Letter dated 3 July 2025 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (transmitting the final report of the Group of Experts)

3 July 2025 Original: English 25-07401 (E) 210725 *2507401* ### Letter dated 3 July 2025 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2738 (2024), have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 6 of that resolution, the final report on their work. The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 6 May 2025 and was considered by the Committee on 2 July 2025. The Group would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Mélanie De Groof Coordinator Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Signed) Jacques Seckène Ndour Expert (Signed) Roberto Sollazzo Expert (Signed) Romina Gilda Rivero Expert (Signed) Krisztina Varga Expert (Signed) David Zounmenou Expert <!-- page 2 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 2/254 ### Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo ### Summary The conflict in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo further intensified, marked by significant territorial gains by Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23) and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), and the breakdown of successive ceasefire arrangements. This coincided with a further regionalization of the conflict through unilateral military deployments by external actors. Despite ongoing peacemaking initiatives, efforts to stabilize the region continued to face significant challenges. Civilians bore the brunt of the conflict, enduring widespread displacement, insecurity and grave violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. AFC/M23 and RDF jointly captured strategic and mineral-rich areas in North and South Kivu Provinces, including the two provincial capitals, Bukavu and Goma. The risk of AFC/M23 and RDF conquering additional territory remained high, despite the military overextension of AFC/M23 and challenges in maintaining public security and imposing control. In early 2025, Uganda unilaterally doubled its military presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, deploying additional troops of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) to North Kivu and Ituri Provinces without the prior approval of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These deployments occurred outside the framework and operational zones previously agreed with the Government. The deployment of UPDF in proximity to AFC/M23 positions, combined with the public alignment of the Chief of Defence Forces of UPDF with RDF, prompted questions about the real objectives of Uganda. RDF support played a critical role in the territorial expansion of AFC/M23 and its occupation of new territories. Its use of advanced military equipment, including jamming systems, short-range air defence systems and armed drones, constitutes a violation of the sanctions regime. The presence of RDF drastically increased during key offensives, such as the takeover of Goma, and was sustained across territories controlled by AFC/M23. RDF forces were actively involved in combat and in cordon-and-search operations to suppress remaining resistance, and provided security for AFC/M23 leadership. The control of AFC/M23 over large parts of North and South Kivu secured the access of Rwanda to mineral-rich territories and fertile land, and increased the influence of Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. AFC/M23 bolstered its military strength through large-scale forced and voluntary recruitment, including of surrendered combatants of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and Wazalendo, diaspora members and ex-RDF elements. Several political actors and armed groups, including some Wazalendo, shifted allegiance following the rapid territorial gains made by AFC/M23. All recruits underwent mandatory military and ideological training, which emphasized the return of Congolese refugees and the overthrow of the Government in Kinshasa as the main objectives of the rebellion. AFC/M23 consolidated its established practice of installing parallel administrations in newly conquered territories, further formalizing its governance as the de facto occupying power. These structures were aimed at consolidating control and generating revenue. AFC/M23 forcibly removed traditional authorities and silenced civil society actors who were deemed unsupportive, often subjecting them to torture or killing them. AFC/M23 operated its imposed governance structures without <!-- page 3 --> S/2025/446 3/254 25-07401 basic legal safeguards or accountability mechanisms, resulting in arbitrary punishments and extrajudicial executions. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to rely on Wazalendo armed groups and the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) as proxy forces. Although offensives carried out by AFC/M23 and RDF decimated the alliance of FARDC, Wazalendo and FDLR, groups belonging to Wazalendo and FDLR reorganized and engaged in tit-for-tat attacks against AFC/M23 and RDF. To address staffing shortfalls, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo accelerated the recruitment and training process for the Armed Defence Reserve. The looting by AFC/M23 of abandoned FARDC materiel exposed the critical structural weaknesses of the army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including with regard to the management of stockpiles. The military occupation by AFC/M23 of key urban centres, including Goma and Bukavu, triggered a surge in grave violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict. Elements of AFC/M23 and RDF carried out a systematic campaign of repression in occupied areas, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances and night raids on hospitals. Meanwhile, retreating FARDC and Wazalendo combatants committed widespread looting, sexual violence and killings. The reintegration of FARDC soldiers accused of serious violations further entrenched impunity within the ranks of FARDC. All parties to the conflict carried out reprisal killings on suspicion of collaboration with the opposing side. Incidents of mob violence, including in Kinshasa, increased after AFC/M23 captured Goma. The targets were individuals perceived as supporting AFC/M23 or Rwanda, often based solely on their physical appearance or the language spoken. Illegal mining in territories controlled by AFC/M23, the smuggling to Rwanda of minerals not eligible for trade, the mixing of such minerals with Rwandan production and their subsequent export to downstream actors reached unprecedented levels. This posed a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of mineral traceability and jeopardized the trade in “3T” minerals (tin, tantalum and tungsten). Ituri Province remained embroiled in persistent intercommunal violence between the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais (CODECO/URDPC) and the Zaïre armed group. CODECO/URDPC was responsible for the majority of documented violations, including mass killings and attacks on sites hosting internally displaced persons. The leadership of CODECO/URDPC failed to ensure accountability for grave abuses against civilians, reflecting internal tolerance for such conduct. All communities continued to be affected by child recruitment and conflict-related sexual violence, both of which remained significantly underreported. The unilateral deployment by Uganda of UPDF troops in Mahagi and Djugu territories in Ituri exacerbated tensions and risked stoking intercommunal violence. The sanctioned individuals Thomas Lubanga and Innocent Kaina each created a politico-military movement with the declared objective of opposing the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Both individuals remained based in Kampala, where their sustained presence and activities benefited from endorsement by Ugandan authorities. CODECO/URDPC and Zaïre continued to control gold mining sites in Djugu and Mahagi territories in Ituri. Some members of the provincial and national parliaments <!-- page 4 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 4/254 involved in illegal gold mining operations made payments to CODECO/URDPC. Gold extracted illicitly from Ituri continued to be smuggled, primarily through Kampala. In South Kivu, AFC/M23 captured a vast territory, including the provincial capital Bukavu, which was taken by AFC/M23 and RDF without major combat. While AFC/M23 struggled to maintain order and control, it continued advancing further south, facing Wazalendo groups weakened by internal rivalries. In the Hauts Plateaux, Charles Sematama assumed command of Twirwaneho after the killing of the sanctioned individual Makanika, officializing the alliance between Twirwaneho and AFC/M23. The massive build-up of Burundian troops, as well as the support of Rwanda for AFC/M23 as it pushed towards areas bordering Burundi, escalated tensions between Rwanda and Burundi. <!-- page 5 --> S/2025/446 5/254 25-07401 ### Contents Page I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 II. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars and Rwanda Defence Force . . . . . . . . . . 7 B. Critical Rwanda Defence Force support to military operations and territorial occupation . . . 13 C. Uganda People’s Defence Forces interposition in Lubero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 D. Government proxies and multiplicity of actors on the ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 E. Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 F. Threats to mineral traceability and supply chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 III. Allied Democratic Forces in the Grand Nord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 IV. Ituri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 A. Armed group dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 B. Uganda People’s Defence Forces deployment in Djugu and clashes with Coopérative pour le développement du Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 C. Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 D. Illegal mineral exploitation and trade financing armed groups and sanctioned individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 V. South Kivu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A. Developments in the northern territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 B. Developments in the Hauts Plateaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 C. Escalation of tensions between Rwanda and Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 VI. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 VII. Addendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Annexes* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 * The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing. <!-- page 6 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 6/254 ### I. Introduction 1. The mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo was extended on 27 June 2024 by the Security Council in its resolution 2738 (2024). Five members of the Group of Experts were appointed by the Secretary-General on

16 August 2024 (see S/2024/620). The sixth expert was appointed on 10 February 2025 (S/2025/88). The sixth expert’s contract commenced on 1 March 2025. Consequently, the expert was not involved in the collection, analysis or verification of evidence contained in the present report. The signature of the expert reflects support for the Group’s collective output. 2. The final report of the Group is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2738 (2024). The Group exchanged information with the panels of experts on the Central African Republic, Haiti, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen, and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023) concerning Al-Shabaab. Cooperation with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 3. The Group expresses its gratitude for the support and collaboration provided by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) during the reporting period. Methodology 4. The Group used a rigorous methodology built on evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Group’s methodology is fully detailed and its interactions with Member States and other actors are described in annex 1. 5. The Group based its findings on documentary evidence and information that was thoroughly verified and corroborated. Given the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, few documents provide definitive proof of illicit activities. The Group has therefore relied on eyewitness testimony, including from victims, members of local communities and former and current members of armed groups, and considered expert testimony provided by Government officials and military officers of countries in the Great Lakes region and beyond, and by United Nations sources. 6. Access to remote or sensitive locations has frequently been constrained by logistical challenges, insecurity or restrictions imposed by armed groups or official authorities. While such constraints have posed operational challenges, they have not prevented the Group from fulfilling its mandate since its establishment in 2004. 7. The present report covers investigations conducted up to 20 April 2025. Owing to word count limitations, the Group has placed certain evidence, analysis and findings in the annexes. Annexes constitute an integral component of the present report and are to be read in conjunction with its main findings and analysis. <!-- page 7 --> S/2025/446 7/254 25-07401 ### II. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars crisis ### A. Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars and Rwanda Defence Force Organization and objectives of Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars 8. The overall military command of Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23) remained under “General” Sultani Makenga (CDi.008), and political leadership with Bertrand Bisimwa and Corneille Nangaa. The military and political leadership of AFC/M23 continued to receive instructions and support from the Government of Rwanda and its intelligence services (see paras. 34–56 below). The Rwandan-Congolese national Fred Ngenzi Kagorora 1 and Brigadier General Patrick Karuretwa remained in frequent contact with Messrs. Makenga and Bisimwa and “Colonel” Imani Nzenze. By contrast, Mr. Nangaa, initially presented as the political face of AFC/M23 to reframe the rebellion as a “Congolese problem” (see S/2024/432, para. 25), was gradually sidelined by Rwanda. This shift occurred primarily due to Mr. Nangaa’s personal ambition to take power in Kinshasa through the use of force (see paras. 42–44 below and annex 2). While Rwanda and M23 subscribed to the notion of regime change, they were not in favour of a military campaign advancing towards Kinshasa. 9. Internal tensions surfaced within AFC/M23, exacerbated by contested internal appointments (see para. 26 below) and former President Joseph Kabila’s controversial announcement that he would return to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. These tensions reignited divisions among historical factions aligned with Rwanda and Uganda. In an effort to restore cohesion and reinforce popular support for AFC/M23, the Government of Rwanda reportedly planned to appoint the sanctioned individual Laurent Nkunda (CDi.022) to an important position within AFC/M23 (see annex 3). 10. The pledge made by AFC/M23 to unite armed groups and political actors (see S/2024/432, paras. 23–29) further materialized. In North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces, several armed groups – including former Wazalendo groups that had shifted allegiance following the rapid gains made by AFC/M23 – decided to join AFC/M23 (see paras. 68, 69, 129 and 171 below). While political and military heavyweights – including Joseph Kabila, Moise Katumbi and John Numbi – did not officially rally to AFC/M23, they were regularly in contact with Mr. Nangaa and with Kigali and Kampala.2 The new alliances made by AFC/M23 and its rapid military conquest of new territories and provincial capitals significantly affected the political and military landscape of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, exacerbating tensions in Kinshasa. On the military side, the failure of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) to secure provincial capitals, along with massive defections and casualties, brought to light the army’s structural weakness, affecting its credibility (see paras. 14–19, 65, 74, 75 and 87–91 below). 11. The initial objective of M23 was to force the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to accept its demands, including on amnesties, repatriation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, integration into FARDC and allocation of political positions (see S/2022/479, annex 35). The initial demand of AFC was, among others, the reconstruction of the State and addressing the underlying causes of the armed conflict (see S/2024/432, para. 25). The alliance between AFC and M23 __________________

1 See S/2014/428, para. 65. Mr. Ngenzi, one of Makenga’s top advisers, frequently travelled between Kigali and Goma. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) sergeant John Muhire has been another of Makenga’s top advisers since February 2025, when he arrived in Goma from Rwanda.

2 AFC/M23, intelligence and diplomatic sources, sources close to the Government of Rwanda and RDF, and community leaders. <!-- page 8 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 8/254 combined the objectives of the two groups. Their demands further evolved to echo the overt and covert objectives of Rwanda (see paras. 42–44 below). Consequently, the indoctrination of new recruits by AFC/M23 conveyed that the organization’s objectives included: (a) the neutralization of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR); (b) the return of Congolese refugees; and (c) the overthrow of the ruling Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see para. 43 below). According to sources in AFC/M23 and RDF, as well as sources close to the Government of Rwanda, the stated objectives included the creation of an autonomous region in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, something that is reflected in the attempts made by AFC/M23 to instate new government structures (see paras. 25–33 below). 12. AFC/M23 did not show a genuine commitment to a negotiated settlement of the crisis.3 AFC/M23 leaders and Rwandan government officials stated that “AFC/M23 would not leave the occupied areas, whatever the outcome of the negotiations”, and that “the time for agreements [had] passed”. This message was disseminated during the indoctrination training provided by AFC/M23 to newly recruited politico-administrative agents (see paras. 20–24 below and annexes 4, 14 and 15), 4 and evidenced by the repeated strategic withdrawals from or boycotting of peace negotiations. Exponential territorial expansion 13. AFC/M23 and RDF jointly captured strategic areas, including provincial capitals and mineral-rich areas, consolidating their territorial control, including through escalated regional tensions. Despite successive peacemaking initiatives (see annex 5), they risked engulfing the region in a broader conflict unless binding dissuasive measures were taken (see paras. 35–44 and 179–181 below and S/2024/969, paras. 44–47).5 14. On 4 January 2025, AFC/M23 and RDF took control of Masisi centre in North Kivu and managed to retain control despite repeated attempts by Wazalendo, FDLR, the Burundi National Defence Force (FDNB) and FARDC to retake it. Two weeks later, AFC/M23 and RDF captured Minova town in Kalehe Territory, South Kivu – a key strategic location facilitating further military operations targeting Goma. The 2,500 FARDC and FDNB troops based in Minova retreated before the arrival of AFC/M23 and RDF troops, leaving behind significant quantities of military equipment. 15. On 22 January, RDF occupied the strategically important Bulenga peninsula, from which it launched attacks against FARDC, the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC) and the defensive positions of MONUSCO in Sake and Mubambiro, which were tasked with defending Goma (see paras. 53 and 84 below). The arrival of RDF troops in Sake and Mubambiro triggered the withdrawal of most FARDC and Wazalendo elements posted there, while FARDC special forces, MONUSCO and SAMIDRC initially resisted. On

24 January, the Military Governor of North Kivu, Major-General Peter Cirimwami, __________________

3 On 18 March 2025, the talks held in Angola stalled as AFC/M23 refused to participate in protest at European Union sanctions targeting AFC/M23 and Rwandan actors.

4 AFC/M23, RDF, intelligence, diplomatic sources and sources close to the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda.

5 See the statement made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO, Bintou Keita, at the thirty-seventh special session of the Human Rights Council on the human rights situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, available at www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/2505/37th-special-session-of-hrc-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-the-east-of-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-2/0, at 00:30:01. <!-- page 9 --> S/2025/446 9/254 25-07401 known for his long-standing ties with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA), was shot dead in Sake (see annex 6). 16. On 24 January, AFC/M23 announced its intention to advance towards Goma to liberate its “compatriots” (see annex 7). The following days, as RDF troop reinforcements arrived from Kitshanga, Kibumba and Kanyamahoro, and from Gisenyi, Rwanda (see paras. 35–39 below), AFC/M23 and RDF launched a decisive attack on Goma. After several days of intense fighting, significant casualties were reported among combatants, including RDF, and among civilians (see paras. 65–67 below). Goma was fully conquered on 27 January. At the time of writing, the airspace over Goma remained closed and AFC/M23 and RDF maintained control over all traffic on Lake Kivu (see para. 169 below and annex 8). 17. Following the takeover of Goma, RDF and AFC/M23 reinforcements were sent by land and by lake to Kalehe Territory in order to pursue rapid territorial conquests in South Kivu. Despite the ceasefire declared by AFC/M23 (see annex 9), AFC/M23 and RDF broke through the joint FARDC-FDNB positions in Nyabibwe on 6 February and managed to seize the strategic airport of Kavumu on 14 February. Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu, was taken on 16 February without combat (see paras. 169–171 below). 18. After conquering the two provincial capitals, AFC/M23 took additional territory, including areas where it had no historical ties to local communities, testing the organization’s ability to sustain control in unfamiliar environments. 6 Amid clashes with FARDC, Wazalendo and FDLR, AFC/M23 managed to conquer areas south of Lubero centre in mid-February, with RDF support. The expansion of AFC/M23 northwards, towards Lubero centre, Beni, Butembo and Kisangani, was curbed by deployments of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), which created a de facto buffer zone between territories controlled by AFC/M23 and FARDC (see paras. 57–61 below). In mid-March, with the aim of bolstering leverage in peace talks that had been planned in Angola and Qatar (see annex 5), AFC/M23 and RDF advanced deep into Walikale Territory, a mineral-rich area home to the largest tin producer in the Democratic People’s Republic of the Congo (see para. 109 below). In early April, AFC/M23 and RDF forces withdrew from Walikale following sustained FARDC airstrikes targeting critical infrastructure, including the Kigoma airstrip (see para. 38 below), alongside mounting international pressure. According to corroborated information obtained by the Group, the decision to withdraw was taken following direct instruction from the Government of Rwanda, once again confirming command and control of Rwanda over AFC/M23 operations (see para. 44 below). 7 This included strategic-level decision-making on whether to seize, hold or relinquish territory, something that demonstrates overall operational coordination and hierarchical subordination. 19. By early April 2025, the area controlled by AFC/M23 and RDF was the largest ever recorded, representing a 100 per cent increase compared with November 2024 (see annex 10). Despite the political and military overextension of AFC/M23 and RDF, and persistent challenges in asserting control and sustaining legitimacy in newly occupied areas, the risk of further southward expansion, particularly along the Uvira- Kalemie axis, remained high. Similarly, had UPDF defensive positions been lifted, __________________

6 For example, while Masisi and Rutshuru territories were widely composed of Kinyarwanda-speaking communities, this was not the case in Lubero or Walikale.

7 See https://cd.usembassy.gov/fr/point-de-presse-numerique-massad-boulos-conseiller-special-pour-lafrique-et-corina-sanders-sous-secretaire-adjointe-aux-affaires-africaines. <!-- page 10 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 10/254 Lubero centre, Beni, Butembo and Kisangani would have been at immediate risk of being conquered (see paras. 57–61 below). Mass recruitment and training 20. In early April 2025, a conservative estimate of 5,000 AFC/M23 combatants were actively deployed in Petit Nord and South Kivu. AFC/M23 military capacity continued to be consolidated through ongoing massive recruitment, both forced and voluntary, and through military and ideological training (see S/2024/432, paras. 35–39; and S/2024/969, paras. 41–43 and 104–108). The armed group was in constant need of new recruits to replace the forces lost, prepare for new offensives and consolidate control over occupied territories (see annex 11). 21. Following the takeover of Goma, over 2,000 FARDC, Congolese National Police (PNC) and Wazalendo elements were taken for training to Rumangabo, Rutshuru Territory, most of them forcibly. Their training was still ongoing at the time of writing. Similarly, following the conquests of Minova, Kavumu and Bukavu, AFC/M23 systematically rounded up FARDC and Wazalendo elements, as well as civilians, who were subsequently taken to undisclosed locations (see annex 12). AFC/M23 exerted pressure on MONUSCO to surrender the approximately 1,200 FARDC and Wazalendo combatants who had sought refuge at MONUSCO bases in Goma (see annex 13). 22. The Group notes that the coercive recruitment of civilians, surrendered soldiers and combatants, and their forced transportation for military training by an occupying force, may constitute a sanctionable act and may amount to a war crime. 23. While thousands joined AFC/M23 under duress, new recruits have also joined AFC/M23 voluntarily. AFC/M23 “Colonel” Semikobe Gafishi was responsible for recruiting combatants and politico-military agents in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following the takeover of Goma, new recruits joined the rebellion, including members of the diaspora from the region and from Europe, Canada and the United States of America. An estimated 600 to 800 Congolese refugees in Rwanda, who had been enrolled in RDF also joined the rebellion, considerably bolstering the combat capacity of AFC/M23 (see annex 14). 24. At the time of writing, over 7,000 new recruits were undergoing training at AFC/M23 military camps located in Tshanzu, Rutshuru, Bwito, Bwiza, and Nyongera (see S/2024/432, para. 38). Training focused on military tactics, ideology, intelligence-gathering and recruitment tactics (see S/2024/969, para. 43 and annex 16). AFC/M23 sources confirmed that “Colonel” Léon Kanyamibwa was in command of all training centres, with the support of AFC/M23 and Rwandan trainers (see S/2024/432, para. 39). Kennedy Nari – an influential businessperson and self-described “fixer” living in Kampala, who has close ties with individuals linked to AFC/M23, including Mr. Nangaa 8 – was instrumental in facilitating the travel of foreign recruits, including from Ituri and refugee camps in Uganda. 9 Several political figures from the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy led by Joseph Kabila provided instruction in ideology and politics. The leadership of AFC/M23 selected future politico-military cadres to attend specialized training at the RDF training centre of Gabiro in Rwanda, a facility known for providing specialized military career courses.10 RDF military centres in Nasho and Gako have also been used to train recruits originating from refugee camps in Rwanda, for the benefit of __________________

8 See https://x.com/kennedynari?s=21&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg.

9 Intelligence, AFC/M23 and Ugandan civil society sources, and a Zaïre ex-recruit.

10 See www.mod.gov.rw/rdf/rdf-schools. <!-- page 11 --> S/2025/446 11/254 25-07401 AFC/M23 and Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi (RED Tabara). 11 These trained recruits were subsequently deployed to consolidate territorial control by AFC/M23, participate in military operations aimed at territorial expansion and disseminate the ideology of AFC/M23 among diaspora communities and populations in areas not yet under the group’s control (see annex 15). Parallel administration of Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars governance structure and systematic persecution of customary and civil society leaders 25. AFC/M23 continued to operate and develop its parallel administration, in efforts to institutionalize its governance structure and financial mobilization. 26. With the aim of formalizing its control and authority, AFC/M23 designated Joseph Bahati Musanga (alias Bahati Erasto) and Emmanuel Birato Rwihimbwa as the Governors of North and South Kivu, respectively. Additional appointments in both provinces included deputy governors, territorial administrators, mayors, bourgmestres, “mine delegates” and other local authorities. AFC/M23 also appointed officers of the police forces, the Directorate-General of Migration, the Directorate- General of Customs and Excise and intelligence networks (see para. 96 below). Details on the newly installed AFC/M23 authorities and services are provided in annex 16. 27. AFC/M23 engaged in a systematic effort to dismantle existing State authority and civil structures in the territories under its control, replacing them with its own parallel governance while targeting perceived dissenters, erasing institutional records and laying the groundwork for demographic and land-control changes. For example, it dismantled administrative services and forcibly removed all civil servants who did not adhere to AFC/M23. Similarly, it threatened civil society leaders and systematically tracked, intimidated and substituted legally appointed customary chiefs. Ephrem Kabasha, the AFC/M23 territorial administrator of Nyiragongo, abducted and tortured several civil society leaders. Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa, Bahati Erasto, Willy Manzi, Ndayambaje Birahira and Vianney Kazarama seized and redistributed public and private property, targeting civil society leaders in particular. AFC/M23 systematically occupied public buildings and destroyed archives in order to erase institutional memory and evidence of land tenure, notably in view of the return from Rwanda to North and South Kivu of all Congolese refugees (see annex 17). 28. The establishment of a “digital army” by AFC/M23 underscored the group’s use of information warfare as a key tool for destabilization. This tactic aligned with broader patterns of narrative manipulation aimed at justifying the armed activities of AFC/M23 and undermining peace processes (see para. 101 below). 12 Lawrence Kanyuka remained the key figure within this structure, in his role as head of communication and media and spokesperson for both AFC and M23. 13 29. The Group notes that the imposition of de facto authorities by an armed group in territories that it has conquered constitutes a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It also contravenes norms of international law, including the obligation to respect pre-existing legal and administrative frameworks and the prohibition on forcibly altering governance __________________

11 Ex-combatants, sources close to the Government of Rwanda, refugees and intelligence sources.

12 Documents, AFC/M23 elements and intelligence sources. See also annex 50. 13 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka?s=21&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg. <!-- page 12 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 12/254 structures (see paras. 94–98 below). 14 The coercive removal and replacement of civilian authorities by non-State actors may constitute a serious breach of fundamental human rights,15 including the right to participate in governance through lawful and democratic processes. Taxes, border controls and banking sector under Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars 30. AFC/M23 has replaced officials of the Congolese State migration police (the Directorate-General of Migration) and customs authority (the Directorate-General of Customs and Excise) with individuals appointed by AFC/M23. To facilitate the transit of goods from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Rwanda, these individuals were instructed not to screen goods transiting at Grande Barrière, the main border crossing between Goma and Gisenyi, and instead to delegate border control for transiting goods to Rwandan authorities.16 31. AFC/M23 has supplanted the legitimate State tax collection system, exerting pressure on businesses and non-governmental and international organizations to remit taxes and other fees (see annex 18). National non-governmental organizations have faced the risk of retaliation by AFC/M23 for non-compliance, including threats of closure (see para. 165 below). 17 Recognizing the risks associated with making payments to M23, which is under United Nations sanctions, some businesses suspended their operations, invoking force majeure in correspondence with the designated officer of AFC/M23 responsible for finance, Chadrac Amani.18 32. The seizure of Goma and Bukavu led to the cessation of banking operations and payment systems, hindering fund transfers and salary payments, limiting local economic activity and affecting every aspect of daily life. This disruption compelled residents to rely on costly alternatives, including digital financial services, to gain access to their funds (see annex 19).19 33. In response to the ensuing liquidity crisis, on 7 April 2025, Mr. Nangaa publicly announced the resumption of banking activities through the reopening of the bank Caisse génerale d’épargne du Congo and the creation of a self-styled “regulation authority for [the] economic, financial and assurance sector” to serve as a parallel central bank.20 The management of the bank immediately disassociated itself from this initiative, calling it economic manipulation aimed at serving an armed occupation (see annex 19).21 Mr. Nangaa’s plan faced multiple challenges, including M23 being a sanctioned entity, the requirement of obtaining approval from a recognized Government to operate, securing affiliation with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and gaining recognition from the Bank for __________________

14 Customary international law prohibits combatants, whether State or non-State, from unilaterally imposing new governance systems or forcibly changing civilian administration. That prohibition applies equally in international and non-international armed conflicts. See Hague Regulations, art. 43.

15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25.

16 Goma dwellers, journalists, civil society and researchers.

17 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations and civil society sources.

18 Economic actors.

19 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, economic actors, journalists, researchers and members of civil society. 20 www.youtube.com/watch?v=p3EaELPBB8Q and www.radiookapi.net/2025/04/08/actualite/ societe/la-direction-generale-de-la-cadeco-denonce-la-relance-des-activites. 21 www.radiookapi.net/2025/04/08/actualite/societe/la-direction-generale-de-la-cadeco-denonce-la-relance-des-activites. <!-- page 13 --> S/2025/446 13/254 25-07401 International Settlements.22 At time of writing, no banking institution was operational in the territory controlled by AFC/M23. ### B. Critical Rwanda Defence Force support to military operations and territorial occupation 34. The Group obtained further evidence – including authenticated photographs and video recordings, drone footage, testimony and intelligence – confirming systematic and massive border incursions by RDF, their reinforced presence in Petit Nord and South Kivu, RDF positioning on front lines and direct engagement in combat, and RDF handling of high-tech weaponry.23 RDF operations were critical to the conquest and occupation of new territories and towns (see paras. 13–19 above).24 One week prior to the Goma attack, Rwandan officials confidentially informed the Group that the President, Paul Kagame, had decided to imminently take control of Goma and Bukavu. Systematic border incursions and military operations 35. Between 21 and 27 January 2025, several columns of RDF troops, each comprising hundreds of well-equipped soldiers, advanced into and seized control of Sake, Mubambiro and Goma town, following a coordinated encirclement of each locality. RDF soldiers already stationed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2024/969, paras. 48–55) approached Goma from Mushaki, Karuba and Minova, to the west and south-west of Goma, as well as from Kanyamahoro and Kibumba, to the north of Goma. RDF soldiers also entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo from Rwanda, crossing the border via Gisenyi and other crossing points north of Goma. RDF troops occupied strategic locations, including the Bulenga peninsula and the vicinity of Goma airport, from which they shelled the positions of FARDC, private military companies, SAMIDRC and MONUSCO (see paras. 15, 48, 53 and 81–86). On 26 January, RDF engaged in fighting at Goma airport and urban combat within the town. Similarly, RDF operations were critical to establishing control in Bukavu, which was taken without urban combat (see para. 169 below). Annex 20 and paragraphs 13–19 and 45–55 contain details on the RDF border incursions, engagement in combat, RDF fatalities and sophisticated weaponry. 36. RDF troop presence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo drastically increased in preparation for and during targeted military operations (S/2024/432, para. 43). In January and February 2025, a conservative estimate of 6,000 25 RDF troops, including RDF special forces, were active in North Kivu and northern territories of South Kivu. RDF also engaged formerly demobilized FDLR combatants in reconnaissance, intelligence and military operations (see annex 21). Following the takeover of Goma, the footprint of RDF was reduced to the minimum necessary, in order to maintain discretion about the involvement of Rwanda. A portion of RDF troops retreated to Rwanda, while others redeployed southwards towards Bukavu (see paras. 169–172 below). 37. At the time of writing, an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 RDF troops remained active in AFC/M23 controlled territories, including in urban centres. In Goma, they supported cordon-and-search and house-to-house search operations for remaining resistance __________________

22 United Nations, Association congolaise des banques, Banque centrale du congo and SWIFT.

23 See S/2024/432, paras. 40–54; and S/2024/969, paras. 48–55.

24 Photographs and video footage, intelligence, security, diplomatic and United Nations sources, eyewitnesses and sources close to RDF, Rwandan officials and Government of Rwanda.

25 Former RDF and Rwandan intelligence reported that at least 10,000 RDF troops were deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. <!-- page 14 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 14/254 (see para. 98 below).26 Besides continued involvement in military operations, they also supervised the security of AFC/M23 leadership and deployed at strategic positions, such as border crossings and airstrips, often wearing official Democratic Republic of the Congo uniforms. 38. RDF resupply for operations were conducted by road and air. Planes servicing RDF troops deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo used the Walikale, Kavumu, and Minembwe airstrips. One Rwandan plane was destroyed by a FARDC-operated CH-4 drone in Walikale (see annex 22). 39. Several thousand RDF troops remained positioned along the Rwandan side of the border, ready to deploy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo if necessary, as was the case overnight from 11 to 12 April, when Wazalendo and FDLR combatants attacked AFC/M23 positions in Goma (see annex 23).27 Rwanda Defence Force command and organization 40. Major-General Ruki Karusisi (RDF Special Force Commander), Major-General Eugène Nkubito 28 (RDF 3rd Division Commander) and Lieutenant-General Mubarakh Mugunga (RDF Army Chief of Staff) played key roles in planning and commanding military operations in North Kivu and South Kivu (S/2023/431, para. 59 and annex 35; S/2023/990, para. 30; and S/2024/432, para. 43 and annex 30). RDF established forward headquarters in Gisenyi, Rwanda, bordering Goma town. 41. RDF sources, sources close to RDF, AFC/M23 and Rwandan officials and intelligence and diplomatic sources confirmed that RDF operations were conceived and coordinated, among others, by General James Kabarebe, a retired RDF military officer currently serving as Minister of State for Regional Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Rwanda, as well as the Army Chief of Staff, Major-General Vincent Nyakarundi,29 and the President of the Rwandan Military High Court in charge of justice and discipline within the RDF, Brigadier General Patrick Karuretwa. 30 Mr. Kaberebe had long-standing links with M23, since the armed group’s first iteration in 2012. In fact, the Group of Experts had established at the time that “the de facto chain of command of M23 … culminate[d] with … Gen. James Kabarebe”. 31 Objectives of the Government of Rwanda 42. Successive RDF military engagements did not primarily aim at neutralizing FDLR or halting an alleged existential threat posed to Rwanda (see annex 24). Instead, RDF reinforcements and decisive military operations aimed at conquering additional territories, while the continued presence of RDF enabled AFC/M23 to consolidate control (see paras. 25–33 above).32 __________________

26 Rwandan sources informed the Group of Experts that RDF presence had fallen from 1,380 in early February to about 1,000 (20 per cent of the initial deployment) by mid-March.

27 Eyewitnesses, security, intelligence and United Nations sources.

28 Eugène Nkubito was Rwandan Security Forces Joint Task Force Commander in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, from August 2022 to August 2023. See www.mod.gov.rw/rw/news-detail/mozambique-defence-minister-receives-the-incoming-rwanda-security-forces-joint-task-force-commander and www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/mozambique-armed-forces-chief-of-general-staff-visits-rwanda-security-forces-new-deployment-in-ancuabe-district-cabo-delgado-province.

