more strongly on integrating and dovetailing the issue of health with other areas of climate policy, in accordance with the One Health approach. We are thereby also aiming to contain the spread of germs (e.g. via contaminated water) and the risk of future pandemics. Besides pandemic prevention, we are also working to improve coordination of global pandemic preparedness and response. → We regard health protection as a catalyst for climate action and adaptation measures and will strengthen the protection of human health from the impacts of climate change. This applies in equal measure to communicable and non-communicable diseases. When it comes to prevention, a sharper focus must also be placed on environment-related risks to human health. Protection and adaptation concepts are being developed to address growing climate-related pressures on workplaces, primarily for espe- cially vulnerable groups. With this in mind, during Germany’s G7 Presidency the G7 agreed on a Roadmap towards Safe and Healthy Work in a Green Economy. We also give specifc consideration to positive health impacts of climate action measures (spending money smarter). → We are stepping up our efforts to establish climate-resilient and climate-neutral health systems. To this end, we cooperate with other countries by expanding international dialogue and encouraging cooperation on research and capacity-building in order to promote adaptation to climate change. Our activities are guided by the goals and approaches frst formulated at COP26 within the context of ATACH (see box be- low). We seek to bring on board other international partner countries. We actively support ambitious goals in the ATACH process, e.g. in relation to monitoring our health systems’ greenhouse gas emissions. → In accordance with the One Health approach, we are expanding our efforts to safeguard natural re- sources. We are thereby helping to reduce migration fows and conficts, which will also bring down the incidence of related diseases, injuries and fatalities. The Alliance for Transformative Action on Climate and Health (ATACH) The Alliance for Transformative Action on Climate and Health (ATACH) seeks to implement the climate change and health goals defned at COP26 by utilising the collective capacity of the WHO’s Member States and other stakeholders in order to achieve rapid and appropriate progress on these goals and by promoting integration of the climate change and health nexus in related national, regional and global plans. The alliance’s work is based on the political commitments which more than 70 health ministries signed up to at COP26 and in which they pledged to develop sustainable climate-resilient and low-carbon health systems. ATACH represents the continuation of this initiative, which aims to put these commit- ments into practice. 50 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy C4. Protecting, restoring and Ecosystems also play an important role in adaptation to climate change. Intact ecosystems are crucial e.g. promoting the sustainable use for water security and related goals such as the avail- of ecosystems ability of drinking water, food security and energy supply. Sustainable use, protection and restoration Biological diversity underpins the functional capacity of ecosystems on land, in fresh water and in the sea of ecosystems, the services of which play a vital role will strengthen natural carbon sinks such as forests, in our existence, the functioning of our societies and soils, peatlands and seagrass meadows and reduce our economies. Women and indigenous peoples, in emissions from degraded ecosystems. particular, frequently depend directly on access to natural resources and are therefore more severely Germany therefore consistently pursues climate affected by the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem action and the protection of biodiversity together services. Climate change is one of the key factors – also in accordance with the Sustainable Develop- driving the loss of biodiversity. At the same time, ment Goals (SDGs). At an international level, we the loss of biological diversity and the destruction press for the promotion and implementation of of ecosystems are further driving climate change. Nature-based Solutions (NbS) to address ecosystem The ongoing deforestation and degradation of fo- degradation and the loss of biodiversity. By reducing rests, particularly in the three global tropical-forest emissions from degraded ecosystems and removing regions – the Amazon, the Congo Basin and South- CO2 and sequestering it in intact ecosystems, we East Asia – is a cause for grave concern. We will be contribute to climate mitigation and adaptation. We unable to stay within the 1.5°C limit without halting are driving forward the implementation of the Global deforestation and substantially restoring degraded Biodiversity Framework (GBF) which was adopted forests. At the same time, in some cases irreversible under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity in degradation processes are being set in motion, which 2022. The framework’s 23 goals address the factors will lead to the loss of valuable ecosystems such as driving the global loss of biodiversity, in order to wetlands and watercourses and adversely affect the turn the tide in relation to the extinction of species future options of the countries concerned. Accor- and the destruction of natural ecosystems by 2030. dingly, rural areas in particular will be Moreover, several of the GBF’s targets are directly affected by growing poverty or indirectly related to climate change. Target 8 is an and migration. explicit climate target, which refects various links between biodiversity and climate change. Further targets of the GBF are to protect 30% of the global land and marine areas effectively and in accordance with the rights of indigenous and local communities (30x30 target) and to restore 30% of degraded eco- systems. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 51 Priority 1: We promote the implementation of the targets of the Global Biodiversity Framework and support initia- tives advancing the implementation of its climate and biodiversity targets. → We are calling for at least 30% of global land, coastal and marine areas to be placed under protection as well as for 30% of degraded ecosystems to be restored. We want to end the global destruction of eco- systems, restore them and ensure their preservation. Since 2021, Germany has been a member of the High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People (HAC), an intergovernmental group which now includes more than 100 countries and champions the protection of at least 30% of global land and marine areas by 2030. → We help partner countries to align their national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs) with the targets of the Global Biodiversity Framework. The international targets of the GBF must be broken down to the respective national level in an appropriate and workable manner so that they can be effectively implemented. For this purpose, a solid monitoring and review system is required which, among other things, demonstrates the level of target achievement through global and national indicators. In addition, NBSAPs are to be strongly integrated with nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs) or strategies. In order to provide support for our partners, we have to- gether with Colombia established the international NBSAP Accelerator Partnership and are also support- ing partner countries at bilateral level. → We advocate an increase in funding for biodiversity from all sources and the alignment of fnancial fows with the targets of the Global Biodiversity Framework. No later than 2025, the German Government plans to increase international biodiversity fnancing, as a proportion of climate fnance, to 1.5 billion euro per year. We support the operationalisation of the new Global Biodiversity Framework Fund at the Global En- vironmental Facility (GEF). → We promote the protection of the oceans as a key ecosystem: Germany is working on a National Ma- rine Strategy. The promotion of climate action through marine protection will be a key action area in this strategy. We are working towards rapid implementation of the new global agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) and the designation of new marine protected areas – also through the Antarctic Treaty System. Protection of the still largely unexplored deep-sea ecosystems is important to us. → We advocate for responsible research on the role of the oceans (including the sea bed) in the absorption of CO2 and want to establish robust rules and scientifc standards for environmental impact assessments in connection with potential technological storage of CO2 in the ocean or under the sea bed. 52 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy → We promote Nature-based Solutions at international level: At bilateral and multilateral levels and in all relevant EU processes, we will continue to promote Nature-based Solutions and support their ambitious implementation. In particular, we aim to further strengthen Nature-based Solutions as a unifying element between the three Rio Conventions (UNFCCC, UN CBD, UNCCD). Nature-based Solutions (NbS) Nature-based Solutions are measures to protect, restore, sustainably use and manage natural or mo- difed terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems. They address social, economic and en- vironmental challenges effectively and adaptively, while simultaneously fostering human well-being, ecosystem services, resilience and biological diversity (see UNEA Resolution 5/5). Examples include agroforestry, the rewetting of wetlands and the restoration of forests. We intend to more effectively pool activities relating to Nature-based Solutions and strengthen their global implementation. For this purpose, we promote progress with the Enhancing Nature-based So- lutions for an Accelerated Climate Transformation initiative (ENACT), which was launched by Germany together with Egypt’s COP27 Presidency and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 2022. The initiative is co-chaired by Germany. It aims to protect at least a billion vulnerable people – including at least 500 million women and girls – against the impacts of climate change and to strengthen their resilience, including by securing up to 2.4 billion hectares of healthy, natural and sustainable agricultural ecosystems and signifcantly increase global mitigation efforts. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 53 Priority 2: We are strengthening partnerships, initiatives, frameworks and regulations in order to halt the global loss of forests by 2030, protect forests, promote sustainable management of forests and restore forest landscapes. → We seek to achieve progress with the restoration of forests in particular. We therefore support the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration 2021-2030 through programmes at national level (e.g. Germany’s Action Plan on Nature-based Solutions for Climate and Biodiversity) as well as internationally, together with the Bonn Challenge initiated by Germany, with the goal of bringing at least 350 million hectares of degraded and deforested landscapes under restoration by 2030. The goal is to improve ecosystem services, resilience and biological diversity, to respect the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, to include them on an equal footing and to enable the broad involvement and cooperation of non-state actors, the scientifc community and the private sector. → We are strengthening cooperation with tropical-forest countries: We are initiating and supporting forest protection projects in all of the major tropical-forest regions. We also seek to strengthen the land rights of indigenous peoples and local communities as the guardians of the forest, as well as initial and advanced training for local farmers relating to sustainable land use methods. We are stepping up our commitment through bilateral and plurilateral forestry and climate partnerships. Our goal is to end deforestation and to promote the protection, near-natural restoration and sustainable management of forests, in order to preserve the full range of ecosystem services. This will be done with the equal participation of marginal- ised population groups, particularly indigenous peoples. → We promote progress with the implementation of forest-related international targets and international initiatives for forest protection: Via the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership (FCLP), the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF), the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Collaborative Partner- ship on Forests (CPF), we support heightened and synergetic measures leading to the implementation of the Global Forest Goals in the Strategic Plan for Forests as well as the forest-related sustainability goals, the forest-related decisions of the Global Biodiversity Framework and implementation of the Paris Agree- ment. This is complemented by the Global Forest Finance Pledge supported by Germany, with the collec- tive promise to provide up to 12 billion US dollars for the protection of forests between 2021 and 2025. We aim to increase Germany’s contribution from 1 billion euro to 2 billion euro (2021-2025). In addition to a more effective and pragmatic regulatory policy and the inclusion of stakeholders, the involvement of the private sector is also necessary. For this purpose, political and economic incentives must be established for the preservation of forests and for climate-positive land use which protects biodiversity. 54 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy → We are strengthening the sustainability of global value chains and deforestation-free agricultural supply chains: Through the EU Regulation on deforestation-free products, we are tackling the key drivers of global deforestation. We promote global implementation of this Regulation by helping actors through- out the supply chain – in particular, small farmers – to develop sustainable and deforestation-free supply chains. For this purpose, we use bilateral and plurilateral formats such as the EU’s Team Europe initiatives and the Amsterdam Partnership. We aim to do so in dialogue with other key consumer countries in order to achieve a uniform approach and avoid leakage effects. Within the scope of our multilateral cooperation and in international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), we campaign for a policy of decoupling agricultural land use from deforestation. We also promote the implementation and (ongoing) development of sustainability standards and transparency systems in third countries (especially the OECD FAO guidelines on due diligence obligations to ensure deforesta- tion-free supply chains). Through forestry and climate partnerships, we help partners to develop climate- friendly agricultural, fnancial and raw materials policies. We have already made an important contribution to the protection of human rights and the environment through our Supply Chain Due Diligence Act. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 55 C5. Strengthening resilience, We are ensuring that the Bundeswehr is fully capable of fulflling its remit including in the context of peace and security evolving climate conditions, and that its operational readiness is guaranteed including on the basis of As one of our century’s greatest challenges, the related conceptual documents. climate crisis increasingly has security implications. It threatens human security and is also jeopardising Germany’s National Security Strategy refects the national and international security. On the one hand, security-related signifcance of climate change. An climate-related extreme weather events with devas- entire chapter is devoted to addressing the climate, tating consequences are occurring more frequently biodiversity and ecosystem crisis, as well as how to and with greater intensity – also in Germany. On safeguard our natural resources, such as drinking the other hand, the effects of climate change are water and food. In addition to the goals of “robust- aggravating existing inequalities in many world re- ness” and “resilience”, for the frst time “sustainabi- gions and are fuelling conficts over the distribution lity” is explicitly included as an objective of German of ever scarcer resources, frequently accompanied foreign and security policy. The German Government by water shortages, famine and other humanitarian must therefore draw up security measures in a way emergencies. Fragile states which are only capable of that takes climate considerations into account and providing public services and resolving conficts to focus on the protection of individual human beings. a limited extent in any case are particularly badly af- Particular attention is devoted to women, children fected by this. The climate change-related rise in sea and vulnerable population groups who are fre- levels is also threatening densely populated coastal quently hit especially hard by the impacts of climate regions and the existence of small island states. change. The impacts of climate change will change our security environment and give rise to new geopoli- tical areas of confict. On the basis of an integrated security policy, we are therefore aligning our climate foreign policy activities with the goals of saving hu- man lives, minimising risks of confict and con- tributing to peace and security. Together with our partners, we must therefore adapt not only our foreign policy but also our security and defence policies accor- dingly, so as to be better prepared for current and future impacts on our security. This means anticipa- ting heightened or new security risks as well as adapting armed forces and capabilities in line with climate change. 56 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 1: We are developing and expanding capacities and expertise for the prevention, containment and manage- ment of climate-related conficts. → Together with the island state of Nauru, as the co-chair of the United Nations’ Group of Friends on Cli- mate and Security we are moving the agenda forward and securing the support of an increasing number of countries. We will again make climate, peace and security a priority in Germany’s upcoming candidacy for UN Security Council membership in 2027-2028. → We promote the United Nations’ Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), which strengthens institutional cooperation at the intersection of climate and security between key UN organisations. We call for the consideration of the climate and security nexus in all relevant UN institutions. We work with UN funds to ensure that investments in crisis contexts are climate-sensitive, while climate projects are peace-build- ing. Moreover, through the appointment of climate and security advisers within the scope of UN missions – such as in Somalia and at the Horn of Africa – we contribute to tackling confict- and climate-related crises in a joined-up way. → We also advocate that all international organisations, in particular the UN, the EU, the OSCE and NATO, strengthen their understanding of climate and security interlinkages. We call for greater consideration and operationalisation of climate and security as a cross-cutting issue in all relevant security organisations. In addition, we support training initiatives to strengthen the capacities of personnel in peace missions, such as climate and security modules at the Center for International Peace Operations as well as the European Defence College and the EU Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management in Berlin. Such modules must be integrated into all relevant security and military advanced training courses. → Building on the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Climate, Environment, Peace and Security Declaration during Germany’s G7 Presidency in 2022, we have established the Climate for Peace Initiative together with partner countries. Here, 28 countries are sharing their experience and needs regarding climate, peace and security-related projects and addressing challenges on a multilateral basis. → We are strengthening our commitment to crisis prevention, stabilisation and peacebuilding in relation to climate risks, in order to lessen the confict-exacerbating impacts of climate change. Among other things, we are doing this through pilot projects in the Bay of Bengal, Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria and Somalia. These pilot projects are based on the Weathering Risk initiative initiated by Germany, which prepares data for climate modelling and confict analyses. We want peace mediation activities to be increasingly carried out in a cooperative context when it comes to water, the environment and climate. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 57 → Through the United Nations Group of Friends on the environmental management of UN peacekeeping operations, we support the use of renewable energy and efforts to reduce the peacekeeping-related ecological footprint. Within the peacekeeping reform process, we continue to advocate adaptation to the impacts of climate change and strengthening the operational readiness and resilience of UN peacekeeping missions and troops providers. Germany plays a key role in continuing to advance this issue at a political and technical level within the United Nations. How are climate change and confict connected? The example of southern Iraq Climate change impacts such as extreme heat, droughts and the increasing salination of the Shatt Al-Arab due to the rising sea level are threatening the unique ecosystem of the marshes of southern Iraq. Sewage, mismanagement and a lack of cross-border cooperation on water are further jeopardising these “paradise-like marshes”. Many families who mainly live off agriculture, livestock breeding and fshing are being deprived of their livelihoods and forced to leave their homeland. They are frequently moving to urban centres in the Basra region, where local population groups with different traditions and customs come together and where jobs are either non-existent or precarious. There is a risk that a scarcity of resources, climate change-related migration, a lack of prospects and inadequate government services, will lead to conficts at a local level as well as between the host communities and internally displaced persons. Climate change may therefore aggravate existing tensions and conficts. 58 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 2: We are more effectively preparing for the geopolitical and security risks associated with the climate crisis. → Together with the Federal Intelligence Service, the German Government has commissioned an assess- ment by leading scientifc institutions in order to be able to more effectively evaluate the impacts of the climate crisis on our national security and make informed decisions on this basis. → We are participating in the debate over the implications of rising sea levels under international law and are supporting the UN International Law Commission (ILC) by contributing opinion statements on the assessment and management of these implications, in particular on the contemporary legal interpretation of existing international law (e.g. UNCLOS). We also support the request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) adopted by the UN General Assembly at the initiative of Vanuatu. Toge- ther with the EU and its member states, we have also contributed to the procedure for an advisory opinion on the protection of the seas before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which was initiated by a group of island states. These two courts will examine what obligations states have under international law in relation to climate change. Under the ICJ procedure, Germany will work together with the EU and other member states towards a strengthening of the Paris Agreement as a central reference system for global climate action. With a view to the future, we argue that the related legal framework needs to be further concretised. In addition, together with the island state of Tuvalu Germany is co-chai- ring the Coalition for Addressing Sea-level Rise & its Existential Threats (C-SET). → We advocate greater consideration of climate issues in the security and defence sector. Through our contribution to the new NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) in Montreal, we are supporting the implementation of NATO’s climate and security action plan and strengthening NATO’s capacities to respond to the security and defence impacts of climate change. This centre will promote understanding of the security and defence-related impacts of climate change and support the necessary strategic orientation. In addition, by seconding experts we contribute to strengthening climate and security expertise in civilian missions within the scope of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). → Due to the uncertainties, implications and risks, the German Government is not currently considering solar radiation management (SRM) as a climate policy option. With a view to the international regulation of SRM, the German Government therefore supports Decision X/33 of 29 October 2010 within the scope of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The German Government does not currently intend to support SRM development and research activities aimed at developing such technologies and their poten- tial use at scale. Nonetheless, in accordance with the precautionary principle we will continue to analyse and assess the extensive scientifc, technological, political, social and ethical risks and implications of SRM, in the context of technology-neutral basic research as distinguished from technology development for use at scale. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 59 Priority 3: We help to protect the safety of people whose living environments and livelihoods are acutely threatened, thus further bolstering their resilience. → We are working to bring together a coherent protection regime for climate change- and disaster-related displacement. For this purpose, we are promoting a dialogue at UN level in order to supplement existing agreements under international law with complementary protection mechanisms where loopholes exist. Among other activities, we are involved as a member of the steering group of the Platform on Disaster Displacement. → We alleviate acute suffering and save human lives as one of the largest humanitarian assistance donors. Support for women, children and other marginalised groups in displacement scenarios – including in the context of climate change – is a top priority. → We work to secure conditions that allow those affected to remain in their home regions or more easily return there. For this purpose, we help affected regions and governments to further enhance their climate resilience, for instance, thus improving prospects for local people (see section C3). → We support affected partner countries including through projects on the sustainable management of human mobility in the context of climate change. We do this by supporting regional dialogues as well as strengthening the work of regional organisations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on De- velopment (IGAD) in eastern Africa. We are also an active participant in the Khartoum Process, a political platform for cooperation between Europe and countries in eastern and northern Africa covering refugee and migration issues. As the largest contributor to Education Cannot Wait (ECW), we support programmes which address climate-induced migration of families and enable children to continue to access education. 60 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy C6. Aligning fnancial fows with Under Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement, all parties agreed to align fnancial fows with a 1.5°C-compati- a 1.5°C-compatible pathway and ble pathway as well as climate-resilient development. climate-resilient development In this context, the German Government believes in the importance of enabling support and assistance for In this decade alone, measures to achieve national those countries, enterprises and individual activities mitigation goals and adaptation to the impacts of cli- which are advancing the transition but are not yet fully mate change will require global funding amounting climate-neutral or climate-resilient, in accordance to several trillion euro (according to the Independent with the 1.5°C limit, while avoiding lock-in effects. For High Level Expert Group). The provision of public this reason, the German Government is, for example, international climate fnance alone cannot cover supporting the G20 Transition Finance Framework. In this fnancial need. However, it is necessary as direct addition, Nature-based Solutions are to be strength- support and in order to leverage private funds. At the ened where possible. same time, studies indicate that private and public funding around the world continues to fnance many In 2009, the industrialised countries collectively activities which are not compatible with the Paris pledged to mobilise an annual volume of 100 billion targets. US dollars from various sources (public and private, bilateral and multilateral) by 2020 in order to support Many low-income countries have a high debt risk or climate action in developing countries. In 2015, this are already over-indebted. As a result – particularly annual obligation was extended until 2025. Germany in view of the social and economic consequences of is strongly committed to ensuring that this promise potential sovereign defaults – the fnancing of miti- is fully implemented as soon as possible (according gation and adaptation investment may take a back to estimates by the OECD, in 2020 just over 83 billion seat for the states concerned alongside spending US dollars was mobilised). The contributor com- to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. For munity is confdent that the target of 100 billion US low-income countries, the G20 Common Framework dollars was achieved in 2023 (see Climate Finance for Debt Treatments is an important multilaterally Delivery Plan, 2021). coordinated instrument for addressing solvency problems (including where partly caused by climate Alongside the funding directly supported by the risks) on the basis of an IMF programme. Since the German Government – i.e. via direct budgetary funds, processes in this framework still take too long, the multilateral development banks, the KfW banking German Government is working within the G20 for group and foreign trade and investment guarantees – more effective implementation, improvement and it is crucial that climate-damaging subsidies are grad- expansion of the G20 Common Framework for Debt ually phased out of national budgets in accordance Treatments. with the commitments made in the G7/G20 context. At the same time, we need to improve the enabling conditions worldwide to increase private investment for climate action, even in cases without direct go- vernment support. After all, private investment and fnancing are crucial, not least in terms of volume. The German Government will therefore continue to advocate for the inclusion of sustainability consid- erations under the globally coordinated international fnancial market policy (sustainable fnance). Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 61 The island state of Dominica Tropical hurricane Maria made landfall on Dominica on 18 September 2017. At the time, the country was still trying to recover from the devastation wrought by tropical storm Erika in 2015. Maria was Do- minica’s worst natural disaster to date and caused damage amounting to 1.3 billion US dollars (226% of the country’s GDP). The devastation resulted in a drop in government revenues and high reconstruction costs which led to a signifcant deterioration in the country’s public fnances and a substantial rise in its level of public debt. This vicious circle is narrowing Dominica’s fscal space to prepare for the next storm on its own or invest in a climate-neutral future. 