29 S/2023/431, annex 35. See also https://www.mod.gov.rw/rdf/leaders/army-chief-of-staff.

30 Appointed President of the Military High Court in November 2024.

31 S/2012/843, paras. 9, 24, 27–29, 32, 74, 83 (a) and (b), 88, 89, 167 and annex 3. See also S/2023/431, para. 61.

32 AFC/M23 official communiqués of 5 February 2025. <!-- page 15 --> S/2025/446 15/254 25-07401 43. In turn, AFC/M23 control over eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo secured access by Rwanda to mineral-rich territories and fertile land, decimated FDLR ranks, and guaranteed political influence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. RDF sources and sources close to the Government of Rwanda reported that the final objective of Kigali was to control the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its natural resources (see paras. 109–121 below and annex 25). 44. The systematic presence of RDF alongside AFC/M23, its key role in the successful military operations aiming at territorial conquest and occupation and its de facto control and direction over AFC/M23 military operations (see para. 18 above) constitute sanctionable acts. The Group reiterates that de facto direction and effective control by RDF over AFC/M23 operations render Rwanda liable for the actions of AFC/M23 (S/2024/432, para. 45). In addition, the direct and decisive use of armed force by Rwanda against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo may constitute an act of aggression. Rwanda Defence Force advanced military equipment and technology 45. The Group continued to document the use by RDF of advanced military technology and equipment (S/2024/969, paras. 51–55), in particular prior to and during the capture of Goma, Kavumu and Bukavu. These military systems played a critical role in enhancing the combat strength of both AFC/M23 and RDF, as well as in rendering non-operational the FARDC air assets, the latter’s most lethal and effective combat component. The detection of these military systems and technology provides new evidence of Rwandan support to AFC/M23 in violation of the arms embargo. Jamming and spoofing systems operated from Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwandan territories 46. Extensive jamming and spoofing within and near areas controlled by AFC/M23 and RDF continued to disrupt the global positioning system (GPS) and navigation capabilities of aircraft, indiscriminately affecting military, humanitarian and commercial flights (S/2024/969, para. 53). Jamming and spoofing were particularly tense prior to and during the takeover of Goma. On 25 January, while Goma was threatened and civilian evacuations were ongoing, civilian and military flights were forced to halt operations. 47. Systems responsible for the signal interference were located on Rwandan territory and in territories conquered by RDF and AFC/M23. 33 At least three systems were positioned in Rwandan territory, with two in Gysenyi, less than three kilometres from the Democratic Republic of the Congo border, and one on Iwawa Island on Lake Kivu. RDF activation of these systems affected the wider Goma region. 48. Several new jamming sources were identified on Democratic Republic of the Congo territory.34 Jamming attacks originating from the Bulenga peninsula were first documented few days after RDF captured the Peninsula (see paras. 15, 35, 53 and 84), and attacks originating north of Minova were first documented when the area came under exclusive RDF and AFC/M23 control (see paras. 14, 21 and 35 above). Jamming and spoofing systems were often activated simultaneously at different locations, making any operation requiring a GPS system in a wide geographical area inoperable (see annex 26). __________________

33 S/2024/969, para. 53. Documents on file with the Group.

34 S/2024/969, annex 25 on previously identified positions of jamming and spoofing systems. <!-- page 16 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 16/254 Short-range air defence systems 49. On 26 January 2025, a short-range air defence system mounted on an armoured infantry vehicle was observed 16 kilometres north-east of Goma airport. Consequently, all air assets were grounded. On 14 February, the day that RDF and AFC/M23 seized Kavumu, such a system was observed on the way to Kavumu, marking the first sighting of this system in South Kivu. Analysis of the imagery of both such systems showed similar characteristics to the Norinco Type 92 Yitian TL-6. The Group previously reported that these ground-to-air missile systems were exclusively operated by RDF (see annex 27).35 50. The deployment of high-tech systems capable of neutralizing air assets offered a decisive tactical advantage to RDF and AFC/M23 (S/2024/432, para. 49; and S/2024/969, para. 55). On 21 February 2025, the Security Council demanded the cessation of GPS jamming and spoofing and the deployment of air-to-air missiles “and of any other threat to the air operations of MONUSCO, SAMIDIRC and humanitarian actors”.36 At the time of writing, GPS jamming and spoofing continued, and short-range air defence systems were still deployed. Armed drones 51. On 26 January 2025, an armed drone destroyed two vehicles belonging to the private military company Congo Protection in Kibati (see para. 74 below). Four company staff were wounded in the attack. Thereafter, the armed drone flew over FARDC and company positions at Lac Vert, between Goma and Sake. 52. According to military analysts, the drone, which was observed and caught on video footage, shows characteristics similar to a TB2 Bayraktar medium-altitude long-endurance armed drone.37 These drones are part of the RDF arsenal and have been observed at Kamembe airport in Rwanda, north-east of Bukavu.38 Sources close to RDF and the Government of Rwanda confirmed that the January 2025 drone attack had been conducted by RDF (see annex 28). Guided missiles against peacekeepers 53. On 25 January 2025, an armoured personnel carrier belonging to MONUSCO, posted at one of the Mission’s blocking positions in Sake, was struck by hostile fire (see para. 29 above). One peacekeeper was killed and four others were injured. In their reports, military analyst indicate that damage was most likely caused by a missile strike.39 Analysis of the missile’s trajectory, coupled with eyewitness testimony and military analysis, indicates that it was fired from the RDF position on the Bulenga peninsula (see paras. 15, 35, 48 and 84). Previously, on 10 June 2024, a SAMIDRC armoured vehicle had been struck by a SPIKE extended-range guided missile (S/2024/969, para. 53 and annex 24). 54. Targeted attacks by the armed forces of Rwanda – a troop-contributing country to United Nations peacekeeping operations (see annex 30) – against United Nations peacekeepers represents a signal of defiance toward the United Nations presence and its mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and a violation of the principles governing peacekeeping operations (see para. 78 below). __________________

35 See S/2024/432, paras. 47–49; and S/2024/969, para. 55.

36 See Security Council resolution 2773 (2025).

37 See https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-tb2/.

38 Imagery on file with the Group.

39 See S/2024/969, para. 53. <!-- page 17 --> S/2025/446 17/254 25-07401 55. Annex 31 contains additional information on AFC/M23 and RDF weaponry and materiel, including erased markings to hide the origin of the weapons and the use of surveillance drones. Request for temporary suspension of military equipment exports to Rwanda due to persistent arms embargo violations 56. The Group notes that the flagrant and systematic violations of the arms embargo, as documented in the present and prior reports,40 highlight the risks associated with the export of military equipment to Rwanda, which may be used by RDF in North and South Kivu, thereby undermining regional peace and security. ### C. Uganda People’s Defence Forces interposition in Lubero 57. The successful AFC/M23 and RDF offensive on Goma and anticipated further advances towards Lubero, North Kivu, prompted a rapid military build-up by UPDF, to serve as a strategic buffer along the northern front lines of North Kivu. The Government of Uganda publicly justified this “forward defensive posture” as necessary to protect its security and economic interests. The President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, stated that UPDF presence was unrelated to “fighting the M23 rebels”, emphasizing instead its objective in countering ADF and securing the construction of the Kasindi-Beni-Butembo road (see annex 32). 58. In early February, UPDF deployed over 1,000 additional UPDF troops to the south of Lubero.41 Additional UPDF troops were stationed along the Lubero-Butembo axis, while others deployed to Bunia and Mahagi and Djugu territories in Ituri (see paras. 134–140 below). Total deployments in 2025 accounted for at least 3,000 additional troops, bringing the total UPDF presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2024 to over 6,000 personnel – effectively doubling the footprint of Uganda in the country.42 By contrast, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had only been officially notified of 2,000 UPDF personnel operating under the framework of Operation Shujaa since its inception. 43 59. Uganda maintained that the UPDF deployment fell within the broader framework of Operation Shujaa. However, the new deployments did not result in any operational gains against ADF (see paras. 122–125 below). The Government confirmed that the new UPDF deployment had been executed without its prior approval and that UPDF was undertaking unilateral initiatives outside the framework of joint operations with the FARDC.44 60. This intervention elevated Uganda to a prominent stakeholder in the ongoing conflict. The immediate proximity of UPDF forces to AFC/M23 and RDF positions in southern Lubero territory 45 raised concerns about the impartiality of the UPDF presence, considering the previously documented support of some UPDF elements to AFC/M23 operations (S/2024/432, paras. 55–59). On the one hand, UPDF prevented AFC/M23 forces from advancing toward Kisangani 46 – through negotiation rather than direct confrontation – consistent with the declared aim of Uganda of protecting its national interests while avoiding armed confrontation with M23. On the other __________________

40 S/2024/969, paras. 51–55; S/2024/432, paras. 46–54; S/2023/990, paras. 29–32; and S/2023/431, paras. 52–61.

41 Intelligence and military sources, photographic and video evidence.

42 United Nations, military and intelligence sources.

43 Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

44 Intelligence and military sources, photographic and video evidence.

45 Ibid.

46 AFC/M23 insiders, and intelligence sources. <!-- page 18 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 18/254 hand, as the FARDC regional headquarters regrouped in Beni, the presence of UPDF effectively acted as a buffer on the northern front, where AFC/M23 and RDF were most vulnerable militarily (see para. 18 above). This positioning yielded a significant tactical advantage to AFC/M23, which, reassured that it would not be attacked from the north, could instead focus its operational capacity westward, facilitating offensives toward Walikale. 61. Repeated incendiary public statements by the Commander of the Defence Forces of UPDF, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, such as expressing admiration for President Kagame and emphasizing close cooperation between the UPDF and RDF, have raised legitimate questions regarding the underlying objectives of the involvement of Uganda in the region (see annex 33). ### D. Government proxies and multiplicity of actors on the ground 62. A multiplicity of uniformed actors – FARDC, Burundian troops (FDNB) (see paras. 179–181 below), MONUSCO peacekeepers, SADC troops, private military companies – were engaged in the operational theatre to stop the AFC/M23 territorial conquest (S/2023/431, paras. 47–48). Moreover, the AFC/M23 and RDF assault on Goma and Bukavu accelerated the plan of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for recruitment and training by the national defence force, known as RAD, to reinforce the capacity of FARDC on the ground (see annex 34). Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo cooperation with Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie/Wazalendo and Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 63. Throughout the period under review, the Government continued to rely systematically on Wazalendo groups, including the Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie (VDP) and the sanctioned FDLR (Cde.005) to fight AFC/M23 and RDF (S/2024/432 paras. 60–65; and S/2024/969, para. 74) on all the front lines (see paras. 14–16, 18, 21 and 39 above). VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR mostly occupied the first line of defence, with FARDC backing them. 47 After a brief and unsuccessful FARDC offensive against FDLR combatants – aimed at demonstrating the responsiveness of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to international pressure to cease its support to FDLR (S/2024/969, paras. 67–80) – the damaged FARDC- VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR relations were restored. On 31 December 2024, the armed groups and military authorities, led by the late Military Governor of North Kivu, Major-General Cirimwami, met in Goma to reinforce their defence cooperation.48 The Government subsequently transferred money and logistics to these groups, in violation of the sanctions regime (see annex 35, and S/2024/969, para. 39). 64. In response to increasing AFC/M23 attacks starting January 2025, VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR intensified the recruitment of new combatants, including children, in their respective areas of influence and in internally displaced persons camps. New recruits received accelerated training to maintain fighting capacity for the successive operations across multiple fronts (see annex 36). __________________

47 FARDC, intelligence and civil society sources, ex-combatants and researchers.

48 FARDC, intelligence, civil society and United Nations sources, ex-combatants. <!-- page 19 --> S/2025/446 19/254 25-07401 Impact of the Goma offensive on Wazalendo and Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 65. The intense fighting during the AFC/M23 and RDF assaults on Sake, Mubambiro and Goma inflicted heavy losses on VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR forces (see paras. 70–73 below). The killing of Major-General Cirimwami, the flight of the FARDC high command and mass retreat of FARDC troops (see paras. 14, 87, 89 and 169) left the armed groups soon facing the enemy alone and without coordination. 66. Frontlines and positions manned by VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR, either alone or jointly with FARDC, rapidly decayed under heavy attacks. Although VDP/Wazalendo initially displayed some resistance, several thousand combatants were either killed or wounded, or captured and brought to AFC/M23 training camps (see paras. 20–24 above). At the time of writing, a considerable number of VDP/Wazalendo combatants remained in hiding in Goma, despite the expiration of successive AFC/M23 ultimatums to surrender.49 Many FDLR captives were handed over to the Government of Rwanda (see para. 70 below). 67. The remaining Wazalendo and FDLR combatants first retreated to the outskirts of Goma, where a significant number of them reorganized and engaged in tit-for-tat attacks against AFC/M23 and RDF positions (see para. 39 above). In mid-February, several thousand combatants transited through Virunga National Park, Bukombo, Mweso and Lukweti to reach the outskirts of Nyabiondo in Masisi territory. 50 Other combatants retreated to Walikale and Lubero territories (see para. 78 below). Lack of cohesion and defections 68. VDP/Wazalendo command remained under the overall leadership of sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwissa (CDi.033), who continued to call for Wazalendo loyalty toward the Government (S/2024/969, para. 74). Still, the Wazalendo coalition was plagued by defections, internal rivalry and distrust towards the Government (see paras. 173–174 below). 69. On 7 March 2025, “General” Kasereka Kasyano Kabidon announced the allegiance of the Front commun de la résistance (FCR), a Wazalendo coalition, to AFC/M23 (S/2024/432. paras. 66–68). However, several FCR members disavowed Mr. Kabidon’s announcement and reiterated their loyalty to the Government (see annex 37). In an attempt to restore VDP/Wazalendo-FARDC coordination and cohesion, plan future operations and mobilize resources, Justin Ndayishimiye, a member of the national Parliament, convened a meeting on 19 March with VDP/Wazalendo commanders from Masisi, Rutshuru and Walikale territories in Katoyi, Masisi territory.51 Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda retreat and reorganization 70. Despite the existence of the joint plan of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to neutralize FDLR (S/2024/969, para. 38), FDLR remained a key ally of FARDC. Former FDLR combatants revealed that the rebellion’s military capacity had been significantly strengthened thanks to important FARDC transfers of equipment (S/2024/969, para. 38).52 From November 2024 until the time of writing, FDLR combatants – either alone or jointly with FARDC, VDP/Wazalendo and/or FDNB – were active at front-line positions in Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, Lubero and __________________

49 Ibid.

50 Eyewitnesses, Wazalendo combatants and civil society sources.

51 VDP, civil society, intelligence and FARDC sources, and researchers.

52 Ibid. <!-- page 20 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 20/254 Masisi territories, and in South Kivu (see paras. 169–174 below, and S/2024/432, paras. 70–72). 71. Nevertheless, the territorial advances of AFC/M23 and RDF significantly disrupted FDLR presence and operations. Key commanders and combatants were compelled to relocate to localities in Rutshuru,53 Masisi 54 and Nyiragongo territories. FDLR military commander and sanctioned individual “Major-General” Pacifique Ntawunguka, alias Omega (CDi.024)55 and other key leaders, fearing RDF attacks, withdrew in the vicinity of the Nyiragongo volcano and inside the Virunga National Park.56 In line with the FDLR strategy to embed combatants within VDP/Wazalendo units (S/2024/969, para. 75), FDLR mixed with CMC-FDP in Bukombo 57 and with Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain and Union des forces pour la défense patriotique congolaise in Nyiragongo and on the outskirts of Goma. 72. Under constant RDF and AFC/M23 threat, FDLR was also forced to decamp from Mianja and Lukweti, traditional FDLR strongholds hosting important FDLR training centres,58 where new recruits were taught anti-Rwanda ideology and combat techniques.59 After a short break allowing for reorganization, in late January-early February, FDLR combatants resumed military operations against AFC/M23 and RDF. 73. On 1 March 2025, AFC/M23 transferred several FDLR captives to the Government of Rwanda, including high-profile commander “Brigadier-General” Ezechiel Gakwerere, (see annex 38). According to AFC/M23, these individuals were arrested during their raid on Goma. 60 Most, including Gakwerere, were arrested during armed operations targeting hospitals (see para. 105 below and annex 39). 61 Private military companies 74. The strategic planning and tactical support of two private military companies – Agemira and Congo Protection (S/2023/431, annex 23; and S/2023/990, paras. 47– 51) – to FARDC counteroffensives against AFC/M23 and RDF was regularly denounced by both AFC/M23 and the Government of Rwanda (see annex 40). During the assault on Goma, 291 Congo Protection staff sought protection at MONUSCO compounds. In accordance with its protection mandate, MONUSCO sheltered Congo Protection staff facing an imminent threat of being killed by AFC/M23. 62 Negotiations between the United Nations and the Government of Rwanda led to their evacuation to Romania via Kigali.63 At the time of writing, all Congo Protection staff had left Democratic Republic of the Congo territory. While 120 Agemira staff were still deployed in Kinshasa and Kisangani, mostly technicians of CH-4 drones and military aircraft, Agemira planned to end its commitments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in September 2025. 75. In December 2024, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concluded a five-year contract with Erik Prince (S/2023/990, annex 31). Through a __________________

53 Ngwenda, Kiseguro, Nyamilima, in Bwisha Chiefdom, and Mabenga, in Bwito Chiefdom.

54 Kahumiro, Kisingari, Kinyamuyaa/Mutsimba, Kikarara.

55 S/2018/531, para. 16; and S/2024/432, para. 74.

56 Ex-combatants, VDP, FARDC, civil society sources and researchers.

57 Masisi territory.

58 Ex-FLDR combatants and intelligence, United Nations and civil society sources.

59 Ex-FDLR combatants, researchers and intelligence sources.

60 AFC/M23 communiqué.

61 VDP, former FDLR, FARDC, civil society sources and researchers.

62 Sources close to AFC/M23 and the Government of Rwanda. Messages on file with the Secretariat.

63 After the Goma assault, 20 former Congo Protection staff were contracted by Agemira to secure the airport in Kisangani. <!-- page 21 --> S/2025/446 21/254 25-07401 complex scheme of enterprises, some based in the United Arab Emirates, Prince offered to secure North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri through the training and deployment of ground troops and the operation of air assets, including armed drones. To finance these military operations, the establishment of a mining “police” was envisaged, charged to collect revenue from Democratic Republic of the Congo extractive industries.64 ### E. Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 76. Amid continued clashes and shifting front lines between armed groups, and between FARDC and AFC/M23, competing for territorial control, civilians once again bore the brunt of the conflict, as all parties committed widespread and systematic violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. While Goma and the surrounding areas were already affected by widespread incidents of sexual violence on a massive scale (see S/2024/432, paras. 91 and 121, and annex 60),65 a further alarming surge in cases has been reported across North and South Kivu, attributed to all armed actors party to the conflict, both in the immediate aftermath of the fighting and during the subsequent consolidation of AFC/M23 control. 77. Given the unprecedented scale of violations, in the present report the Group highlights key categories, focused on events in the context of the AFC/M23 territorial expansion since January 2025 and subsequent efforts to consolidate its occupation. Civilian and humanitarian impact of assault on Goma 78. The battle for the occupation of Goma worsened an already critical humanitarian crisis (S/2024/432, paras. 90–92), severely affecting civilians, further displacing over 700,000 internally displaced persons, disrupting humanitarian assistance (see annex 41) and hindering the ability of MONUSCO to implement its protection of civilians mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (see annex 42). Following the capture of Goma, hate speech and incidents of mob violence increased, targeting individuals perceived to be affiliated with AFC/M23 or Rwanda – often solely on the basis of physical appearance or language. Over a dozen such incidents were documented, primarily in Kinshasa. One man, reportedly accused of being an M23 member due to his ethnicity, was lynched on 25 January in the Lushagala internally displaced persons camp in Goma. 66 79. The fighting resulted in a high number of casualties, including civilians, although the exact toll remained undetermined (see annex 43). One week after hostilities subsided, publicly reported figures varied between 900 67 and 2,900 68 fatalities and over 3,000 wounded, while hasty mass burials were still ongoing and hundreds of corpses still remained unburied.69 While the precise proportion of civilian versus military casualties remains undetermined, military personnel (including Wazalendo) accounted for the majority of fatalities. 70 AFC/M23 political coordinator __________________

64 Government, security and intelligence sources, and sources with knowledge of the matter.

65 See www.msf.org.za/news-and-resources/press-release/msf-reports-massive-figures-sexual-violence-admissions-drc.

66 Open-source video footage, and United Nations, humanitarian and civil society sources.

67 See https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-intensification-violence-north-kivu-and-south-kivu-provinces-situation-report-1-3-february-2025.

68 See https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1159826.

69 United Nations, civil society, protection and intelligence sources, and Goma residents.

70 See www.icrc.org/fr/communique-de-presse/rd-congo-le-cicr-condamne-les-attaques-recentes, and https://msf.org.au/article/project-news/drc-msf-appeals-humanitarian-access-goma-casualties-seek-medical-care. <!-- page 22 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 22/254 Bertrand Bisimwa publicly denied civilian deaths, claiming that all fatalities were combatants (see annex 44). These claims were contradicted by consistent reports on civilian casualties from residents, humanitarian and medical actors, United Nations sources, public reporting, as well as photographic and video evidence. 80. During the hostilities, three MONUSCO peacekeepers were killed and 37 injured,71 along with 16 SAMIDRC personnel killed and 26 wounded (see para. 53 above).72 Indiscriminate shelling 81. Indiscriminate shelling in populated areas continued, notably in Masisi, Sake, Goma and Kalehe (S/2024/432, paras. 91 and 93–98). Warring parties disregarded international humanitarian law obligations of distinction, proportionality and precaution, affecting civilians, displacement camps, civilian dwellings and medical facilities. 82. Hospitals in Goma were overwhelmed by the influx of casualties injured by gunfire and heavy artillery shelling.73 Over 1,000 wounded were registered between 23 and 28 January – including civilians, many of them women and children. 74 83. Between 19 January and 14 February 2025, multiple incidents were reported involving harm to protected medical facilities and personnel. On 20 January, bullets and several rockets landed near the Médecins sans frontières (MSF)-supported hospital in Masisi town, killing one MSF worker and injuring another. Earlier, two civilians were shot outside the same facility, while thousands were sheltering within the compound.75 On 27 January, intense firing and shelling affected two hospitals in Goma, injuring a medical practitioner and a newborn at Goma Provincial Hospital. 76 Humanitarian actors reported that, between 25 January and 14 February, at least 27 health structures in and around Goma had been impacted by attacks. 77 The repeated impact of hostilities on healthcare infrastructure implies a failure to uphold principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution.78 84. On 26 January 2025, several bombs launched from positions on the Bulenga peninsula, controlled by RDF (see para. 53 above), 79 struck the Rusayo 1 and 2 internally displaced persons camps on the outskirts of Goma, killing at least 12 people, including children, and injuring many others. 80 85. On 27 January 2025, as intense fighting centred around Goma airport and Mont Goma, where remaining FARDC and Wazalendo elements resisted, heavy cross-border exchange of artillery fire between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and __________________

71 See S/2025/176, para. 19.

72 See S/2025/73, annex.

73 Protection, humanitarian and United Nations sources. See https://x.com/ICRC_Africa/status/ 1882808926732705993, and https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/01/1152541.

74 See https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/extremely-serious-humanitarian-situation-goma-requires-immediate-attention-international-community.

75 See www.msf.or.ke/news-and-resources/news/north-kivu-masisi-general-hospital-hit-again-gunfire-two-msf-staff-slightly, and www.msf.org/fr/rdcongo/goma-msf-condamne-les-tirs-ayant-fait-un-mort-au-sein-de-lhôpital-de-kyeshero?s=08.

76 United Nations, humanitarian and civilian sources, and photographs. See also https://actualite.cd/index.php/2025/01/27/m23-goma-en-plein-service-un-medecin-touche-par-balle-lhopital-provincial#google_vignette, and https://msf.org.au/article/project-news/drc-msf-appeals-humanitarian-access-goma-casualties-seek-medical-care.

77 See www.unicef.org/media/168896/file/DRC-Flash-Update-28-February-2025.pdf.pdf.

78 Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law.

79 Military and intelligence sources.

80 United Nations and humanitarian sources, researchers, and video evidence. <!-- page 23 --> S/2025/446 23/254 25-07401 Rwandan forces resulted in civilian casualties and severe damage to civilian homes and infrastructure, on both sides of the border. In Goma, the Birere neighbourhood near Goma airport was severely impacted, with at least 53 civilian fatalities documented, mainly women and children, after at least five shells struck several homes in Mapendo and Kahembe neighbourhoods between 27 and 28 January 2025. 81 Residents reported that FARDC heavy artillery was positioned near residential areas.82 Concurrently, shelling and gunfire originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo resulted in the deaths of 5 civilians and injuries to 25 civilians, as well as damage to civilian infrastructure in the Rwandan border town of Gisenyi in Rubavu District (see annex 45).83 86. On 6 February, FARDC bombarded Nyabibwe village in Kalehe territory, South Kivu, targeting AFC/M23 positions. The bombing resulted in injuries to three civilians and the destruction of civilian homes,84 contrary to AFC/M23 claims that four civilians were killed, including an infant 85 (see annex 46). Violations by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo/ Wazalendo amid breakdown of command and control 87. The Group documented a pattern of grave violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by retreating FARDC and Wazalendo combatants during and following the takeover of Goma. These abuses occurred in a climate of impunity, in the general context of a weakening chain of command, including loss of authority due to many high-ranking FARDC officers fleeing and abandoning their troops in Goma (see paras. 14 and 169–170). 88. From 26 to 27 January, in Goma, retreating FARDC and Wazalendo systematically looted civilian homes and shops, engaging in theft, extortion and the shooting of civilians resisting extortion (see annex 47). 86 Between 6 and 8 February, similar patterns were recorded in South Kivu, between Kalehe and Kavumu, as retreating FARDC forces looted civilian property and a health centre, forcibly enlisted civilians to transport stolen goods, deliberately killed at least 15 civilians 87 and engaged in widespread sexual violence.88 MONUSCO documented the rape of three girls aged 13 to 17 by FARDC soldiers between 31 January and 2 February. FARDC authorities confirmed the violations and reported the arrest of alleged perpetrators. On 10 February, at least 84 FARDC soldiers appeared before a military court in Bukavu, accused of desertion, the murder of at least 12 civilians, rape, looting and other crimes committed in several villages of Kabare and Kalehe territories. 89 On

15 February, the withdrawal of FARDC forces from Bukavu led to the escape of over 2,800 detainees and widespread looting, contributing to insecurity. 90 __________________

81 Civilian, humanitarian and United Nations sources.

82 Confirmed by United Nations and intelligence sources.

83 United Nations and intelligence sources, and researchers. See also www.newtimes.co.rw/article/ 23582/news/africa/five-rwandans-killed-35-injured-by-bombshells-from-dr-congo; https://x.com/ bwindja/status/1884160891534598274/photo/1; www.tiktok.com/@user1956621803235/video/ 7465209390132382981; https://x.com/nda_jule/status/1884368676654071986; and https://x.com/ nda_jule/status/1883871253884448904.

84 United Nations sources, local authorities and civil society.

85 See https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1887716114676793435?s=12&t=_n75X fLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg.

86 Civil society, United Nations sources, audiovisual documentation.

87 Civil society, FARDC, United Nations sources, audiovisual documentation.

88 Humanitarian, United Nations, civil society and FARDC sources.

89 United Nations and FARDC sources. See also https://apnews.com/article/congo-soldiers-trial-death-penalty-d49d92f3bfe93010efd1e8250d2170de.

90 Military, intelligence, civil society and United Nations sources, audiovisual documentation. <!-- page 24 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 24/254 89. Similarly, since 17 February, Uvira experienced a severe breakdown in law and order, as the AFC/M23 advance loomed and security forces either retreated (see paras. 169–170 below) or lost control of key areas. Criminal elements and undisciplined FARDC and Wazalendo engaged in widespread killings, looting and attacks on civilian and humanitarian infrastructure. Residents reported bodies strewn all over the city. 91 For weeks, the city became paralysed, causing the mass displacement of civilians, who took refuge in Burundi. Until early April, Wazalendo elements controlled the city, operating with full impunity (see para. 171 below). 92 90. In Lubero town, North Kivu, on 20 February 2025, after AFC/M23 advances had led to heavy clashes and FARDC withdrawals, FARDC elements engaged in systematic looting of civilian homes and shops. 93 The next day, FARDC issued a public apology, attributing the acts to fleeing, undisciplined soldiers acting in violation of orders, and giving assurances that they would face justice. 94 However, on

15 March, 55 FARDC elements who had been convicted for the lootings on

20 February were among the 260 soldiers enrolled in a military “refresher training” programme at the Nyaleke training centre in Beni. 95 91. The practice of reintegrating military personnel implicated in serious misconduct (see para. 141 below) further reinforced impunity within FARDC ranks. Violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars 92. The systematic pattern of grave violations previously documented (S/2024/432, para. 116) persisted as AFC/M23 and RDF sought to consolidate control over newly captured territories. Coerced displacement of internally displaced persons 93. After taking control of Goma, AFC/M23 forcibly displaced internally displaced persons camps west of the city, ordering civilians to vacate within 72 hours, without ensuring that returns were safe (see annex 48). Despite AFC/M23 claims that returns were voluntary,96 evidence indicates coercion, with tens of thousands displaced again to unsafe areas without humanitarian assistance or access to their lands. 97 These forced displacements, without imperative military necessity or civilian protection, violate international humanitarian law and may constitute war crimes. Repressive de facto governance 94. Following the capture of Goma and Bukavu, AFC/M23 established a parallel administration (see paras. 25–33 above). However, it failed to uphold minimum standards of governance and accountability required under international humanitarian law for entities exercising de facto authority over territory. In particular, AFC/M23 did not establish a functioning system for maintaining public order and administering justice. AFC/M23 lacks the institutional infrastructure, qualified personnel, oversight __________________

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Military, United Nations and civil society sources.

94 See https://tazamardc.net/2025/02/21/lubero-larmee-sexcuse-apres-le-pillage-oeuvre-des-elements-incontroles-et-rassure-les-commercants/.

95 United Nations and military sources.

96 See https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1899022537910038669.

97 Civil society, humanitarian, protection and United Nations sources, researchers, representatives of internally displaced persons and audiovisual evidence; see also https://actualite.cd/2025/03/ 02/est-de-la-rdc-plus-de-70-des-retournes-nont-plus-acces-des-terres-pour-lagriculture-en. <!-- page 25 --> S/2025/446 25/254 25-07401 mechanisms and independent review bodies necessary to ensure respect for fundamental legal safeguards.98 95. AFC/M23 relied on civilian informants or self-styled “intelligence operatives” to identify alleged offenders.99 Arrests were routinely carried out by armed elements without investigation, judicial oversight or due process. Sentences – typically beatings or summary executions – were imposed arbitrarily. Perceived disloyalty, theft or sexual violence were generally punished by death. 100 In the absence of detention facilities, extrajudicial executions were employed as a means of expediency. 101 96. AFC/M23 maintains two principal intelligence entities: the Directorate of Security and Intelligence (Direction de sûreté et de renseignement), comprising intelligence and immigration services, headed by Basile Gasigwa, a.k.a. “Gas”; 102 and a military intelligence unit, led by “Colonel” Imani Nzenze. Mr. Gasigwa reports to “General” Makenga, as the civil administration remains under the broad influence of the AFC/M23 military wing.103 These bodies are responsible for surveillance, arrests, identity checks and internal punitive actions.104 97. The disorderly retreat of FARDC, abandonment by Wazalendo of its weapons (see para. 88 above) and mass escape of detainees from prisons has contributed to widespread insecurity in Goma and Bukavu. In this context, AFC/M23 launched a broad security crackdown aimed at consolidating control and deterring dissent. 98. Measures included sweeping operations, cordon-and-search raids and house-to-house searches conducted by AFC/M23 police and military units, including RDF elements (see para. 37 above). Publicly framed by AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka as “security stabilization operations,”105 these actions were accompanied by consistent patterns of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, threats and intimidation, and torture. 106 Victims included suspected FARDC, Wazalendo, FDLR and affiliates; individuals accused of common criminal offences; human rights defenders; civil society members; and political opponents. 107 On 6 February, the AFC/M23-appointed Governor of North Kivu, Bahati Erasto, justified the operations as necessary to apprehend “Wazalendo and FDLR, mercenaries and FARDC who are still hiding in the houses”. 108 99. In Bukavu, at least six children who had dressed up in military uniforms and played with weapons discarded by fleeing FARDC soldiers were killed by AFC/M23 soldiers conducting security sweeps on 16 February – raising questions of excessive use of force.109 __________________

98 Hague Regulations, art. 43, applicable in both internal and international armed conflicts.

99 AFC/M23 insiders, intelligence and United Nations sources.

100 Ibid., and former combatants.

101 Intelligence and United Nations sources, AFC/M23 insiders and former combatants.

102 AFC/M23 insiders, intelligence, United Nations and protection sources.

103 Military, intelligence, United Nations, protection and civil society sources; and former AFC/M23 combatants and insiders.

104 Intelligence sources and AFC/M23 insiders.

105 See https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1897250180652786173?s=12&t=_n75X fLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg, para. 7.

106 United Nations sources, residents, victims’ relatives, civil society, protection actors and human rights defenders.

107 Civil society, researchers, protection actors, military, intelligence and United Nations sources, and audiovisual documentation.

108 Video footage of Bahati Erasto speaking in Kinyarwanda, 6 February 2025.

109 Humanitarian sources, researchers and video/photographic evidence. <!-- page 26 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 26/254 Summary executions 100. The Group identified a consistent pattern of targeted killings and summary executions perpetrated by AFC/M23 in Goma, commencing on 28 January. 110 Prior to that date, civilian casualties had primarily been the result of crossfire between armed groups or indiscriminate shelling (see paras. 82–85 above). Between 28 January and

9 April, the Group recorded at least 70 distinct incidents of targeted killings in Goma attributable to AFC/M23, resulting in over 200 fatalities. Adult men comprised the majority of the victims, but which also included women and children. 111 101. In many cases, the precise motive could not be conclusively established. However, prevailing patterns suggest the following as primary drivers: alleged collaboration with FARDC, FDLR or Wazalendo; refusal to join AFC/M23 ranks; expression of dissent or criticism towards AFC/M23; and engagement in civil society or political activities (e.g., human rights defenders, lawyers, musicians and local leaders). Additional contributing factors included: presence in the vicinity of AFC/M23 patrols; attempts to flee or perceived resistance during operations; violations of curfew or movement restrictions; and nonconformity with imposed moral standards (e.g., alcohol consumption). These findings illustrate a widespread and systematic campaign of intimidation and repression against civilians. Annex 49 contains details of some of the documented incidents. Despite substantial and credible evidence implicating AFC/M23 in serious human rights abuses, AFC/M23 has persistently sought to dissociate itself from these violations. This deflection and denial strategy was not incidental, but formed part of a well-established and coordinated information campaign, institutionalized by the AFC/M23 “digital army” (see para. 28 above, and annex 50). 102. After the expiration of a seven-day ultimatum issued on 11 February by AFC/M23 – demanding the surrender of members of the FARDC, PNC, Wazalendo and FDLR, urging civilians to denounce them and warning that failure to comply would result in being treated as enemies – AFC/M23 intensified house-to-house searches and targeted operations against individuals suspected of affiliation with Wazalendo, FDLR or FARDC and against persons perceived to have opposed the movement.112 Corporal punishment and torture 103. Targeted individuals (see para. 98 above) were routinely subjected to severe physical abuse, including beatings leading to death (S/2024/432, para. 116).113 Several beatings in Goma and Bukavu, some executed in public, were captured on video (see annex 51). Arbitrary arrests and illegal detention 104. AFC/M23 operated clandestine detention sites where detainees were held incommunicado, subjected to torture and in many cases either disappeared or later found dead, their bodies discarded in public or remote areas.114 Several notorious sites were identified in Goma, including a military detention site on Mont Goma; 115 at the Katindo camp; in the “Chien méchant” cell, a known unofficial detention facility used __________________

110 Community-based confidential sources, residents, witnesses, civil society, human rights defenders, United Nations, intelligence and humanitarian sources, and researchers.

111 Ibid.

112 United Nations sources and protection actors.

113 Ibid.

114 United Nations and intelligence sources, AFC/M23 insiders, civil society and protection sources, and Goma residents.

115 Confidential protection sources, community leaders and civil society sources. <!-- page 27 --> S/2025/446 27/254 25-07401 by other regimes in the past; and at the Stade de l’unité, also known as a transit camp for coercively recruited individuals (see para. 103 above).116 According to an AFC/M23 insider, military positions also had holding cells, including at the police academy in Mugunga,117 where individuals were taken for interrogation. Raids on hospitals 105. AFC/M23 conducted armed night raids on hospitals in Goma. Heal Africa and CBCA Ndosho hospitals were targeted, on 1 and 3 March, respectively, as part of operations tracking FARDC, Wazalendo and FDLR combatants who had not surrendered (see para. 21 above). Male caregivers were briefly detained and released. A total of 164 patients were abducted – 48 from Heal Africa and 116 from CBCA Ndosho – some of whom had been undergoing treatment, others who had refused to leave for fear of forced recruitment. 118 On 5 March, another AFC/M23 search operation targeted Virunga Hospital in Goma, where AFC/M23 elements arrested an unconfirmed number of suspected FARDC elements.119 106. On the night of 4 to 5 April 2025, armed AFC/M23 elements entered the MSF-supported Kyeshero Hospital compound in Goma in search of FARDC elements who had completed medical treatment but remained at the hospital for fear of being recruited. The AFC/M23 elements opened fire within the facility grounds, killing one person, injuring three and assaulting two staff members. Although the soldiers did not enter the hospital ward, bullets struck the treatment areas. 120 107. Following the incidents in March, Bertrand Bisimwa, Lawrence Kanyuka and “General” Makenga issued public denials of responsibility, claiming they had acted in full compliance with international humanitarian law and with the aim of securing the hospitals from “infiltrated rogue combatants” who had been “endangering” patients and medical staff (see annex 52). Contrary to those assertions, witnesses confirmed that no weapons were found in the hospitals and the arrested individuals had not endangered patients or staff.121 108. The Group notes that the systematic armed raids – carried out at night without prior warning, involving threatening and assaulting medical personnel, forcibly removing wounded or sick individuals hors de combat, including those sheltering out of fear of forced recruitment – are unlawful. The continued presence of hors de combat elements does not render a hospital a legitimate military target under international humanitarian law, as the individuals targeted were not using the facilities to commit acts harmful to the adversary – a sine qua non condition under international humanitarian law for the loss of protection. Even in such cases, protections may only cease following due warning and reasonable opportunity to respond, neither of which was observed. These actions therefore constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law and further contravene the prohibitions against enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention. __________________

116 See www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr47/018/2000/en/; and www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/ 2000/drc/Drc005-04.htm.

117 See https://maps.app.goo.gl/h7D5mKEFSh76TzST7?g_st=com.google.maps.preview.copy.

118 Confidential protection sources, United Nations sources and researchers. See also https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/drc-m23-attacks-hospitals-gravely-concerning; and https://amnesty.hosting.augure.com/Augure_AmnestyInternational/ default.ashx?WCI=EmailViewer&id=%7B8a4330fd-8a81-4795-92eb-30ddb42c098d%7D, https://youtu.be/hbxFzrpI9-0?si=oHN1PK_vnVuyv5wj.

119 United Nations and protection sources.

120 Protection sources. See also www.msf.org/fr/rdcongo/goma-msf-condamne-les-tirs-ayant-fait-un-mort-au-sein-de-lhôpital-de-kyeshero?s=08.

121 United Nations and protection sources. <!-- page 28 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 28/254 ### F. Threats to mineral traceability and supply chain 109. Following the seizure of Rubaya in April 2024, AFC/M23 maintained control over several mining sites, trading centres and mineral transport routes in North Kivu, severely disrupting exports of “3T” minerals (tin, tantalum and tungsten) (S/2024/969, para. 56).122 In early February 2025, AFC/M23 expanded its influence into South Kivu, establishing exclusive control over key mineral trading centres in Lumbishi, Numbi and Nyabibwe in Kalehe territory. The subsequent capture of Bukavu granted AFC/M23 strategic dominance over major mineral transport routes across Kalehe, Kabare and Walungu territories. Further military advances towards Uvira resulted in the paralysis of mining activities in Kamanyola. 123 Similarly, in Walikale territory, the Alphamin Bisie mine, a major industrial tin producer, suspended operations from 13 March to mid-April 2025. 124 Its resumption of activities coincided with the AFC/M23 withdrawal (see para. 18 above). 110. Following the suspension of International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (ITSCI) tagging in Masisi territory in December 2023 and May 2024, minerals sourced there became ineligible for trade. Evidence indicated increasing risks of cross-border fraud, as minerals from North Kivu, particularly coltan from the AFC/M23-controlled Rubaya mine, continued to be smuggled to Rwanda. 125 These minerals were then mixed with production of Rwandan origin and exported downstream (see annex 53). 111. Since April 2024, and peaking since January 2025, AFC/M23, occasionally with the participation of RDF, perpetrated acts constituting violations of mineral traceability that threaten the integrity and subsistence of the free trade of minerals in the Great Lakes Region.126 These acts included trading minerals ineligible for trade, pillaging tagged minerals from Congolese exporters and the looting of ITSCI premises (see paras. 114–116 below). 112. The AFC/M23-designated Governor of North Kivu, Erasto Bahati, visited Rubaya mining sites on 5 March 2025.127 Mr. Bahati was the key figure behind the illegal exploitation and smuggling by AFC/M23 of minerals since the capture of Rubaya in April 2024 (S/2024/969, para. 56); he implemented taxation at mining and trading sites and hand-picked traders permitted to purchase minerals and smuggle them to Rwanda (see para. 114 below).128 He also progressively removed diggers and traders perceived as antagonistic to AFC/M23 (S/2024/969, para. 59).129 Mr. Bahati thus committed sanctionable acts. __________________

122 See https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/Mazars%20%20RDC%20Rapport%20ITIE% 20Artisanal%203T%20OR%20adopt%C3%A9%20le%2027%20novembre%202023%20par%20l e%20CE.pdf, and https://ctcpm.cd/fr/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/statistiques/ STATISTIQUES-MINIERES-EXERCICE-2024.pdf.

123 Economic actors, Ministry of Mines, Commission nationale de lutte contre la fraude minière, Comité provincial de suivi des activités minières, and intelligence sources.

124 See www.alphaminresources.com/2025/04/09/alphamin-announces-decision-to-resume-mining-operations/.

125 See www.itsci.org/2025/02/05/itsci-clarifies-the-role-of-its-3t-traceability-and-due-diligence-programme-addressing-amsterdam-partners-and-other-reports/.

126 Goma dwellers, researchers and intelligence sources.

127 United Nations sources, and media.

128 Goma and Rubaya dwellers, researchers, intelligence sources, civil society and economic actors.

129 Rubaya diggers, traders and dwellers; AFC/M23 combatants; economic actors; civil society; researchers; intelligence; and United Nations sources. <!-- page 29 --> S/2025/446 29/254 25-07401 Mineral production and trade by Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars 113. In the Rubaya area, AFC/M23 exploited coltan, cassiterite and other minerals at numerous sites, including Nyagisenyi, Bunjari, Kashaki, Muderi, Muchacha, Luwowo/Nyange, Nyambisi, D4 Gakombe, Kasasa, D3 Bibatama, D2 Mataba and Luoo, all located within the PE76 and the revoked PE4731 zones. Mineralized ores were washed at Mumba, Flat Mumba and Himbi under the surveillance of AFC/M23 combatants. AFC/M23 also maintained control over trading centres at Rubaya centre, Kasoko Mumba, Mumba and Kalambairo (see annex 54).130 114. Among the traders hand-picked by Mr. Bahati (see para. 112 above) were Augustin Baribugwira Bizimana, Mutombo “Safari” Cimana, Charles Munyaneza and Manizabayo Semafuko, 131 who played a pivotal role in the AFC/M23 smuggling network between Rubaya and Rwanda. In addition, the disruption of banking operations and payment systems (para. 32 above) compelled mineral buyers in Rwanda to transfer funds directly through these four individuals.132 Looting of “3T” minerals in Goma and Bukavu by Alliance Fleuve Congo/ Mouvement du 23 mars 115. Since January 2025, AFC/M23 systematically targeted warehouses belonging to mineral exporters, looting more than 500 tons of tagged and untagged 3T minerals. Video evidence showed AFC/M23 elements forcibly removing tags from looted mineral consignments. Sealed containers were broken open, their contents exposed to illicit handling.133 ITSCI immediately cancelled all tags and logbooks associated with the looted minerals, rendering them ineligible for trade. 134 AFC/M23 also looted 186 tons of untagged 3T minerals in Nyabibwe, South Kivu, smuggling them to Rwanda through Mukwija port in Kalehe territory.135 116. Once in Rwanda, the looted minerals were mixed with local production, effectively laundering them into the downstream supply chain under the guise of Rwandan origin. This disrupted legitimate trade.136 117. In response, ITSCI opened several incident inquiries in North Kivu, South Kivu and Rwanda. The Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities submitted official incident reports to the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (see annex 55). Smuggling to Rwanda 118. After the takeover of Goma and Bukavu, AFC/M23 began smuggling 3T minerals to Rwanda through the main border crossings, including via the Great Barrier dam in Goma and Ruzizi I in Bukavu.137 To avoid detection, the smuggling generally occurred at night.138 For example, during the final week of March 2025, nine trucks similar to those used by RDF and three vehicles loaded with Rubaya minerals crossed the Great Barrier dam into Rwanda. With an estimated payload of 20 tons per truck and 5 tons per vehicle, that week’s operation amounted to 195 tons. __________________

130 Rubaya diggers, traders and dwellers; civil society; researchers; and economic actors.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 Economic actors in Goma and Bukavu. Records and video footage on file with Secretariat.

134 ITSCI, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

135 ITSCI.

136 Economic actors, intelligence sources and AFC/M23 combatants.

137 Bukavu dwellers, civil society reports, researchers and economic actors.

138 Goma dwellers, civil society, researchers, economic actors, journalists and AFC/M23 combatants. <!-- page 30 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 30/254 These data suggests smuggling volumes not only persisted but likely increased (S/2024/969, para. 64). 119. Part of the minerals smuggled to Rwanda were purchased by Boss Mining Solutions, an ITSCI member, represented by Eddy Habimana, who had been previously involved in the smuggling of minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Rwanda (S/2012/843, para. 167).139 120. To justify the plausibility of domestic origin of the volumes of 3T minerals exported by Rwanda, the Rwanda Development Board declared annual domestic production of 8,000 to 9,000 tons of 3Ts minerals. 140 This claim was contradicted by data from the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, independent geological studies and ITSCI records. From October 2024 to March 2025, ITSCI opened 51 incident inquiries of plausibility and misrepresentation of mineral origin for Rwanda.141 121. Due diligence claims by certain Rwandan mineral exporters to justify the plausibility of their supply chains did not include third-party geological verification, as mandated by industry standards. The Group recommends that such verification be applied to artisanal and small-scale mining operations, which represent the majority of Rwandan 3T mines. ### III. Allied Democratic Forces in the Grand Nord 122. Despite its relative success in decimating ADF leadership and combatants (S/2024/969, paras. 7–14), the joint FARDC-UPDF Operation Shujaa did not curb ADF violence against civilians in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces. The additional UPDF deployment in southern Lubero territory did not target the highly active ADF cells in north-western Lubero (see paras. 57–61 above). 123. Taking advantage of the reduced FARDC footprint, focused on the escalating AFC/M23 conflict, ADF continued to operate in eastern Beni territory, north-western Lubero, and in Irumu territory (S/2024/969, paras. 19–22).142 Highly mobile groups of combatants, often launching simultaneous attacks, killed and abducted civilians and burned and looted homes; ADF also continued to clash with Forces patriotiques populaires-Armée du people (FPP-AP) combatants.143 124. Following the peak in killings in June 2024, when over 200 civilians were killed (S/2024/969, para. 20), January 2025 marked the second time in which ADF-attributed fatalities exceeded 200 within a single month – predominantly in the Beni region and Lubero territory.144 The group, led by sanctioned individual Ahmad Mahmood Hassan, alias Abwakasi (CDi.040), active in the Bapere sector, Lubero territory, was reportedly responsible for at least half of those fatalities. Claims published by Da’esh – which attributed 127 attacks to its ADF affiliate between November 2024 and early April 2025 – heavily emphasized incidents in the Bapere sector, suggesting direct contacts between Abwakasi and Da’esh (S/2024/969, para. 26). __________________

139 Economic actors, civils society, researchers and customs data. Boss Mining Solutions is a member of the Rwanda Mining Association (see https://cdnc.heyzine.com/flip-book/pdf/ b01d5d5b642c850b74ea25febe23d93c08ea4055.pdf); it is unrelated to ERG Boss Mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

140 See https://rdb.rw/export/export/products-directory/mining-sector.

141 Confidential data on file with the Secretariat.

142 The Boga-Tshabi-Kainama axis, Eringeti-Komanda-Luna axis (RN4), east and west of Biakato (RN44).

143 FARDC, civil society, United Nations sources and researchers.

144 Researchers, United Nations and government sources. <!-- page 31 --> S/2025/446 31/254 25-07401 125. The Group inspected 16 ADF weapons, half of them originating from FARDC stockpiles (see annex 56). As previously documented, ADF stole FARDC weapons and supplies during attacks on FARDC positions (S/2024/969, annex 6). ### IV. Ituri ### A. Armed group dynamics 126. Violence and instability intensified in Ituri Province, with continued clashes between Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais (CODECO/URDPC) and Zaïre/“Auto-défense des communautés victimes de l’Ituri” (ADCVI, hereafter Zaïre). Significant developments involved the emergence of a new politico-military movement, by sanctioned individual Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (CDi.007), backed by Uganda. In April 2025, sanctioned individual Innocent Kaina (alias India Queen) (CDi.004), a former M23 commander residing in Kampala, announced the creation of another politico-military group in Ituri, the Coalition nationale pour la libération du Congo (CNLC). Both politico-military movements declared to be opposing the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Tensions further escalated with the deployment in February and March 2025 of UPDF forces that clashed with CODECO/URDPC and fuelled intercommunal violence (S/2024/969, paras. 81–97). Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais 127. CODECO/URDPC maintained its command structure as previously reported, 145 consolidating in six brigades reporting to the headquarters in Dyaro, in the Dhendo groupement in Walendu Pitsi sector (see annex 57). Command and control over the general modus operandi and joint operations was generally effective, with local commanders maintaining autonomy over routine activities. However, occasional discords among local CODECO groups and commanders emerged, some leading to armed clashes and the killing of rogue or disobedient commanders (see para. 156 below). For instance, disputes over proceeds from gold mining led to violent clashes among CODECO militias of 4th Brigade, based in Mabu, during which 13 combatants and the commander of the brigade, “General” Lango, were killed (S/2024/432, paras. 164–166). 128. CODECO/URDPC successfully dislodged Zaïre forces from Mongbwalu and most of Bayali Kilo sector, consolidating control over most gold mines, whose exploitation generated important resources to sustain its activities (see paras. 158–165 below).146 Zaïre 129. Zaïre remained embroiled in clashes with CODECO/URDPC and retaliatory attacks on Lendu civilians (see paras. 143–147 below). Dissimulating support for the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme, Zaïre commander Baraka Maki Amos (S/2024/969, paras. 101–103) held a staged disarmament ceremony in Mabanga, Mambisa chiefdom, on 15 January 2025. 147 However, Zaïre’s genuine commitment to disarmament was highly disputed, 148 __________________

145 S/2024/969, para.154; S/2023/431, paras. 104–112; and S/2023/990, paras. 76–77 and annexes 49 and 50.

146 Armed groups, intelligence, civil society, MONUSCO sources and researchers.

147 Ibid.

148 FARDC, intelligence, combatants, civil society and researchers. <!-- page 32 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 32/254 having already used non-functional weapons to simulate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration compliance in the past (S/2024/432, para. 154). While approximately 2,500 armed combatants participated in the ceremony, 1,106 registered for disarmament and collectively surrendered only 85 AK-type assault rifles, 2 PKMs, 2 RPG-7s and a few handguns and grenades.149 After the ceremony, an estimated 2,500-3,000 combatants – both demobilized and still armed – returned to their operational areas, with Zaïre continuing to stockpile arms, conduct training and engaging in deadly clashes.150 Convention pour la révolution populaire/Force pour la révolution populaire 130. On 10 January 2025, in Kampala, Thomas Lubanga signed a statute on the creation of a new politico-military movement named Convention pour la révolution populaire/Force pour la révolution populaire (CRP/FRP) with the stated objective of overthrowing the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Efforts to set up CRP/FRP had been led by Mr. Lubanga in Kampala from around September 2024 (S/2024/969, paras. 91–94), with at least moral and passive endorsement from the Ugandan authorities. Zaïre commanders Fidele Babala, Pharaon and Logo Marine played a role in the creation of CRP, with Logo Marine serving as deputy chief of staff of CRP/FRP. The creation of the movement was officially announced on

25 March 2025, in Berunda, Djugu territory – a Zaïre stronghold. 131. Following a strategy similar to that employed by AFC (S/2024/432, paras. 23–29), CRP/FRP claimed to represent a platform of all the major armed groups in Ituri and published a leadership structure with roles attributed to representatives of the groups. However, several groups, including CODECO, subsequently denied affiliation with CRP/FRP, and some leaders denounced the forgery of their signatures (see annex 58).151 132. At the time of writing, Lubanga had failed to mobilize significant popular support for CRP/FRP. He was accused of using the movement opportunistically to position himself for potential negotiations between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, AFC/M23 and other political and military actors. 152 The creation of CRP/FRP also sparked an internal rift within Zaïre.153 Zaïre leader Baraka Maki Amos claimed loyalty to the Government without explicitly distancing himself from CRP/FRP or Lubanga (see annex 59). Several key political and armed actors expressed scepticism toward CRP/FRP, choosing to withhold their support pending clearer evidence of the movement’s credibility and operational capacity. 154 133. On 24 February 2025, CRP/FRP launched a first armed attack, on a FARDC naval base in Nyamamba, Djugu territory, resulting in multiple casualties and the kidnapping of a PNC commander. Sources within the movement reported that the attack had been intended to secure control over strategic areas near Lake Albert, a precondition set by Uganda for providing support and materiel (see annex 60). 155 The attack was repelled by FARDC. Although CRP/FRP appeared weakened by the failed offensive, it maintained its focus on this strategic area, evidenced by continued clashes throughout March and April.156 __________________

149 Ibid.

150 Combatants, civil society, intelligence, FARDC and PNC sources.

151 Former combatants, civil society, United Nations and FARDC sources.

152 Researchers, intelligence, FARDC, civil society sources and former combatants.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 Intelligence, FARDC, civil society and former combatants.

156 Intelligence, FARDC, United Nations, PNC and civil society sources. <!-- page 33 --> S/2025/446 33/254 25-07401 ### B. Uganda People’s Defence Forces deployment in Djugu and clashes with Coopérative pour le développement du Congo 134. In February and March 2025, without the approval of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UPDF deployed over 1,000 troops and considerable military materiel to Bunia, as well as Mahagi and Djugu territories. 157 The operation was commanded by Major-General Felix Busizoori, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, and fell outside the mandate and chain of command of Operation Shujaa (S/2022/479, para. 21).158 135. UPDF justified its deployment as part of operations targeting CODECO, citing the group’s role in systematic attacks against the Hema population in Djugu territory.159 However, the Ugandan “interests” that the UPDF was sent to protect (see para. 57 above) go beyond the scope of civilian protection, focusing on major geopolitical and economic interests from the mineral and gold trades, as well as oil and gas exploitation in Lake Albert and other cross-border trade and lucrative contracts.160 136. The UPDF presence in Bunia was perceived as a threat by FARDC, provincial authorities and the Lendu community. 161 In an effort to de-escalate tensions – acknowledging the limited capacity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to engage a second foreign army – the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi, accepted the deployment post facto and dispatched The FARDC Chief of Staff for Operations, General Tchaligonza, and the Deputy Defence Minister, Samy Adubango, to engage with UPDF leadership in Ituri to normalize relations. Modest efforts included the establishment of joint UPDF- FARDC patrols in certain areas in March 2025.162 137. In March, UPDF established camps near Fataki, along route RN27—an area recently affected by CODECO attacks (see para. 146 below). This deployment was a key step in securing the route RN27 corridor, which holds strategic importance for the UPDF in re-establishing commercial flows between Ituri and Uganda. 138. CODECO/URDPC perceived the UPDF deployments as directed against its combatants and the broader Lendu community. CODECO/URDPC and UPDF engaged in weeks of intense fighting and frequent bombardments by UPDF, which affected, among others, the Lendu village of Ar’r, destroying civilian homes. CODECO/URDPC registered heavy casualties, and an undisclosed number of UPDF were killed.163 139. UPDF deployment in Djugu – coupled with the inflammatory public statements by the Chief of Defence Forces of Uganda, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, defending the Hema community and threatening CODECO (see annex 61) – risked further escalating intercommunal tensions. These concerns were rooted in the previous UPDF intervention in Ituri in the early 2000s, which involved deadly attacks on Lendu villages alongside Hema militia, exacerbating the ethnic conflict (S/2004/573, paras. 19–28). __________________

157 Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

158 Intelligence and United Nations sources.

159 Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, military, intelligence, diplomatic and United Nations sources.

160 Intelligence, United Nations, FARDC, researchers, civil society and diplomatic sources.

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid.

163 Civil society, intelligence, FARDC and United Nations sources, and combatants. <!-- page 34 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 34/254 140. The presence of UPDF in Djugu Territory also posed operational challenges for MONUSCO efforts to protect civilians, pending formal clarification of the UPDF mandate and area of operations. UPDF deployed in locations that intersect with MONUSCO zones of intervention, particularly at sites hosting internally displaced persons. This overlap raises concerns regarding operational coordination, especially given the absence of communication and coordination between the two forces. ### C. Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law 141. The ongoing crisis in Ituri Province was overshadowed by the focus on the escalating conflict involving AFC/M23 in North and South Kivu. The redeployment of FARDC from Ituri to reinforce military operations against AFC/M23 created a critical security vacuum, increasing civilian exposure to violence. Moreover, in early March 2025, FARDC personnel were released from detention in Bunia and immediately reinstated to offset troop shortages 164 – despite ongoing concerns about impunity and erosion of civilian trust (see para. 90 above). 142. The cumulative impact of recurrent cycles of violence has devastated local populations in Ituri, triggering waves of forced displacement and severely disrupting access to healthcare, education and humanitarian assistance (see annex 62). 165 Cycles of retaliatory violence by Coopérative pour le développement du Congo and Zaïre 143. Since September 2024, Djugu territory experienced a renewed escalation of violence, with intensified clashes between CODECO and Zaïre. Of the more than 500 civilians killed across Ituri Province since September, over 266 were killed in Djugu territory alone.166 144. The ongoing cycle of violence (S/2023/431, paras. 125–126; and S/2024/432, para. 159) was marked by retaliatory attacks triggered by perceived provocations or earlier incidents. These attacks consistently targeted civilians, rival combatants and strategic positions, with each incident serving as both retribution and justification for subsequent attacks. Both groups deliberately targeted civilians in attacks characterized by extreme brutality. Annex 63 contains a detailed account of attacks documented. 145. CODECO/URDPC was responsible for the majority of documented incidents, including attacks on internally displaced persons, lethal ambushes, targeted killings and armed robberies – and accounted for significantly more civilian casualties than Zaïre (S/2024/432, para. 159). While both groups engaged in ethnically motivated violence, CODECO/URDPC operations were marked by more direct armed confrontations and extreme brutality toward civilians. Killings and injuries often involved severe mutilation, including of women, children and infants. The nature and timing of these attacks suggest a deliberate strategy of disproportionate retaliation – intended to inflict suffering, instil fear and assert territorial control. 167 By contrast, Zaïre operated by establishing illegal checkpoints, conducting targeted killings and retreating into civilian populations – including internally displaced persons sites – to evade confrontation. The systematic presence of Zaïre combatants in internally __________________

164 Intelligence, military sources and United Nations sources.

165 See www.unocha.org/publications/report/democratic-republic-congo/west-and-central-africa-latest-events-glance-18-24-march-2025, humanitarian, medical and security sources.

166 Humanitarian, intelligence and United Nations sources.

167 Community sources and eyewitnesses, intelligence, military, United Nations and humanitarian sources, civil society and researchers. <!-- page 35 --> S/2025/446 35/254 25-07401 displaced persons camps continued, in violation of the civilian character of such sites, exposing civilians to further cycles of deadly attacks by CODECO/URDPC (S/2023/990, paras. 81–82).168 146. Between 9 and 12 February 2025, CODECO/URDPC carried out one of its deadliest massacres in recent years, killing over 80 civilians in a coordinated attack on Hema villages around the Djaiba internally displaced persons camp, in retribution for the killing of five Lendu civilians by Zaïre in Ar’r village, near Fataki (see annex 64). Through March, CODECO/URDPC carried out further incursions in Djugu territory and regularly ambushed travellers along route RN27, particularly around Djugu and Fataki. In turn, Zaïre elements launched sporadic retaliatory attacks on Lendu-populated areas, causing casualties and burning homes.169 On 24 March, CODECO/URPDC also attacked the Loda internally displaced persons site, killing eight Hema civilians with machetes.170 147. Route RN27 between Mahagi and Bunia remained a strategic hotspot for ambushes, with passengers targeted on the basis of ethnicity. CODECO imposed taxes on road users of Hema ethnicity, who were often constrained to move along in convoys escorted by Zaïre militias. Zaïre elements similarly screened and taxed passengers of Lendu ethnicity. These practices often resulted in abductions, lootings and killings by both sides.171 Humanitarian convoys and staff were also ambushed and robbed by CODECO/URDPC, including those of at least two international organizations (see annex 65). Child recruitment and sexual violence 148. The widespread presence of minors among the ranks of CODECO/URDPC continued to be reported, including their deployment on front lines during assaults (S/2022/479, para. 99).172 Community leaders corroborated ongoing child recruitment, noting that many children joined voluntarily. CODECO/URDPC was the armed group most resistant to ongoing demobilization efforts. 173 149. Conflict-related sexual violence remained widespread yet significantly underreported, disproportionately affecting displaced populations. Underreporting was mainly attributable to limited access to medical services, fear of reprisals, stigmatization and lack of trust in judicial mechanisms. Local protection organizations noted a significant increase in incidents in 2024, with most victims being minors.174 Cases have been particularly prevalent during rising tensions between CODECO/URDPC and Zaïre, with most documented incidents attributed to CODECO/URDPC. Lendu women were also frequently raped by Zaïre elements, yet their cases were less frequently reported due to their limited access to humanitarian assistance and medical care, as Lendu populations are located outside formal internally displaced persons camps.175 150. The Group documented a pattern of sexual violence followed by killing of victims. Some members of the Lendu community, including armed elements, reported __________________

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.

170 Security, intelligence and United Nations sources.

171 Ibid.

172 Eyewitnesses, community members, humanitarian and United Nations sources, civil society, and intelligence sources.

173 United Nations, intelligence and Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and Stabilization Programme sources.

174 Humanitarian and United Nations sources, civil society.

175 Lendu community leader, and intelligence, humanitarian and civil society sources. <!-- page 36 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 36/254 that since customary beliefs prohibit rape, perpetrators may resort to killing their victims to avoid repercussions (see annex 66). 151. The United Nations documented three cases of gang rape – two involving minor girls – committed on 21, 22 and 25 February by elements of the 3202nd FARDC regiment based in Bule. At the time of reporting, the cases had not been addressed by military justice authorities. Absence of accountability for grave violations within Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais 152. The Group conducted an in-depth assessment of the command structure of CODECO/URDPC, with particular attention to its ability to exercise effective command and control over its combatants and to ensure accountability for serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, constituting sanctionable acts. 153. The CODECO/URDPC leadership is reported to operate through a loosely structured hierarchy centred around its Chief of Staff (État-Major), who issues strategic directives to subordinate local commanders. The CODECO/URDPC spokesperson, Basa Zukpa Gerson, is widely regarded as the most respected and influential military figure within CODECO/URDPC leadership, alongside Desiré Londroma, defence secretary (S/2023/431, annex 59). 154. Local commanders had autonomy in deciding day-to-day operations, subsequently submitting operational updates to the Chief of Staff, who provided overarching guidance on modus operandi and coordinated large-scale operations involving mobilization and synchronization of movements. Operational decisions, including explicit calls for restraint (e.g., prohibitions on pursuing Zaïre elements or attacking specific targets), have generally been followed. The Chief of Staff also issued denials or assumed responsibility for attacks carried out by factions (S/2023/431, annex 69; and S/2023/990, annex 49). 155. While this suggests a functioning internal command-and-control system, during episodes of intercommunal violence, such as retaliatory actions following Zaïre attacks, control appeared less centralized. Leadership acknowledged the difficulty of containing violence rooted in long-standing community tensions. This dynamic suggests that, while formal command lines exist and are generally followed, the leadership’s control over all actors – in particular during emotionally charged retaliations – remained limited. CODECO/URDPC leaders – in particular Basa – portrayed violent attacks against civilians as spontaneous or retaliatory, not the result of direct orders. During an interview with the Group, Basa claimed that he had attempted to halt reprisal attacks on Djaiba in February 2025, but his orders had not been followed.176 156. Accountability of commanders and elements for violations has been consistently lacking. The Group documented instances of commanders being punished within CODECO/URDPC ranks (see para. 127 above).177 Lower-level combatants were also physically punished for acts such as theft or disobedience.178 However, no punishments were given in response to attacks or massacres against civilians. __________________

176 Interview with Basa Zukpa Gerson, 13 March 2025.

177 Interviews with CODECO/URDPC leaders Basa Zukpa Gerson and Desiré Londroma, and annex 59.

178 Military, intelligence and United Nations sources, community leaders, combatants, and audiovisual evidence. <!-- page 37 --> S/2025/446 37/254 25-07401 157. The consistent absence of sanctions for grave violations, including massacres, reflects intentional disregard within CODECO/URDPC regarding such abuses targeting enemy communities. ### D. Illegal mineral exploitation and trade financing armed groups and sanctioned individuals 158. In Djugu and Mahagi territories, almost all mining sites were controlled by CODECO or Zaïre, yielding significant revenues (S/2024/432, paras. 163–170). They also imposed taxes and checkpoint fees and prevented mining administration officials from gaining access to sites under their control. FARDC only managed to reclaim control of the Lodjo mining site in Djugu territory (S/2024/969, para. 100 and annex 50). 159. CODECO/URDPC commander Samuel Kadogo controlled the Mongbwalu- Nzebi gold mining complex, whereas Zaïre commander Baraka Maki controlled all economic activities in Mambisa chiefdom (S/2024/969, para. 102). Role of Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais in illegal gold mining 160. Members of the national and provincial parliaments, including Floribert Ngabu Njabu (CDi.021), were involved in illegal gold mining in CODECO-controlled areas (see annex 67). 161. In an authenticated audio recording from early 2025, Joachim Kambale Ngendu and Jean Batchu Ngbadhe, two members of the provincial parliament, discussed their illegal mechanized mining exploitations in Banyali Kilo chiefdom. 179 They referred to similar illegal exploitations in Banyali Kilo, owned by their fellow parliament members Serge Lonema Mbukana, Djokaba Lambi Bede, Jean Paul Ngabu Tchunde and Floribert Ngabu Njabu. The audio revealed that each of the abovementioned individuals paid $10,000 monthly to CODECO/URDPC for the protection of their business.180 Several sources corroborated the content of the audio, regarding both the role of the individuals in illegal mining and the payments. 181 Payments to and collaboration with armed groups constitute sanctionable acts. 162. CODECO commander Samuel “Kadogo” imposed one-off payments to allow mining activities in areas under CODECO control. Fees were ethnically discriminatory – while Lendu businessmen paid $17,000, non-Lendu paid $30,000 (S/2024/432, para. 166).182 163. A trader based in Nzebi commonly known as “Tchenji” was the main buyer of gold produced in Mongwalu and Nzebi, controlled by CODECO. 183 The successors of late gold trader “Exodus” Adelard (S/2021/560, para. 99; and S/2020/482, paras. 62 and 113) continued to buy gold from Mongbwalu through their own illegal comptoir (trading house) in Bunia.184 __________________

179 Audio recording on file with Secretariat; and civil society, economic actors, researchers and intelligence sources.

180 Ibid.

181 Civil society, intelligence sources, researchers.

182 CODECO combatants, intelligence sources, civil society, economic actors.

183 CODECO combatants, economic actors, Nzebi and Mongbwalu dwellers, civil society, intelligence sources.

184 Ibid. <!-- page 38 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 38/254 Role of Baraka Maki Amos in illegal gold mining 164. Zaïre commander Baraka Maki Amos further consolidated his economic power through illegal gold exploitation in Mabanga area of Mambisa chiefdom (S/2024/969, para. 102). He also imposed monthly fees of $3,000 on cooperatives operating in Mabanga. These cooperatives belonged to businesspeople in Bunia, including Raphael Mambo Kamaragi (owner of Coopérative Minière Saint Raphael), and Aime Mbanga and Robert Ucaya (owners of Cooperative Umoja) (see annex 68).185 165. Baraka Maki Amos leveraged his control of Zaïre by levying illegal taxes and imposing “salongo” (forced labour) in Mabanga (see annex 69), and harshly punishing non-compliance, including business owners. 186 He laundered part of his money through his “Ndibé” and “New Cosmos” hotels Bunia. 187 Gold smuggling to Uganda 166. Gold exploited illegally was regularly smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Uganda to purchase goods abroad, which were then sold in Ituri at a profit (S/2020/482, para. 113).188 This illicit trade qualifies as trade-based money-laundering, enabling cross-border cashless value transfers outside formal financial channels, making transfers difficult to detect. 189 For example, Ituri-based Bassa Ndroza, the main trader of gold extracted in Djugu and Mahagi territories, was the main importer of rice and palm oil from Uganda. 190 167. Gold traders in Butembo remained key enablers of illegal gold mining and smuggled their gold to Uganda (S/2019/469, para. 178).191 They owned microfinance banks in Bunia that they used to pre-finance gold mining cooperatives, which are obliged to sell gold back to these traders. Their business partner in Bunia, Edmond Kasereka, held shares in the microfinance bank T.I.D and Muungano na Maendeleo, Bunia’s sole official gold comptoir, the latter co-owned with gold buyer Banga Ndjelo (S/2021/560, para. 99; and S/2020/482, para. 62).192 168. Gold extracted in Djugu and Mahagi territories was transported to Kampala through the Aru and Mahagi crossings and the Butembo-Kasindi route (S/2019/469, para. 179). Gold was purchased by, among others, Uganda-based gold buyers operating gold comptoirs in the border town of Arua.193 The influx of gold smuggled from Ituri to Kampala significantly inflated the gold refining and export figures of Uganda.194 The Group notes that a large part of the gold refined and exported in Uganda was thus ineligible for trade. __________________

185 Zaïre combatants, economic actors, civil society, researchers, intelligence sources.

186 Mabanga residents, economic actors, intelligence sources, civil society.

187 Bunia dwellers, economic actors, intelligence sources, civil society.

188 Civil society, economic operators, import and export documents, intelligence sources.

189 Economic actors in Ituri and Uganda. See www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/ Methodsandtrends/Role-hawalas-in-ml-tf.html.

190 Economic actors, MONUSCO, intelligence sources, civil society.

191 Intelligence sources, researchers, economic actors.

192 Economic actors, civil society, intelligence sources.

193 Ibid.

194 In its latest validation report for Uganda, released in October 2024, EITI also expressed doubts on the legal origin of the gold refined and exported by Uganda. See also https://eiti.org/ documents/uganda-2021-2022-eiti-report. <!-- page 39 --> S/2025/446 39/254 25-07401 ### V. South Kivu ### A. Developments in the northern territories 169. After the takeover of Goma, AFC/M23 and RDF advanced further south (see para. 17 above). While the FARDC/FDNB/Wazalendo coalition managed to contain advancements for several weeks, AFC/M23 and RDF broke through their defensive positions in Nyamibwe on 6 February and advanced rapidly. Without major combat, AFC/M23 and RDF took control of Kavumu airport and Bukavu town, the provincial capital of South-Kivu, on 14 and 16 February, respectively, asserting full control over Lake Kivu. Government authorities, FDNB and FARDC withdrew towards Kamanyola, Uvira and Bujumbura in Burundi. Approximately 2,000 FARDC and PNC were captured and brought to the Rumangabo training camp (see para. 21 above). 170. While RDF logistical and military support were decisive in the AFC/M23 military dominance over the FARDC-led coalition in Nyamibwe and other FARDC defensive positions, internal factors – including FARDC logistical breakdowns, poor command and control, desertions and low troop morale –contributed significantly to the coalition’s defeat. Retreating FARDC units systematically committed human rights abuses, including looting, pillaging and killing civilians (see paras. 88–89 above). AFC/M23 used growing insecurity as an excuse to reverse course on its unilaterally announced ceasefire, announcing the capture of Bukavu to protect the population from FARDC/Wazalendo atrocities (see annex 70). 171. AFC/M23 began installing its parallel administration (see paras. 25–33 above) and co-opted certain local politicians and Wazalendo factions (see annex 71). Nevertheless, AFC/M23 continued to face persistent challenges in maintaining public order, while its combatants perpetrated serious violations on a daily basis (see paras. 93–106 above). The tenuous hold of conquered territories 195 did not deter AFC/M23 and RDF from advancing further south. At the time of writing, the rebellion controlled mineral-rich mining areas in Kalehe, Walungu and Mwenga territories, up to Kamanyola in the south, a transit point for Rwandan supplies. By contrast, FARDC, FDNB and Wazalendo groups maintained control over the Ruzizi plain and held positions along the Kamanyola-Sange-Uvira road, blocking the advancement of AFC/M23 towards Uvira.196 172. The forced retreat southwards triggered shifts in Wazalendo’s internal dynamics and operational tactics. First, Wazalendo groups increasingly resorted to hit-and-run tactics against AFC/M23 and RDF positions. Second, Wazalendo’s disgruntlement over the collapse of FARDC led to growing tensions and FARDC-Wazalendo clashes.197 Third, some Wazalendo groups defected to AFC/M23.198 ### B. Developments in the Hauts Plateaux Wazalendo-Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo dynamics in Uvira 173. From February, as the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities and security actors largely withdrew from Uvira, Wazalendo armed groups de facto controlled __________________

195 At a public meeting hosted by Nangaa in Bukavu on 27 February, two explosions resulted in 17 civilians killed and 68 wounded.

196 FARDC, AFC/M23, civil society, United Nations and intelligence sources, and researchers.

197 Wazalendo, FARDC and United Nations sources, and researchers.

198 Ibid., and AFC/M23 sources. <!-- page 40 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 40/254 Uvira town and surroundings, where they resorted to the disproportionate use of force and widespread abuses, in particular targeting Banyamulenge communities. 199 While AFC/M23 and RDF threatened to capture Uvira, Wazalendo rivalry, distrust and internal clashes, as well as tensions between FARDC and Wazalendo, destabilized the town.200 A key Wazalendo leader, “General” Ebuela Mtetezi, was killed by rival Mai- Mai groups on 16 March, reportedly because of his clandestine support to AFC/M23 (S/2024/432, annex 105). 174. In an attempt to restore security, FARDC headquarters and the South Kivu Governorate were reinstalled in Uvira in early March. Early April, the Minister for Defence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guy Kabombo, and the former national Coordinator of the RAD, General Padiri, travelled from Bujumbura to Uvira to pacify the Wazalendo groups. During a meeting, Wazalendo factions complained about lack of support, military logistics and financing. To appease them, the Minister announced that all Wazalendo leaders would be placed under the authority of RAD (see para. 62 above). At the time of writing, FARDC-Wazalendo relations had improved, and some Wazalendo groups had left Uvira centre upon the request of FARDC command.201 Officializing of the Twirwaneho alliance with Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars 175. Sanctioned individual and military leader of Twirwaneho, “General” Michel Rukunda (CDi.041) (S/2021/560, para. 134) was killed by an FARDC CH-4 drone strike on 15 February.202 The following day, after heavy clashes with FARDC, Twirwaneho took control of the Minembwe airstrip, effectively cutting off FARDC resupply in the Hauts Plateaux. On 9 and 25 March, an airplane operating for the benefit of RDF conducted three landings in Minembwe to evacuate at least 16 wounded Twirwaneho and provide pharmaceutical and military supplies. 203 176. Charles Sematama (S/2023/990, para. 88) assumed the military command of Twirwaneho, and on 23 February he announced its alliance with AFC/M23 (S/2024/969, para. 106). While Makanika remained defiant towards Kigali, Sematama’s ties with Kigali brought Twirwaneho closer to AFC/M23 and Rwanda. As previously reported, a significant portion of the Banyamulenge community rejected support for AFC/M23 and Rwanda (S/2023/431, para. 143).204 These dissidents were systematically persecuted and intimidated by members of their own community, including abroad. Some dissidents, including in the diaspora, were targeted for assassination, their names circulating on hit-lists called “akagara”.205 177. Between January and April, FDNB, FARDC and allied armed groups, including Ngumino 206 repeatedly clashed with Twirwaneho and Red Tabara – both supported by Rwanda (S/2024/969, para. 106) – blocking their advancement towards Uvira. 207 After FARDC vacated the area in early March, clashes continued between Twirwaneho and Wazalendo groups, in particular Mai-Mai Ebuela and Biloze Bishambuke, which committed gross violations, including burning shelters in Banyamulenge internally __________________

199 Civil society, FARDC and United Nations sources, and researchers.

200 Ibid., and Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo sources.

201 Diplomatic and United Nations sources, and researchers.

202 Security, FARDC and Banyamulenge sources.

203 Twirwaneho, Banyamulenge, United Nations and intelligence sources.

204 Banyamulenge, Ngumino and United Nations sources, and researchers.

205 Refugees, civil society, eyewitnesses, dissidents, imagery, social media.

206 The Ngumino armed group is linked to the Banyamulenge community, yet is firmly opposed to Twirwaneho.

207 FARDC, United Nations and Banyamulenge sources, and researchers. <!-- page 41 --> S/2025/446 41/254 25-07401 displaced persons sites in Mikenge in late February 2025. 208 Following those armed confrontations, as well as a second FARDC drone strike in the Minembwe area on 25 February 2025, in which four Twirwaneho leaders were killed, AFC/M23 leaders and Banyamulenge hardliners, in particular Moise Nyarugabo and Mahoro Peace Association leaders (S/2023/431, paras. 144–167), claimed that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was planning the ethnic cleansing of Banyamulenge. Such claims were instrumentalized to justify AFC/M23 and RDF intervention in Minembwe.209 178. In late March, AFC/M23 “Colonel” Japhet Gakufe and Charles Sematama arrived in Minembwe with an estimated 200 AFC/M23 combatants, 210 confirming the intention of AFC/M23 to conquer the Hauts Plateaux. ### C. Escalation of tensions between Rwanda and Burundi 179. The massive build-up of Burundian troops (FDNB) in support of FARDC (S/2024/432, paras. 81–87), to contain further AFC/M23 and RDF expansion, continued to fuel tensions between Rwanda and Burundi (S/2024/432, paras. 179–180). In early April, the majority of the 7,000 to 9,000 Burundian troops were positioned in South Kivu, notably the Ruzizi Plain along the tri-border area, and in the Hauts Plateaux near Minembwe (see annex 72). Heavy clashes between FDNB supported by FARDC and Wazalendo, and AFC/M23 supported by RDF, resulted in several hundreds of FDNB casualties.211 180. The support of Rwanda to AFC/M23 and the latter’s push towards the border with Burundi further escalated tensions and warmongering. In February 2025, the President of Burundi, Évariste Ndayishimiye, accused Rwanda of intending to invade Burundi, including through its backing of the Burundian armed opposition group Red Tabara, and announced the readiness of Burundi to fight back (see annex 73). Rwanda, in turn, signalled a commitment to regime change in both Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 181. In mid-March, both countries agreed on verbal and military de-escalation, reportedly concluding a non-aggression agreement.212 In view of the enduring mutual distrust between the two countries, the agreement could be threatened by any further AFC/M23 advancement. ### VI. Recommendations 182. The Group of Experts makes the recommendations set out below: Security Council (a) Call upon the Government of Rwanda to avoid any acts that may interfere with the ability of MONUSCO to implement its mandate (see paras. 35, 50, 53, 78 and 80); __________________