62 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 1: We will remain a strong and reliable partner on international climate fnance. → Germany stands by its commitment to increase the funding it provides for international climate fnance to 6 billion euro by 2025, drawn from budgetary and public funds. This goal was already achieved in 2022, three years early than pledged (see box). We will do everything possible to maintain this level of 6 billion euro so as to continue to provide ambitious support for developing countries and emerging eco- nomies for climate action and in addressing climate change – including by increasing Germany’s com- mitment to the international protection of biodiversity to 1.5 billion euro per year by 2025. We will also contribute to the collective doubling of international adaptation fnance which was decided at COP26 (collective increase from 20 billion US dollars in 2019 to 40 billion US dollars by no later than 2025). We are also endeavouring to signifcantly improve the mobilisation of private climate fnance through the use of public funds (see below). → We are strengthening the key multilateral climate funds – the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global En- vironment Facility (GEF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Adaptation Fund: We are calling for these funds to support a 1.5°C-compatible, climate-resilient transition in developing countries and equal representation on decision-making bodies. Our aim is for all of the international funds to make access to climate funding easier for the poorest and most vulnerable, i.e. in particular the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS). Good governance is a guiding principle for us, also in relation to multilateral funds. We also use our funding commitments to encourage other contribu- tor countries to likewise make appropriate contributions. → We are ramping up the mobilisation of private funds for the purpose of climate and biodiversity fnance: We will leverage budgetary funds for international climate fnance more strategically, in order to mobilise private funds with a transformational impact. This includes improving enabling conditions for private in- vestment in developing countries and emerging economies and making greater use of instruments to mo- bilise domestic and foreign private capital, e.g. blended fnance and innovative fnancial instruments. We are engaging multilateral development banks on this issue, as well as other contributors, in order to better address it in the delivery of the 100-billion annual target, on the basis of lessons learned to date. Within Germany, we will work across ministries to advance and support initiatives that can scale up and speed up effective approaches. This includes the use of international guarantee and protection instruments (im- proved use of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, protection against currency risks, investment guarantee instruments and other guarantee instruments of the international fnancial institutions (IFIs) and KfW, use of the instruments available to the climate funds) and support for national approaches and enabling conditions in developing countries. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 63 → Gaining new contributors for the provision of climate fnance: In relation to post-2025 climate fnance (New Collective Quantifed Goal, NCQG), we are seeking a new, more effective approach to future climate fnance. We seek to ensure that, alongside the traditional contributor countries, countries whose national prosperity has greatly increased in recent years make bigger, more transparent and reliable contributions to multilateral funding moving forward, in line with their capabilities – in particular by contributing to multilateral funds. A broader base of contributor countries is a key prerequisite for an ambitious post-2025 target, which demonstrates solidarity and shared responsibilities while also dynamically refecting coun- tries’ fnancial capabilities. Each state should contribute a fair share. An overview of German climate fnance Germany stands by its commitment to increase the funding it provides for international climate fnance to 6 billion euro by 2025. This goal was already achieved in 2022, three years earlier than pledged. By no later than 2025, the German Government intends to increase international biodiversity fnancing as a proportion of climate fnance to 1.5 billion euro per year. In 2022, German climate fnance drawn from budgetary funds (including grant equivalents from KfW development loans) amounted to 6.39 billion euro. Overall, Germany’s international climate fnance in 2022, drawn from the full range of sources (i.e. including 3.09 billion euro of market funding publicly mobilised via KfW and DEG and 0.48 billion euro of mobilised private funding) amounted to 9.96 billion euro. Together with our EU partners, we are the largest climate fnance contributors worldwide. Germany is also the second-biggest contributor in the area of public development cooperation. In future, we will continue to try and strike a balance between adaptation and mitigation fnance (2022: 46% adaptation, 54% mitigation). In addition, in 2022 the German Government guaranteed climate projects amounting to around 226 million euro in developing countries and emerging economies in the form of export credits. Germany is currently the largest contributor to the Green Climate Fund – one of the largest multilate- ral climate funds – providing 1.5 billion euro for the 2020-2023 period and 2 billion euro via the current replenishment, the largest contributor to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Least Devel- oped Countries Fund (LDCF) and the largest contributor to the Adaptation Fund. 64 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 2: We promote and fnance sustainable and Paris-compliant investments and projects internationally. → We will live up to the commitment made in Glasgow in the COP26 statement on Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition, in accordance with the G7 resolutions (see Annex 2), to end public international fnance of unabated fossil fuels from the start of 2023, subject to limited, clearly defned exceptions in ac- cordance with the 1.5°C limit. The G7 agreement will permit limited exceptions in accordance with the Paris Agreement and the 1.5°C limit. The German Government is continuously assessing how exemptions should be defned, taking into account energy policy challenges, including those resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as compliance with the Paris Agreement and the 1.5°C pathway. → Against this background, the German Government has developed climate strategies for the guarantee instruments used to promote foreign trade and investment. These strategies are subject to continuous review and adjustment. The goal of these climate strategies is to reduce emissions arising due to foreign transactions underwritten by German Government guarantees to net zero by no later than 2050 (2045 for guarantees underwriting projects in industrialised nations) by aligning underwriting practice with a 1.5°C- compatible decarbonisation pathway on the basis of sectoral guidelines. Guidelines have been devised for key sectors covered by these instruments. These climate strategies stipulate simplifed underwriting processes for especially climate-friendly projects and exclusions for climate-damaging projects, particularly those involving coal and oil. The guidelines will be updated in relation to CCS/CCU in accordance with the Carbon Management Strategy. For projects involving natural gas, supplementary exemptions can apply in exceptional cases, if these are necessary for national security or the geostrategic security of supply interests, while complying with the 1.5°C limit and avoiding lock-in effects. In this way, the Federal Government will strengthen the international competitiveness of promising climate-friendly technologies from Germany. → We aim to fulfl our G7 commitment to phase out ineffcient (climate-damaging) subsidies by 2025 and will work to advance progress on the worldwide phase-out of ineffcient climate-damaging subsidies, as agreed at COP27. According to several different estimates (World Bank, IEA), over 1 trillion US dollars in the form of direct climate-damaging subsidies are paid out every year. We also advocate for the phase-out of biodiversity-damaging subsidies by 2030 in accordance with the Global Biodiversity Framework and the G7’s commitment. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 65 Priority 3: We support a sustainable fnance approach for the fnancial sector in Europe and third countries, in close cooperation with European and G20 partners. → We promote coherent sustainable fnance policies within the G20 and worldwide: The German Govern- ment is supporting the implementation of the G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap, the G20 Transition Finan- ce Framework and a German Sustainable Finance Strategy. Through the G20’s sustainable fnance activities, we advocate internationally coherent standards and policies. At an international level, we will strengthen the demand for and credibility of sustainability bonds and green bonds. We are continuing the success story of green German Government securities. The central banks’ and supervisory authorities’ Network for Gree- ning the Financial System (NGFS) – which contributes to the development of environmental and climate risk management in the fnancial sector and supports the mobilisation of fnance for the transition to a sustainable economy – is likewise a key format for this purpose. → We work to advance international sustainability standards for corporate reporting: In all of the relevant committees, we promote progress with the international sustainability reporting standards of the Inter- national Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) for the climate and, in future, also for biodiversity within the scope of corporate reporting. → We are strengthening international cooperation in the fght against environmental crime and money laundering: Based on resolutions adopted by the G7, the G20 and COP26, we intend to increase awareness of the role of money laundering in connection with environmental crime and strengthen international co- operation in this area. 66 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Priority action areas for our climate foreign policy Priority 4: We are building and strengthening alliances for the reform of the international fnancial and development institutions, to better anchor and implement climate action and biodiversity protection as well as climate resilience across the board. → We are strengthening the alignment of multilateral development banks with the goals of the Paris Agreement, the Global Biodiversity Framework and the 2030 Agenda. Together with our partners, we will continue to drive forward the conceptual development and implementation of the Paris Alignment of all multilateral development banks – i.e. the alignment of all activities with the 1.5°C limit, as well as the goals of the GBF and the 2030 Agenda. We likewise advocate the corresponding alignment of regional and natio- nal development banks. → We intend to mobilise additional climate and biodiversity fnance, making effcient use of available funds: We are encouraging the multilateral development banks to widen their fnancing scope now (with- out any capital increase) by implementing the recommendations of the G20 group of experts on the re- view of the Capital Adequacy Frameworks (CAF review) and, among other measures, more strongly focusing on climate- and biodiversity-related investment. We therefore call for the increased use of transformative fnance instruments such as policy-based loans, partly in order to improve the enabling conditions for private-sector investment. We also aim to improve the quality of climate fnance provided by multilateral development banks. In this respect, we advocate equal access to investment funding, in particular for women in all their diversity and for marginalised groups. → We are active in shaping the reform of the international fnancial architecture: In the debates on reform- ing the international fnancial architecture (e.g. reform of the World Bank, G20 CAF Review (see above), the Bridgetown Initiative, the Paris Pact for the People and the Planet), we want to be bridge-builders and pioneers in more effectively tackling the multiple crises such as poverty, famine, the loss of biodiversity, the climate crisis and global pandemics. We will work to ensure that the multilateral development banks and fnancial institutions make greater use of their fnancial strength in order to enable climate investment and mobilise more private funding. The resolutions adopted at the World Bank’s annual meeting in Marrakech in October 2023 were an important step in this direction. We champion direct fnance instruments in order to empower indigenous peoples and local communities. We want to fnd ways of preventing climate-re- lated extreme weather events from leading to over-indebtedness in the worst-affected countries. We are positioning ourselves more coherently across ministries in order to actively engage across all relevant inter- national processes and forums. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 67 D. Thinking globally – acting strategically and in a differentiated way We aim to promote progress together with industrialised nations, emerging economies and the major emitters of the future in terms of ambitious mitigation efforts in all sectors as well as a just econo- mic transition (see sections C1, C2, C4). We intend to help develop- ing countries with rapidly rising emissions shift to the expansion of renewable energy instead of fossil fuels and thus achieve devel- opmental leapfrogging. Our partnership models, our development cooperation, and cooperation within the scope of our International Climate Initiative – which provides targeted support for partner countries in relation to ambitious climate measures and policies – and our activities within multilateral forums and institutions such as the Climate Club, the G7 and the G20 and the multilateral develop- ment banks are of key signifcance here. We aim to commit to more binding mitigation measures with the historical major greenhouse gas emitters as well as the major emitters of the future. 68 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Thinking globally – acting strategically and in a differentiated way Together with other countries, we can achieve more through progressive alliances within the scope of the rapid progress in the fght against the climate crisis, international climate negotiations, but also through and we can build on innovations which have proven research cooperation, through working closely with their worth elsewhere in order to make our econo- the multilateral development banks / international my and society ft for a climate-neutral and more fnancial institutions and through jointly advocating just future. We specifcally aim to work closely with ambitious climate standards, as well as via sustai- countries demonstrating a particularly high level of nable raw materials partnerships and cooperation ambition in international debates and in implemen- arrangements relating to green and low-carbon ting their own just transition towards greenhouse gas hydrogen. neutrality. Via a close alliance with these countries, we aim to forge, strengthen and promote ambi- At the same time, we are aware that climate policy tion-based alliances such as the Climate Club. We cannot be isolated from geopolitical interests but is are thus seeking to accelerate the global transition, also shaped by them. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 69 Changes in the ranking of the world’s largest carbon emitters Size of points corresponds to absolute emissions, Value in brackets represents the relative change from 2015 to 2030 2015 2030 1: China 1: China (+11%) 2: US 2: India (+51%) 3: EU 3: US (-40%) 4: India 4: Russia (+19%) 5: Russia 5: EU (-41%) 6: Japan 6: Iran (+122%) 7: Brazil 7: Indonesia (+107%) 8: Germany 8: Turkey (+110%) 9: Indonesia 9. Brazil (-15%) 10: Iran 10: Japan (-38%) 11: Mexico 11. Mexico (+6%) 12: Canada 12: Saudi Arabia (+7%) 13: Korea 13: Vietnam (+125%) 14: Saudi Arabia 14: Egypt (+78%) 15: South Africa 15: Korea (-31%) 16: Canada (-40%) 17: Germany (-52%) 18: Turkey 18: South Africa (-25%) 22: Vietnam 24: Egypt The above diagram illustrates the expected changes in the ranking of the world’s largest carbon emitters in the period from 2015 to 2030: the proportion of global carbon emissions accounted for by the EU and Germany will decrease in this period, while other states’ share of carbon emissions will signifcantly increase. 70 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Thinking globally – acting strategically and in a differentiated way We intend to further expand our climate cooperation – and thereby our climate partnerships – with the following countries and regions in particular: 1. those which have major greenhouse gas reduction potential and are potential future contributors of inter- national climate fnance. In order to still limit global warming to 1.5°C, major emitters in particular must massively and rapidly step up climate action efforts. 2. those where climate justice and the SDGs – in line with the “leave no one behind” principle – entreat us to support peoples and communities historically least responsible for climate change and worst affected by its impacts. 3. those where our cooperation can have multiplier effects across the breadth of our bilateral relationships. One such example is our increased commitment in the Pacifc region, where our new diplomatic mission in Fiji with its Special Envoy for the Pacifc Island States will support regional engagement and more joined-up German climate capacities and projects in this region. We also intend to provide particular support for regions whose transition is of outstanding strategic interest to Germany and the EU. No country on Earth will escape the effects of cli- Ambitious and more coherent partnerships mate change. However, it is precisely the countries least responsible for climate change which have the Over the next few years, we will establish a more least capacity to deal with the devastating conse- coherent, denser and stronger network of partners. quences. For least developed countries (LDCs) and The implementation of our climate foreign policy countries especially vulnerable to climate impacts is tailored to the needs and priorities of our partner – such as the small island states in particular – countries: that is why there is simply no one model reconciling economic development, resilience, for our climate partnerships. What they all have in sustainability, equality and social justice is the key common is the goal of working together to step up challenge. In future, we will therefore work to efforts to achieve the Paris climate targets and the consistently strengthen synergies between climate Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda. action and adaptation, humanitarian assistance, We take our partners’ needs, interests and potential climate risk management and development cooper- into account as much as our own interests and needs. ation (see also sections C2, C4, C5 and C6). We also intend to work together with states which do not fully share our principles or goals, in a focused and issue-based manner. The climate foreign policy activities of third countries and specifc geopolitical conditions are also taken into account. We adapt our climate partnerships to the circum- stances in our partner countries and to their needs, in order to more rapidly achieve results in all felds of activity and work together to champion ambitious outcomes in international climate negotiations. In Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 71 particular, we intend to enter into climate partner- As well as our bilateral partnerships, we are commit- ships with countries that can contribute to emis- ted to plurilateral cooperation formats involving the sions reductions on a large scale and are prepared EU or other partner countries (e.g. other contributor to accelerate the transition to climate neutrality in countries) with which we support progress in areas accordance with the 1.5°C target. Via tailored offers including the energy transition in third countries (e.g. (bilateral or multiple-contributor partnerships, e.g. JETPs, see box) and the protection of forests (e.g. on the basis of the Just Energy Transition Partners- within the scope of partnerships as part of the Forest hips (JETPs) model), we aim to provide ambitious and Climate Leaders’ Partnership – see section C4). countries with more targeted support for the tran- sition processes beyond the project level. JETPs are As a complement to our bilateral partnerships, we beacons of international climate, energy and de- intend to strengthen broader regional approaches velopment cooperation, with a high level of ambition and cooperation with regional institutions (e.g. with and international (fnancial and technological) sup- the OSCE, ASEAN, the Pacifc Islands Forum, ECO- port. They are dedicated to the goals of a just energy WAS, CARICOM) in order to support regional co- transition and follow the principle of not promoting operation and regional capacity-building. In terms of fossil fuels and of accelerating the decarbonisation of both energy and security policy, we have a particular the energy sector. strategic interest in advancing climate transitions in the countries of the Eastern Partnership, the Western At the same time, we support smaller states which Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the MENA are particularly exposed to the effects of climate region. This is because of the connections with our change, in particular in strengthening their resilience, own energy systems – as well as the aim to support including within the scope of existing partnership accession candidates in the EU’s neighbourhood in models (see Annex 1) – from development part- converging with Europe’s climate neutrality pathway. nerships to raw materials partnerships – in which climate is playing an increasingly important role. We are working towards improving access to lower- We will make targeted use of our interministerial cost fnancing options via regional and multilateral foreign-policy partnership formats such as binational development and investment banks (see section C6). commissions and strategic partnerships with intergo- At the same time, we aim to more strongly align inst- vernmental consultations to centrally anchor climate ruments such as Global Gateway and the G7 Partner- action cooperation as a cross-cutting priority and ship for Global Infrastructure and Investment with strengthen interlinkages with other geopolitically climate action, in order to make sustainable (energy) important and strategic issues. infrastructure a reality. Moving forward, we want to ensure greater transpa- At the end of 2024, we intend to evaluate the results rency with regard to the criteria for and modalities of of our bilateral partnerships and further develop our partnerships, for our partners at governmental level, partnerships concept on this basis. We are seeking but also for other important stakeholders such as the even greater strategic alignment of these partner- private sector and civil society. Signifcantly im- ships in the context of our bilateral relations and to proved coherence across our international engage- coordinate the ongoing development of our network ment will be key. Alongside active and coherent of partners at the political level. In doing so, we are external communication on all partnerships, this also bearing in mind synergies with partnerships of the includes a strong role for our diplomatic missions as EU and its member states. We will therefore pursue a point of contact in partner countries. this approach with a view to the greatest possible degree of coordination at European level. 