208 United Nations, Banyamulenge and humanitarian sources, and researchers.

209 Banyamulenge, AFC/M23, United Nations and diplomatic sources.

210 Video footage.

211 FDNB, security, Government of Burundi, FARDC and intelligence sources.

212 Message by the Rwandan Minister for Foreign Affairs on X, available at https://x.com/ onduhungirehe/status/1900300269956518108. <!-- page 42 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 42/254 (b) Call upon the Government of Uganda to ensure coordination with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors, in particular in areas where both UPDF and MONUSCO maintain a presence (see para. 140); (c) Strengthen the civilian protection mandate of MONUSCO, including through further deployment, in particular in areas where the FARDC have withdrawn or are inoperational (see paras. 14–15, 17–18, 64–69, 89–90, 126, 129, 134, 139–151 and 173–174); (d) Call upon all parties to the conflict (AFC/M23, Wazalendo, CODECO/URDPC, Zaïre, RDF and FARDC) in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri to cease all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and refrain from targeting civilians and protected infrastructure, including internally displaced persons camps, hospitals and humanitarian installations (see paras. 78–91, 93–106 and 139–151); (e) Call upon Member States only to deem eligible for trade those minerals that entered the supply chain after 2025 if the mines of origin, smelters and refiners disclose all documents that adhere to international standards for mineral projects (see paras. 109–121); (f) Request Rwanda to fully articulate its security concerns and demands through diplomatic channels, and to engage constructively in conflict resolution efforts, including through the Luanda and Nairobi processes, without resorting to support for armed groups (see paras. 34–56); Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (g) Assess its capacity to secure or destroy in a timely manner its materiel prior to any expected territorial extension of an armed group and strengthen its stockpile management accordingly (see paras. 14, 65, 87, 89 and 169); (h) Cease the redeployment and reintegration of FARDC soldiers previously implicated in serious violations (see paras. 90–91 and 141); (i) Strengthen command and control over national armed forces and ensure that violations committed by FARDC and affiliated armed combatants are investigated and those found guilty of violations are prosecuted (see paras. 85–90); Government of the Republic of Uganda (j) Clarify the mandate and scope of UPDF deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and ensure that all deployments are conducted in coordination with, and the prior consent of, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see paras. 57–61 and 134–140); (k) Ensure coordination with MONUSCO and humanitarian actors to avoid gaps in the protection of civilians (see para. 140); Government of Rwanda (l) Cease all support to AFC/M23 in violation of the arms embargo and sanctions regime, including military, intelligence and logistical assistance (see paras. 34–56); (m) Withdraw all troops and materiel from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see paras. 34–56); (n) Cease training AFC/M23 and Red Tabara in military camps in Rwanda (see para. 24); <!-- page 43 --> S/2025/446 43/254 25-07401 (o) Request AFC/M23 leadership to order their combatants to return to cantonment (see paras. 9–12 and 20–29); (p) Request AFC/M23 leadership to ensure that international human rights law and international humanitarian law are fully respected (see paras. 78–86 and 92–108); States Members of the United Nations (q) Assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in building its capacity to secure or destroy in a timely manner its materiel prior to any territorial extension of an armed group (see paras. 14, 65, 87, 89 and 169); (r) Temporarily suspend exports of military equipment to Rwanda and halt cooperation in military training taking place at RDF training centres (see paras. 24 and 34–56); (s) Assess the risks of future arms exports to Rwanda being utilized by RDF deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or ending up in the hands of AFC/M23, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see paras. 34–56); (t) Share information and work with the Group of Experts, regarding individuals supporting AFC/M23 through propaganda, financing, recruitment and materiel support (see para. 23); (u) Ensure that upstream and downstream actors along the mineral supply chain enforce their own enhanced due diligence when sourcing tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold from the Great Lakes Region, in alignment with recognized industry standards (see para. 121). ### VII. Addendum 183. In its 2024 report, the Group addressed the role of Mr. Sibtein Alibhai in the transportation of Congolese gold from Kigali to Dubai, and his position as a board member of the Primera Gold venture until his resignation in June 2023 (S/2024/432, paras. 218 and 219). 184. On 6 August 2024, Mr. Alibhai, through his legal representative, contested the information reported by the Group, claiming that he had not been provided an opportunity to respond prior to the publication of the Group’s findings. 185. Consistent with the evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997), the Group affirms that it undertook thorough verification by engaging directly with individuals and entities with relevant knowledge concerning Mr. Alibhai’s activities. Therefore, the Group did not find it necessary to solicit a response from Mr. Alibhai before publication. 186. Following additional verification prompted by Mr. Alibhai's contestation, the Group maintains its findings as published. The Group remains open to reviewing any further information Mr. Alibhai may wish to submit. 187. The Group hereby acknowledges Mr. Alibhai’s contestation of the referenced information. <!-- page 44 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 44/254 ### List of annexes • Annex 1 (para. 6) - Investigative methodology, particularly in contexts of insecurity and access denial • Annex 2 (para. 8) - Corneille Nangaa’s aspiration to take power in Kinshasa • Annex 3 (para. 9) - Additional information on AFC/M23 internal tensions and Joseph Kabila’s controversial announced return to Eastern DRC • Annex 4 (para. 12) - AFC/M23 claims and objectives • Annex 5 (para. 13) - Ceasefire agreements and diplomatic initiatives to address the AFC/M23 crisis • Annex 6 (para. 15) - The killing of the Military Governor of North Kivu, Major-General Peter Cirimwami • Annex 7 (para. 16) - AFC/M23 communiqué of 24 January 2025 announcing the liberation of Goma • Annex 8 (para. 16) - Information relating to the attack on Goma • Annex 9 (para. 17) - Unilateral ceasefire declared by AFC/M23 on 3 February 2025 • Annex 10 (para. 19) - Maps showing the AFC/M23 and RDF area of influence • Annex 11 (para. 20) - AFC/M23 in constant need of new recruits • Annex 12 (para. 21) - Additional information on the coercive recruitment of surrendered FARDC soldiers, Wazalendo combatants, and civilians, and their training and redeployment • Annex 13 (para. 21) - AFC/M23 requesting MONUSCO to hand-over the surrendered FARDC and Wazalendo • Annex 14 (para. 23) - Additional information on AFC/M23 new recruits from both the DRC and diaspora, and RDF joining AFC/M23 • Annex 15 (para. 24) - Additional information on training, training centers and trainers • Annex 16 (para. 26) - Additional information on the AFC/M23 governance structure • Annex 17 (para. 27) - Additional information on the persecution of legally appointed customary chiefs and civil society leaders, the destruction of state archives, and the return of Congolese refugees • Annex 18 (para. 31) - AFC/M23 illegal taxation • Annex 19 (paras.32-33) - Banking disruption in areas occupied by the AFC/M23 • Annex 20 (para. 35) - RDF systematic border incursions, RDF direct engagement in combat, killed RDF soldiers, and RDF continued presence in the DRC • Annex 21 (para. 36) - Additional information regarding the use of former FDLR combatants by RDF, and the mobilization of reservists • Annex 22 (para. 38) - Planes servicing RDF troops • Annex 23 (para. 39) - Attack on 11-12 April, and RDF and AFC/M23 response • Annex 24 (para. 42) - Allegation of an existential threat and planned attacks against Rwandan citizens and/or Rwandan positions • Annex 25 (para. 43) - Strategic military, economic and political objectives of the Government of Rwanda in supporting AFC/M23 • Annex 26 (para. 48) - Spoofing and jamming of GPS systems in and around AFC/M23 and RDF controlled areas • Annex 27 (para. 49) - SHORAD systems spotted in the vicinity of Goma and Kavumu airports • Annex 28 (para. 52) - Armed drones • Annex 29 (para. 53) - Guided missiles • Annex 30 (para. 54) – Overview of the contribution of uniformed personnel by Rwanda to the United Nations • Annex 31 (para. 55) - Additional information on AFC/M23 and RDF weaponry and materiel • Annex 32 (para. 57) - Speech of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, on 21 February 2025 • Annex 33 (para. 61) - Illustrations of incendiary public statements by General Muhoozi Kainerugaba • Annex 34 (para. 62) - Update on the national defence reserve force, known as the Réserve armée de la défense (RAD) • Annex 35 (para. 63) - Money transfer receipts and acknowledgement of receipts • Annex 36 (para. 64) - Illustrations of armed confrontations involving Wazalendo groups • Annex 37 (para. 69) - Documents announcing allegiance of the Front commun pour la résistence (FCR) to AFC/M23, and FCR members disavowing the announcement • Annex 38 (para. 73) - “Brigadier General” Ezechiel Gakwerere’s identification documents, and FDLR combatants handed over to the Rwandan authorities • Annex 39 (para. 73) - Additional information on Gakwerere and controversies around his arrest and transfer to the Rwandan authorities <!-- page 45 --> S/2025/446 45/254 25-07401 • Annex 40 (para. 74) - The Government of Rwanda and AFC/M23 denouncing the presence and operations of Private Military Companies in the DRC • Annex 41 (para. 78) - Humanitarian and civilian impact of the battle for the takeover of Goma • Annex 42 (para. 78) - Attacks against MONUSCO, obstruction of movements and obstacles to MONUSCO’s protection mandate • Annex 43 (para. 79) - Death toll after the battle for the takeover of Goma • Annex 44 (para. 79) - Bertrand Bisimwa statement denying the existence of any civilian fatalities in Goma • Annex 45 (para. 85) - Cross-border shelling causing casualties and damage in Gisenyi, Rwanda • Annex 46 (para. 86) - FARDC bombing in Nyabibwe, Kalehe territory, South Kivu, on 6 February 2025 • Annex 47 (para. 88) - FARDC and Wazalendo engaging in looting, theft, and extorsion of civilians in Goma • Annex 48 (para. 93.) - Coerced returns of IDPs by AFC/M23 around Goma • Annex 49 (para. 101) - Summary executions by AFC/M23 • Annex 50 (para. 101) - Strategy of systematic denial of responsibility by AFC/M23 and AFC/M23’s “Digital Army” • Annex 51 (para. 103) - Evidence of torture and corporal punishments by AFC/M23 • Annex 52 (para. 107) - AFC/M23 leadership denials of responsibility for attacks on hospitals in Goma • Annex 53 (para. 110 ) - Additional information on the plausibility of Rwanda’s 3T production • Annex 54 (para. 113) - Mining areas controlled by AFC/M23 • Annex 55 (para. 117) - DRC complaint to the ICGLR regarding smuggling of DRC minerals to Rwanda, and ICGLR response • Annex 56 (para. 125) - ADF assault type rifles • Annex 57 (para. 127) - Additional information on the CODECO/URDPC Brigades • Annex 58 (para. 131) - The statutes of CRP/FRP and the signatories • Annex 59 (para. 132) - Zaïre Commander Maki Baraka Amos’s communique of 15 January 2025 • Annex 60 (para. 133) - Attacks on the FARDC Naval Base in Nyamamba • Anne 61 (para. 139) - Public statements by General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) • Annex 62 (para. 142) - Humanitarian impact of the recurrent cycles of violence in Djugu territory, hindering access to healthcare, education, and aid delivery • Annex 63 (para. 144) - Cycle of reprisal attacks by CODECO/URDPC and Zaïre since September 2024 • Annex 64 (para. 146) - CODECO/URDPC attack on Djaiba IDP site and surrounding Hema villages, between 9 to

12 February 2025 • Annex 65 (para. 147) - CODECO/URDPC threats, ambushes and attacks on humanitarian convoys and humanitarian staff • Annex 66 (para. 150) - Conflict-related sexual violence in Ituri Province • Annex 67 (para. 160) – Failures in the implementation of sanctions • Annex 68 (para. 164) - Non-exhaustive list of mining cooperatives working with CODECO and Zaïre • Annex 69 (para. 165) – Proofs of salongo imposed by elements under the control of Zaïre’s Baraka Maki • Annex 70 (para. 170) – AFC/M23 communiqué of 10 February 2025 • Annex 71 (para. 171) - Illustrations of political and influential figures’ alliance with AFC/M23 in Bukavu • Annex 72 (para. 179) - Additional information on FDNB deployments in the DRC • Annex 73 (para. 180) - Statement of President Ndashimiye on 1 February 2025 <!-- page 46 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 46/254

Annex 1 (para. 6) Investigative methodology, particularly in contexts of insecurity and access denial Méthodologie d’enquête, particulièrement dans des contextes d’insécurité et de refus d’accès • Compliance with the requests of the Group of Experts for information During its mandate, the Group engaged with government authorities, private sector stakeholders and organizations across several countries. The Group addressed a total of 37 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities. By the time of drafting this present report, the Group had received 18 responses. The Group regrets the limited number of substantive responses from both private sector actors and Member States, as such engagement is essential to the Group’s investigative work. The Group also notes with regret that, despite an official request to visit Rwanda, the Rwandan Government did not receive the Group (see below). • Investigative methodology in context of insecurity and access denial The Group has operated in complex and often volatile environments, covering extensive areas of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in the course of its investigations. Access to remote or sensitive locations has frequently been constrained by logistical challenges, insecurity, or restrictions imposed by armed groups or official authorities. While such constraints have posed operational challenges, they have not prevented the Group from fulfilling its mandate since its establishment in 2004. In the current reporting period, access to Goma was denied by AFC/M23 (see additional information below). The absence of physical access to Goma following its takeover by AFC/M23 in January 2025 constrained the Group’s ability to verify certain specific incidents using standard investigative methods, including the examination of material evidence and on-site observations. Nevertheless, the Group was able to pursue its investigations by applying established methodologies tailored to non-permissive environments. To mitigate such constraints, the Group has been applying established methodological practices consistent with United Nations sanctions monitoring and reporting in contexts where direct field access is restricted due to insecurity or denial of access by armed groups. In particular, the Group adopted a triangulation-based methodology 213 relying on a combination of the following sources and techniques: • Authenticated documents, photographs, and audio/video recordings. • In-person interviews with individuals displaced from Goma or other relevant locations after having witnessed the events under investigation. • Interviews with captured/detained or defected AFC/M23 and RDF elements. • Remote interviews with victims, witnesses, members of armed groups, including AFC/M23, members of state armed forces, including RDF, trusted key informants, using secure communication platforms and only after rigorous identity verifications when the source was not previously met in person. • Privileged reliance on primary witnesses and those directly involved or implicated participants in alleged circumstances. __________________ 213 S/2006/997, pages 17-32. <!-- page 47 --> S/2025/446 47/254 25-07401 • Triangulation of information across multiple, independent, and credible sources to corroborate facts and assess the reliability of testimony. • Reliance on trusted and rigorously vetted intermediaries who have worked with the Group in the past. • Cross-verification of testimonies from multiple independent sources. • Analysis of satellite imagery, open-source information, and verified multimedia content. • Use of imagery and third-party verified visual evidence to confirm the presence of military activity, destruction of infrastructure, or civilian impact. • Confidential inputs from protection actors, researchers, and UN entities operating in adjacent or accessible areas. • Documentation by UN agencies, NGOs, and other verified humanitarian or protection actors, including incident reports. • Remote data collection, open-source intelligence, and secondary sources. • Photographs of injuries suffered by victims of atrocities. • Authentication of origin for all documentary evidence used. • Credible media and civil society reporting. • Studies or contemporaneous reports obtained from UN and other credible sources. • Statements by the alleged sanctions violators. • Statements published through official government channels or verified social media accounts. • Verification of circumstantial evidence based on previously documented patterns. • Analysis of systemic issues based on previously observed behaviors and documented practices. • Systematic search for extenuating or exculpatory information. • Conversations conducted in the presence of at least two experts taking notes and verifying relevant documents, photographs, or videos that confirm or contradict key allegations, independently of each other. Given these limitations on direct documentation in certain geographical areas, the Group prioritized the verification of incidents for which corroboration could be obtained through multiple, independent, and credible sources. Consequently, the Group’s findings in this context focused on substantiated patterns and trends of violations, exemplified through verified individual cases. While maintaining a high evidentiary threshold for the confirmation of specific incidents, the Group's inability to access key locations likely resulted in the underreporting of the full extent and severity of violations committed during the reporting period. <!-- page 48 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 48/254 The methodology applied is consistent with international standards for documentation of grave violations in armed conflict settings, including guidance from OHCHR, 214 the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and relevant jurisprudence from international accountability mechanisms. Information relating to the Group’s requests to access Goma and Kigali, and denial by AFC/M23 and the Rwandan authorities, respectively • AFC/M23 From mid-February onwards, the Group contacted the AFC/M23 leadership expressing its intent to visit Goma including for meetings with AFC/M23 appointed authorities. In the absence of any substantive reply, on 19 March 2025 the Group sent a formal correspondence to AFC/M23 leadership confirming the Group’s intention to visit from 23 to 27 March. The correspondence also detailed a proposed agenda of discussion topics. On 21 March 2025, Mr. Delion Kimbulungu, permanent secretary of AFC/M23, formally acknowledged the Group’s request, stating that he was instructed by “the coordination of the Alliance” to acknowledge receipt of the Group’s letter and “to welcome you and your entire team, while reassuring you of its availability to address with responsibility all questions relating to your mission in the liberated areas” (see below). The following day, on 22 March, however, AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka announced via X that “contrary to the program agreed upon by the members of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Congo, the meeting initially planned will no longer take place in view of last-minute emergencies” (see below). Few hours later, Delion Kimbulungu sent an official letter echoing the message of Lawrence Kanyuka (see below). Delion Kimbulungu also rejected the Group’s subsequent request to enter Goma and meet with other actors. The Group therefore cancelled its planned visit to Goma. On 7 April, the Group addressed a further letter to AFC/M23 leadership, formally requesting written responses to 24 questions and topics within the Group’s mandate. Despite previously confirming its willingness to engage, AFC/M23 did not provide any response. • Rwandan authorities On 21 February, the Group sent an official correspondence to the Rwandan authorities requesting to meet with relevant Rwandan authorities and stakeholders in Kigali, in March 2025. The Group explained that it would transit through Kigali to travel to Goma. On 21 March, the Permanent Mission of Rwanda in New York, via the UN Secretariat, authorized the Group to transit through Kigali. However, the following day, on 22 March, merely few hours after AFC/M23 withdrew its invitation to meet the Group in Goma, the Permanent Mission of Rwanda informed the Group by that “unfortunately, due to unforeseen circumstances, we are unable to receive the delegation at this time.” Consequently, the Group cancelled its planned travel to Kigali. __________________ 214 OHCHR – Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Guidance and Practice, 2015; <!-- page 49 --> S/2025/446 49/254 25-07401 Letter received on 21 March 2025 <!-- page 50 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 50/254 Message posted on X by Lawrence Kanyuka on 22 March Letter received on 22 March 2025 <!-- page 51 --> S/2025/446 51/254 25-07401

Annex 2 (para. 8) Corneille Nangaa’s aspiration to take power in Kinshasa L'aspiration de Corneille Nangaa à prendre le pouvoir à Kinshasa Corneille Nangaa, the national coordinator of the AFC/M23 coalition, publicly reinforced AFC/M23’s ambition to conquer further territories, including Kinshasa, alluding to his ambition to stage a coup d’état. In a press conference held in Goma on 1 February 2025, he stated: “we are going to fight until we get to Kinshasa. We have come to Goma to stay, we are not going to withdraw, but we are going to move forward from Goma, [to] Bukavu, Kisangani, Bunia, Lubumbashi, Kananga, Mbuji-Mayi, up to Kinshasa”. Nangaa reiterated this claim at a public rally organized at Goma stadium on 6 February 2025, and on the social media (see below). A Rwandan officer reported the following on Nangaa: “Nangaa is not in Doha [where negotiations between the DRC Government and AFC/M23 were organized]. We do no longer know what to do with the man. He has played his role as a distraction to the presence of Rwandan troops. He has had his time there. He is now no longer preoccupied with the Kivus but he is now preoccupied with Kinshasa, even though Makenga has clearly told him that Kinshasa is out of the question.” Rwanda’s dissatisfaction with Nangaa as political leader of AFC/M23 intensified during the period under review. While at some point Rwanda’s objective was to replace Nangaa with another political figure, it decided to momentarily maintain Nangaa, including because prominent political figures pleaded his cause. Messages of Corneille Nangaa posted on X on 2 April 2025 in which he states: “Our goal is Kinshasa. We are waging a noble struggle to liberate the Democratic Republic of Congo from the hands of unconscious people.” <!-- page 52 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 52/254 Messages of Corneille Nangaa posted on X on 8 March 2025 (left) and 2 March 2025 (right). The message of 2 March reads as follow: “We have a special mission to accomplish, come rain or snow. The Congolese people are ready for a new era and God has accepted that this is how it should be” <!-- page 53 --> S/2025/446 53/254 25-07401

Annex 3 (para. 9) Additional information on AFC/M23 internal tensions and Joseph Kabila’s controversial announced return to Eastern DRC Informations complémentaires sur les tensions internes de l'AFC/M23 et l'annonce controversée du retour de Joseph Kabila dans l'est de la RDC AFC/M23 internal tensions • An individual close to the Rwandan Government and AFC/M23 reported that Rwanda’s initial intention was to replace Sultani Makenga with an FARDC officer, who was also a former CNDP officer. However, this individual declined Rwanda’s request. Consequently, Rwanda decided to maintain Makenga as the overall military commander of AFC/M23. • Sources close the Rwandan Government and AFC/M23 reported that Rwanda’s intention was to soon reinstall sanctioned individual Laurent Nkunda (CDi.002) as one of the leaders of AFC/M23. Laurent Nkunda’s planned travel to AFC/M23 controlled territories aimed at boosting the rebellion’s legitimacy and popular support. Laurent Nkunda reportedly accepted Rwanda’s project and agreed to recognize Sultani Makenga – with whom he had long-standing rivalries – as the military commander of the rebellion. The Group notes that Laurent Nkunda has been incommunicado since October 2024, when Rwandan officers moved him from his residence in Kigali to a secret location. • AFC/M23 internal rivalries were sparked by several recent nominations, including the much-contested nomination of Erasto Bahati as the “Governor” of North Kivu. • While the Government of Rwanda maintained firm control and direction over AFC/M23, certain AFC/M23 leaders and combatants also maintained long-standing connections with Uganda. According to several AFC/M23 sources and sources close to the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda, AFC/M23’s planned take-over of Kisangani, could lead to tensions between Rwanda and Uganda (see also paras. 57-61). These tensions would also rub off on the Rwandan- and Ugandan- aligned factions AFC/M23. The Group notes that UPDF had blocked AFC/M23 forces from advancing towards Kisangani – through negotiation rather than direct confrontation (paras. 18, 56-61). Kabila’s contacts with AFC/M23, Kabila’s disputed return to Goma, and the reactions of the DRC Government • Early April 2025, Joseph Kabila, the former DRC Head of State, wrote the following message: “After six years of absolute silence, a year of exile and in view of the deteriorating security situation throughout the country, and the decay and rot that is infecting all sectors of national life and is completely out of control, I have decided to return to the country without delay, in order to contribute to the search for a solution. For obvious reasons to do with peace and security, and after meeting a number of heads of state and former heads of state from the region, and other national and foreign political and social players with an interest in the Congolese crisis, I decided to start in the eastern part of the country, because there is danger in the air. Joseph Kabila Kabange” • On 18 April 2025, Joseph Kabila arrived in Kigali. Few hours later social media messages reported that Joseph Kabila had arrived in Goma, together with Néhémie Mwilanya, Kikaya Bin Karubi and Moise Nyarugabo. However, the Group did not obtain any evidence of Kabila’s presence in Goma. Several sources informed the Group that the messages were false, and that the announcement of Kabila’s arrival was only meant to test Kinshasa’s reactions. • On 18 April, the day of the announced (but most likely fake) arrival of Kabila in Goma the DRC Government ordered a search at Kabila’s farm in Limete, as well as in other properties belonging to the former Head of State. <!-- page 54 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 54/254 • The DRC Government denounced Kabila’s “ambiguous attitude” towards the occupation of a part of the national territory by the Rwandan army and the M23/AFC, as well as the fact that he never condemned this aggression (…). The DRC Government also stated that Kabila’s silence and that of his political party PPRD (“Parti du Peuple pour le Reconstruction et la Démocratie”) was “culpable, if not complicit” (see communiqué below). • The Ministry of the Interior and Security announced the suspension of the PPRD throughout the country, as well as the referral of the case to the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Constitutional Court. • On 18 April, the Minister of Justice instructed the FARDC Auditor General and the Prosecutor General of the Court of Cassation to initiate legal proceedings against Kabila for his direct participation in the aggression led by Rwanda through the AFC/M23. Message of Corneille Nangaa posted on X on 9 April 2024 in which he states: “It would be an honour for us to receive him [Joseph Kabila]. You will be most welcome, chief senator for life.” <!-- page 55 --> S/2025/446 55/254 25-07401 Official communication of the DRC Government following Kabila’s announced return to Eastern DRC. Received from DRC Government source. <!-- page 56 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 56/254

### Annex 4 (para. 12) AFC/M23 claims and objectives Revendications et objectifs de l'AFC/M23 • The Group recalls that the first attacks launched by M23, in November 2021, were partially motivated by grievances due to a lack of progress in the implementation of the Nairobi Agreements signed on 12 December 2013, which defined the terms for M23’s demobilization, demilitarization and social reintegration, and for conditional amnesty (S/2022/479, paras. 58-72). Fourteen-month long confidential negotiations between the DRC Government and an M23 delegation had started in September 2020, but stalled. In 2022, the Group reported that Makenga’s plan was to force the Government to accept the demands of M23/ACR regarding amnesties, asset recovery, return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, integration into FARDC and political positions (S/2022/479, para. 69). The Group noted, however, that the Nairobi Agreement did not refer to integration into FARDC or political positions that could be obtained by M23 ex-combatants. Moreover, on 27 September 2013, the DRC Government published a communiqué listing commanders and other individuals belonging to or associated with the M23 who could never be integrated into the FARDC. Colonel Makenga Sultani was on this list. The picture below shows an excerpt from the Declaration on the commitments of the 23 March Movement at the conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue (excerpts of the 12 December 2012 “Nairobi Agreement”). The Group obtained three notebooks from AFC/M23 elements who were enrolled in AFC/M23 trainings in 2024 and 2025, which all contained identical notes on the subjects taught during the trainings. These notebooks revealed that the general objectives of AFC/M23 that were articulated during the training were as follows: (1) the neutralization of FDLR, (2) the return of refugees, and (3) removing the “dictatorial power”. The specific objectives were articulated as follows: (1) install democracy in the country; (2) self-management of the population; (3) build a nation with a single and same vision; (4) organize administrative entities; (5) run a patriotic awakening campaign. The picture below shows an excerpt of a notebook of an AFC/M23 trainee outlining the general and specific objectives of the movement. • AFC/M23 and RDF sources, and sources close to the Rwandan Government, reported that these objectives were to be achieved through the creation of an autonomous region in Eastern DRC, hence AFC/M23’s attempts to institutionalize new government structures. Annexes 16-19 provides further details on the AFC/M23-installed parallel administrations. • Several AFC/M23 sources, RDF sources and sources close to the Rwandan Government explained that AFC/M23 leadership and officers of the Government of Rwanda – including Patrick Karuretwa and James Kabarebe (para. 41) – stated that AFC/M23 would not leave conquered territories, whatever the outcome of the negotiations. Ongoing mediation efforts, they said, “served to gain time”. • Likewise, AFC/M23 trainers instructed trainees that “our weak point was signing agreements. This time it won't be the case. The time for agreements has passed” (see picture below). <!-- page 57 --> S/2025/446 57/254 25-07401 <!-- page 58 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 58/254 Annotated excerpt from the Declaration on the commitments of the 23 March Movement at the conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue (excerpts of the 12 December 2012 “Nairobi Agreement”) <!-- page 59 --> S/2025/446 59/254 25-07401 Excerpt from the notebook of an AFC/M23 trainee outlining the general and specific objectives (outlined above) of AFC/M23. Excerpt from the notebook of another AFC/M23 trainee outlining that “Our weak point was signing agreements. This time it won't be the case. The time for agreements has passed.” <!-- page 60 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 60/254

### Annex 5 (para. 13) ### Ceasefire agreements and diplomatic initiatives to address the AFC/M23 crisis ### Accords de cessez-le-feu et initiatives diplomatiques visant à résoudre la crise de l’AFC/M23 • In December 2024, the planned signing of the African Union-mandated Luanda Process peace agreement between Rwanda and the DRC collapsed when the Government of Rwanda insisted on direct negotiations between DRC authorities and AFC/M23. Faced with escalating violence and the risk of regional spill-over of the crisis, regional and international actors increased efforts to rescue the peace process and called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. These initiatives were yet to yield any concrete outcomes. • As the situation considerably deteriorated in late January 2025, EAC and SADC held separate, and later joint summits, reiterating the urgent need for a ceasefire and setting out measures to de-escalate tensions. EAC and SADC leaders directed DRC and Rwanda’s Chiefs of Defence to meet, requested an immediate and unconditional halt to hostilities, and called for unimpeded provision of humanitarian assistance, repatriation of the deceased, and evacuation of the injured. • The Chiefs of Defence of DRC and Rwanda were also directed to develop a securitization plan for Goma and surrounding areas, including (a) the reopening of the main supply routes (along the Goma-Sake-Bukavu, Goma- Kibumba-Rumangabo-Kalengera-Rutshuru-Bunagana, and Goma-Kiwanja-Rwindi-Kanyabayonga-Lubero axes), (b) the reopening of navigation on Lake Kivu between Goma and Bukavu, and (c) the immediate reopening of Goma Airport. They also issued guidance on additional facilitative measures. • The 38th African Union Summit held between 12-18 February 2025 echoed calls by regional leaders calls for a peaceful settlement of the crisis and endorsed various resolutions. • Although regional and continental resolutions continued invoking the Luanda and Nairobi processes, the meeting between Presidents Paul Kagame and Felix Tshisekedi in Doha on 19 March appeared to have effectively relocated negotiations to Qatar. On 24 March, Angolan President João Lourenço announced his withdrawal as the mediator. Diplomatic sources cited failed ceasefire efforts and exclusion from the Doha consultations. Angola’s last attempt, on 18 March, to revive the process with talks in Luanda had failed when AFC/M23 refused to participate, in protest of EU sanctions on senior AFC/M23 leaders and Rwandan actors announced the previous day. • The impasse forced SADC leaders to end the SAMIDRC mandate, and to seek a deal with AFC/M23 to facilitate the withdrawal of SADC troops and military equipment from Goma. • At the time of writing, the Doha negotiations were coupled with the appointment of a panel of facilitators including five Heads of State of the SADC and the EAC – namely, former presidents Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Kgalema Motlanthe of South Africa, Sahle-Work Zewde of Ethiopia, and Catherine Samba-Panza from Central African Republic. The President of the Republic of Togo, Faure Gnassingbe, was appointed by the African Union Commission as the Chair of the Panel. • At the time of drafting, no party heeded the calls for a ceasefire or respected unilateral ceasefire declarations. Progress on ongoing peace and mediation initiatives – including the Doha process and the African Union Panel – remained in their initial stages. Parties also failed to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2773 from 21 February 2025. <!-- page 61 --> S/2025/446 61/254 25-07401

Annex 6 (para. 15) The killing of the Military Governor of North Kivu, Major-General Peter Cirimwami L'assassinat du gouverneur militaire du Nord-Kivu, le Général de division Peter Cirimwami It its previous reports, the Group documented Major-General Peter Cirimwami’s long-standing ties with FDLR-FOCA and Wazalendo groups (S/2023/990, para. 36; and S/2022/967, annexes 41 and 50; S/2024/432, para. 72; S/2024/969, paras. 67-73). The Military Governor of North Kivu, Major-General Peter Cirimwami, was shot on 24 January while visiting FARDC and Wazalendo forces in Sake to encourage them and request them to continue fighting. He succumbed to his injuries the following day. It remains unclear who killed Major-General Peter Cirimwami. The two options vehiculated were that he was either killed by a member of the FARDC or Wazalendo, or by enemy sniper fire. Some sources, including an FARDC officer present in Sake when Major-General Cirimwami was killed, claimed that disgruntled FARDC or Wazalendo shot him. On the other hand, an AFC/M23 insider declared that the Governor was killed by enemy sniper fire (see also annex 15). <!-- page 62 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 62/254

Annex 7 (para. 16) AFC/M23 communiqué of 24 January 2025 announcing the liberation of Goma Communiqué de l'AFC/M23 du 24 janvier 2025 annonçant la libération de Goma AFC/M23 communiqué received from AFC/M23 source <!-- page 63 --> S/2025/446 63/254 25-07401

### Annex 8 (para. 16) Information relating to the attack on Goma Informations concernant l'attaque de Goma • From 23 to 25 January 2025, AFC/M23 and RDF increased pressure on Sake-Mubambiro, Kibati-Kibumba and Rusayo, the last defence positions around Goma town. During these three days of combat, FARDC and Wazalendo massively withdrew from the three frontlines. On 24 January, in an official communiqué, AFC/M23 announced that they were “advancing to liberate [their] compatriots in Goma”. • On 25, 26 and 27 January 2025, RDF troop reinforcements, including RDF Special Forces, arrived from Kitchanga, Kibumba and Kanyamahoro, in the DRC, where RDF was already posted, as well as from Gisenyi, Rwanda. RDF also employed artillery and attack drones from Rwanda across the border into DRC. The presence of RDF naval forces patrolling the lake on the DRC side has also been reported. • On 25 and 26 January 2025, AFC/M23 and RDF bypassed MONUSCO and SAMIDRC positions along three different fronts.215 On 26 January 2025, they engaged in military operations to capture Goma International Airport. After heavy fighting, they secured full control of the airport on 27 January 2025. • AFC/M23 officially announced the closure of the airspace over Goma on 26 January 2025. Intense jamming and spoofing were recorded during this time (para. 46-48). • MONUSCO managed to evacuate 1,882 staff and dependents up until 26 January. Thereafter, for several weeks, many MONUSCO staff, consultants, dependents have been blocked at MONUSCO compounds, in difficult conditions, with scarce access to food, water, sanitation and other supplies. MONUSCO personnel and other individuals were compelled to shelter in bunkers on 27 January for 8 hours, as the compound came under indirect fire as well as crossfire. MONUSCO’s Lava Site, in Goma center, was hit by two RPG rockets and one mortar bomb on 27 January. Other MONUSCO bases also came under direct, indirect and crossfire. • On 27 January 2025, AFC/M23 announced the suspension of all lake activities, which continued to be controlled by RDF naval forces at the time of drafting.216 As a result, evacuations by air, boat, and road, including of UN personnel, were impossible for several weeks. At the time of drafting, the airport remained closed.217 • Wazalendo combatants and FARDC soldiers had withdrawn in large numbers from the positions they have held between 23 to 27 January 2025. Upon entering Goma, they engaged in fighting inside the city and at border crossings. A significant number of Wazalendo combatants and FARDC troops were killed or neutralized during this urban combat. • On 27 January 2025, border clashes and cross-border heavy shelling resulted in casualties in Gisenyi, Rwanda. Five civilians were killed, and 25 civilians were wounded (see para. 85). • The FARDC military command and provincial authorities, without informing their soldiers, have fled on boats to Bukavu in the evening of 26 January 2025. • Following RDF additional reinforcements, on 27 January 2025, AFC/M23 and RDF took full control of Goma town. __________________ 215 At Sake, Mubambiro, Rusayo, Munigi, Kibati, and Rusayo. 216 Communiqué of 27 January 2025. 217 Goma airport infrastructure suffered significant damage during the military operations, as can be observed on imagery on file with the Secretariat. <!-- page 64 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 64/254

Annex 9 (para. 17) Unilateral ceasefire declared by AFC/M23 on 3 February 2025 Cessez-le-feu unilatéral déclaré par l'AFC/M23 le 3 février 2025 AFC/M23 communiqué received from AFC/M23 source <!-- page 65 --> S/2025/446 65/254 25-07401

Annex 10 (para. 19) Maps showing the AFC/M23 and RDF area of influence Cartes montrant la zone d’influence AFC/M23 et RDF • M23 and RDF’s area of operations late October 2024 (see also S/2024/969, annex 20) Map reflecting the positions on 28 October 2024, received from confidential source The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations <!-- page 66 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 66/254 • M23 and RDF’s area of operations in April 2025 Map reflecting the positions on 15 April 2025, received from confidential source The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations <!-- page 67 --> S/2025/446 67/254 25-07401

Annex 11 (para. 20) AFC/M23 in constant need of new recruits Besoin constant de nouvelles recrues de l’AFC/M23 AFC/M23 sources reported that the armed group was in constant need of new recruits, to replenish forces lost, prepare for new offensives, and consolidate control over occupied territories. The following excerpt from the notebook of an AFC/M23 recruit, who took notes during his indoctrination training by AFC/M23, illustrates this constant need of new recruits. Translation: Question recruit: Is it going to take a long time for the (military) people to be numerous? Answer AFC/M23 trainer: We need everyone's efforts if we are to have an army, because wherever the army conquers, it must advance, and it is the cadres who maintain security after they have gone. <!-- page 68 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 68/254

Annex 12 (para. 21) Additional information on the coercive recruitment of surrendered FARDC soldiers, Wazalendo combatants, and civilians, and their training and redeployment Informations supplémentaires sur le recrutement forcé des soldats FARDC, combattants des Wazalendo, et civils, ainsi que la formation militaire et redéploiement • Forced recruitment of FARDC and Wazalendo On 25 January 2025, i.e. two days before the take-over of Goma, AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka issued a 48- hour ultimatum for FARDC to surrender (see below). On 27 January 2025, AFC/M23 declared that the ultimatum had expired, instructing all FARDC personnel to hand over their weapons and assemble at Goma’s Stade de l’Unité.218 In the following days, it reiterated calls for remaining FARDC and Wazalendo to surrender, assuring they will not be harmed.219 On 27 and 28 January, hundreds of FARDC and Wazalendo surrendered to AFC/M23. Many gathered next to MONUSCO’s Lava site base where they took off their uniforms while being guarded by AFC/M23 and RDF (see annex 20). The FARDC were escorted by AFC/M23 and RDF, some to the Stade de l’Unité and others to the harbor in Goma. Many more FARDC surrendered in the early morning of 29 January.220 On the morning of 29 January 2025, social media footage showed hundreds of FARDC gathered at the Stade de l’Unité in Goma. Images received by the Group show that hundreds were loaded onto trucks and taken to Rumangabo for accelerated military training (see pictures 2 and 3 below). According to local and intelligence sources, over two thousand former FARDC and Wazalendo were taken to Rumangabo in a matter of days. Similarly, following the takeover of Minova on 21 January 2025, local sources and intelligence reports indicated that AFC/M23 rounded up all the local youth and men, and transported them in trucks to an undisclosed location. On 22 February, approximately 2,000 FARDC and PNC were brought from Bukavu to Rumangabo camp, via Goma. These events align with AFC/M23’s previously documented pattern of systematic forced recruitment in newly occupied areas (S/2024/432, paras. 35-39 and 100-108; S/2024/969, paras. 41-43). Additionally, AFC/M23 exerted pressure on MONUSCO to hand over approximately 1,200 FARDC and Wazalendo combatants who had surrendered and sought refuge at MONUSCO bases in Goma (see also annex 13).221 An AFC/M23 commander informed the Group that their intention was to send these soldiers and combatants to Rumangabo for training. As outlined in annex 11 above and confirmed by AFC/M23 insiders as well as intelligence sources, AFC/M23 was in constant need of new recruits, to replenish forces lost and to prepare for new offensives. While some FARDC and Wazalendo may have voluntarily joined AFC/M23, most did so under duress, fearing for their lives if they refused. • Training of FARDC and Wazalendo in Rumangabo and their redeployment Several thousands of FARDC and Wazalendo from Goma, Bukavu and other territories under AFC/M23 control, in particular the newly conquered territories, were taken to Rumangabo for military training. AFC/M23 military and tactical training, ideology and indoctrination were extensively documented in the Group’s previous reports (S/2024/969, annexes 15 and 16; S/2024/432, paras. 37-29 and annex 26; S/2023/990, para. 28). After more than two months of military training in Rumangabo, AFC/M23 started gradually redeploying the surrendered FARDC from early April 2025 onwards. Civil society and FARDC sources reported that several FARDC who had been trained in Rumangabo fled AFC/M23 after their redeployment. __________________ 218 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1883615541199568978?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg 219 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1885766817894826093?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg 220 Video footage on file with the Secretariat. 221 Intelligence, UN, AFC/M23 sources, and surrendered soldiers and combatants. <!-- page 69 --> S/2025/446 69/254 25-07401 • Forced recruitment of civilians The systematic forced recruitment by AFC/M23 in newly occupied territories was extensively documented in the Group’s previous reports (S/2024/969, paras. 41-43 and annex 14; S/2024/432, paras. 35-39 and 101-). The Group obtained new evidence of systematic, and often forced, recruitments of civilians, including minors, by AFC/M23. Since the Group’s last report, forced recruitments reached unprecedented levels. Several AFC/M23 combatants interviewed by the Group reported that they had been abducted by AFC/M23 prior to their enrollment in military training. Multiple sources, including civil society leaders, human rights defenders, UN sources, humanitarian organizations, eyewitnesses and former AFC/M23 combatants reported that AFC/M23 systematically abducted men, adolescents and children in conquered territories, in rural areas but also in and around urban settings including in Minova, Goma and Bukavu. • Violations of the sanctions regime, and violations of international humanitarian and human rights law The Group notes that the coercive recruitment of surrendered soldiers along with their forced transportation for military training, by a non-state armed group who also acts as an occupying force, with the support of a foreign State actor, constitutes a sanctionable act under the UN sanctions regime. Such acts violate multiple principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, and may amount to a war crime: • The Third Geneva Convention, Article 130 prohibits compelling prisoners of war to serve in the forces of the hostile power. • The Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 51 prohibits the occupying power from compelling protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. • Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977), Article 51(3), regarded as customary IHL, prohibits the compelling of civilians to participate in hostilities. • Additional Protocol I, Article 75(2)(a)(ii) and Article 77(2) prohibits forced recruitment and considers it a grave breach if done unlawfully. • Customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Rule 95 (ICRC Customary IHL Database) prohibits compelling persons under occupation to serve in the armed forces of the occupying power. • ICRC Customary Rule 129 prohibits the forced displacement or deportation of persons under occupation. • ICRC Customary Rule 135 reaffirms that “civilians shall not be compelled to participate in hostilities.” This binds all parties to a conflict—including non-state armed groups—even if they are not party to Protocol I. • Article 8(2)(a)(v) & (b)(xv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court classifies compelling a prisoner of war or a protected person to serve in the hostile force as a war crime. • In the context of an international armed conflict, Article 8(2)(b)(xv) of the Rome Statute criminalizes “compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent’s service before the commencement of the war.” This also covers coercing enemy civilians to bear arms or otherwise serve in military activities. <!-- page 70 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 70/254 Screenshots of video showing hundreds FARDC loaded onto trucks in Goma and taken to Rumangabo for accelerated military training on 29 January 2025 <!-- page 71 --> S/2025/446 71/254 25-07401 AFC/M23 communiqué issuing a 48-hour ultimatum for FARDC to surrender. Document received from AFC/M23 and published on X on 25 January 2025 <!-- page 72 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 72/254 AFC/M23 communiqué announcing the expiration of the ultimatum for FARDC to surrender. Document received from AFC/M23 and published on X on 27 January 2025 <!-- page 73 --> S/2025/446 73/254 25-07401 Communiqué of the AFC/M23 appointed mayor of Goma calling upon all the FARDC, PNC, Wazalendo, and FDLR elements on the move in and around the town to surrender and move to the Stade de l’Unité. Document received from AFC/M23 source. <!-- page 74 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 74/254

Annex 13 (para. 21) AFC/M23 requesting MONUSCO to hand-over the surrendered FARDC and Wazalendo AFC/M23 demandant à la MONUSCO de remettre les FARDC et Wazalendo qui se sont rendus Document received from AFC/M23 <!-- page 75 --> S/2025/446 75/254 25-07401

Annex 14 (para. 23) Additional information on AFC/M23 new recruits from both the DRC and diaspora, and RDF joining AFC/M23 Informations complémentaires sur les nouvelles recrues venant de la RDC et de la diaspora , et les RDF qui rejoignent l'AFC/M23 • RDF joining AFC/M23 Sources close to the Rwandan Government, RDF sources, and Congolese refugees reported that nearly every Congolese young male national living in refugee camps in Rwanda, had been enlisted in the Rwandan army. Some young men who grew up in refugee camps were formed as RDF Special Forces. These RDF had both Rwandan and Congolese nationality. One RDF soldier stated the following: “A lot of Congolese refugees went to RDF! And many of these RDF are now joining M23!”. One RDF source recognized several soldiers currently serving within the ranks of AFC/M23 in Goma as having previously been deployed with RDF in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, and in the Central African Republic. The Government of Rwanda reportedly gave permission to these RDF to join AFC/M23, and even encouraged RDF of Congolese origin to join the rebellion. Guarantees regarding continued pension rights were provided.222 The presence of these former RDF, including from the Special Forces, within the ranks of AFC/M23 has increased the current military capacity of the rebellion. The influence of the Rwandan military on the AFC/M23 is also visible in its structure and organization, as most units are now organized similarly to the Rwandan army. • Young men and women from the DRC and diaspora joining AFC/M23 In its previous reports, the Group documented AFC/M23’s continued recruitment abroad, including in refugee camps in Rwanda and Uganda, primarily targeting Congolese refugees (S/2024/432, paras. 103-105 and S/2024/969, annex 14). During the current reporting period, recruitment efforts continued, not only in AFC/M23 controlled territories, but also in the diaspora. - AFC/M23 continued to recruit in North and South Kivu. In South Kivu, recruitment was particularly frequent in the newly conquered territories of Kalehe and Kabare, as well as within the broader area around Bukavu town; in North Kivu, recruitment was frequently reported in Masisi, Walikale and Lubero territories, and in Goma town (S/2024/969, annexes 14 and 53). New recruits also came from other areas in the DRC not controlled by AFC/M23. For example, a newly recruited M23 trainee reported that recruits coming from all over DRC attended the AFC/M23 military and ideological training in Nyongera, notably from Beni and Butembo in North Kivu, Kisangani and the broader Tshopo Province, Maniema Province, Haut Uéle Province, Katanga Province, as well as from Kinshasa,. The Group collected additional evidence of AFC/M23 recruitment in the region, notably in refugee camps in Rwanda (S/2024/432, para. 103), in Kenya,223 Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda.224 Several Burundian recruits and former refugees having lived in camps in Rwanda, as well as intelligence and protection sources, revealed that recruitments in refugee camps in Rwanda have been systematically carried out since at least 2017, at first for the benefit of the RED Tabara armed group, and since the resurgence of M23, for the benefit of the latter. These recruitments were orchestrated by RDF and Rwandan intelligence operatives. New recruits were systematically trained, including by military personnel in active service within the RDF, and by RDF training centres such as Nasho and Gako.225 Similarly, Congolese refugees living in refugee camps in Uganda, including in Nyakivale, revealed an identical scheme of recruitments for the benefit of M23, orchestrated with the implication of Rwandan __________________ 222 RDF sources and sources close to the Rwandan Government. 223 Including from Kakuma refugee camp located in the north-western region of Kenya. 224 AFC/M23 recruits, Banyamulenge and Tutsi sources in Kenya, Burundi, and the DRC, intelligence sources, and RDF sources. 225 Ibid. <!-- page 76 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 76/254 intelligence operatives and a network of M23 recruiters.226 For example, Kennedy Nari (see para. 24) was identified by several AFC/M23 recruits and by individuals living in Ugandan refugee camps as one of the key figures facilitating the travel of new recruits from Uganda to Tchanzu. - After the take-over of Goma and Bukavu by AFC/M23, AFC/M23 diaspora leaders travelled to Eastern DRC. For example, Willy Manzi Ngaramba – who had been appointed as the coordinator in charge of AFC/M23 diaspora in June 2024, with the task of revitalizing M23’s diaspora – travelled from Canada to Goma via Kigali in February 2025, to take up his new role as AFC/M23-appointed deputy “Governor” of North Kivu. Dr. Freddy Kanyiki, a prominent member of the Banyamulenge diaspora, linked to efforts to support the Twirwaneho armed group 227 (see paras. 175-177), attended the AFC/M23 rally in Bukavu with the AFC/M23 leadership, after the city was taken in mid-February.228 Moreover, the Group also collected evidence that diaspora youth from Europe, Canada and the United States, began travelling to Eastern DRC, to enroll in military and ideological training. AFC/M23 recruits reported that Congolese youth from Belgium, Poland, United Kingdom, Norway and Germany attended an ideological training in Nyongera in early 2025. According to AFC/M23 sources, the recruits who arrived from Europe, Canada and the United States travelled back to their respective home bases after the military and ideological training. AFC/M23 tasked them to sensitize and persuade other youth to join the AFC/M23 cause. - AFC/M23 recruits who arrived from Kinshasa were also redeployed to their areas of origin after the training, tasked to collect intelligence from their respective localities and persuade new recruits to either physically join AFC/M23, or rally to the AFC/M23 cause. __________________ 226 AFC/M23 recruits, refugees living in Uganda, intelligence sources. 227 Intelligence sources, Twirwaneho members, witnesses from the Banyamulenge community in the DRC and the diaspora living in the USA, Burundi, Kenya. 228 Photographic and video evidence, intelligence sources and witnesses who identified Dr. Kanyiki. <!-- page 77 --> S/2025/446 77/254 25-07401 Message posted by Corneille Nangaa stating that “a strategic meeting was held today in GOMA with the Congolese diaspora from several countries around the world. The Congo is crying out for us”. Posted on X on 11 April 2025. <!-- page 78 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 78/254

Annex 15 (para. 24) Additional information on training, training centers and trainers Informations complémentaires sur la formation, les centres de formation et les formateurs • Trainers teaching military tactics and ideology AFC/M23 recruits confirmed that “Colonel” Leon Kanyamibwa was the AFC/M23 commander responsible for military training (see S/2024/432, para. 39, and S/2024/969 annex 15). He supervised all training centers, frequently travelling between these training centers. Kanyamibwa originates from Masisi territory, DRC. AFC/M23 recruits reported that Kanyamibwa was always accompanied by very young female bodyguards, the majority minors, between 15 and 20 years old. Pictures of “Colonel” Kanyamibwa received from AFC/M23 recruit At the Nyongera training center, “Lieutenant” Justin served as the trainer of trainers. According to AFC/M23 sources, Justin was a Rwandan national. Other military trainers in Nyongera training center were identified as Pacifique Ngabo, originally from Masisi territory, as well as two individuals called Prince and Isaaq. According to one AFC/M23 recruit that was trained in Nyongera, Prince and Isaaq were Rwandan nationals. Isaaq taught tactical and military training, spoke English and Kinyarwanda, but could not speak any Swahili. During the training in Nyongera, Pacifique Ngabo declared to recruits that he was at a 800-meter distance from the late Governor Chirimwami when the latter was killed by Ngabo’s fellow sniper. AFC/M23 recruits reported the presence of Adam Chalwe 229 at Nyongera training center, teaching politics. Adam Chalwe was a prominent political figure of the former DRC ruling party, People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), and appeared alongside Nangaa in March 2024 at a rally in Kiwanja (S/2024/432, annex 18). Yanick Tshisola, current Chief of Staff of Corneille Nangaa and former PPRD political figure, instructed a course on “communication in wartime” (S/2024/432, annex 18). In its previous report the Group provided details on of some trainers in Nyongera (S/2024/969, annex 16). Other trainers of theoretical courses at Nyongera were identified as “Professor” Nkuba, “Professor” Samuel Sabimana, “Professor” Pascal Kasantré Uzamukunda, and “Professor” Désiré Rwigema Rukomera. The Group obtained two additional copies of notebooks with handwritten notes taken by trainees, listing the theoretical courses and the names of the following additional trainers: Jean-Louis Musubao and “Colonel” Samuel Nsabimana. __________________ 229 See also media article <!-- page 79 --> S/2025/446 79/254 25-07401 Pictures of “Lieutenant” Justin (left) and Pacifique Ngabo (middle) and Prince (right) received from AFC/M23 recruit • AFC/M23 military and tactical training, ideology and indoctrination in training camps To consolidate AFC/M23 control in conquered territories, and in view of new military operations aimed at extending AFC/M23’s territorial footprint, AFC/M23 increased its training efforts for both civil-administrative agents and combatants. During the period under review, military training was provided mainly in Tchanzu, while civil-administrative agents were trained in Nyongera. During the period under review, thousands of new recruits were trained at Tchanzu and other military camps including in Rutshuru (Birere neighbourhood), Bwito, and Bwiza (S/2024/432, para. 38; S/2024/969, annex 15). Between January and April 2025, at least 2,000 FARCD, Wazalendo and PNC received accelerated military training at the strategic FARDC camp in Rumangabo, currently under control of AFC/M23 (S/2022/967, para. 30; S/2023/431, para. 45; S/2024/432, para. 36). Military training in Tchanzu AFC/M23’s main military base and military training center remained in Tchanzu. Tchanzu’s military training facility was significantly expanded dring 2023, as corroborated by imagery (S/2024/432, annex 26). “Colonel” Kanyamibwa was the main commander in Tchanzu, in charge of training. During the reporting period, an estimated 5,500 recruits were being trained and were expected to graduate in April 2025. AFC/M23 combatants and recruits stated that at Tchanzu the emphasis was on practical military and tactical courses, it also included several theoretical courses. Specific ideological courses at Tchanzu were mandatory for recruits that joined AFC/M23 from other armed groups, for example the recruits who came from Ituri.230 Training for civil-administrative agents in Nyongera, DRC, and in Gabiro, Rwanda Recruits destined to carry out intelligence, political, administrative and civil tasks were trained at the AFC/M23 training camp in Nyongera, Rutshuru territory. Between 7 and 24 March 2025, 875 new recruits, including from the diaspora (see also annex 14), were trained as civil-administrative cadres. AFC/M23 sources enrolled in the March 2025 training session explained that 1,682 candidates had applied for the training in Nyongera, surpassing the capacity of the training centre. Some recruits were rescheduled for subsequent training sessions, planned to commence after the closing ceremony of the March training session. __________________ 230 Testimonies of AFC/M23 recruits, including from Ituri. <!-- page 80 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 80/254 “Colonel” Gafishi Semikobe Simon, responsible for recruiting and mobilizing combatants and politico-military cadres in Eastern DRC, and former FARDC commander “Colonel” Samuel Sabimana, were involved in selecting suitable recruits for the training of politico-administrative agents. From Nyongera, a select group of trainees – chosen by “Colonel” Kanyamibwa and approved by Sultani Makenga - was sent for specialized training at RDF’s Gabiro combat training center in Rwanda. The specialized training focused on intelligence, administration, communication and logistics, as well as on the building of civilian-military relations. AFC/M23 agents reported that “only talented AFC/M23 cadres” attended training in Gabiro. Between September and November 2024, 60 recruits attended this specialized training in Gabiro. Specialised training in Gabiro was confirmed by several AFC/M23 cadres and sources close to the Rwandan Government. In its previous report, the Group listed the theoretical courses instructed at Nyongera training camp (S/2024/969, annex 16). The trainees also received a course outlining the general objectives of AFC/M23 as well as the propaganda efforts that had to be undertaken. The handwritten notebooks of trainees, analysed by the Group, follow an identical structure and headlines, and have an identical content. They all referred to the following: General objectives of AFC/M23: 1. Neutralisation of the Interhamwe armed groups 2. Return of Rwandan refugees 3. Drive out the dictatorial power [in Kinshasa] Specific objectives: 1. Install democracy in the country 2. Self-management of the population 3. Build a nation with a single and same vision 4. Organize administrative entities 5. Run a patriotic awakening campaign The course also outlined that there were three types of mobilization: 1) financial mobilization: financing had to be found for the rebellion and everyone should contribute; 2) mobilization of human resources; 3) mobilization of information, including through radio and social media such as Facebook and Whatsapp. The following stages of mobilization were identified: 1) identify the objectives; 2) communication and sensibilization; 3) organization and coordination of the units; 4) engagement and participation; 5) evaluation. The course referred to the necessity to “look for information regarding the enemy”, and warned that military information could not be shared on social media. Recruits were also instructed to be very discrete. During the course, recruits were given guidelines for the content of war propaganda: 1. “we don’t want war, but we react”; 2. “the adverse camp is the only responsible party for the war”; 3. “the boss of the adverse camp (i.e. Tshisekedi) is the devil”; 4; “our cause is a noble one”; 5. “the enemy uses non authorized weaponry”; 6. “we suffer very few losses”; 7. “intellectuals do support our cause”. See also annex 50. <!-- page 81 --> S/2025/446 81/254 25-07401

Annex 16 (para. 26) Additional information on the AFC/M23 governance structure Informations complémentaires sur la structure de gouvernance de l'AFC/M23 In its previous reports, the Group documented the AFC/M23 parallel administration and provided details on nominations and newly installed local authorities, including security and intelligence actors (S/2024/432, annex 25; S/2022/967, annex 23; S/2024/969, paras. 40, 59-61). The new appointments following the takeover of Goma and Bukavu have been publicly announced in AFC/M23 communiqués (see below). • North Kivu and Goma On 5 February 2025, AFC/M23 announced new administrative appointments with the aim of formalizing its control and authority. It designated Bahati Musanga Joseph, also known as Bahati Erasto (S/2024/432, paras. 35, 36 and 102) as governor of North Kivu, with Manzi Ngarambe Willy and Amani Bahati Shaddrak as deputy governors. Nzanzamahoro Tegera Vincent was appointed as the Chief of Staff of Bahati Erasto’s cabinet. Additional appointments included Katembo Ndalieni Julien as mayor of Goma, and Ngabo Désiré as his deputy. The administration of Goma was further developed, with Mukadisi Niragire Hélène named as bourgemestre of Goma Commune, Abdoul Bikulu Crispin overseeing Karisimbi Commune, and Kulu Musubao Jean-Louis appointed to Kirumba Commune. In the broader territorial administration, Ndizeye Emmanuel was assigned as territorial administrator (“AT”) of Masisi, with Banyene Malira Jonas as his deputy, while Kabasha Ephrem assumed the role of AT for Nyiragongo. On 19 March 2025, Haba Patient was appointed as the North Kivu Provincial Coordinator for Finances. Ndayambaje Birihari was appointed Deputy Provincial Coordinator in charge of public finances and taxes, while Musango Rutera Sumche was appointed Deputy Provincial Coordinator in charge of public debt and investment. Mukingi Liévin was appointed as “Delegate to Mines”. On 6 April 2025, AFC/M23 announced additional administrative appointments. Kulu Musubao Jean-Louis was appointed AT of Lubero, with Radjabu Kwizera Elie as his deputy. Munyandekwe Innocent was appointed bourgemestre of Kirumba Commune, with Jeaninie Kavugho as his deputy. Kahinda Jean Baptiste was appointed bourgemestre of Kayna Commune, with Mumbere Siméon as his deputy. Matimano Jean was appointed bourgemestre of Kanyabayonga Commune, with Senzoga Martin as his deputy. AFC/M23 installed Baziramwabo alias Baz as the Chief Intelligence (ANR) in Goma. Bonane Bujakera was affected to Baziramwabo’s office. Bari and Hermann Bahinzi were charged with all ANR administration.. The ANR office was located at the DRC Government’s ANR office. “Colonel” Gafishi Semikobe Simon, officially appointed AFC/M23 “Officer for Mobilisation and Recruitment” on 11 February 2025, also carried out responsibilities relating to the “security files”. • South Kivu and Bukavu On 28 February, the AFC/M23 announced new administrative appointments in South Kivu. It appointed Emmanuel Birato Rwihimba as the governor of South Kivu, with Dunia Musumbuko Bwenge and Gishinge Gasinzira Juvénal as deputy governors. • AFC/M23 general nominations (without geographical restriction) Kanyamuhanda Essiel was appointed as the “Officer for the Rehabilitation of Infrastructure”, with Habiyaremye Claude as his deputy. <!-- page 82 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 82/254 On 19 March 2025, Mugisha Robert was appointed Chief of the Finance Department, with Buhunda Kilo serving as his deputy in charge of public finance and taxes and Kaj Kayemb Fanny as deputy in charge of public debt and investments. On 6 April 2025, Gage Musanga was appointed “Intendant General” by AFC/M23 • Examples of administrative and security services provided by AFC/M23 - AFC/M23 authorities issued civil status documents, including matrimonial documents and newborn certificates. - AFC/M23 deployed police authorities. Armed AFC/M23 police elements were involved in patrolling and conducting military operations and arrests, in particular of alleged Wazalendo and FDRL combatants. - AFC/M23 established customs authorities involved in illegal tax collection. - AFC/M23 civil administration appointees and AFC/M23 leaders were involved in land and property management, i.e. redistributing land and properties, renting seized land and properties, restricting access to land to certain farmers, and/or taxing access to land. - AFC/M23 organized night patrols carried out by AFC/M23 combatants, but also by youth selected by local chiefs upon AFC/M23’s orders. • Salongo Consistent with previously observed practices, on 31 January 2025, AFC/M23 imposed 'Salongo,' a mandatory community labor initiative requiring civilians to participate in town clean-up efforts. To enforce compliance, AFC/M23 issued participation receipts (“jeton”) and reportedly threatened punitive measures against those who failed to comply with the directive.231 __________________ 231 Local sources, intelligence sources. <!-- page 83 --> S/2025/446 83/254 25-07401 <!-- page 84 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 84/254 <!-- page 85 --> S/2025/446 85/254 25-07401 Documents received from AFC/M23 Official documents relating to AFC/M23 nominations and appointments are on file with the Secretariat. <!-- page 86 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 86/254

Annex 17 (para. 27) Additional information on the persecution of legally appointed customary chiefs and civil society leaders, the destruction of state archives, and the return of Congolese refugees Informations complémentaires sur la chasse aux chefs coutumiers désignés et à la société civile, la destruction des archives de l'État, et le retour de réfugiés Congolais Systematic substitution of customary chiefs In the DRC, customary chiefs (chef de chefferie or “Mwami”, chef de groupement, and chef de village) play an important role in governing local populations. These chiefs are central figures of authority and local legitimacy, exerting considerable influence in managing social affairs, land issues, and conflict resolution. Under Congolese law, customary power is recognized by the Constitution and regulated by law,232 acknowledging the role of customary leaders in local governance, land administration, and dispute settlement. This legal framework underlines the importance of customary chiefs in bridging the gap between state institutions and the communities they serve, particularly in rural and remote areas where state presence is limited. The involvement of customary chiefs in such matters helps to ensure that decisions are made in line with local traditions and customs, while also aligning with the national legal framework. Their role, while not replacing the state apparatus, often complements formal state structures, allowing for better management of resources, peacebuilding, and societal order. AFC/M23 has systematically chased and removed customary chiefs who opposed AFC/M23 and replaced them with AFC/M23-aligned individuals. In doing so, AFC/M23 sought to consolidate its influence and control. In the few cases where the customary chiefs were maintained, these individuals had either already worked with AFC/M23 or belonged to AFC/M23- friendly communities, and thus accepted AFC/M23’s authority. The following list provides examples of customary chiefs that have been removed, had to flee and/or were killed, and were replaced by AFC/M23 allied individuals: • Nyiragongo territory: • Chefferie Bukumu: Mwami Lebon Bakungu Bigaruka replaced by Isaac Butsitsi • Groupement Kibumba : Chef de groupement Furaha Kiri replaced by Gatambaro Kariwabo Karemera • Groupement Buhumba: Chef de groupement Deo Makombe replaced by Bigabiro Sebahutu o Village Rwibiranga : Chef de village Nrere Ndagahire replaced by Tama Barawigirira o Village Chyegera : Chef de village Kabaume Sebyera replaced by Emmanuel Kabumba o Village Nakabumbi : Chef de village Byimana Dismas replaced by Mbirabumbva Mujinya o Village Kabuye : Chef de village Shamurembwa Ndibugirumwe replaced by Abidenego Muzayifu o Village Ngobera : Chef de village Iyakaremye Nzayino replaced by Majaribu Gishuba o Village Kabagana : Chef de village Mbonariba Rudodo Kamoso replaced by Rwanze Bachungu o Village Kabuhanga : Chef de village Gakomati Semiryango was not replaced o Village Kanyanja : Chef de village Nginzwe Karyugahawa was not replaced because he had already been working with AFC/M23 __________________ 232 Law No. 08/016 of 7 October 2008 pertaining to the composition, organization, and functioning of Decentralized Territorial Entities (ETDs) and their relations with the State and Provinces. It outlines the administrative structure of chiefdoms, inte grating customary chiefs into the decentralized governance system. The Code des Personnes et de la Famille (2006) recognizes the authority of customary chiefs in matters such as marriage and inheritance, provided these practices do not contravene nationa l laws. <!-- page 87 --> S/2025/446 87/254 25-07401 • Rutshuru territory: • Groupement Jomba: Chef de groupement Jackson Kachuki replaced by Vincent Mwabutsa • Groupement Rugari : Chef de groupement Eric Mashagiro replaced by Rukavu Buhuzu • Groupement Kisigari : Chef de groupement Justin Komayombi replaced by Nzamuye. AFC/M23 stated that Nzamuye was appointed in the « interim » and would only be confirmed if Justin Komayombi definitively refused to adhere to AFC/M23 • Groupement Bweza: Chef de groupement replaced by his son • Groupement Bukoma: Chef de groupement replaced by his son • Groupement Busanza: Chef de groupement Jojo Bahizi replaced by Bahizi Désiré On 3 March 2025, Fikiri Mwishuko, the Chef de groupement of Shanga, was abducted by AFC/M23 from the CBCA Ndosho hospital (paras. 105-108), amongst others sick and wounded patients. Fikiri Mwishuko subsequently died, reportedly after having been tortured by AFC/M23. The Group notes that several newly installed leaders claimed they were the legitimate leaders. This, however, was contested by the legally appointed customary leaders who had to flee, who claimed that the installation of new customary leaders was illegal and disrespected customary power and heritage.233 For example, fearing for his life, the Mwami of the chefferie Bwisha, Jean Baptiste Ndeze Katurebe, fled his chiefdom when AFC/M23 took control of the area in 2022. AFC/M23 replaced Ndeze Katurebe, by Ndeze Mbonyumugenzi Patrick Jean Daniel, who had been living Rwanda. On X the latter claimed that he was the legitimate Mwami. However, customary leaders reported that in Bwisha chefferie customary power was acquired through heritage, passed on from father to son, and that Ndeze Mbonyumugenzi’s father had not been the chief of the chiefdom. In the meantime, Ndeze Katurebe was appointed by the DRC Government to serve as Vice-Minister for customary affairs.234 The persecution and threatening of civil society leaders During the period under review, AFC/M23 leaders have systematically harassed, tortured, threatened, killed, and seized properties of civil society leaders. Several AFC/M23 leaders publicly announced a ban on all activities by civil society, citizens' movements and pressure groups. For example, in mid-February 2025, Ephrem Kabasha, recently appointed by AFC/M23 as territorial administrator of Masisi, prohibited all associations, including civil society, during a speech in Kaseni. On 2 February 2025, Jean-Louis Kulu Musubaho, responsible for ideology within AFC/M23, during an exchange at the CBCA church in Goma, threatened that those taking part in activities of the civil society, citizen’s movements and pressure groups, “would have problems”. The following are illustrations of the systematic persecution of civil society leaders: • On 7 January 2025, Ndayambaje Birahira, AFC/M23-appointed deputy provincial coordinator in charge of public finances and taxes in North Kivu, threatened the family of a prominent civil society actor from Rutshuru, and obliged his family to leave their house in the Rutshuru. AFC/M23 expropriated the house and all its contents. Thereafter, the house was occupied by Ndayambaje, Bahati Erasto (later designated as governor of North Kivu) and Willy Manzi (later appointed as deputy governor of North Kivu). The Group corroborated the presence of the three AFC/M23 leaders in the seized parcel in January 2025. The civil society actor was threatened by Ephrem Kabasha, the AFC/M23 appointed territorial administrator (“AT”) of Nyiragongo, for having alerted UN officers about the seizure of his house, Kabasha warned himthat all his belongings would be confiscated,235 __________________ 233 Katurebe Protests M23 Decision to Replace Him As Chief :: Uganda Radionetwork 234 Son Excellence, le vice-ministre des affaires coutumières, Mwami Ndeze Katurebe Jean-Baptiste visite l’ERAIFT 235 Screenshots of whatsapp messages, on file with the Secretariat. <!-- page 88 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 88/254 • A prominent member of the civil society in North Kivu was arrested on 1 February 2025 by Rwandan authorities at the Grande Barrière, the border crossing between Goma and Gisenyi, and incarcerated in Rwanda for four days before being released. Civil society leaders reported that his arrest was due to his criticism vis-à-vis Rwanda. • In March 2025, a prominent member of the civil society in the Bweza groupement, at the time living as a displaced person in Goma, was kidnapped by Ephrem Kabasha, the AFC/M23 appointed territorial administrator (“AT”) of Nyiragongo, while the individual was at the office of Bukuma chefferie. He was taken to an underground cell north of Kanyaruchinya and tortured. The individual was released in the evening of of the same day, following mediation efforts by some civil society leaders close to the AFC/M23 leadership. Prior to his release, Ephrem Kabasha warned that he continued to actively look for other civil society leaders as he deemed them responsible for denouncing Ephrem’s conduct. The individual’s house was looted by AFC/M23 elements commanded by Ephrem Kabasha and “colonel” Mugabo. • A prominent member of civil society in Nyiragongo and his family members were systematically threatened by AFC/M23. In early 2024. Ephrem Kabasha, Madouard Paluku and Elysée Kamal threatened them verbally and in writing. On 23-24 January 2025, few days prior to AFC/M23 take-over of Goma, Ephrem warned this individual that AFC/M23 were on their way to Goma, accused him of cooperation with FDLR and VDP and threatened to behead him.. Late January 2025, Kennedy Nari (para. 24) accompanied by AFC/M23 combatants went to the individual’s house inquiring about his whereabouts. A month later,the family members of this individual were again visited and interrogated about his whereabouts. In March 2025, Ephrem Kabasha and four AFC/M23 combatants threatened the individual’sfamily members at gunpoint. Destruction of state archives and seizing of properties AFC/M23 systematically occupied all DRC Government offices and public buildings in the occupied territories, looting and destroying office equipment, documents, and archives. To illustrate, in June 2024, all office equipment and documents of the office of the Bashali chefferie was looted. Immediately after their takeover by AFC/M23, the archives of the Bwisha chefferie, the Bwito chefferie, and of Kitchanga have also been destroyed. AFC/M23 leaders and officers actively engaged in seizing and redistributing public and private properties. The Group documented the seizure of private properties, including in Rutshuru and Goma by the following AFC/M23 leaders: • “Colonel” Vianney Kazarama, the spokesperson of the 2012-2013 iteration of M23, who had lived for a decade in Rwanda and recently returned to DRC • Bahati Erasto • Willy Manzy • Ndayambaje Birahira • Benjamin Mbonimpa • Bertrand Bisimwa • Corneille Nangaa AFC/M23 sources and sources close to the Rwandan Government informed the Group that the redistribution of land and properties was a part of AFC/M23’s plan, as also illustrated by excerpts from notebooks belonging to AFC/M23 recruits (see picture below). <!-- page 89 --> S/2025/446 89/254 25-07401 ### Translation Question trainee: There are displaced people who have fled after doing bad things. He's leaving having sold everything he had, so what's it going to be like to bring him back? Answer AFC/M23 trainer: We'll have distributive justice, which means equal rights for all, but also transitional justice. Initial reports on the return of Congolese refugees Between May and September 2024, a multitude of sources reported about several waves of Tutsi returnees, primarily coming from Rwanda, that began arriving in the Rutshuru and Kitchanga regions.236 Local sources from Kitchanga (who limited their observations to Kitchanga and its immediate surroundings) described these individuals as largely refugees, primarily of Tutsi origin, who had fled the region during earlier conflicts and were now returning to areas previously vacated by IDPs. Some of these families were recognized by the locals. Others, however, were newcomers with no prior ties to the region, as nobody recognized them, they did not know anyone, could not speak the local language and only expressed themselves in Kinyarwanda, were unfamiliar with local customs, and could not count in the local currency. Corroborated reports indicated that the returnees were often transported in convoys escorted by AFC/M23 military personnel. These convoys, sometimes involving trucks – Fuso and Kamaz models – and jeeps, have brought groups of between 100-230 individuals per trip – with at least eight trips confirmed between June and September 2024. The returnees were primarily coming from Rwanda, although some sources also reported arrivals from nearby areas in Uganda. The first wave of returnees was reported to have arrived in late May - early June 2024, with several subsequent waves following throughout the summer. Witnesses interviewed by the Group confirmed the settling of these returnees in Rutshuru and Kitchanga, regions that the witnesses had intimate knowledge of, but did not rule out the possibility of returnees also having settled in other regions under AFC/M23 control. They based this assessment on hearsay, and on having witnessed the onward journey of some of these individuals upon their arrival to Kitchanga, to a destination unknown to these witnesses. Once in the region, the returnees occupied vacant homes and agricultural fields left behind by IDPs. Even among the returnees who had been living in the region many years ago, many no longer possessed houses or land, and therefore settled in the vacant homes of IDPs and worked the lands abandoned by the latter. Local authorities were instructed to open abandoned homes for these returnees, and in some cases houses were opened forcibly. Several locals from Kitchanga who have fled their homes due to the ongoing hostilities and the occupation of AFC/M23 expressed concern over their abandoned houses – they received warnings that if they did not return, their houses were going to be confiscated. Several of them reported that their houses, or the houses of their relatives, have already been occupied by families who had recently arrived __________________ 236 Intelligence, researchers and protection sources, UN, civil society, community leaders, locals from affected communities. <!-- page 90 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 90/254 from Rwanda. The returnees were occupying both houses and fields in several locations, including Kitchanga, Kahe, Mushaki, and areas around Bwiza. In addition to providing transport or escorting them, the AFC/M23 forces have reportedly also been directly involved in the logistics of settling the returnees, sometimes by directing them to occupy specific homes or fields. Additionally, there were reports of the returnees engaging in farming and small businesses, such as opening shops and restaurants in the areas where they settled. Local sources indicated that while some members of the community welcomed the returnees who had left the area during previous cycles of conflict or the recent one, there was growing tension regarding the occupation of vacant homes and agricultural land abandoned by IDPs. Reports have already emerged from IDPs who were compelled to return to their areas following AFC/M23's takeover of Goma (para. 93), only to find their homes and lands occupied by "strangers". This resettlement process was understood by the majority of the locals to be part of a broader strategy, with local leaders noting that the AFC/M23 aimed to facilitate the return of Tutsi refugees to reclaim territory. When asked to explain the basis for such a statement, one source replied that many locals had relatives or friends who had joined AFC/M23 and continued providing information to them, despite having joined the ranks of the rebellion. Several local sources interviewed by the Group responded along the same lines, stating that these things “were known” or “could not be kept a secret” in the community. Given conflicting reports on the number and origins of returnees, the Group was unable to independently assess the full scale of these movements or their impact on local communities. Nevertheless, local leaders and protection actors warned that these returns threatened land tenure and regional stability, potentially sowing the seeds of future violent land disputes. AFC/M23 statements about return of refugees As initial reports regarding the settlement of returnees from Rwanda in the Rutshuru and Kitchanga areas began emerging, AFC Coordinator Corneille Nangaa publicly addressed the issue of refugee returns in a communiqué released on 6 May 2024 (see images below for the full text of the communiqué in French). Key points regarding the return of refugees mentioned by Corneille Nangaa in his communiqué: • He condemned the allies of FARDC – the Wazalendo and FDLR – whose aim was to exterminate certain communities in Eastern DRC under the pretext of fighting against M23. • He accused the Kinshasa regime of using propaganda to deny refugees their right to return and claimed that this denial made refugees appear stateless. • He emphasized that M23's mission included helping these refugees, who were members of their families, to reclaim and protect the lands that were historically theirs, which were seized by the FDLR and their local allies the Wazalendo. • He criticized the Kinshasa regime, led by President Tshisekedi, for obstructing the return of refugees and denying them citizenship. • Nangaa stressed that any approach that did not address the FLDR threat or guarantee the return of refugees from neighboring countries and the peaceful cohabitation of communities was doomed to fail. He also added that as long as these profound causes of the conflict were not resolved, AFC will not abandon its fight. The communiqué was signed by Corneille Nangaa on 6 May 2024 and published by Lawrence Kanyuka on “X” on 8 May 2024. <!-- page 91 --> S/2025/446 91/254 25-07401 <!-- page 92 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 92/254 <!-- page 93 --> S/2025/446 93/254 25-07401 https://twitter.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1788259609561505861?t=1UCoO39b-bQYL6jXMNAR1A&s=19 <!-- page 94 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 94/254