72 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Thinking globally – acting strategically and in a differentiated way Examples: there is no “one-size-fts-all” climate foreign policy United States – a key player in the feld of green industrial policy As the world’s largest economy and second-largest greenhouse gas emitter, the United States plays a key role in international climate policy. Through the Infation Reduction Act, the United States has launched the largest climate investment programme in its history and sent a clear signal that the markets of the future will be green and sustainable. Under the leadership of the European Commission – also within the framework of this strategy – we intend to work closely with our US partners in order to build upon each other’s strengths, avoid protectionism and jointly contribute to a new era of sustainable and cir- cular production. In 2022, we deepened our bilateral climate cooperation by establishing a climate and energy partnership – with the goal of accelera- ting efforts to achieve climate neutrality in the United States, in Germany and worldwide. In order to place our climate cooperation on a broad footing, we are also supporting the involvement of stakeholders which play an active role in climate policy beyond national Small island states – government level (e.g. federal states, the business existentially threatened by climate sector, young people) via the Transatlantic change Climate Bridge. Within the scope of this strategy, the German Gov- ernment will step up its cooperation with small and climate-vulnerable island states. In addition to adapting to climate change, the small island states also have to deal with unavoidable loss and damage. They are particularly at risk from extreme weather events which are occurring more frequently and with greater intensity. Moreover, rising sea levels are jeopardising access to resources for many, as well as their cultural heritage and, in the long term, their very existence. The German Government is therefore supporting island states through bilateral, multilateral and regional projects, such as reconstruction following extre- me weather events that expands renewable energy while taking local conditions and needs into consideration. In doing so, we also intend to support small island states in strengthening their in- dependence and resilience. Brazil – a potential Global Player in the climate-neutral economy Brazil plays a key role in global climate action as well as the protection of biodiversity and the environment and has the potential to become a global player in the green economy. Due to deforestation and further changes to vegetation in the Ama- zon biome, there is a risk of passing irreversible tipping points, with potentially massive global consequences for climate and food security. Within the scope of our climate foreign policy, we want to work closely with Brazil as a partner in the global transition to sustainability. Three major topics stand at the forefront of our cooperation on a socially just ecological transformation: the preservation of the Amazon rainfo- rest, the promotion of sustainable agricultural and food systems and the expansion of renewable energy. We are also working to step up regional and multilateral cooperation with Brazil and intend to work together to include local indigenous communities to an even greater extent. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 73 China – the biggest emit- ter, but also the largest renewable energy producer Without China, it will be impossible to address the climate crisis. China is also the largest producer of renewable energy. The German Government is encouraging China to live up to its global re- sponsibility, since the country’s climate and environmental policy decisions affect the entire world. As two strong economies, Germany and China have a responsibility to make signifcant contributions to climate action globally. Given that China is currently responsible for around 25 to 30% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, it has a particularly high level of global responsibility. The German Government intends to continue to work with China at the level of joint pro- jects, where this is in both parties’ interests and will yield concrete results. Germany is also engaging China on more ambitious targets to reduce greenhouse gases. Germa- ny’s climate-related engagement with China is, however, increasingly shaped by competition over green and sustainable markets and resources. As part of our climate foreign policy – embedded in the broader context of Germany’s Stra- tegy on China and the EU’s China policy – we intend to pursue an even more active dialogue with China. A climate and transformation dia- logue has been agreed for this purpose. The German Government will also call for increased contributions to multilateral climate fnance and fair competition in the area of Indonesia – jointly accele- climate-friendly technologies. rating a just energy transition Indonesia – the world’s third-largest democracy – is already among the major emitters in the Global South and its energy demand is set to increase even further in future. Currently, more than half of its electricity demand is met using coal. Without an accelerated energy transition in countries such as Indonesia, we will be unable to achieve the Paris climate targets. In 2022, we therefore utilised the momentum of the coinciding Indonesian G20 Presidency and German G7 Presi- dency to agree on a multi-contributor partnership for a just energy transition (Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), see box above) with Indonesia and other G7 partners as well as Norway and Denmark. Within the scope of this partnership, among other goals Indonesia has committed to achieving net zero emissions in its electricity sector by 2050 – ten years earlier than without this JETP – and to achieving at least 34% renewables in its electricity mix by 2030. That means roughly doubling its expansion of renewables in the present decade compared to its previous plans. In return, the contributors have committed to mobilise 20 billion US dollars to support the attainment of these goals, of which 10 billion US dollars will be from the private sector. Indonesia is currently preparing a Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP) for Kenya – Africa’s renewa- its accelerated energy transition. This will spell ble energy champion out concrete activities for the next 3-5 One goal of our climate foreign policy is to acce- years. lerate the progress of the global energy transition and to help partners expand renewable energy and overcome energy poverty. One example of this is our cooperation with Kenya, the country emerging as Africa’s renewable energy champion. Most of its electricity is already produced using renewable energy (> 90%), with a goal of reaching 100% by 2030. At the same time, in 2021 a quarter of the population lacked access to electricity, and the impacts of climate change are already being felt – as they are in many countries on the African continent. Together with Kenya, we can demonstrate that climate action and adaptation and sustainable development positively reinforce one another. We recently further deepened our long-standing cooperation by entering into a climate and development partnership focusing on renewable energy, sustainable hydrogen and adaptation in the agricultural sector. Moreover, Kenya is playing an increasingly active role in international climate negotiations and was the frst African country to join the Climate Club. We intend to support Kenya to con- tinue to lead the way in climate policy on the African continent. 74 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Thinking globally – acting strategically and in a differentiated way Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 75 E. A participative climate foreign policy Germany’s climate foreign policy is participative. We are therefore systematically expanding opportunities for the whole of society to be involved in our climate foreign policy. It is part of our funda- mental understanding of climate foreign policy that it thrives on the active participation and pooled knowledge of everyone: civil society, business, unions, academia, culture, women, young people, indige- nous peoples and marginalised groups. Subnational structures such as cities and municipalities likewise play a role in the effectiveness of our climate foreign policy. Moreover, the German Government engages in regular dialogue with the German Bundestag on climate foreign policy issues. Transition processes designed to halve emis- sions by 2030 and strengthen climate resilience within this decade will only succeed with frm societal support. The German Government is committed to supporting the active and equal participation of all interested groups. 76 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – A participative climate foreign policy → We pursue close dialogue with civil society and enable the integration of civil-society dialogues in all of our partnership models. → We actively seek dialogue with businesses, trade unions and stakeholder associations in order to reconcile transition processes with fair international competition and position Germany as a partner for ambitious climate action and the decarbonisation of industry. As bodies representing the interests of employees, trade unions are key actors in shaping just transitions. Within the scope of foreign trade promotion and climate diplomacy, we help German businesses to secure opportunities for climate-friendly technologies and markets in other countries. → We also engage in regular dialogue with scientists, in order to ensure that our climate foreign policy approaches are based on the best available science. We work closely with the scientifc community on pro- jects such as the quantitative analysis of climate-confict risks. → All of Germany’s Core Climate Embassies regularly provide platforms for dialogue with national and inter- national experts, including via a “climate talks” format which has been newly established at our missions. → Via the instruments of science diplomacy – such as scholarships, university cooperation arrangements and research centres – we enable researchers, teachers and students to make signifcant contributions to research into climate change (and its impacts) as well as solutions to address climate change. → We continue to expressly support the ambitious implementation of the Gender Action Plan within the scope of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as well as gender-responsive climate fnance. We implement our projects and initiatives in a gender-responsive and, where possible, gender-transformative manner. We supplement the gender strategy of the International Climate Initiative with a gender action plan. The just transition will also be a core aspect of the development action plan on gender equality which was due to be published in late 2023: with concrete measures empowering girls, women and marginalised groups as actors in the transition. → We reach around 2000 schools worldwide via our network of partner schools. More than 15 million people are learning German through our networks. That also enables them to develop an understanding of issues of importance to Germany. This is an ideal way of gaining partners for a climate foreign policy with a social impact. → As a member of UNESCO’s Greening Education Partnership (GEP), we support the worldwide inclusion of climate education in teacher training. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 77 → Via our Goethe-Institut and cultural activities, we involve people from every part of different societies in climate foreign policy. We use both of these instruments to establish spaces which promote mutual un- derstanding of perspectives on climate change and its impacts. We are thus able to develop far-reaching social partnerships on the climate issue. → We continue to consistently call for access for observer groups (NGOs, the scientifc community, the busi- ness sector, representatives of young people, women and girls, indigenous peoples etc.) at the UN and in multilateral formats. 78 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Annex 1

Annex 1: Overview of current partnership approaches Climate and energy partnerships and dialogues, hydrogen partnerships With more than 30 partner countries, Germany’s bilateral energy and climate partnerships and dialogues – the latter being the precursor to a partnership – have served as key instruments of the German Government’s climate and energy foreign policy for many years now. These partnerships enable a structured energy and climate policy dialogue at intergovernmental level with countries which are seeking to transform their energy systems. They also provide momentum for economic cooperation and innovation, on the path to a global energy transition. Germany is also cooperating through hydrogen partnerships (partly as a component of existing energy and climate partnerships) with a growing number of countries in order to accelerate the production and market ramp-up of green and low-carbon hydrogen. Bilateral energy and climate partnerships, energy dialogues and hydrogen partnerships Ukraine Canada Uzbekistan TŸrkiye Kazakhstan Qatar Israel China Tunisia Algeria USA Japan Morocco Mexico South Korea Egypt Vietnam Oman UAE Jordan Saudi Arabia India Brazil Namibia Australia Chile Energy and climate partnerships Ethiopia Energy partnerships South Africa Energy dialogues New Zealand Hydrogen partnerships Source: 2022 annual report on energy and climate partnerships, German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 79 Orientation: Bilateral Relevant for: Developing countries, emerging markets and industrialised nations which are seeking to pursue a process of transition for their energy systems. Focus: Energy sector Objective: In-depth energy policy dialogue at intergovernmental level (e.g. regarding grid and system rules, electricity market design, hydrogen strategies); drafting of joint and country-specifc solutions. Instruments: Working groups, workshops, high-level steering group meetings, bilateral discussions, delega- tion trips, high-profle events, market studies, pilot projects. Example: Germany’s bilateral energy partnership with Ukraine – includes promotion of the sustainable and climate-friendly transformation of the country’s energy sector in connection with reconstruction; example: energy dialogues in Central Asia – advising states where fossil fuels are predominant (such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) on the energy transition. Climate and development partnerships Bilateral climate and development partnerships are intended to provide increased support for developing countries and emerging economies seeking to become more ambitious about achieving the Paris climate targets, while also making progress with their implementation of the 2030 Agenda’s Sustainable Development Goals. Bilateral climate partnerships combine sectoral and reform policy dialogue with approaches aimed at promoting development policy such as advisory services, investment and budget fnance. Their bilateral cha- racter means that they are signifcantly smaller than the plurilateral JETPs (see below). They also do not focus on the energy sector. Instead, they cover climate action and adaptation in various sectors and combine these with the 2030 Agenda. In the past two years, Germany has entered into partnerships with Pakistan, Serbia, Rwanda, India, Peru, Kenya and Colombia as well as a regional partnership with the Western Balkans; further partnerships are in preparation, including with Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire. Orientation: Bilateral Relevant for: Developing countries and emerging economies which have stated their commitment to a heightened level of ambition with regard to the Paris climate targets, in accordance with the 2030 Agenda. Focus: Climate action and adaptation in various sectors (e.g. energy transition, sustainable infrastructure, urban development, transport, waste management and agriculture, protection of natural sinks such as forests and moors, strengthening resilience, macro-fscal transformation). Objective: Support for developing countries and emerging economies in order for them to become more ambitious about achieving the Paris climate targets; involvement of civil society, the scientifc community and the private sector as well as various levels of government (local and national). Instruments: High-level climate and development policy dialogue, increased support in relation to develop- ment and climate policy collaboration and cooperation with the business sector, the scientifc community and civil society. 80 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Annex 1 Just Energy Transition Partnerships The plurilateral Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) which we promoted during our G7 Presidency are an innovative form of climate partnership. The idea behind the JETPs is that various contributor countries (G7+) pool their political and fnancial resources and jointly enter into a dialogue with an ambitious partner country in the Global South – in particular, major emitters seeking to accelerate a just phase-out of coal and their expansion of renewables. Ambitious partner countries receive an extensive offer of support enabling an accelerated energy transition, while committing to clear and measurable increases in their level of climate policy ambition. JETPs currently exist with South Africa, Indonesia, Viet Nam and Senegal. Orientation: Plurilateral (multiple contributor countries for one partner country) Relevant for: Developing countries and emerging economies, in particular major emitters which are commit- ted to accelerating a just energy transition towards 1.5°C. Focus: Energy transition in the partner country, especially the electricity sector Objective: Support for a just transformation of the energy sector, with particular consideration of women, young people and marginalised groups, subject to concrete and quantifable targets on the part of the con- tributors (fnancial and technical support) and the partner country (e.g. emissions ceiling for the electricity sector in 2030, renewables share in 2030). Instruments: International group of partners (high level of coordination among contributors); secretariat as an interface between contributors and the partner country; comprehensive investment and reform plan as well as implementation plan for an accelerated energy transition through which specifc implementation projects are identifed and supported. Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 81 Forestry partnerships Orientation: Bilateral or plurilateral Relevant for: Tropical-forest countries (developing countries and emerging economies) which are pursuing ambitious goals in order to halt deforestation and restore ecosystems. Focus: Forestry and land use sectors Objective: Support for the implementation of country-specifc strategies and measures with defned goals in order to preserve forests and transform the land use sector. Coordination of (increased) climate fnance in line with ambitious national targets. Instruments: Increased coordination among contributors via Germany’s partnership with Norway, the United Kingdom, active role in shaping the country packages through the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership (FCLP), high-level climate and development policy dialogue and cooperation with the business sector, the scientifc community and civil society. Forestry partnerships with Viet Nam and Ecuador are envisaged via the GN2U framework (cooperation in the forestry sector between Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States). They are still at an early stage, but are being actively pursued. Raw materials partnerships Orientation: Bilateral or regional Relevant for: Developing countries, emerging markets and industrialised nations which have raw materials for the energy transition. Focus: Raw materials for the energy transition, in particular rare earths, lithium. Objective: Safeguarding a sustainable and long-term supply of raw materials in order to diversify raw mate- rials supply chains. Instruments: Intergovernmental agreements, joint declarations; in this context, commercial contracts entered into by business enterprises. Besides deepening existing partnerships such as the one with Kazakhstan, the development and expansion of strategic cooperation arrangements (e.g. the Minerals Security Partnership with the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, France, Finland) is envisaged. In addition, raw materials co- operation arrangements are planned with selected countries in Africa and South America (in particular, Chile). 82 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Annex 2