### Annex 18 (para. 31) AFC/M23 illegal taxation Taxation illégale per l’AFC/M23 AFC/M23 replaced tax collection – a fundamental source of generating public revenues by a State – in all areas under its control in North and South Kivu (see documents below). In doing so, AFC/M23 also claimed taxes from entities that had been exempted by the DRC Government, including MONUSCO. For example, during the week of 4 March 2025, for each ration truck ready to enter from Gisenyi to Goma, AFC/M23 requested MONUSCO to pay $ 8,000 refusing to recognize MONUSCO’s UN tax exemption status. MONUSCO refused to pay taxes. The trucks were finally able to cross the Gisenyi border and enter Goma after intense negotiations. AFC/M23 also refused to recognize the right of MONUSCO staff and other UN laissez-passer carriers to enter Goma. Obstructing access to or distribution of humanitarian assistance in the DRC may constitute a sanctionable act. AFC/M23 also requested that taxes previously levied by the DRC, such as the rental taxes (Impôt sur le revenu locatif – IRL), pension taxes (CNSS), labor taxes (Impôt professionnel sur les rémunérations – IPR), be now remitted to AFC/M23, regardless of previously existing exemptions. AFC/M23 also introduced new taxes, such as road taxes (documents below). AFC/M23 communiqué with the designation of individuals responsible to oversee finance, taxation and mining in North Kivu, posted on X <!-- page 95 --> S/2025/446 95/254 25-07401 Document illustrating tax requests by AFC/M23, received from a confidential source. <!-- page 96 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 96/254 Order signed by the AFC/M23 appointed governor of South Kivu establishing road taxes. Document received from an economic actor <!-- page 97 --> S/2025/446 97/254 25-07401

Annex 19 (paras. 32-33) Banking disruption in areas occupied by the AFC/M23 Collapse du système bancaire dans les zones occupées par l’AFC/M23 AFC/M23 takeover of Goma and Bukavu led to the suspension of banking and payments systems, which severely impacted local economic activities and the payment of salaries. Few banks continued to offer cash withdrawals through teller machines. Yet, most financial transactions relied on mobile money and remittance systems. The fees charged by mobile money operators have surged from 2.5% to an average of 10%, spiking as high as 20% during peak demand. This further eroded people’s purchasing power. To cope, some economic actors resorted to physically transporting cash from neighboring countries to Goma and Bukavu, exposing themselves to heightened risks of robbery.237 In response to the liquidity crisis, on 7 April 2025 Corneille Nangaa publicly announced the resumption of banking activities through the reopening of CADECO (Caisse génerale d’epargne du Congo) and the creation of a self-styled “regulation authority for economic, financial and assurance sector” to serve as a parallel central bank.238 The initiatives vented by Nangaa presented the following main technical challenges: 1) M23 is a designated entity subject to asset freeze. A bank acting under the orders or direction of M23 or AFC/M23 shall be considered an M23 asset and thus becomes subject to freezing. If not frozen as a M23 asset, such a bank would then be sanctionable as an entity, pursuant to paragraph 7 (h) of resolution 2293 (2016).239 2) All banks operating in the DRC need to obtain an authorization by the national regulator, the Banque Centrale du Congo (BCC). A bank deliberately controlled by AFC/M23 would hardly receive such authorization from the BCC. 3) The currency to be used by banks operating under the control or direction of AFC/M23 poses an additional challenge. That is, all banks have an obligation to secure their deposits and activities by a certain level of liquidity reserves. A bank in the DRC can either operate in the DRC official currency, which is the Congolese franc, or in US dollars. Since the use of the Congolese franc is regulated by the BCC, it is unlikely that banks operating under the direction or control of AFC/M23 will receive authorization to operate this currency (see point 2 above). The use of the US dollar by a bank controlled or directed by AFC/M23 cannot be accepted by the US Regulator , since both M23 and AFC leader Corneille Nangaa were sanctioned by OFAC. 4) The integration into the worldwide banking system of banks operating under the control or direction of AFC/M23 poses another challenge. That is, in order to perform cross-border transactions or operations involving foreign exchange (for example, operations between different currencies) banks must obtain a license from SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) or a similar clearing institution.240 Moreover, recognition of financial operations by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is also a prerequisite for a bank to be able to operate at the international level. .241 Without obtaining these licenses, a bank can only operate at local level, can only operate in the currency for which it maintained some reserves, and cannot perform any cross-border transactions. __________________ 237 Economic actors, civil society, researchers. 238 Autorité de régulation du secteur économique, financier et des assurances, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p3EaELPBB8Q, https://www.radiookapi.net/2025/04/08/actualite/societe/la-direction-generale-de-la-cadeco-denonce-la-relance-des-activites. 239 Acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated individual or entity, or acting on behalf of or at the direction of a n entity owned or controlled by a designated individual or entity. 240 https://www.swift.com/about-us. SWIFT is the registration authority (registrar) for the bank identifiers used in international transactions, such as the Bank identifier codes (BIC), the Codes for exchanges and market identification (MIC) or the Interna tional Bank Account Number (IBAN). 241 https://www.bis.org/. The BIS is the oldest international financial institution (IFI), and is owned by Central Banks from 63 jurisdictions (representing 95% of global GDP). Owing to the role BIS plays, it is referred to as the “bank of central banks”. <!-- page 98 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 98/254

Annex 20 (para. 35) RDF systematic border incursions, RDF direct engagement in combat, killed RDF soldiers, and RDF continued presence in the DRC Incursions systématiques des RDF aux frontières, engagement direct des RDF dans les combats, soldats RDF tués, et présence continue des RDF en RDC • RDF in Petit Nord and on the outskirts of Goma town, between 21-27 January Between 21 and 27 January 2025, large columns of well-equipped RDF soldiers encircled, entered, and took control over Goma town.242 On 21-22 January, an estimated force comprised of 500 RDF combatants coming from Mushaki-Karuba- Minova arrived on the Bulenga Peninsula, a strategic position opposite Sake, Mubambiro and Goma, from where they shelled FARDC, PMC, SAMIDRC and MONUSCO positions (paras. 22,48 and 84). On 24 January, RDF troops positioned in Kanyamahoro and Kibumba attacked FARDC and PMC positions in Kibati, north-east of Goma, with ZU-23 MM anti-aircraft guns and Type 63 multiple rocket launchers. That same day between 30 and 50 RDF soldiers took control of the FARDC Special Forces position in Sake, which triggered the withdrawal of 2,500 FARDC soldiers from both Sake and Mubambiro. On 25 January, at least 1,000 RDF troops coming from Mushaki and Kilolirwe reinforced RDF positions in Sake and Mubambiro, and about 500 RDF soldiers took position at Shove close to Sake, where FDLR maintained bases until September 2024.243 On 26 January 2025, the day when RDF and AFC/M23 launched their attack on Goma town, large columns of well-equipped RDF soldiers entered the DRC before midday through several border crossings, including at bornes 12 and 13, north of Goma airport. One hour after their crossing, a short-range air defence system was spotted 16 kilometres north-east of Goma airport (paras. 48-50). Two other columns of 300 RDF soldiers each were observed marching from Kibumba and Kanyamahoro towards Goma town. Annexes 26-29 provide additional details on the sophisticated weaponry used by RDF. Details – including imagery, maps and used weaponry - are outlined below and provide additional information, in chronological order, of documented RDF operations and incursions between 21 and 27 January 2025: - On 21-22 January 2025, an estimated force of 500 RDF soldiers advancing along the Mushaki-Karuba-Minova axis arrived on the Bulenga Peninsula, opposite Sake and Mubambiro. The map below depicts the strategic RDF positions and RDF movements. __________________ 242 Photographs and video footage, intelligence, security and MONUSCO sources, eyewitnesses and sources close to RDF and Rwandan Government. 243 S/2024/969, annex 38 <!-- page 99 --> S/2025/446 99/254 25-07401 Map data ©2025 Google The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations - On 23 January 2025, approximately 30 RDF soldiers arrived in Sake (picture 1 and 2 below). They seized the FARDC Special Forces and PMC Congo Protection position in Sake the following day.244 This position, built by PMC Agemira, was equipped with watchtowers, embankments, firing positions and barbed wire, providing a solid defence to RDF once the position was taken. The FARDC were unable to retake control of the camp. __________________ 244 Video footage on file with the Secretariat. <!-- page 100 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 100/254 Screenshots of video of 23 January 2025 in Sake - RDF arrival in Sake triggered the withdrawal of 2,500 FARDC soldiers and Wazalendo combatants from both Sake and Mubambiro. - On 24 January 2025, RDF troops positioned in Kanyamahoro and Kibumba attacked FARDC Special Forces and PMC positions in Kibati, north-east of Goma, with ZU-23 MM anti-aircraft guns and Type 63 multiple rocket launchers. - The next day, on 25 January 2025, at least 1,000 RDF troops arrived from Mushaki and Kilolirwe to reinforce RDF positions in Sake and Mubambiro. An additional 500 RDF troops took positions at Shove, close to Sake. - On 26 January 2025, before midday, large columns of well-equipped RDF soldiers entered the territory of the DRC through at least two border crossings – at bornes 12 and 13 - north of Goma airport, between Kibati and Munigi. One hour later, a short-range air defence system (SHORAD) was spotted 16 kilometres north-east of Goma airport (see also annex 27). - On 26 January 2025, one column of 300 RDF soldiers was also observed marching southwards along the RN2 along the Kibumba – Kanyamahoro – Kibati axis. Another column of 300 RDF soldiers originating from Kibumba and Kanyamahoro reached Kibati circling to the west, on the flank of the Nyiragongo volcano. - Video footage corroborated by the Group shows some RDF soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment in close vicinity of the FARDC position in Kanyamahoro on 26 January (picture 1 below). Video footage also shows a T-54 tank and several vehicles driving from Kanyamahoro towards Kibati (picture 2 below), and RDF soldiers and vehicles in Kibati (picture 3 below) <!-- page 101 --> S/2025/446 101/254 25-07401 - <!-- page 102 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 102/254 Pictures received from security sources • RDF entering Goma, RDF continued presence in Goma, and RDF presence in other territories - According to RDF sources and sources close to the Rwandan Government, 3 or 4 RDF battalions, amounting to approximately 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers, crossed the Rwanda-DRC border during the take-over of Goma. RDF sources reported that these RDF mainly arrived from Rubavu and Kirehe districts in Rwanda. RDF Special Forces arrived from the Kanombe military barracks 245, Bigogwe and Kigali, in Rwanda. - On 27 January, RDF reinforcements crossed the border from Gisenyi, Rwanda, into Goma and engaged in combat in Goma town. Corroborated video footage of that day, recorded before midday, showed a heavily armed and well-equipped RDF unit seeking cover behind a wall in the midst of shooting, and advancing in combat style (picture 1 below). That same day, RDF took control of Mount Goma where the most strategic FARDC base was positioned. Video footage of that day shows at least one RDF unit marching climbing Mount Goma (picture 2 below). Video footage shot in the early afternoon shows RDF soldiers marching in large columns on the roads in Goma (picture 3 below). __________________ 245 S/2012/843, paras. 43-45. <!-- page 103 --> S/2025/446 103/254 25-07401 Picture and screenshots of video footage received from eyewitnesses - RDF sources, eyewitnesses, sources close to Rwandan authorities, intelligence, UN, and civil society sources reported that RDF soldiers were killed in combat during the takeover of Goma. One RDF source personally knew 20 RDF soldiers who were killed, and further received information on many other RDF soldiers killed during Goma takeover (see further details below). <!-- page 104 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 104/254 - Goma was fully conquered on 27 January 2025. Nevertheless, on 28 January RDF and during the following days and weeks, RDF presence continued to be documented in Goma town. For example, on 28 January, following AFC/M23’s ultimatum to surrender (para. 66), FARDC troops and Wazalendo combatants gathered next to MONUSCO’s Lava site base and surrendered. Video footage shows that FARDC had taken off their uniforms, stacked on tiles next to Lava site, and wore white turbans to display their hors de combat status (picture 1). RDF soldiers supervised the operation. From MONUSCO Lava site, the FARDC and Wazalendo were escorted by AFC/M23 and RDF towards the harbour in Goma. Eyewitnesses, security and UN sources indeed reported the important presence of RDF soldiers next to MONUSCO Lava site. Video recordings taken that day show RDF soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment in close vicinity of MONUSCO Lava site controlling surrendered FARDC (picture 2). Picture and screenshots of video footage received from eyewitnesses <!-- page 105 --> S/2025/446 105/254 25-07401 - Following the takeover of Goma, the footprint of RDF was reduced to the minimum necessary, in order to maintain discretion about Rwanda’s involvement. A portion of RDF troops retreated to Rwanda, while others redeployed southwards towards Bukavu (paras. 169-172). At the time of drafting, an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 RDF remained active in AFC/M23 controlled territory, including urban centres such as Goma, Bukavu, Lubero and Bukavu (para. 37). RDF fulfilled several missions after the take-over of Goma. First, RDF continued to be involved in military operations, such as the takeover of Walikale. Second, RDF were tasked to collect intelligence and geographical/topographical information. The Group interviewed one RDF soldier who was specifically tasked to work on maps of South Kivu and North Kivu and take pictures of specific areas with a small drone (para. 52). This RDF soldier had crossed the Rwanda-DRC border in Goma, at the ‘Petite Barrière’, on 22 February, almost one month after the take-over of Goma. Third, RDF coordinated the security of AFC/M23 leadership. Fourth, RDF positioned at strategic positions such as border crossings and airstrips, often wearing DRC official uniforms. - RDF soldiers who arrived in Goma were required to take off their RDF uniforms and were given uniforms similar to AFC/M23 combatants. RDF soldiers were briefed by “Colonel” Espoir Rukinisha about their tasks. According to RDF sources interviewed by the Group, Rukinisha was the commander of the third bataillion in Bigogwe, Rwanda, before joining M23 in 2023. RDF sources reported that Rukinisha played an important role during the takeover of Goma, and that he provided instructions and orders to RDF troops deployed in Goma. Rukinisha reportedly received instructions from Rwanda. Rukinisha was in close contact with “General” Sultani Makenga, with whom he discussed tactical decisions. During the briefing to RDF soldiers, also attended by Sultani Makenga, Rukinisha promised that all RDF soldiers would be paid 2000 USD once the Eastern Provinces of the DRC would be “liberated”. RDF sources reported that Rukinisha was a Rwandan national, and that his parents were originally from Murenge district in Uvira territory, DRC. - One RDF soldier and one Rwandan officer informed the Group that they saw RDF soldiers and officers they personally knew acting as police in Goma and Bukavu in February and March 2025. The military police units (identified by red arm bands such as the one depicted in the picture below) included RDF soldiers. RDF soldiers and officers disguised as Congolese police were seen in town and at more strategic areas such as the Goma Airport. RDF presence has also been documented at crime scenes (see picture below and paras. 37 and 98). <!-- page 106 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 106/254 Screenshot of a video shot on 10 February 2025 showing an RDF element wearing a red armband “PU” (Police Unit) at a crime scene in Goma. During those days AFC/M23, with RDF support, were conducting sweeping operations. This video was taken at a crime scene of an alleged killing of a man who had criticized AFC/M23 • RDF presence, supplies and operations in Bukavu and South Kivu Imagery from 14 and 16 February shows the presence RDF soldiers, including marching in column formation, in Kavumu and Bukavu. At the same time, a radar-supported air defence system (SHORAD) mounted on an armored infantry vehicle was detected driving towards Kavumu, South Kivu, on 14 February 2025. SHORAD systems were operated exclusively by RDF, as it required highly specialized training (paras. 49-50). Another video from 16 April shows RDF columns in Bukavu town, corroborated by eyewitnesses and intelligence sources. <!-- page 107 --> S/2025/446 107/254 25-07401 Picture of a column of RDF soldiers on 16 April in Bukavu, received from eyewitness Prior to the takeover of Bukavu, AFC/M23 and RDF had sent military supplies, vehicles, and sophisticated weapon systems, some coming from Rwanda (see paras. 45-56), by road, via Minova, as well as via Lake Kivu. RDF naval forces, which controlled Kivu Lake, brought supplies to Nyamukubi, on the shores of Lake Kivu, which were then transported to Nyabibwe area. Since the takeover of Bukavu other naval entry points further south were also used by RDF to resupply. • RDF brigades and battalions deployed in February and March 2025 RDF troops remained present in the DRC also after the takeover of Goma and Bukavu. The Group documented the presence of soldiers of the following RDF brigades and battalions in North Kivu in February and March 2025 246: - 107 Brigade - 55th Battalion - 79th Battalion - 87th Battalion - 85th Battalion - 57th Battalion - 15th Battalion - 03rd Battalion - 06th Battalion - 04th Battalion - 135 Brigade - 27th Battalion - 29th Battalion - 109 Brigade - 69th Battalion - 85th Battalion - 72rd Battalion - 75th Battalion __________________ 246 RDF and intelligence sources. <!-- page 108 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 108/254 • RDF killed in combat - The killing of RDF soldiers in the DRC was extensively documented also in the Group’s previous reports (S/2023/431, para. 54 and annex 29; S/2023/990, para. 30 and annex 15). - RDF sources, sources close to Rwandan officials, eyewitnesses, FARDC sources and intelligence sources reported that between December 2024 and early April 2025, several hundreds of RDF soldiers were killed in Sake, Mubambiro, Goma, and in Walikale, Lubero and Nyiragongo territories. The Group interviewed several sources, including RDF soldiers and Rwandan nationals of several backgrounds, all reporting to personally know RDF soldiers killed in combat in Eastern DRC in December 2024 and January-March 2025. In this regard, the Group also notes that many death notifications of RDF soldiers circulated. The special feature of these death notifications of mostly young men is that none of them mentions the circumstances of their death. RDF soldiers and Rwandan sources informed the Group that there was a total ban on reporting or commenting the circumstances, particularly the location, of the death of RDF soldiers that were deployed in the DRC. It is noteworthy that, despite the substantial numbers of official RDF deployments, (as indicated in the brackets), including as part of UN peacekeeping missions in various regions, the reported fatalities in these locations were low. This included deployments in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA, with 2,828 RDF deployed), South Sudan (UNMISS – 2,060 RDF deployed), Abyei (i.e. disputed area between Sudan and Sudan Sudan, UNISFA - 7 RDF deployed), Haiti (BINUH, 2 RDF deployed) or Mozambique (Cabo Delgado, around 2,000 RDF deployed). - The Group obtained video footage of RDF soldiers in Sake on 24 January 2025 (picture one below). The RDF unit in Sake was targeted by two air strikes by MI24 helicopters belonging to the FARDC. At least one RDF soldier was killed (picture 2 below). Sources with knowledge of the matter estimated that on 24, 25 and 26 January in Sake at least 200 RDF soldiers were killed (see above). FARDC attacked newly established RDF positions in Sake and Mubambiro with Sukhoi SU 25 aircraft, Mi24 helicopters and mortar shelling. In less than 24 hours, FARDC fired 220 rounds of 120 mm mortar shells. <!-- page 109 --> S/2025/446 109/254 25-07401 Screenshots of video footage received from security sources, showing an RDF casualty - The wounded RDF soldiers and the bodies of deceased RDF soldiers were evacuated by road or via Lake Kivu to Rwanda (see also S/2023/431, annex 29). - The Group sent a request for information to the Government of Rwanda on 7 April 2025 regarding – amongst others – the surrender, capture and killing of RDF soldiers in the DRC. The Group provided a list of names of individuals that were reportedly killed in the DRC between December 2024 and March 2025. The Group requested the Rwandan authorities to confirm the Rwandan nationality of the individuals, to confirm whether these individuals were members of the Rwandan army or the Rwandan reserve force, to provide details on their official rank and battalion, to confirm whether the individuals passed away in North Kivu or South Kivu and to provide any information relating to the precise circumstances of their death. The Government of Rwanda did not reply to the Group’s official request. <!-- page 110 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 110/254

Annex 21 (para. 36) Additional information regarding the use of former FDLR combatants by RDF, and the mobilization of reservists Informations supplémentaires concernant l'utilisation d'anciens combattants des FDLR par les RDF, et la mobilisation de réservistes • In its previous reports, the Group documented that RDF and M23 were supported by several combat support and reconnaissance teams totaling 250 former FDLR combatants, operating under the command of the Rwanda Defence Intelligence Department (DID) (S/2023/990, para. 30 and S/2024/432, para. 43 and annex 30). These combat support and reconnaissance teams were first formed in April 2023. The Group documented the continued return to Petit Nord of formerly demobilized ex-FDLR combatants in support of RDF operations. Well-informed sources also reported that all demobilized FDLR combatants sent to the demobilization/training center of Mutobo in Rwanda, were automatically enrolled as RDF reservists (S/2024/432, annex 30). From Mutobo, some were sent to the DRC as part of the support and reconnaissance teams, while others were sent to peacekeeping missions and other RDF areas of operation, such as Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. • In its previous reports, the Group also documented the mobilization of RDF reservists to reinforce RDF units deployed in Eastern DRC (S/2024/432, para. 43 and annex 30). RDF sources and sources close to the Rwandan authorities reported that the near totality of RDF reservists was deployed in North Kivu and South Kivu since early 2025. The Group could not independently verify this claim. <!-- page 111 --> S/2025/446 111/254 25-07401

Annex 22 (para. 38) Planes servicing RDF troops Avions desservant les troupes des RDF Between 21 March and 2 April, at least two planes servicing RDF troops performed multiple rotations, landing in Walikale for RDF resupply. On 27 March, one such plane was hit by an FARDC-operated CH4 drone upon landing in Walikale. The CH4 drone video recordings (see images below) show that at least one crew member was able to leave the plane before it was hit, but that three others crew members were reportedly killed by the explosion. Several sources reported that the plane’s crew were of Caucasian origin (“white”). However, this could not be independently verified by the Group. The airstrip was again targeted by FARDC on 25 March, with the intention of rendering it non-operational. However, bulldozers began repairing the airstrip the following day, attesting to the importance of the airstrip for RDF resupply purposes. RDF also activated jamming and spoofing systems in Walikale from 22 March onwards. Paragraph 175 provides additional details on planes serving RDF troops in the Hauts Plateaux of South Kivu. Screenshots of a video received from FARDC sources depicting the targeting of the RDF-serviced plane at Walikale airstrip, the moment it was hit by the FARDC-operated CH-4 drone, on 27 March 2025 <!-- page 112 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 112/254

Annex 23 (para. 39) Attack on 11-12 April, and RDF and AFC/M23 response Attaque le 11-12 avril, et réponse des RDF et de l'AFC/M23 During the night of 11-12 April 2025, a group of reportedly 200 Wazalendo and FDLR combatants, organized in several units, attacked AFC/M23 positions in Goma, including the neighborhoods of Ndosho, Mugunga, Kyeshero, and Lac Vert. Clashes were also reported in Rusayo, Rumoka and Lushaga, Nyiragongo territory. 247 Sources reported that up to 52 individuals were killed in the attack, including at least 12 AFC/M23 combatants and/or RDF soldiers. The Group could not independently verify this information. Yet, the Group received video footage of materiel and weaponry reportedly taken from the deceased AFC/M23 and/or RDF.248 The Group notes that none of the Wazalendo combatants or other individuals involved in the clashes belonged to the group sheltering at MONUSCO bases, or to SAMIDRC, contrary to what has been reported by AFC/M23 and in some social media groups (see below) (para. 21). In an official communiqué, the Southern African development Community (SADC) stated that “SAMIDRC has not participated in any joint operations” and refuted AFC/M23’s allegations which it qualified as “inaccurate and misleading” (see communiqué below). Eyewitnesses, security, intelligence and MONUSCO sources reported that RDF reinforcements crossed the border into Goma to reinforce AFC/M23 and repel the Wazalendo/FDLR attack. __________________ 247 Video footage, audios, eyewitnesses, civil society, intelligence and UN sources. 248 Video on file with the Secretariat. <!-- page 113 --> S/2025/446 113/254 25-07401 Earlier that week, several clashes between Wazalendo and AFC/M23/RDF were reported in Nyiragongo territory. Wazalendo and FDLR combatants reported that RDF Special Forces were involved in the clashes in Nyiragongo. The Group could not independently verify this information. Message circulating on social media <!-- page 114 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 114/254 AFC/M23 communiqué referring to the 11-12 April attack received from AFC/M23 source <!-- page 115 --> S/2025/446 115/254 25-07401 SADC press release received from UN source <!-- page 116 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 116/254

Annex 24 (para. 42) Allegation of an existential threat and planned attacks against Rwandan citizens and/or Rwandan positions Allégation de menace existentielle et d'attaques planifiées contre des citoyens rwandais et/ou des positions rwandaises On 4 April 2025, Ambassador Francois Nkulikiyimfura reported that “it has been proven that a large-scale attack on Rwandan soil was being prepared by the FDLR/FARDC, the Wazalendo militias, the FDNB, the SAMIDRC and European mercenaries”. It was further stated that large stocks of weapons, ammunition, heavy artillery, mortars, long-range missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and kamikaze drones, found less than 5 kilometres from the Rwandan border, were deployed to target Rwandan civilian positions.249 The Group requested the Rwandan authorities to provide any available information regarding this planned attack on Rwandan positions, including documents, data, photographs and/or audio files relating to the planned operation, the specific locations targeted by the planned attack, and the identity of the commanders and planned perpetrators/executors of this operation. The Government of Rwanda did not reply to the Group’s official request. The Group did not find any evidence of a planned attack on Rwandan territory. __________________ 249 RDC /Rwanda| L'ambassadeur du Rwanda en France menacé par des députés français. Suivez... <!-- page 117 --> S/2025/446 117/254 25-07401

Annex 25 (para. 43) Strategic military, economic and political objectives of the Government of Rwanda in supporting AFC/M23 Objectifs stratégiques militaires, économiques et politiques du gouvernement du Rwanda a travers son soutien à l'AFC/M23 • In 2023, the Group reported that “the objective of the RDF military actions on DRC territory, labelled “North Kivu operations” was to reinforce M23 by providing troops and materiel and to use them to secure control over mine sites, gain political influence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and decimate FDLR” (.S/2023/431, para. 60) • In 2024, the Group documented RDF support to AFC/M23 and provided details on AFC/M23’s control of mineral transport routes from Rubaya to Rwanda, where Rubaya minerals were mixed with Rwandan production. AFC/M23 ensured a monopoly for the export of coltan from Rubaya to Rwanda (S/2024/969, paras. 62-66). Paragraphs 109- 121 of this report provide information on the smuggling of 3T minerals to Rwanda. • The Group interviewed many sources – RDF soldiers, AFC/M23 combatants, sources closely linked to the Rwandan Government and intelligence sources – who provided details on Rwanda’s overt and covert objectives when providing military, logistical and intelligence support to AFC/M23. The following quotes provide some information on the objectives and strategy of the Government of Rwanda: • “At 5 p.m. on 31 December 2023, President Kagame called on all demobilized soldiers in the Ministry of Defence (Pentagon) office. Kagame, James Kabarebe and Mubarak Muganga were there. There were around 40 first lieutenants and captains there (…) They explained at the meeting: "If we're going to lose the war, where are we going?” But no one can resist Kagame or say otherwise. They also said that there wouldn't be a second Berlin conference, so they had to take the country indirectly. He also said “we are threatened by neighbouring countries” (…)” (Source: RDF officer deployed in Eastern DRC) • “The economic objective of the minerals is part of the plan; the other objective is to help the M23 win the war, and then they're going to do what they did in South Sudan and declare the Kivus an independent state. The President said that. Remember history, this whole area used to belong to Rwanda (…)” (Source: RDF officer deployed in Eastern DRC) • “The idea was to help the M23 and, after recovering the territory, Rwanda was going to lobby the United Nations and argue that this part of the country should at least be given independence. It's a line that goes back a long way, even to when James Kabarebe was still on the general staff. Kagame says this every time he speaks to the military, to indoctrinate them and say that this part of Rwanda has been taken over (…) The objective was to fight and defeat the FARDC; then the government would be forced to negotiate; and then Kagame could emerge as a negotiator and put conditions on the table (…) For the moment, they have changed their strategy; their objective is no longer Kinshasa, but North and South Kivu (…) In South Kivu, they also started to create conflicts between the Banyamulenge community and other communities; this was to create disorder so that the RDF could go and help (…). It's the same thing for South Kivu: they don't necessarily want to take the big towns, but rather all the villages next door to inculcate the ideology that this part belonged to the neighbor (…) Their mission was to come and fight here and take territory with natural resources, hold the place, push the DRC Government into negotiations until the eastern part was split up. This is Kagame's doing.” (Source: RDF officer deployed in Eastern DRC) • “There is a mission of RDF to protect the people. The mission is to provide M23 army with technology (…) After the capture of these territories, each one will receive 2,000 USD. And then Congo will be free (…) It is a big secret that there are RDF in Congo. I am very surprised about your questions, that you know this. In journalism [in Rwanda] we cannot speak about this; we keep this quiet. We can talk about Cabo Delgado, the Central African Republic,…but not about Congo! The mission is a very secret mission. The mission is not good, because to fight other country it is not ok. (…) RDF operation is to attract territory of Congo and to attract minerals. The people in Rwanda know this. The secret is that in North Kivu and South Kivu there are many minerals; more than in other <!-- page 118 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 118/254 parts of Congo. The secret of the soldiers of Rwanda is that they want to capture minerals and go back to Rwanda. The government will take the minerals, and the soldier will protect this (…) I was not allowed to tell the name of the mission. The mission was also to protect the Tutsi. The mission was “mission of peace”. The RDF usually go to James Kabarebe's for a briefing before going to Congo (…) (Source: RDF soldier deployed in Eastern DRC) • The President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, questioned the legitimacy of the DRC borders in several speeches and in media interviews. <!-- page 119 --> S/2025/446 119/254 25-07401

Annex 26 (para. 48) Spoofing and jamming of GPS systems in and around AFC/M23 and RDF controlled areas Espionnage et brouillage des systèmes GPS dans les zones contrôlées par le M23 et RDF et aux alentours In its midterm report, the Group reported that since late May 2024, while operating in and around M23/RDF controlled areas, the Global Positioning Systems (GPS) of different types of assets – UN military and civilian aircraft, MONUSCO surveillance drone, FARDC surveillance drones, humanitarian and commercial aircrafts, and different types of GPS devices – were impacted by jamming and spoofing attacks (S/2024/969, para. 54 and annex 25). Radio communications were also affected by the jamming. Spoofing attacks result in the GPS receiver computing erroneous location or time; jamming attacks overpower GPS signals so that a GPS receiver can no longer operate. Jamming and spoofing can therefore be used to interfere with, and counteract, potential military attacks (for example by armed drones or attack helicopters) or aerial observations (for example by surveillance drones or aircraft)(S/2024/969, annex 26). RDF sources and sources close to Rwandan authorities confirmed that RDF did operate jamming and spoofing systems to affect GPS signals in the DRC. According to one RDF soldier, 30 RDF received training to operate these systems in Israel. He also reported that one unit operating jamming and spoofing systems was based in Rubavu district, close to Goma, while another unit was based in Rusizi distict, close to Bukavu. Between 14 and 26 January, extensive jamming and spoofing indiscriminately impacted air operations by FARDC, SAMIDRC and MONUSCO, as well as humanitarian and commercial flights. On several occasions, military resupply flights could not continue formation to Goma/Mubambiro due to the jamming and spoofing. Information below provides details of the frequency and locations of the jamming attacks. Jamming and spoofing continued also after the take-over of Goma. Several new jamming and spoofing sources were identified in areas controlled by RDF and AFC/M23, including on the Bulenga Peninsula since RDF established positions there on 21-22 January 2024, as well as around Minova since the area came under AFC/M23 and RDF exclusive control. At least three jamming and spoofing systems were positioned on Rwandan territory, i.e. two in Gisenyi and one on Iwawa Island (see below). Jamming and spoofing systems were activated simultaneously at different locations, making any operation requiring a GPS system in a very wide geographical area inoperable. For example, on 4 January 2025, seven locations of jamming/spoofing systems were identified (see image below). The jamming systems were mobile and transported in trucks. Spoofing and jamming attacks have been documented in areas around Goma, Gisenyi (Rwanda), Sake, Mubambiro, Mushaki, Karuba, Kibati, Kibumba, Kitchanga, Kanyabayonga, Minova, Kavumu, Bukavu, Kamembe/Cyangugu (Rwanda) and Iwawa Island (Rwanda). <!-- page 120 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 120/254 Map showing jamming sources Source: MONUSCO The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations The Group documented the precise location of several jamming and spoofing systems on different dates, as illustrated below: • Location Jammer 14 January 2025 – Gisenyi, Rwanda - 1°42'26.5"S 29°15'57.0"E – affecting the general area of Goma: Map data ©2025 Google <!-- page 121 --> S/2025/446 121/254 25-07401 • Location Jammer 14 January 2025 – between Sake and Masisi - 1°30'55.2"S 28°54'58.5"E - affecting the general area of Sake: Map data ©2025 Google • Location Jammer 15 January 2025 – East of Shasa - 1°37'34.0"S 28°54'34.2"E- affecting the general area of Sake: Map data ©2025 Google • Location Jammer 20 January 2025 – West of Minova - 1°41'56.3"S 28°56'43.5"E- affecting the general area of Sake: <!-- page 122 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 122/254 Map data ©2025 Google • Location Jammer 20 January 2025 – Iwawa island, Rwanda - 1°55'15.0"S 29°09'06.1"E - affecting the general area of Sake and Goma: Map data ©2025 Google <!-- page 123 --> S/2025/446 123/254 25-07401 • Location Jammer 23 January 2025 – Karuba area - 1°35'28.9"S 29°00'48.0"E – affecting general area of Sake: Map data ©2025 Google • Location Jammer 23 January 2025 – Gisenyi – 1°42'26.0"S 29°15'58.1"E – affecting the general area of Goma: Map data ©2025 Google • Location Jammer 25 January 2025 – Bulengo Peninsula - 1°44'00.9"S 29°03'11.0"E – affecting large areas including Kibati: <!-- page 124 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 124/254 Map data ©2025 Google The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations <!-- page 125 --> S/2025/446 125/254 25-07401

Annex 27 (para. 49) SHORAD systems spotted in the vicinity of Goma and Kavumu airports Systèmes SHORAD repérés à proximité des aéroports de Goma et de Kavumu • The Group documented the presence of several SHORAD systems in earlier reports (S/2024/432, annex 34 and S/2024/969, para. 55 and annex 27). • Screenshot of a video of a radar-supported air defence system mounted on an armored infantry vehicle in the vicinity of Goma airport on 26 January 2025: Picture received from security source • Screenshot of a video showing a radar-supported air defence system mounted on an armored infantry vehicle driving towards Kavumu, South Kivu, on 14 February 2025 <!-- page 126 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 126/254 Screenshot of video received from eyewitness and circulating on social media • The SHORAD systems spotted in the vicinity of Goma and Kavumu airports were similar to the one spotted in Karuba on 25 October 2024 (S/2024/969, annex 27). Screenshots of video received from confidential security source • The video of the SHORAD system driving towards Kavumu shows that the soldiers operating the SHORAD system and the soldiers in vehicles driving before and behind the SHORAD system were equipped with uniforms, weaponry, and helmets similar to standard RDF-issued equipment. The Group reiterates that SHORAD systems could have only entered DRC territory by road through a neighboring country, and that its presence in the DRC was recorded for the first time in February 2024 in AFC/M23 and RDF-controlled territories (S/2024/432, annexes 21 and 33). <!-- page 127 --> S/2025/446 127/254 25-07401 • Analysis of the imagery shows that the SHORAD systems have characteristics virtually identical to the Norinco Type 92 Yitian TL-6, and that the SHORAD system was mounted on a vehicle identical to a WMZ-551 6x6 vehicle, both of Chinese manufacture (S/2024/432, annex 33 and S/2024/969, annex 27). The Group reiterates that, if it was confirmed that the SHORAD system and/or the vehicle were of Chinese manufacture, this does not mean that the material was transferred in violation of the sanctions regime. Rather, if confirmed, it would imply that the materiel was diverted from its intended legal end-use. • The Group sent two requests for information to the Government of Rwanda - on 29 October 2024 and 7 April 2025 - regarding the diversion of military materiel from its intended legal and end-user and/or end-use, including with regards to the SHORAD system. The Government of Rwanda did not reply to the Group’s official correspondence. The Group recalls that to an earlier request for information to the Government of Rwanda, sent on 12 April 2024, the Government of Rwanda dismissed the Group’s inquiry in the following terms: “Regarding short-range air defence (SHORAD) systems allegedly identified in Bumbi, Rutshuru Territory, the Government of Rwanda rejects the use of drone imagery from undisclosed sources to give credence to pre-conceived narratives regarding Rwanda’s advanced weaponry in DRC. The Government of Rwanda does not attach any credibility or importance to such unverified evidence.” • The presence of SHORAD system in South Kivu was first documented on 14 February, i.e. when RDF and AFC/M23 took control of Kavumu airport and two days prior to RDF and AFC/M23 taking full control of Bukavu. • The Group also notes that on several occasions, Member States and the UN Security Council called on Rwanda to immediately remove its surface-to-air missile systems (S/2024/432, annex 21). On 27 February 2025, the Security Council demanded “the cessation of GPS jamming and spoofing and the deployment of surface-to-air missiles, capacities and any other threat to the air operations of MONUSCO, to SAMIDRC and humanitarian actors”.250 __________________ 250 Security Council resolution 2773 (2025) <!-- page 128 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 128/254