Annex 2: G7 communiqué and other reference documents Hiroshima communiqué of the G7 heads of state and government, May 2023 “We underline our commitment, in the context of a global effort, to accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels so as to achieve net zero in energy systems by 2050 at the latest in line with the trajectories re- quired to limit global average temperatures to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, and call on others to join us in taking the same action.” “We also highlight that we ended new direct public support for the international unabated fossil-fuel energy sector in 2022, except in limited circumstances clearly defned by each country consistent with a 1.5 °C warm- ing limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement, recognising the importance of national security and geo- strategic interests. It is necessary to accelerate the phase out of our dependency on Russian energy, including through energy savings and gas demand reduction, in a manner consistent with our Paris commitments, and address the global impact of Russia’s war on energy supplies, gas prices and infation, and people’s lives, rec- ognising the primary need to accelerate the clean energy transition. In this context, we stress the important role that increased deliveries of LNG can play, and acknowledge that investment in the sector can be appro- priate in response to the current crisis and to address potential gas market shortfalls provoked by the crisis. In the exceptional circumstance of accelerating the phase out of our dependency on Russian energy, publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response, subject to clearly defned national circumstances, if implemented in a manner consistent with our climate objectives without creating lock-in effects, for example by ensuring that projects are integrated into national strategies for the develop- ment of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen.” Elmau communiqué of the G7 heads of state and government, June 2022 “Recognising the importance of national security and geostrategic interests we commit to end new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022, except in limited circumstances clearly defned by each country consistent with a 1.5°C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement. In this context and with a view to accelerating the phase out of our dependency on Russian ener- gy, we stress the important role increased deliveries of LNG can play, and acknowledge that investment in this sector is necessary in response to the current crisis. In these exceptional circumstances, publicly supported investment in the gas sector can be appropriate as a temporary response, subject to clearly defned national circumstances, and if implemented in a manner consistent with our climate objectives and without creating lock-in effects, for example by ensuring that projects are integrated into national strategies for the develop- ment of low-carbon and renewable hydrogen.” Resolution adopted by Germany’s coalition committee (CC) on the protective shield on 29 Septem- ber 2022 The CC’s resolution on the protective shield of 29 September 2022 includes the statement that “in accordance with the obligations under the Paris Climate Agreement, we will work with countries which have the oppor- tunity to develop new gas felds in order to replace Russian gas deliveries now no longer available with a new supply of LNG.” Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 83 COP26 statement on “Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition” “Our joint action is necessary to ensure the world is on an ambitious, clearly defned pathway towards net zero emissions, that is consistent with the 1.5°C warming limit and goals of the Paris Agreement, as well as the best available science and technology. These measures will help stimulate sustainable, resilient and inclu- sive economic development globally, and support a just transition for affected communities: 1. We will prioritise our support fully towards the clean energy transition, using our resources to enhance what can be delivered by the private sector. This support should strive to “do no signifcant harm” to the goals of the Paris Agreement, local communities and local environments. 2. Further, we will end new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector within one year of signing this statement*, except in limited and clearly defned circumstances that are consistent with a 1.5°C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement. 3. We will encourage further governments, their offcial export credit agencies and public fnance insti- tutions to implement similar commitments into COP27 and beyond. This includes driving multilateral negotiations in international bodies, in particular in the OECD, to review, update and strengthen their governance frameworks to align with the Paris Agreement goals. For government signatories, this will also guide our approach on the boards of multilateral development banks. In committing to the above, we furthermore recognise: 1. the fndings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and IEA net-zero analysis show that in the pathways consistent with a 1.5°C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement, the global production and use of unabated fossil fuels must decrease signifcantly by 2030; 2. that the accelerated alignment of international public and private sector fnancial fows is critical to driving energy transitions, energy access and supporting the development of both emerging and existing clean technologies, improving livelihoods and employment prospects worldwide; 3. the progress, driven in part by enabling public fnance investments, in reducing the costs of clean energy alternatives such as solar and wind power to become cheaper than unabated fossil fuels in almost every region of the world, revolutionising and transforming energy options and access; 4. that investing in unabated fossil-related energy projects increasingly entails both social and economic risks, especially through the form of stranded assets, and has ensuing negative impacts on government revenue, local employment, taxpayers, utility ratepayers and public health; 5. the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to recover better and greener for a sustainable economic recovery that saves lives and improves livelihoods.” 84 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Annex 2 Upon signing the statement, Germany submitted the following side letter: “Germany supports the ambition of aligning international public support with the goals of the Paris Agreement. It is key to accelerate the support for renewable energy and energy effciency measures and solutions, while phasing out direct public support for fossil fuels and supporting the transition. At the same time, fossil fuel projects will still be needed to enable the transition to climate neutrali- ty, while simultaneously avoiding lock-ins is indispensable. Thus, targeted support should be possi- ble during the transition period. For Germany, this specifcally concerns natural gas and the gradual transition towards the production and use of clean hydrogen. Germany underlines that any of those projects have to be in line with global and national pathways towards climate neutrality. Therefore, Germany intends to introduce clearly defned conditions for bilateral and multilateral public sup- port. To this end, Germany is committed to advance the discussions around Paris-aligned export credits and insurance within the EU, partners in the E3F Coalition and others.” Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 85

Annex 3: Glossary AEGEI Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ATACH Alliance for Transformative Action on Climate and Health BBNJ Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction CAF Capital Adequacy Frameworks CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market CBAM Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism CBD Convention on Biological Diversity CC Coalition committee CCASCOE Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence CCS Carbon capture and storage CCU Carbon capture and utilisation CEM Clean Energy Ministerial CIPP Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan CMS Carbon management strategy CPF Collaborative Partnership on Forests CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy C-SET Coalition for Addressing Sea-level Rise & its Existential Threats CSM Climate Security Mechanism DAS German Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change DEG German Investment and Development Company DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs E3F Export Finance for Future ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ENACT Enhancing Nature-based Solutions for an Accelerated Climate Transformation ERA European Research Area FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FCLP Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership G20 Group of 20 G7 Group of 7 GBF Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework GCF Green Climate Fund GEF Global Environment Facility GEP Greening Education Partnership GN2U Cooperation in the forestry sector between Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom and the USA GW Gigawatt HAC High Ambition Coalition for Nature and People HDP Humanitarian assistance/development cooperation/peace promotion ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICJ International Court of Justice IEA International Energy Agency IFCMA Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches 86 | Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy – Annex 3 IFIs International fnancial institutions IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development IKI International Climate Initiative ILC International Law Commission IMF International Monetary Fund IMO International Maritime Organization IPBES Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency ISSB International Sustainability Standards Board ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature JETP Just Energy Transition Partnership KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau bank KSpG Carbon Dioxide Storage Law LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund LDC Least Developed Country LiFE Lifestyle for Environment LTNES Long-term negative emissions strategy LNG Liquefed natural gas MI Mission Innovation NAP National Adaptation Plan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NbS Nature-based Solutions NBSAPs National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans NCQG New Collective Quantifed Goal NDC Nationally Determined Contribution NGFS Network for Greening the Financial System OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PtL Power-to-Liquid PtX Power-to-X SASSCAL Southern African Science Service Centre for Climate Change and Adaptive Land Management SDG Sustainable Development Goal SIDS Small Island Developing States SRIA Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda SRM Solar Radiation Management TW Terawatt UN United Nations UNCCD United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifcation UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNEA United Nations Environment Assembly UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFF United Nations Forum on Forests V20 Vulnerable Twenty Group Strategy on Climate Foreign Policy | 87 WASCAL West African Science Service Centre on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization WTO World Trade Organization Picture credits: Cover: picture alliance - dpa, Alex F. 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