### Annex 28 (para. 52) Armed drones Drones armés • On 26 January 2025, an armed drone 251 destroyed two vehicles belonging to the private military company (PMC) Congo Protection in Kibati. Congo Protection had relocated its base from Mubambiro to Kibati in June 2024, after being exposed to repeated shelling by RDF and AFC/M23.252 The pictures below show the targeted vehicles and the bomb crater. RDF sources and sources close to the Rwandan Government reported to the Group that the armed drone was operated by RDF. __________________ 251 Video footage of the drone on file with the Secretariat. 252 S/2023/990, paras. 47-51 and S/2024/432, annexes 36, 37 and 42. Imagery on file with the Group. <!-- page 129 --> S/2025/446 129/254 25-07401 • One day after the attack, on 27 January 2025, the military spokesperson of AFC/M23, Willy Ngoma, posed next to the carcass of the destroyed armored vehicle. • Additional information on Bayraktar TB2 drones and their acquisition by Rwanda In 2021, RDF announced the purchase of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial systems, reportedly for its use in operations in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.253 __________________ 253 Rwanda Procures Deadly Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicles | The Kampala Post, Rwanda Eyes Turkey’s Combat Bayraktar Kizilelma Drones | ChimpReports <!-- page 130 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 130/254 Reports on file with the Group show that RDF-operated drones were observed flying along the DRC-Rwanda border in South Kivu (more precisely along the Kambembe-Ruzizi border) at least twice, i.e. in January and April 2023. Satellite imagery collected by JANES captured the first image of a drone on 8 December 2023 in Kamembe, Rwanda. Hangars and ground control antennas for drones were captured on imagery earlier, i.e. since March 2023. Kamembe airport is located 3 kilometers north-east from Bukavu and 20 kilometers from Kavumu airport. Screenshot of JANES article Imagery shot by the CH4 drone of the DRC armed forces clearly shows the presence of drone infrastructure at Kamembe airport: <!-- page 131 --> S/2025/446 131/254 25-07401 Screenshot of report received from security sources The TB2 basic model has a range of 150 to 200 kilometers depending on the topography. The Group notes that at 150 kilometers, the TB2 drones can reach most of South Kivu and southern North Kivu, including Goma. At 300 kilometers, TB2 drones can reach the whole of South Kivu, eastern Maniema and most of North Kivu, up to Butembo. The Group notes that President Paul Kagame visited the Ozdemir Bayraktar National Technology center in January 2025.254 __________________ 254 https://www.military.africa/2025/01/kagame-heads-to-turkey-ahead-of-possible-war-with-drc/ <!-- page 132 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 132/254

Annex 29 (para. 53) Guided missiles Missiles guidés On 25 January 2025, an armoured personnel carrier (APC) of the Uruguayan MONUSCO contingent posted at MONUSCO’s blocking positions in Sake was targeted and destroyed. One peacekeeper was killed in the attack, and four others were injured. RDF sources reported to the Group that software and engineering specialists were deployed by Rwanda in Eastern DRC, including Goma and Bukavu, “to combat with bombs”, referring to the specific technology required for handling guided missiles. Pictures of the APC of the MONUSCO contingent, received from UN sources <!-- page 133 --> S/2025/446 133/254 25-07401

Annex 30 (para. 54) Overview of the contribution of uniformed personnel by Rwanda to the United Nations Aperçu de la contribution du personnel en uniforme du Rwanda aux Nations Unies Rwanda presently has a total of 5,897 troops deployed in UN missions, ranking Rwanda as the second largest contributor of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping: <!-- page 134 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 134/254

Annex 31 (para. 55) Additional information on AFC/M23 and RDF weaponry and materiel Informations supplémentaires sur l’armement AFC/M23 et RDF et matériel In its previous reports, the Group documented AFC/M23 and RDF weaponry employed in the DRC (S/2022/479, para. 68; S/2022/967, annex 30; S/2023/431, annex 26; S/2023/990, annex 17: S/2024/432, annexes 36, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42). The information provided in this annex complements information previously documented. Seized materiel In Beni, the Group inspected nine weapons in total – recovered from RDF soldiers killed or captured in Lubero territory, and from captured or killed AFC/M23 combatants. Most of the weapons had erased markings to dissimulate its origin. Nevertheless, the Group was able to conclude that several weapons originated from the FARDC stockpiles. In this regard, the Group recalls that AFC/M23 and RDF attacked many FARDC bases and took large amounts of weaponry. The Group also inspected military uniforms, including two that provide clear markings of “Rwanda” and “RDF”. Picture of AK type assault rifle with erased markings. Picture taken by the Group in Beni. Picture of a uniform belonging to a captured RDF soldier. Picture taken by the Group in Beni. <!-- page 135 --> S/2025/446 135/254 25-07401 In February 2025, the FARDC clashed with RDF soldiers on Mount Ndoluma in Lubero territory, during which RDF soldiers were killed and captured. The Group interviewed one captured RDF soldier who was imprisoned in Beni and who acknowledged that his unit was attacked. The FARDC seized military equipment belonging to the RDF unit, including ballistic Kevlar helmets, bullet-proof jackets, rocket-propelled grenades, mortar shell containers, anti-personnel grenades, and AK type assault rifles. RDF soldiers were also equipped with VHF radios.255 Screenshots of video received from FARDC source and corroborated by RDF soldier Surveillance drones Throughout January, February, and March 2025, unmanned aerial vehicles were observed flying in both North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces. For example, on 27 and 28 January 2025, a surveillance drone was observed flying over Kavumu airport in South Kivu, and on 8 February, a drone was observed flying over Munigi, near Goma, in North Kivu.256 On 13 February 2025, a surveillance drone crashed in the vicinity of Kavumu, South Kivu (picture 1 below). On 31 March 2025, a Congolese armed group shot down another surveillance drone in Masisi, North Kivu (picture 2 below). RDF sources confirmed the use by RDF of surveillance drones in North Kivu and South Kivu. The Group interviewed one RDF source that had been tasked to collect intelligence and geographical/topographical information in Eastern DRC. He was specifically tasked to further detail maps of South Kivu and North Kivu. He explained that he was provided with maps of the area with annotated locations, and he had to find the routes to go from one place to another. He was also tasked to localize enemy positions, bridges and other points of interest. The RDF soldier was instructed to contact an RDF technician of the regiment of John Rurangirwa in Rwanda, in case he encountered any difficulties. The technician would then send out a drone to visualize the terrain and provide instructions accordingly. According to the RDF soldier, the technician in Rwanda systematically referred to their drone being positioned in Bukavu area. The RDF soldier reported that the surveillance drones were active also by night. __________________ 255 RDF soldiers and pictures. 256 Reports on file with the Secretariat, MONUSCO, security and intelligence sources, sources close to RDF and the Rwandan Government. <!-- page 136 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 136/254 Imagery of a surveillance drone recovered in the area of Kavumu Imagery of a surveillance drone recovered in Masisi area <!-- page 137 --> S/2025/446 137/254 25-07401

Annex 32 (para. 57) Speech of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, on 21 February 2025 Discours du Président Yower Museveni le 21 février 2025 In a press release on 31 January 2025, the Government of Uganda cited deteriorating security conditions in North Kivu and surrounding areas – driven by intensified clashes between M23 and FARDC – as the reason for adopting a “Forward Defensive Posture” aiming to deter “other negative armed groups” from exploiting the situation and to “safeguard and secure Uganda’s interests”: https://www.updf.go.ug/press-release/updf-to-strengthen-defences-in-eastern-drc/ <!-- page 138 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 138/254 In a public statement on 21 February 2025, President Museveni clarified the objectives behind the UPDF’s presence in Eastern DRC, emphasizing that it was not related to combatting “the M23 rebels”. Instead, the UPDF’s deployment was primarily aimed at countering the ADF and securing the construction of the Kasindi-Beni-Butembo road. President Museveni further elaborated on these points, offering insights into Uganda’s role in the region and the broader security objectives shared with the Congolese government. The following excerpts from his speech, as published by NewVision on 21 February 2025, outline these key messages: “There was an item that said that Uganda had deployed troops in Eastern Congo to help the Congo Government fight the M23 rebels. This is not true. About four years ago, the government of H.E. Tshisekedi, at long last, listened to our requests of allowing us to help the Congo Army fight the ADF terrorists that had been killing Congolese and Ugandans with impunity, using Congolese territory, for the previous 20 plus years, ever since 2002. We were very happy for H.E. Tshisekedi to do this and it has helped the Congolese citizens in the area, they have gone back to their villages and the Ugandans are no longer being killed (…). Along the way, two new tasks were added: protecting the jointly funded Kasindi-Beni-Butembo road and being part of the East African Force that had successfully separated the M23 fighters that were East of the Bunagana-Goma road and the Congo government troops that were, mainly, West of that road in some sections (…) With the mandate of the East African Force cancelled by the Congo government, the UPDF remained with the two tasks: to fight the ADF alongside the Congo Army and to protect the construction of the Kasindi-Beni-Butembo road. With the deteriorating security situation in Eastern Congo, we secured the permission of the Congo government to deploy in Lubero, near Butembo and Bunia, to the North of our operational area. Our presence in Congo, therefore, has nothing to do with fighting the M23 rebels. Right from the beginning, our advice to the involved parties in the Congo government-M23 conflict, was negotiations. The history of that conflict is well known and the solutions are there (…).” <!-- page 139 --> S/2025/446 139/254 25-07401

Annex 33 (para. 61) Illustrations of incendiary public statements by General Muhoozi Kainerugaba Illustrations des déclarations publiques incendiaires du général Muhoozi Kainerugaba General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Commander of the Defence Forces of UPDF, in several messages published on X expressed admiration for President Kagame and emphasized close cooperation between the UPDF and RDF. Moreover, Muhoozi also published messages in which he threatened or announced to take Kisangani. These incendiary statements raised legitimate questions regarding the underlying objectives of Uganda’s involvement in the region: <!-- page 140 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 140/254 <!-- page 141 --> S/2025/446 141/254 25-07401 Messages published on Muhoozi Kainerugaba’s X account at https://x.com/mkainerugaba?s=21&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg <!-- page 142 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 142/254

Annex 34 (para. 62) Update on the national defence reserve force, known as the Réserve armée de la défense (RAD) Mise à jour sur la Réserve armée de la défense (RAD) The AFC/M23 and RDF assault on Goma and Bukavu prompted the DRC Government to accelerate RAD’s recruitment and training process in order to reinforce FARDC’s operational capacity on the ground (S/2023/990, paras. 41-42; S/2024/432, paras 60, 80). In February 2025, Minister of Defence and the Vice-Prime Minister, at a meeting in Beni, announced that three new RAD recruitment and training camps would be established in Beni area and Butembo. During the meeting, promises were also made to VDP leaders – including “General” Kabidon (FPP-AP), “General” Amisi Emmanuel Taylor (MAP) and “General” Mayani (UPLC) – that they would be given a future role in the RAD. In South Kivu as well as in several provincial capitals – including Mbuji-Mayi,257 Gbadolite,258 Mbandaka,259 Gemena,260 Lisala 261 and Boende 262 - numerous candidates also registered for training, further reinforcing the national scope of the RAD recruitment and training process. At the time of drafting, the RAD was not yet operational. The Group notes that long-term, structural reform of the security sector remained essential in the DRC, particularly to avoid the continued involvement of armed groups in functions providing law and order. Previous integration processes – known as brassage and mixage, which incorporated armed elements into the national army – did not favour the emergence of a professional, well trained and disciplined army, effective and committed to defending the DRC’s territorial integrity and ensuring the protection of its citizens (S/2007/423, paras.84-98; S/2008/43. paras.21-22). Moreover, supplying armed group elements with military equipment or training constitutes a violation of the sanctions regime. __________________ 257 Capital of Kasai-Oriental Province. 258 Capital of Nord-Ubangi Province. 259 Capital of Équateur Province. 260 Capital of Sud-Ubangi Province. 261 Capital of Mongala Province. 262 Capital of Tshuapa Province. <!-- page 143 --> S/2025/446 143/254 25-07401

Annex 35 (para. 63) Money transfer receipts and acknowledgement of receipts Reçus de transfert d’argent et accusés de réception On 28 February 2025, sanctioned individual Guidon Shirimay Mwissa, the overall leader of the VDP, sent a report to the DRC authorities on the distribution of funds received in January from the DRC authorities to the VDP armed groups active in Walikale territory. The DRC authorities acknowledged receipt of Guidon’s report and stamped the document on 5 March. The document established that a total of $20,000 was allocated to Michel Moto, a Member of the Parliament of Walikale territory, who was responsible for forwarding the money to the VDP groups. The document established the breakdown of the funds distribution, indicating that the NDC-R led by Guidon received $6,000, while the other five armed groups each received between $1,500 and $2,500. Document received from VDP source. <!-- page 144 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 144/254 <!-- page 145 --> S/2025/446 145/254 25-07401 <!-- page 146 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 146/254 <!-- page 147 --> S/2025/446 147/254 25-07401 <!-- page 148 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 148/254 <!-- page 149 --> S/2025/446 149/254 25-07401 <!-- page 150 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 150/254 Documents received from VDP sources <!-- page 151 --> S/2025/446 151/254 25-07401

Annex 36 (para. 64) Illustrations of armed confrontations involving Wazalendo groups Illustrations de confrontations impliquant des groupes Wazalendo The following provide a non-exhaustive list of armed confrontations between the FARDC and Wazalendo/VDP armed groups on the one hand, and AFC/M23 and RDF on the other: • On 23 December, the FARDC supported by APCLS, PARECO/FF and FDDH combatants clashed with AFC/M23 in Kinigi, Masisi territory; • On 26 December 2024, the FARDC together with combatants of several Wazalendo groups - NDC-R, ANCDH Abazungu, and APCLS – attacked AFC/M23 positions in Peti, east of Pinga, in Masisi territory; • On 30 December 2024, AFC/M23 and the Coalition of Patriotic Movements for the Defense of the Nation (CMPDN) clashed in Chugi, Masisi territory; • On 3 January 2025, the FARDC supported by Wazalendo armed groups of the VDP coalition and the FDNB, clashed with the M23/AFC on axis Kitchanga-Kayabayonga. • On 4 January 2025, the FARDC supported by combatants of APCLS clashed in Ndumba, Masisi territory; • On 19 January 2025, the FARDC supported by combatants of the FDLR and the Coalition of Patriotic Movements for the Defense of the Nation (CMPDN) - composed of PARECO-FF, PARECO/Mahoro, FDDH, and GAV – attacked AFC/M23 in Masisi centre; • On 14 February 2025, the FARDC together with combatants of APCLS and ANCDH clashed with AFC/M23 in Kinyana and Musi, Masisi territory; • On 20 February, the FARDC together with combatants of APCLS, CMC-FDP and NDC-R clashed with AFC/M23 and RDF in Mabanga, Rutubogo, Karisimbi • On 23-24-25 February 2025, the FARDC together with combatants of ANCDH and APCLS clashed in Kalembe, at the border between Masisi and Lubero territories; • On 28 February 2025, CMC-FAPC clashed with AFC/M23 on the Rusamambo axis, about 100 kilometers northeast of Waliale; • On 6 March 2025, AFC/M23 clashed with the FARDC and VDP in Kamandi Lac, located along the shores of Lake Edward. • On 6-7 March 2025, the FARDC and VDP clashed with AFC/M23 in Lwanguba, Kanji and Kivuye, Masisi territory; • On 8 March 2025: the FARDC together with VDP combatants clashed with AFC/M23 and RDF in Mukowa, Lwashi and Bukombo in Masisi territory; • Between 4 and 10 March, the FARDC together with combatants of APCLS, ANCDH and FDLR-FOCA clashed with AFC/M23 and RDF on the Massisi-Nyabiondo axis; • On 12 March 2025, armed groups from the VDP coalition – NDC-R and CMC-FAPC clashed in Rusamambo, Masisi territory; • On 9-10 April 2025, AFC/M23 clashed with FPP-AP combatants southwest of Lubero town; • On 10 April 2025, AFC/M23 attacked the FPP-AP stronghold in Bunyatenge, Lubero territory; • On 11 April, AFC/M23 attacked FPP-AP in Masika and Kayatsi-Katama, Lubero territory. <!-- page 152 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 152/254

Annex 37 (para. 69) Documents announcing allegiance of the Front commun pour la résistence (FCR) to AFC/M23, and FCR members disavowing the announcement Documents annonçant l'allégeance du Front commun pour la résistance (FCR) à l'AFC/M23, et les membres du FCR désavouant cette annonce Message of Lawrence Kanyuka announcing that FCR officially joined the AFC/M23 alliance, posted on X on 9 March 2025 <!-- page 153 --> S/2025/446 153/254 25-07401 <!-- page 154 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 154/254 <!-- page 155 --> S/2025/446 155/254 25-07401 <!-- page 156 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 156/254 <!-- page 157 --> S/2025/446 157/254 25-07401 . Documents received from VDP sources <!-- page 158 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 158/254

Annex 38 (para. 73) “Brigadier General” Ezechiel Gakwerere’s identification documents, and FDLR combatants handed over to the Rwandan authorities Les documents d’identité du « général de brigade » Ezechiel Gakwerere et des combattants des FDLR remis aux autorités rwandaises Document received from confidential source <!-- page 159 --> S/2025/446 159/254 25-07401 Picture depicting the arrest of Gakwerere, received from VDP source The following FDLR elements were arrested by AFC/M23 and transferred to the Rwandan authorities: 1. Brig Gen Jean Baptiste Gakwerere 2. Maj Gilbert Ndayambaje 3. SM Nsabimana August 4. Sgt Mupenzi JMV (Escort to Brig Gen Gakwerere) 5. Cpl Sibomana Laurent 6. Cpl Ishimwe Patrick 7. Cpl Ibyimanikora Concorde 8. Cpl Ukwishaka Sadam 9. Cpl Hategekimana Eric 10. Pte Ndayambaje Pascal 11. Pte Rukundo Daniel Desire 12. Pte Ntakirutimana Niyonzi 13. Pte Ndayambaje Fabien 14. Pte Uwuduhaye Gilbert Source: https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/press-release-afc-m23-hands-over-fdlr-fighters-to-rwanda-defence-force <!-- page 160 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 160/254

Annex 39 (para. 73) Additional information on Gakwerere and controversies around his arrest and transfer to the Rwandan authorities Informations complémentaires sur Gakwerere et controverses autour de son arrestation et de son transfert aux autorités rwandaises “Brigadier General” Ezechiel Gakwerere (alias Sibomana Stany or Julius Mboko), was a veteran military commander of the Rwandan national army (FAR) before joining FDLR-FOCA in late 1990s (S/2024/432, annex 51; S/2024/433, paras. 103; S/2022/479, para. 74). Singled out for his participation in the genocide, Gakwerere fled to the DRC where he participated in the organization and operations of the FDLR. At the time of his arrest, he was Omega’ Secretary-General. Until 2023, Gakwerere represented Omega in various meetings with FARDC officers to discuss coordination with, and support to, FARDC operations targeting AFC/M23. Since December 2023, Gakwerere went missing. The circumstances of Gakwerere’s arrest, dressed in brand new FARDC fatigues – as seen in photographs of his arrest that circulated online – has sparked controversies. The DRC Government stated that the arrest was staged by the Government of Rwanda to sustain the narrative of FARDC-FDLR cooperation, in order to justify Rwanda’s act of aggression. FDLR spokesperson, Cure Ngoma, denied the allegations of Gakwerere’s cooperation with the FARDC, and raised concerns over RDF incursions in the DRC. While acknowledging Gakwerere’s FDLR membership, Cure Ngoma insisted that he has was no longer active within the movement, as he was sick and under medical treatment in Goma. <!-- page 161 --> S/2025/446 161/254 25-07401

Annex 40 (para. 74) The Government of Rwanda and AFC/M23 denouncing the presence and operations of Private Military Companies in the DRC Le gouvernement du Rwanda et l'AFC/M23 dénoncent la présence et les opérations des Compagnies Militaires Privés en RDC Excerpt from a message of Lawrence Kanyuka posted on X on 25 January 2025, stating that “our struggle is directed against the Kinshasa regime, which is responsible for ethnic cleansing, massacres, harassment, serious human rights violations, the spread of hate speech, poor governance and the insecurity that reigns in Goma and throughout the country. We therefore call on the FARDC to act with responsibility and courage by freely laying down their arms and dissociating themselves from the Mercenaries, elements of the FDNB and the FDLR, in the interest of peace for all.” <!-- page 162 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 162/254 Message of Lawrence Kanyuka posted on X on 26 January 2025, stating that AFC/M23 “urges all foreign armed forces present in the DRC, including the FDNB, SAMIDRC, and the Agemira Private Military Companies (PMC), to immediately stop killing our people and to leave Congolese soil.” See also S/2024/432, annex 56 Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, denounced the use of private military companies, which he labelled as “mercenaries” on several occasions. For example, during an interview on 3 February 2025, he stated that “they cannot have FDLR in Congo, being armed, being supported by the government of DRC, supported by mercenaries, supported by an army from Burundi, then business continues as usual”.263 Also, at the 24th Extraordinary Summit of the East African Community (EAC) heads of State in late January 2025, President Kagame, denounced the presence of foreign troops, including FDNB and mercenaries, in Eastern DRC: “He [i.e. Tshisekedi] got rid of them and decided to bring in SADC. SADC was without any question coming to assist Tshisekedi to fight alongside FDLR – these murderers of our people here in this country – and to fight alongside mercenaries, and to have Burundi on ethnic political bases decided to support Tshisekedi (…) We have MONUSCO, SAMIDRC, mercenaries, Burundi, FDLR (…) and everybody is there watching this”. 264 On 4 April 2025, the Rwandan Ambassador in France, Francois Nkulikiyimfura, reported that “it has been proven that a large-scale attack on Rwandan soil was being prepared by the FDLR/FARDC, the Wazalendo militias, the FDNB, the SAMIDRC and European mercenaries” (see also annex 24).265 __________________ 263 Kagame: Support for FDLR, collabo with mercenaries can’t be business as usual - Rwanda 264 (769) President Kagame | Extra Ordinary Summit of EAC Heads of State on Eastern DRC. - YouTube and 24th Extra Ordinary Summit of EAC Heads of State on Eastern DRC | Remarks by President Kagame 265 RDC /Rwanda| L'ambassadeur du Rwanda en France menacé par des députés français. Suivez... <!-- page 163 --> S/2025/446 163/254 25-07401

Annex 41 (para. 78) Humanitarian and civilian impact of the battle for the takeover of Goma Impact sur les civils et l’action humanitaire de la bataille pour la prise de Goma • Pre-existing humanitarian situation Prior to the takeover of Goma by AFC/M23 and RDF forces, the humanitarian situation in North Kivu was already critical. Over 2.8 million people—representing more than one-third of the province’s population—were displaced across the province. Since 1 January 2025, more than 100,000 individuals have been newly displaced within Masisi territory following clashes between the FARDC and its allies and AFC/M23 and RDF (paras. 14 and 83).266 • Massive new displacement Between 23 and 28 January 2025, intense fighting for control of Goma triggered a major humanitarian crisis across North and South Kivu. The anticipated fighting once again displaced more than 700,000 IDPs previously living in the camps and makeshift shelters around Goma. Some sought refuge with host families, while others took shelter in abandoned structures, facing precarious conditions with limited access to food, water, and essential services. Over one million people were newly displaced within three weeks of the escalation at the end of January, including approximately 400,000 children.267 • Disruption of humanitarian operations Humanitarian operations were severely disrupted by ongoing insecurity, the destruction of critical infrastructure, and mass displacement. Between 27 and 29 January, the widespread looting, mainly by the population, of humanitarian warehouses— including those of the World Food Programme (WFP), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 268 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), UNHCR, IOM, Save the Children, and UNICEF—resulted in acute shortages of food, medicines, and emergency relief supplies.269 Efforts to replenish these stolen supplies have been severely hindered by the inoperability of Goma airport, and by the holdup of numerous trucks in Gisenyi, at the Rwandan border. 270 • Destruction of critical infrastructure Goma airport suffered extensive damage during the fighting, including the deliberate destruction of equipment such as the control tower, runway, and electrical systems, 271 rendering the facility inoperable and preventing the timely evacuation of wounded __________________ 266 https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/le-coordonnateur-humanitaire-deplore-les-deplacements-provoques-par-lintensification-des-hostilites-au-nord-kivu-et-rappelle-au-respect-du-droit-international-humanitaire 267 https://www.unicef.org/media/168896/file/DRC-Flash-Update-28-February- 2025.pdf.pdf#:~:text=amount%20of%20unexploded%20ordinance%20poses,3; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-intensification-violence-north-kivu-and-south-kivu-provinces-situation-report-1-3-february- 2025#:~:text=,several%20hospitals%2C%20NGO%20offices 268 https://x.com/cicr_afrique/status/1886779502954414433?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg 269 UN and humanitarian sources, video and photographic evidence. 270 UN and humanitarian sources. See also https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/le-coordonnateur-humanitaire-exprime-sa-profonde-inquietude-quant-limpact-de-lintensification-des-combats-autour-de-la-ville-de-goma-sur-les-populations-civiles-et-sur-la-capacite-des-partenaires-humanitaires-leur-fournir; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/extremely-serious-humanitarian-situation-goma-requires-immediate-attention-international-community; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-waterborne-diseases-threaten-compound-escalating-humanitarian-crisis-warns-irc; 271 Photographic and video evidence, military and intelligence sources. <!-- page 164 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 164/254 civilians and the delivery of lifesaving assistance. 272 AFC/M23 and RDF forces prevented MONUSCO from accessing the site to assess or repair the damage.273 Shortly after the fall of Goma, AFC/M23 and RDF also seized Kavumu Airport in South Kivu (see para. 17), effectively disrupting humanitarian and civilian flights at both strategic airports. 274 • Attacks on health facilities and escalating health crisis In the aftermath of the fighting, a growing health crisis emerged. The World Health Organization (WHO) warned of heightened risks of epidemic outbreaks linked to the continued presence of decomposing bodies throughout the city.275 Medical facilities, some directly impacted by hostilities,276 were overwhelmed by casualties. On 28 January 2025, the ICRC reported treating over 600 individuals in ICRC-supported facilities since early January, approximately half of whom were civilians injured in bombardments and clashes in densely populated areas 277 such as Minova, Sake, and Goma (see paras. 81–85). The CBCA hospital in Ndosho, Goma, exceeded its capacity after treating more than 1,000 patients by 3 February 2025, mostly for injuries caused by explosive ordnance.278 Between 19 and 20 February 2025, 34 out of 47 health facilities assessed by humanitarian actors in North Kivu were affected by violence, of which 27 health structures were attacked in and around Goma – a twelvefold increase of previously reported trends.279 • Child protection and impact on education UNICEF and local protection partners warned of a surge in the number of children separated from their parents, exposing them to kidnapping, recruitment by armed groups, and sexual violence.280 According to UNICEF, grave violations against children sharply escalated following the conflict: incidents of rape and sexual violence against children by parties to the conflict rose by more than two and a half times; abductions increased sixfold; and killings and maiming rose sevenfold.281 The conflict also severely disrupted access to education. At least 80 schools were damaged or destroyed in Goma and Nyiragongo territory. UNICEF estimated that over 795,000 children no longer had access to education in North Kivu due to the ongoing violence. • Increasing sexual violence Goma and the surrounding areas were already affected by widespread incidents of sexual violence on a massive scale (see S/2024/432, paras. 91, 121, and annex 60).282 A further alarming surge in cases has been reported across North and South Kivu, attributed to all armed actors party to the conflict, both in the immediate aftermath of the fighting and during the subsequent __________________ 272 https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/extremely-serious-humanitarian-situation-goma-requires-immediate-attention-international-community, video footage on file with the Secretariat, UN sources. 273 https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1159826 274 Ibid. 275 https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1159701 276 https://msf.org.au/article/project-news/drc-msf-appeals-humanitarian-access-goma-casualties-seek-medical-care 277 https://www.icrc.org/fr/communique-de-presse/rd-congo-le-cicr-condamne-les-attaques-recentes 278 Protection sources. See also https://actualite.cd/2025/02/05/rdc-lhopital-de-ndosho-toujours-deborde-necessite-plus-dintrants-medicaux-et-du-materiel#google_vignette 279 https://www.unicef.org/media/168896/file/DRC-Flash-Update-28-February- 2025.pdf.pdf#:~:text=amount%20of%20unexploded%20ordinance%20poses,3 280 https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1159541 281 UNICEF Flash Update – 28 February 2025 282 https://www.msf.org.za/news-and-resources/press-release/msf-reports-massive-figures-sexual-violence-admissions-drc <!-- page 165 --> S/2025/446 165/254 25-07401 consolidation of AFC/M23’s control. Human rights defenders reported that survivors faced significant barriers in accessing medical care, primarily due to fear of reprisals by AFC/M23 elements.283 Reports on the mass escape of prisoners from Muzenze prison in Goma on 27 January 2025 indicated that over 160 women perished in a fire that engulfed the facility, with a significant number of women reportedly raped by escaping male prisoners.284 The Group has not yet been able to independently verify the reported figures and continues to investigate the incident. • Deteriorating public order and protection risks The mass influx of displaced civilians into Goma, combined with the retreat of FARDC and Wazalendo armed combatants, significantly heightened protection risks. The unregulated abandonment of weapons throughout the city and the escape of more than 4,763 male prisoners from Muzenze Prison further compounded insecurity.285 In the aftermath, AFC/M23 and RDF forces began imposing public order through coercive measures, leading to daily incidents of summary executions, enforced disappearances, and acts of torture (see paras. 92-106). Residents of Goma described a drastic deterioration of living conditions, marked by a pervasive climate of fear and intimidation. Civilians expressed widespread concern regarding arbitrary violence, with many refraining from leaving their homes after dark. A self-imposed curfew began around 6:30 pm, with the city largely deserted by 9 pm. Despite AFC/M23 public statements portraying the city as safer than ever, residents denounced a profound erosion of civil liberties, an environment of generalized insecurity, and increased restrictions on freedom of movement.286 __________________ 283 Humanitarian, UN, civil society, researchers. See also https://www.unicef.org/media/168896/file/DRC-Flash-Update-28- February-2025.pdf.pdf#:~:text=amount%20of%20unexploded%20ordinance%20poses,3; https://amnesty.hosting.augure.com/Augure_AmnestyInternational/default.ashx?WCI=EmailViewer&id=%7B8a4330fd -8a81- 4795-92eb-30ddb42c098d%7D. 284 UN and government sources. 285 UN, humanitarian, civil society sources, researchers, video and photographic evidence. 286 Civilian residents, civil society, researchers and intelligence sources. <!-- page 166 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 166/254

### Annex 42 (para. 78) ### Attacks against MONUSCO, obstruction of movements and obstacles to MONUSCO’s protection mandate ### Attaques contre la MONUSCO, obstruction des mouvements et entraves au mandat de protection de la MONUSCO During the assault on Goma, AFC/M23 and RDF engaged in direct attacks on UN peacekeepers (paras. 53-55), with MONUSCO sustaining three fatalities and 37 peacekeepers wounded.287 • Preemptive narrative to excuse future attacks Between 22 and 25 January 2025, AFC/M23 issued daily communiqués (see below) warning MONUSCO that it would be targeted, alongside SAMIDRC, unless it distanced itself from the so-called "negative coalition". AFC/M23 accused both entities of disregarding their request to maintain neutrality in the ongoing conflict, further alleging violations of international conventions by MONUSCO. AFC/M23 systematically claimed a self-defense posture, while preparing a large-scale offensive on Goma with the direct participation of RDF. This sequence of communiqués was thus aimed at manufacturing a pretext to justify, in advance, planned attacks against MONUSCO, despite being aware of MONUSCO’s mandate under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to defend Goma from armed attack. On 22 January 2025, as it was mounting its attack on Goma, AFC/M23 announced it had no grievance towards MONUSCO or SAMIDRC, but reserved the right to “defend itself in the event of aggression”: https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1882220141418856734?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg __________________ 287 UN sources. <!-- page 167 --> S/2025/446 167/254 25-07401 On 23 January 2025, AFC/M23 reiterated its pre-emptive self-defense posture against MONUSCO and SAMIDRC, claiming they disregarded AFC/M23’s previous warning and were preparing to attack AFC/M23, who had no choice but to defend itself: https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1882418685207548151?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg English translation: “Despite our press release of 22/01/2025 informing @SAMIDRC and the @MONUSCO that the AFC/M23 has neither difference [sic!] nor hostile posture towards them, all signals indicate that MONUSCO and SAMIDRC are ready to attack us, therefore we will defend ourselves.” On 24 January, AFC/M23 claimed that the previous day MONUSCO had engaged in military coordination with so-called "genocidal groups," leading to attacks on civilian areas, implying that MONUSCO had violated international conventions and endangered the lives of civilians: <!-- page 168 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 168/254 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1882716663721914617?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg On 25 January 2025, AFC/M23 reiterated its warning to MONUSCO, demanding that it ceases all collaboration with FARDC and what it referred to as "genocidal forces launching bombs in densely populated areas and attacking our positions." AFC/M23 further urged MONUSCO to limit its activities strictly to the protection of civilians, attempting to reframe MONUSCO’s mandate in a manner aligned with its own operational objectives: https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1883170137723043925?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg <!-- page 169 --> S/2025/446 169/254 25-07401 • Unlawful invocation of self-defence and undermining of UN authority The Group notes that under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the right of self-defense against armed attacks is reserved to States. The invocation of pre-emptive self-defense by AFC/M23—a non-State armed group—on the basis of an alleged imminent attack, including by MONUSCO, is therefore without legal foundation. Moreover, the principle of imminence requires the existence of a clear and immediate threat, which was not established in this case. The offensive against Goma was therefore launched in violation of international norms governing the use of force. In addition, irrespective of whether peacekeepers were engaged in defensive military operations alongside FARDC and SAMIDRC, any deliberate attack against United Nations peacekeeping forces directly undermines the authority of the United Nations and the peace enforcement mandate granted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such attacks also violate fundamental principles of international peace and security enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits the use of force except in self-defense or when explicitly authorized by the Security Council. Furthermore, given that Rwanda is a troop-contributing country to United Nations peacekeeping operations (see paras. 53–55), the engagement of RDF in hostilities against United Nations peacekeeping forces on the territory of another Member State— thereby violating its territorial integrity—further exacerbates the gravity of these breaches. The critical contribution of RDF forces to the assault and takeover of Goma significantly compounds the seriousness of the violations committed. • Obstruction of MONUSCO operations and undermining of its protection mandate Since 28 January 2025, MONUSCO has not sustained further casualties but has remained under constant threat. AFC/M23 has imposed a requirement of 48 hours' advance notice for any MONUSCO movements through AFC/M23 checkpoints, restricting movement primarily to logistical resupply operations. While some convoys have been permitted, others have been arbitrarily blocked, severely hampering MONUSCO’s operational effectiveness. Troop and staff rotations, as well as patrols critical to the protection of civilians, have been significantly impacted. Additionally, AFC/M23 and RDF forces have blocked key humanitarian corridors, notably through the border crossing at Gisenyi, delaying the evacuation of bodies and the delivery of essential humanitarian supplies. On 5 February 2025, AFC/M23 extended the restrictions by banning all MONUSCO routine patrols in Goma and around IDP concentration points, further limiting MONUSCO’s ability to fulfil its protection of civilians mandate.288 AFC/M23 also forced withdrawal of MONUSCO forces from strategic defensive positions around Goma—specifically those related to Operation Springbok—weakening MONUSCO’s effectiveness in protecting civilians under its Chapter VII mandate.289 In addition to obstructing MONUSCO’s core operations, AFC/M23 and RDF forces have also obstructed the activities of other UN agencies, notably UNMAS, whose work in clearing unexploded ordnance (UXO) was vital for civilian safety and the continuation of humanitarian operations. 290 • Direct threats against MONUSCO MONUSCO’s bases in Goma have become severely overcrowded as they sheltered unarmed, surrendered non-combatants (hors de combat), including over 1,400 members of FARDC, the PNC, Wazalendo fighters, and other Congolese individuals seeking protection.291 AFC/M23 has persisted in pressuring and threatening MONUSCO, demanding the handover of FARDC and Wazalendo personnel seeking refuge within the bases, as well as the weapons abandoned by FARDC forces. These threats violated principles of international human rights law protecting individuals seeking shelter from harm. In parallel, AFC/M23 launched a campaign to divert public opinion against MONUSCO. On 6 February, it accused MONUSCO of “criminal activities” in Goma, accusing it of having intentionally released 100 FARDC and FDLR armed elements into the city “to massacre civilians”. However, these allegations were unfounded, as MONUSCO had complied fully with its standard operating procedures: all individuals seeking protection were disarmed upon entry and could only leave UN premises voluntarily and unarmed.292 __________________ 288 UN, diplomatic, and intelligence sources. 289 Ibid. 290 Ibid. 291 https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1159826 292 UN sources. <!-- page 170 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 170/254 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1887716114676793435?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg AFC/M23 maintained, until the time of writing, accusations against MONUSCO and demanded that it hand over all the hors de combat elements sheltering within its premises, as exemplified by the AFC/M23 communiqué issued on 12 April: <!-- page 171 --> S/2025/446 171/254 25-07401 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1911263245609877748?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg <!-- page 172 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 172/254

Annex 43 (para. 79) Death toll after the battle for the takeover of Goma Nombre de morts après la bataille pour la prise de Goma Following the intense fighting in Goma between 23 and 28 January 2025, numerous residents described the city as the scene of a “carnage” and “open air cemetery” with streets littered with corpses, predominantly of FARDC and Wazalendo fighters (see also annex 20).293 Medical and military sources reported that at least 500 FARDC fatalities were stored at Katindo hospital morgue after the first day of fighting alone. Although combatants represented a significant portion of the fatalities, civilians accounted for a considerable number of the wounded, with civilians constituting approximately half of all patients treated in hospitals.294 Hundreds of bodies remained unburied or uncounted for days, particularly in areas surrounding Muzenze Prison and Goma Airport. Intelligence, humanitarian, and local sources reported that the retrieval of bodies from Muzenze Prison, the site of mass female prisoner deaths following the 27 January 2025 prison break, only began on 10 February, more than two weeks after the event. Eyewitnesses and local sources also described corpses visible throughout Goma, including outside morgues, along main roads, and near the airport perimeter. For example, testimonies detailed that more than 500 FARDC bodies remained at the Goma airport gates well into February. The Congolese Red Cross, with support from the ICRC, undertook large-scale operations to recover bodies. On 7 February 2025 WHO reported that “since 26 January, 3082 injured and 843 dead have been reported from 31 health facilities in and around Goma, North Kivu”.295 The accumulation of decomposing bodies, along with the lack of adequate medical care and sanitation, significantly heightened the risk of epidemic outbreaks, with WHO warning of a potential public health emergency involving mpox, cholera, and measles.296 By early February, the Congolese Red Cross had buried hundreds of bodies to prevent sanitary disasters. Community-led mass burials were also reported throughout the city, often conducted under rudimentary conditions to prevent the spread of disease. Following criticism regarding inconsistencies in reported fatality figures, humanitarian and UN agencies reduced public reporting on casualty statistics. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the loss was universally acknowledged. Humanitarian actors underlined that beyond numerical debates, what was essential was the recognition of the severe humanitarian impact, the grave violations of international humanitarian law, and the urgent need for protection of civilians. __________________ 293 Intelligence and protection sources, coupled with testimonies of Goma residents and eyewitnesses present in Goma during and after the fighting. Video footage and photographic evidence showed bodies, some in uniforms, but mostly in civilian clothing, piled up inside and outside the morgue of the central hospital in Goma on 29 January 2025. 294 https://www.icrc.org/fr/communique-de-presse/rd-congo-le-cicr-condamne-les-attaques-recentes ; https://msf.org.au/article/project-news/drc-msf-appeals-humanitarian-access-goma-casualties-seek-medical-care ; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/extremely-serious-humanitarian-situation-goma-requires-immediate-attention-international-community 295 https://www.who.int/news/item/07-02-2025-dire-health-and-humanitarian-crisis-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-prompts-escalation-of-efforts-by-who--partners?utm_source 296 https://www.yahoo.com/news/decomposing-bodies-removed-devastated-prison-175835460.html <!-- page 173 --> S/2025/446 173/254 25-07401

Annex 44 (para. 79) Bertrand Bisimwa statement denying the existence of any civilian fatalities in Goma Déclaration de Bertrand Bisimwa niant l'existence de victimes civiles à Goma Betrand Bisimwa @bbisimwa on X, posted on 8 February 2025. https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1887019223995527605?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg English translation: “The Kinshasa regime must stop fueling the shameful controversy around the deaths in Goma. The bodies that littered the streets of Goma, collected by health services, stored in the morgue of Goma Hospital prior to burial, are indeed those of FARDC soldiers and their allies (Wazalendo, FDLR, FDNB, mercenaries) who fell on the battlefield. It is well known and attested by all, through videos that circulated around the world, that the defeated FARDC forces and their allies refused to comply with our forces’ orders to lay down their arms at MONUSCO and be gathered at the Unité stadium. They preferred to engage in combat in the very center of Goma city, where they were subsequently definitively neutralized. The bodies of these soldiers have been buried and the city of Goma is now fully secured. No family in Goma is mourning these deaths.” <!-- page 174 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 174/254

Annex 45 (para. 85) Cross-border shelling causing casualties and damage in Gisenyi, Rwanda Tirs transfrontaliers causant des victimes et des dégâts à Gisenyi, Rwanda On 27 January, the Rwandan Defence and Military Spokesperson, Brigadier-General Ronald Rwivanga accused FARDC of having launched an attack in Rubavu, in Rwanda, resulting in five casualties and 20 injuries.297 Open-source video footage posted on social media networks 298 corroborated information received by the Group from confidential sources, researchers, intelligence, and diplomatic sources, describing damage to civilian buildings in the border town of Rubavu by shells originating in the DRC. A classroom and a local butcher shop were impacted, although no fatalities were recorded at these locations. Below are open-source images posted on social media platforms on 28 January, allegedly depicting the impact of the shelling on 27 January: https://www.tiktok.com/@user1956621803235/video/7465209390132382981 __________________ 297 https://www.newtimes.co.rw/article/23582/news/africa/five-rwandans-killed-35-injured-by-bombshells-from-dr-congo 298;; https://x.com/nda_jule/status/1883871253884448904 <!-- page 175 --> S/2025/446 175/254 25-07401 https://x.com/nda_jule/status/1884368676654071986 https://x.com/bwindja/status/1884160891534598274?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg <!-- page 176 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 176/254 Google Maps coordinates of a butcher shop/deli listed as “Rugari meat processing LTD” [-1.684506, 29.247037] match the images depicted in the video above of the burning building in Rubavu: Source: Google Maps, imagery ©2025 Google, Maxar Technologies Google Maps location of “Rugari meat processing LTD” shop and publicly posted photos by Google Maps users, retrieved by the Group on 27 April 2025 <!-- page 177 --> S/2025/446 177/254 25-07401 The "Rugari Meat Processing Ltd" facility is located approximately 300 meters from the border with Goma. Given the intense combat and the occurrence of cross-border shelling in both directions at the time, coupled with the facility’s close proximity to the border, the damage sustained on Rwandan territory does not necessarily indicate deliberate or targeted shelling. At the time of reporting, the Group had not yet been able to fully assess the extent of the damage or determine responsibility for the shelling. The Group addressed an official correspondence to the Government of Rwanda on 7 April 2025 requesting further information regarding this incident. However, no response had been received at the time of writing. <!-- page 178 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 178/254

### Annex 46 (para. 86) ### FARDC bombing in Nyabibwe, Kalehe territory, South Kivu, on 6 February 2025 ### Bombardement par FARDC à Nyabibwe, territoire de Kalehe, Sud-Kivu, le 6 février 2025 Local sources, verified by UN sources, reported three civilian injuries (a man and his two children), and at least 35 civilian homes impacted, but no fatalities: List received from a confidential source Below, an AFC/M23 communiqué issued on 6 February 2025 claiming the deliberate targeting of Nyabibwe by FARDC bombing, resulting in the massacre of civilians, notably four fatalities including an infant: <!-- page 179 --> S/2025/446 179/254 25-07401 https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1887716114676793435 <!-- page 180 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 180/254

### Annex 47 (para. 88) ### FARDC and Wazalendo engaging in looting, theft, and extorsion of civilians in Goma ### FARDC et Wazalendo impliqués dans des actes de pillage, de vol et d’extorsion des civils a Goma Below are screenshots from a video depicting three armed individuals in uniform during the retreat of FARDC and Wazalendo forces in Goma on 26 January 2025, robbing and injuring a civilian. After stealing from him, one combatant shot and injured the victim before leaving the scene. Numerous similar incidents were reported across Goma, and in other locations in South Kivu, revealing a widespread and systematic practice by FARDC and Wazalendo elements. Screenshots from a video filmed by an eyewitness and shared with the Group by a confidential source on 26 January 2025 <!-- page 181 --> S/2025/446 181/254 25-07401

### Annex 48 (para. 93) ### Coerced returns of IDPs by AFC/M23 around Goma ### Retours forcés de déplacés internes par l’AFC/M23 autour de Goma As hostilities between the FARDC and its allies against AFC/M23, supported by RDF elements, intensified around Goma and a full-scale assault on the city became imminent, civilians, including IDPs began fleeing en masse. Many fled to escape the risk of being caught in the crossfire, while others fled in anticipation of the arrival of AFC/M23 forces, known for their hostility toward the presence of IDP sites. • Initial incidents of forced displacement outside Goma, and IDPs fleeing combat On 24 January 2025, AFC/M23 dismantled the N’shanga IDP camp in Kalehe territory to repurpose the site for the reinforcement of their elements advancing towards Sake.299 On 26 January, heavy shelling and combat erupted along the Kibumba axis, notably in Munigi and in the vicinity of Goma’s airport (north and north-east of the city), as AFC/M23 and RDF forces advanced from the direction of Kibumba and Munigi, crossing near border markers (“bornes”) 12 and 13 (see paras. 16, 35). Amid escalating hostilities, the remaining IDPs around Kanyaruchinya have fled the area. Reportedly, what remained of the sites was subsequently dismantled by the local population, aiming to prevent any return of the displaced and to reclaim lands that had long been occupied by the IDPs.300 When combat seized after the 27 January, a significant number of displaced persons who had taken refuge in Goma town have returned to the IDP sites located west of Goma, along the Goma–Sake axis.301 • Coerced returns following AFC/M23 pressure and public statements These remaining IDPs in sites west of Goma were eventually dismantled following orders by AFC/M23 to vacate. On 28 January 2025, in Minova (20km south of Sake), local sources reported that AFC/M23 elements destroyed IDP camps and forced IDPs to return home and resume a normal life.302 On 30 January, AFC/M23 elements requested IDPs still residing at the Lushagala camp to return to their home villages. This prompted leaders of IDPs to request for additional time, as many of the IDPs had no homes to return to, their homes having been destroyed during previous fighting. Others pleaded that their areas of origin remained unsafe and that they had no means of subsistence or access to their land.303 On 3 February 2025, civil society leaders documented the destruction of Kahembe, Kanyaruchinya, Main de Dieu, and Lushagala IDP camps, with AFC/M23 elements forcing IDPs to return home without any assistance. Many IDPs sought refuge with host families, in unfinished buildings, churches, or schools, lacking water, food, and basic shelter. During the public rally organized by AFC/M23 at the Unity Stadium in Goma on 6 February 2025, Corneille Nangaa reiterated the call for the return of IDPs. On the same occasion, Bahati Erasto, the newly appointed AFC/M23 Governor of North Kivu, also announced during a filmed interview that IDPs had to return to their homes: __________________ 299 UN and local sources. 300 UN, humanitarian, civil society, IDP representatives, researchers. See https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-intensification-violence-north-kivu-and-south-kivu-provinces-situation-report-1-3-february- 2025#:~:text=,several%20hospitals%2C%20NGO%20offices 301 Ibid. 302 UN and local protection sources. 303 Ibid. <!-- page 182 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 182/254 Screenshot from video received on 6 February 2025 from a confidential source. Translation of Bahati Erasto’s statement from Kinyarwanda to English: "All the displaced persons who were in the camps must return home. Those who are in camps in Uganda and Rwanda must all return to Congo because we are going to restore peace. In this city, there are three problems: the prison, which released murderers and bandits who were freed by the State before our conquest of the city; the Wazalendo, the FDLR, the mercenaries, and the FARDC soldiers who are still hiding in houses. We will work with the local authorities, and we will arrest them all to bring peace back to our population." On 9 February, a 72-hour ultimatum was issued by AFC/M23 for IDPs to vacate the remaining sites. Tens of thousands were compelled to return to unsafe or inaccessible areas, often without access to humanitarian assistance.304 On 10 February 2025, AFC/M23 released an official communiqué stating that that IDPs were returning voluntarily to areas under AFC/M23 control that were “secured in liberated areas”, dismissing contrary reports as "Kinshasa propaganda": __________________ 304 UN, local protection sources, civil society. See also https://www.focus-actu.cd/2025/02/09/rdc-goma-la-societe-civile-alerte-les-deplaces-de-mugunga-et-nzulo-sommes-de-quitter-leurs-camps-dans-72-heures/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/13/dr-congo-m23-drives-displaced-people-goma-camps <!-- page 183 --> S/2025/446 183/254 25-07401 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1889093392618991739?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg However, findings from humanitarian actors, local leaders and the IDPs themselves directly contradicted these claims – confirming that intimidation, threats, and coercion were employed to force departures from IDP sites. IDPs were forced to return to unsafe or inaccessible areas without humanitarian assistance.305 By mid-February, the IDP sites around Goma, which had hosted approximately 700,000 displaced persons just a month earlier, had vanished.306 On 9 March 2025, Bertrand Bisimwa, political leader of the AFC/M23, blamed the international community for exploiting the suffering of the displaced, stating that: “Thousands of internally displaced people have already returned to their homes, people who, for years, were trapped in miserable camps while their suffering was exploited by international agencies and local actors who profit from endless displacement.”307 __________________ 305 UN, protection actors, civil society sources, researchers, community leaders. See also https://actualite.cd/2025/03/02/est-de-la-rdc-plus-de-70-des-retournes-nont-plus-acces-des-terres-pour-lagriculture-en; https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/13/dr-congo-m23-drives-displaced-people-goma-camps 306 UN, protection actors, civil society sources, researchers, community leaders. See also https://x.com/hrw/status/1892511590332740043?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg; https://x.com/hrw/status/1892511590332740043 307 https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1899022537910038669?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg <!-- page 184 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 184/254 • Forced returns constituting violations of international law The orders for the dismantlement of IDP camps and forced displacement of IDPs conducted by AFC/M23, occurred without an imperative military necessity or regard for the safety and dignity of civilians, a serious violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). Such conduct constitutes sanctionable acts and may also amount to war crimes. <!-- page 185 --> S/2025/446 185/254 25-07401

Annex 49 (para. 101) Summary executions by AFC/M23 Exécutions sommaires par l'AFC/M23 A systematic pattern of summary executions and targeted killings has emerged under AFC/M23 occupation. M23/AFC patrols, including nocturnal operations, continued across the city's neighborhoods, systematically searching for armed elements reportedly concealed within residential premises (paras. 37, 98). Individuals were most often targeted for alleged links to armed groups, for expression of dissent or criticism towards M23/AFC, as well as for engagement in civil society or political activism, including those involving human rights defenders, lawyers, influential figures, and local leaders. Numerous reports also indicated that AFC/M23 adopted a 'no questions asked' approach, carrying out the summary execution of unarmed civilians based on the slightest and often unfounded suspicions. 308 Men comprised the majority of the reported victims.309 Bertrand Bisimwa admitted to the existence of regular daily and nocturnal patrols sweeping the city, but claimed that these were carried out lawfully, succeeding to ensure security for all – and that any claims to the contrary aimed to “maintain demonization of AFC/M23”: “[…] Restoring Order in Goma: Since the liberation of Goma in January 2025, we have re-established law and order where there was none. Businesses have reopened, children have returned to school, and our forces patrol the streets day and night to ensure security for all. Unlike the DRC government, which failed its people, we have succeeded in ensuring the free movement of individuals and their property. It is well known that AFC/M23 liberated areas are rigorously respectful of the obligations derived from the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols […]”310 (emphasis added) Contrary to AFC/M23’s claim, consistent and corroborated reports depicted a population living in constant fear and terror. Many civilians who felt at risk have either fled or went into hiding.311 Unlawful and violent repression, including summary executions, were a daily occurrence.312 The Government of the DRC, through official communiqués regularly published through its Minister of Interior, Shabani Lukoo Bihango, denounced the scale and systematic nature of abuses perpetrated by AFC/M23 and the Rwandan army, including summary executions: __________________ 308 UN, intelligence, protection sources, residents, local leaders, family members of victims, witnesses. 309 Statistics based on reported incidents. 310 Excerpt from Bertrand Bisimwa’s statement published on X, 9 March 2025, at https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1899022537910038669?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg 311 UN, intelligence, protection sources, residents, local leaders, family members of victims, witnesses. See also https://amnesty.hosting.augure.com/Augure_AmnestyInternational/default.ashx?WCI=EmailViewer&id=%7B8a4330fd -8a81- 4795-92eb-30ddb42c098d%7D. 312 Ibid. <!-- page 186 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 186/254 Minister of Interior - Communiqué of 23 February 2025. Official DRC source <!-- page 187 --> S/2025/446 187/254 25-07401 Minister of Interior - Communiqué of 15 March 2025. Official DRC source <!-- page 188 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 188/254 Minister of Interior - Communiqué of 12 April 2025. Official DRC source • Killing of popular musician Delcat Idengo, 13 February 2025 On 13 February 2025, Delcat Idengo – by his real name Delphin Katembo Vinywasiki – a well-known “revolutionary” activist musician, famous for his politically charged songs, was shot and killed by AFC/M23 elements shortly after publicly criticizing AFC/M23 in his song and publicized speech (full speech translated below). He was killed around 1 pm, near his residence in Kilijiwe neighborhood of Goma. Eyewitnesses who were at the scene identified AFC/M23 fighters as responsible for his assassination. Idengo died instantly from a gunshot wound to the head.313 __________________ 313 Local community leaders, civil society, researchers. Audio-video recorded testimonies from the local population, and several video footages of his body, revealing a gunshot wound to the head - on file with the Secretariat. See also https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/12/dr-congo-rwanda-backed-m23-target-journalists-activists. <!-- page 189 --> S/2025/446 189/254 25-07401 Idengo has also criticized the Kinshasa government in the past. He has been detained in Goma at the Munzenze Central Prison until December 2023, for releasing a song titled “Politiciens escrocs” (“Crooked politicians”), denouncing widespread corruption, and openly criticising President Tshisekedi.314 He was charged with contempt against the Head of State and for actions aimed at demoralizing frontline soldiers.315 He was subsequently arrested in Beni, in August 2024 – later released – for his involvement in anti-MONUSCO demonstrations in Beni.316 The song that allegedly led to his assassination, “Bunduki za Kwetu” (The Guns of Our Homeland) was released only hours before his assassination. He was shot dead while filming the music video for the song. The song strongly condemned the occupation of Goma by the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) and their proxy, the M23.317 Two days earlier, Idengo had released a video message in Swahili, filmed in Goma, addressed to “Friends of freedom” (Amis de la liberté), calling for a revolt against the occupation by the “Tutsi” enemy, which widely circulated on social media: "Hello friends of freedom, Due to lack of leadership, the population applauded the enemy. Imagine that while the enemy was entering, the young resistants were running out of ammunition to fight. The officers fled a long time ago; today, the population is orphaned and does not know whom to turn to. For your information, the liberator does not exist — keep that in mind. A people is not liberated; a people liberates itself. At present, we are neither on the side of the government nor on the side of the enemy. I have always told you: a Tutsi cannot lead this country. These were the same statements that led to the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. As I speak, to everyone who hears me, I am in Goma, and we will not leave until this issue is clarified. As I said, a people must liberate itself. The soldiers have fled; today, we are in the enemy’s hands. These are things we have denounced for a long time. We have said that MONUSCO sides with the enemy. MONUSCO is on the side of the government but also on the side of the enemy. Don’t you see how they are working to balkanize our country? Now, when we ask who will save us from this situation, everyone stays silent. They say Kinshasa will send — I don't know what — but that is completely false. A people is not liberated; the people liberate themselves. To all who hear me during this period we are living through: everyone is observing, thinking, 'if I speak, I will be arrested,' or something similar. If you accept being dominated by a Tutsi, stay silent. But if you want liberation, align yourself with the saviors — those who are neither on the side of the government nor on the side of the rebel group calling itself M23, or Nangaa. All this is part of the white man’s politics aimed at dividing the country. Freedom — everyone must get ready. We cannot accept being ruled by these people." [Translation from Swahili by the Group] __________________ 314 https://youtu.be/qSaiy5esD4U?feature=shared 315 https://radioelimu.uor-rdc.net/beni-nouvelle-arrestation-du-musicien-delcat-idengo-9-mois-apres-sa-liberation-conditionnelle/#page-content 316 https://radioelimu.uor-rdc.net/beni-nouvelle-arrestation-du-musicien-delcat-idengo-9-mois-apres-sa-liberation-conditionnelle/ 317 https://youtu.be/WaoKX8AaXb4?feature=shared <!-- page 190 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 190/254 Screenshot from the video of Idengo’s recorded speech, two days prior to his assassination in Goma. Video received from a confidential source Idengo’s assassination was widely perceived as a warning message of dissuasion to those who dared to speak out against the occupying forces.318 His death prompted protests and demands for justice, particularly in his hometown of Beni, during his funeral. Denial of responsibility by AFC/M23 The same evening, on 13 February, AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka publicly denied any involvement in the killing of Idengo, condemning it as a “score-settling between different factions of the Wazalendo and the FARDC”: __________________ 318 Local sources, community leaders, researchers. <!-- page 191 --> S/2025/446 191/254 25-07401 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1890157418090491962?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg English translation by the Group: “Contrary to the rumors circulated on social media regarding the death of musician Indego, we condemn the score-settling between different factions of the Wazalendo and the FARDC. We call on them to surrender and hand over their weapons to our security services.” A month later, on 12 March 2025, Lawrence Kanyuka reiterated his denial of AFC/M23’s responsibility for the killing of Idengo, in reaction to the publication of a report accusing M23 of the artist’s killing – stating: “Furthermore, it is important to clarify that on February 13th, 2025, we publicly addressed, through a tweet, the circumstances surrounding the death of musician Indego. We stated that his killing resulted from internal conflicts among different factions of the Wazalendo militia and the FARDC, a fact that some media outlets have deliberately ignored in favor of misleading narratives.” (emphasis added) <!-- page 192 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 192/254 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1899815246816063598?s=48&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg <!-- page 193 --> S/2025/446 193/254 25-07401 • Massacre in Katindo neighborhood of Goma, 22 February 2025 On 22 February 2025, at least 17 civilian men were executed near Katindo camp, in Karisimbi commune, Goma. Witnesses reported that the killings took place within a larger context of ongoing sweeping military operations by AFC/M23 in the Katindo neighborhood. This neighborhood – which housed a large FARDC camp and the families of FARDC personnel, who were still living there – was particularly affected by frequent sweeping and house-to-house search operations led by AFC/M23 units since they took control of Goma. Multiple witnesses confirmed that on 22 and 23 February, AFC/M23 carried out operations involving door-to-door searches throughout the area. During these raids, at least 50 civilians were reported to have been killed or forcibly disappeared, with executions taking place on the streets and in civilian homes.319 The Group was able to verify the deaths of at least 17 male victims through a combination of photographic and video evidence, corroborated by multiple witness testimonies. On 22 February, AFC/M23 combatants were seen arriving in trucks and rounding up men, allegedly on suspicion of criminal activities. Other victims were reportedly found doing sports, or consuming alcohol and therefore associated with criminal behavior.320 Video footage received by the Group on 22 February depicts 11 bodies amassed in a single compound, which appears to be an abandoned construction site. According to witness accounts, the 11 men were killed near the former FARDC camp, during the operation that took place in the afternoon of 22 February. Most victims, dressed in civilian clothing, sustained gunshot wounds to the head. Six others, also identified on video footage, were killed at a nearby location known as Afia Bora. Both sites are located within Katindo neighborhood.321 Family members identified the victims as individuals living in the neighborhood. Witnesses reported that a few items of military clothing were found thrown over the bodies, but these did not belong to any of the victims. This narrative is consistent with previously documented patterns of AFC/M23 staging civilian corpses to suggest they were combatants, disseminating false narratives aimed at minimizing or obscuring abuses. Some witnesses also described a group of young men who were rounded up in the morning of 23 February at a location commonly known as “Terrain des scouts” – an open field where locals gathered to do sports, and some to consume alcohol and drugs. The men were thereafter loaded into trucks and taken to an unknown location. On this occasion, several men attempted to escape and were executed. The Group received video footage on 23 February depicting a group of men sitting in front of a building, located near the “Terrain des scouts”, guarded by AFC/M23 elements, including one clearly identifiable as wearing a red armband marked “PU” (Police unit) – matching the incident and the location described by witnesses. __________________ 319 Local protection sources and witness accounts. 320 Intelligence, protection sources, witness accounts, researchers. 321 Intelligence, military, protection sources, source close to AFC/M23 <!-- page 194 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 194/254 Screenshots from a video received by the Group on 23 February 2025 from a confidential source, depicting the rounding up of men near the “Terrain des scouts” in Katindo neighborhood of Goma. Note the AFC/M23 soldier with the red “PU” armband worn by the soldier in the middle of the image, typically used by the AFC/M23 military police The local population identified AFC/M23 as responsible for the killings, having seen the AFC/M23 elements operating in the neighborhood, and citing a systematic pattern of similar abuses occurring daily, albeit not typically involving such a high number of victims in a single incident. Goma residents stated that this incident formed part of a broader climate of terror prevailing under AFC/M23 control, where young men have frequently been executed and posthumously labeled as bandits or enemy fighters under the false pretext of AFC/M23 ensuring civilian protection. <!-- page 195 --> S/2025/446 195/254 25-07401 A source close to AFC/M23 confirmed the group's responsibility for the incident, stating that AFC/M23 acknowledged internally that it was a “bad incident” involving the summary execution of men accused of taking “drugs,” with M23 security forces having killed many of those apprehended. The source further indicated that due to the group’s lack of proper policing capacity, AFC/M23 combatants often responded with disproportionate force. Denial of responsibility by AFC/M23 In response to a France24 television report on the incident — which alleged that an M23 spokesperson had confirmed the killings occurred during a "sweeping and clearing of the area to secure the city," and that the victims were either former FARDC soldiers, Wazalendo members, or drug users 322 — Lawrence Kanyuka dismissed the report as "fake news" and blatant misinformation aligned with Kinshasa’s propaganda. He further denied having spoken to France24 regarding the matter. 323 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1894103004128670027?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg __________________ 322 https://x.com/civuadikalanga/status/1893994545076908193?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg – 323 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1894103004128670027?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg <!-- page 196 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 196/254

### Annex 50 (para. 101) ### Strategy of systematic denial of responsibility by AFC/M23 and AFC/M23’s “Digital Army” Stratégie de déni de responsabilité systématique de la part de l’AFC/M23 et de l'« Armée numérique » de l’AFC/M23 The above-cited statements by AFC/M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka — systematically denying responsibility for grave incidents — are indicative of a broader and consistent pattern of deflection employed by AFC/M23 leadership (see also annex 52 below). Despite substantial and credible evidence implicating AFC/M23 in serious human rights abuses, the group has persistently sought to dissociate itself from these violations, routinely attributing blame to alleged provocations or internal disputes among other adversary groups – namely FARDC, Wazalendo, etc. 324 Efforts to conceal their involvement have included the staging of crime scenes – for example, by placing military uniforms on civilian corpses to falsely suggest they were combatant casualties 325 - and the dissemination of false narratives aimed at minimizing or concealing the extent of abuses. Labeling reports of violations as "fake news", "blatant misinformation", or narratives “aligned with Kinshasa’s propaganda”, exemplifies AFC/M23’s broader strategy of systematic denial. This approach includes repeated attempts to discredit independent reporting and reputable human rights organizations, illustrating a deliberate strategy to evade accountability for human rights violations and crimes under international law. Such practices perpetuate a climate of fear, misinformation, and impunity in areas under AFC/M23 control. This deflection and denial strategy was not incidental but formed part of a well-established and coordinated information campaign, institutionalized within a structure referred to as AFC/M23’s “digital army” (armée numérique), overseen by Lawrence Kanyuka in his capacity as the group’s “Communications Focal Point.” The digital army was tasked with conducting psychological operations (psy-ops) and implementing the group’s propaganda strategy. The objectives and core tactics of the digital army were systematically taught during ideological training sessions, which were mandatory for all new recruits who were going to be integrated into AFC/M23’s civilian administration. Several recruits who attended these trainings confirmed that the group's “war propaganda” doctrine included a strategic deflection of responsibility, consistent blame attribution to adversaries, demonization of opposing leaders, and affirmations that AFC/M23 does not seek conflict but merely responds to provocation. Recruits were also taught to portray the group’s cause as noble, present themselves as liberators, and assert that the adversary employs unauthorized or illegal weaponry. The below images are excerpts from the notebook of a trainee who attended the mandatory ideological training in Nyongera in 2025. [Translation from the French text by the Group:] “The components of the war: Two components: - the military component - the psychological component 1. The psychological component This psychology implies some strategy: for example, the information war (info-war); and manipulation (of..) __________________ 324 https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1899022537910038669 325 Intelligence, military, protection sources, witnesses, relatives of victims, civil society. <!-- page 197 --> S/2025/446 197/254 25-07401 War is a matter of image; the best […] of war is to liberate without fighting, and within this strategy, it is necessary to create narratives explaining why we wage war. Alongside the army of soldiers, there must be a digital army…and in the digital army, our weapon is the digital. A few political lines for the war propaganda: 1. We do not seek war; our actions are primarily in response [reaction] 2. The opposing party bears sole responsibility 3. The leader of the opposing camp is the devil 4. Our cause is noble; it is we who have liberated 5. The enemy commits…[illegible] 6. The enemy uses unauthorised weapons 7. We are suffering heavy losses 8. Artists and intellectuals support our cause 9. Our cause is sacred [short: we need to be very active] 10. Those who cast doubt over our propaganda are traitors” <!-- page 198 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 198/254 Excerpts from a trainee notebook on the content of AFC/M23 ideological training in Nyongera, early 2025. Provided by confidential source <!-- page 199 --> S/2025/446 199/254 25-07401

Annex 51 (para. 103) Evidence of torture and corporal punishments by AFC/M23 Evidence of torture and corporal punishments by AFC/M23 Following the capture of Goma and Bukavu, images surfaced showing armed AFC/M23 and RDF combatants patrolling the city, conducting sweeping operations, and publicly subjecting civilians to severe beatings. Video evidence received throughout February and March 2025, corroborated by consistent reporting by residents, protection actors, researchers, and intelligence sources, indicates a systematic and sustained pattern of such practices by AFC/M23, reflecting efforts to consolidate control through violence, intimidation, and fear among the civilian population, rather than responding to specific security threats. • Incidents of public beatings in Bukavu (1) A video filmed on 17 February 2025, two days after AFC/M23 took control of Bukavu, shows the public beating of an individual by men in military uniforms. For the duration of the 1-minute video, the victim received approximately 27 blows with a stick across the entire body, including the face, by a man wearing full military fatigues and combat helmet. Another soldier standing next to the victim is seen jabbing the individual with the butt of a rifle. The assault occurred in a public setting and was carried out by AFC/M23 and RDF forces who had just taken control of the city. Screenshot from video received by the Group on 17 February 2025 from confidential source in Bukavu <!-- page 200 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 200/254 (2) On the same day, 17 February 2025, video footage depicted a group of AFC/M23 combatants, dressed in full combat gear and armed, patrolling the streets of Bukavu alongside civilians who appeared to be guiding them, some carrying large sticks. The footage shows a young man lying face down on the ground, being beaten by a civilian wielding a large stick, while a soldier in combat gear, armed with a rifle, watches on. Screenshot from video received by the Group on 17 February 2025 from confidential source in Bukavu • Incidents of public beatings in Goma (3) Video footage received on 8 March 2025, recorded at night, shows two men with their hands tied behind their backs being severely beaten by at least five individuals in civilian clothing. A man in military uniform, visibly armed with a handgun, stands nearby supervising the scene without intervening. The two restrained men are seen pleading for mercy from the soldier during the assault.326 __________________ 326 Local community leaders and civil society sources. <!-- page 201 --> S/2025/446 201/254 25-07401 Screenshots from video received on 8 March 2025 from a confidential source (4) Video footage filmed and provided to the Group on 18 March 2025 documents an incident of severe corporal punishment inflicted by several armed individuals in uniform at the Stade de l’Unité in Goma. The perpetrators include several men dressed in full combat gear, equipped with weaponry and backpacks consistent with standard RDF-issued equipment, one individual wearing a red "PU" (military police) armband, and another in a plain military uniform – suggesting coordinated action by different units operating together. The footage shows the group of military men simultaneously beating a detainee with sticks and whips, while at least half a dozen other detainees are seen looking on. The location is clearly identifiable as the Stade de l’Unité, with a visible sign in the video confirming the site, and this identification was further corroborated by local residents of Goma. Multiple corroborated testimonies identified the Stade de l’Unité as a holding and detention site operated by AFC/M23 and RDF forces, notably used for detaining and forcibly recruiting individuals (see para. 104). <!-- page 202 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 202/254 <!-- page 203 --> S/2025/446 203/254 25-07401 Screenshots from video dated 18 March 2025, depicting the beating of an individual at the Stade de l’Unité in Goma. Video received from a confidential source. Key elements visible in the images include: blue sign with white letters in the background stating “Stade de l’Unité”; a group of additional detainees seated on the stairs to the left side of the frame, guarded by men dressed in uniform and full combat gear; a man positioned in the center of the image, kneeling on the ground, being beaten by three individuals, each wearing a different type of military uniform. (5) In a video footage received on 26 March 2025, a young man, stripped of his clothes, is being subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment, and physical abuse. The victim is forced to stand on his arms, with his legs raised against a wall. A man in uniform is seen beating him repeatedly with a stick, while another armed soldier in uniform, holding a gun, observes. Several civilians are present, watching the incident. The video captures dialogue in Kinyarwanda, including orders such as "come here, leave him" and "let's finish with him." The soldier instructs the victim not to lower himself to the ground, commanding him to raise his feet higher, threatening, "Do you want me to kill you?" and "Hurry up, lift your [an insult in context referring to the victim’s mother], move quickly." The commander then orders the victim to receive "100 lashes". The victim is heard pleading, "Papa, you are going to kill me." When the victim shows signs of resisting, the commander adopts a shooting stance, threatening to open fire. He then instructs, "Make him fall face-first quickly," to which the victim responds, "I understand, I will lift myself."327 __________________ 327 Translation by the Group. <!-- page 204 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 204/254 Video provided to the Group by a confidential source • Conclusion – sanctionable acts potentially constituting war crimes Video footage presented above depict conduct that amounts to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, prohibited under international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The stripping, forced physical positioning, repeated beatings, and psychological intimidation — including death threats — inflicted upon the victims in the presence of armed personnel and civilians, constitute serious violations of the victim’s dignity and physical integrity. The explicit threat of lethal force by a commanding officer, combined with the infliction of corporal punishment under coercive conditions, reinforces the gravity of the abuse. Such practices, especially when occurring in a context of armed conflict and under the authority of organized armed groups, also amount to torture, and may constitute potential war crimes. The incidents described constitute sanctionable acts. <!-- page 205 --> S/2025/446 205/254 25-07401

Annex 52 (para. 107) AFC/M23 leadership denials of responsibility for attacks on hospitals in Goma Dénis de responsabilité par la direction de l'AFC/M23 concernant les attaques contre des hôpitaux à Goma • An official AFC/M23 communiqué was published on 5 March 2025, signed by Lawrence Kanyuka, denying responsibility for the raids on the hospitals, accusing MONUSCO officials of erroneous interpretation of the facts, with the intention of manipulating the narrative to tarnish AFC/M23’s image. The communiqué acknowledges that 130 FARDC elements were taken, but claims that the operation was carried out in in a peaceful manner and in full compliance with IHL, because the FARDC elements had “infiltrated” the medical facilities and had reportedly carried out crimes against the civilian population: <!-- page 206 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 206/254 https://x.com/lawrencekanyuka/status/1897250180652786173?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg • On 10 March 2025, Bertrand Bisimwa published a statement on his “X” account, justifying the AFC/M23’s cause, and listing several issues that he labelled as “facts hidden from the public to maintain the demonization of AFC/M23”. Among these, a statement claiming that AFC/M23 was “rigorously respectful of the obligations derived from the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, which protect civilian infrastructure, including hospitals.” <!-- page 207 --> S/2025/446 207/254 25-07401 <!-- page 208 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 208/254 https://x.com/bbisimwa/status/1899022537910038669 • On 13 March 2025, the excerpt from an interview by Alain Destexhe, a Belgian national, with “General” Sultani Makenga was published on “X”. Responding to a question about the raid on the Heal Africa hospital, Makenga repeated the claims that the men who were “arrested” were former FARDC who were pretending to be patients or hospital staff, and therefore had no reason to be in the hospital. <!-- page 209 --> S/2025/446 209/254 25-07401 [….] https://x.com/kivuresidence/status/1900155727877955924?s=46&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg English translation of the excerpt: “Sultani Makenga: Former FARDC soldiers were pretending to be patients or hospital attendants. Fourteen weapons were found there. It was hospital staff who alerted us to this situation. We arrested those who had no reason to be at the hospital. There are FARDC wounded in all hospitals in the city, and we are not targeting them. You can verify this. Alain Destexhe: During a visit to the North Kivu Provincial Hospital, I was able to confirm the presence of many wounded FARDC soldiers, who told me they did not feel unsafe.)” <!-- page 210 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 210/254

Annex 53 (para. 110) Additional information on the plausibility of Rwanda’s 3T production Informations supplémentaires relatives à la vraisemblance de la production de 3T au Rwanda The Group previously documented that on 8 May 2024, after AFC/M23 occupied the Rubaya area, ITSCI had suspended all tagging in Masisi territory. By October 2024, ITSCI had expelled Rwanda’s two only 3T smelters, Luna Smelter ltd and Power X ltd, for failure to uphold due diligence expectations. In a statement of 2 February 2025, ITSCI recalled that instances of fraudulent misrepresentation of mineral origin (see para 120) were the most severe of all the incidents recorded across the Great Lakes Region, and that they soared by 60% in the last reporting period.328 Furthermore, 51 incident inquiries of plausibility and misrepresentation of mineral origin for Rwanda (para. 120) remained open by the end of March 2025.329 In a letter to smelter members dated 4 March 2025 ITSCI stated that "based on available information, there is evidence of a real risk of misrepresentation of mineral origin and possible association with non-state armed groups." In 2015, the Group reported that coltan from the DRC, which has a typical white appearance due to its higher content of tantalum over niobium, was smuggled to Rwanda, where it was darkened to match the color of the local production, before being sold downstream under deceptive Rwandan origin (S/2015/19, para 174). In the same report the Group explained that the Government of Rwanda compared samples of minerals smuggled from the DRC with samples from the mining sites that had been “fingerprinted” as part of Rwanda’s traceability efforts (S/2015/19, para 175). On that occasion the Government of Rwanda concluded that the field (mine) samples and the consignment (suspect) samples did not appear to be plausibly similar, which led to the disqualification of the mineral consignment. This example showed the practicality of the mineral fingerprinting (where available) conducted on mining sites in the Great Lakes Region to timely detect instances of fraudulent misrepresentation of mineral origin. In a 2020 article, geologists from the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) described the geology of tantalum occurrences in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.330 The geologists found that in the region, which is geologically homogenous for cassiterite and coltan deposits, the mean coltan content of mixed coltan and cassiterite deposits would be 25% of the total, the rest being cassiterite. The Rwanda Development Board’s claims contradicted this geological data by implying that mixed coltan and cassiterite deposit in Rwanda would contain about 60 to 70% coltan (para. 20). Furthermore, information obtained by the Group indicates that not all the tantalite (coltan) exported by Rwanda in 2024 could have originated from domestic production alone.331 In the absence of any independent verification, the potential for cross-border smuggling increases — such as those previously documented by the Group (S/2024/969, paras 62 – 63, S/2024/432, paras 141 – 143, S/2019/974, para 46, S/2019/469, paras. 152–156). It would therefore be paramount for all 3T mines in Rwanda to be fingerprinted so that plausibility claims can be conducted beyond reasonable doubt, to promptly detect instances of contamination with minerals of non-Rwandan origin. Industry standards for the disclosure of scientific and technical information about mineral projects are provided by Australia’s JORC Code and Canada’s National Instrument (NI) 43-101.332 Under NI 43-101, companies, regardless of their size or financial turnover, must file technical reports to support certain disclosures, particularly regarding mineral resources and reserves, as well as economic analysis. Its purpose is to prevent misleading or fraudulent information from being published to investors about mineral properties. NI 43-101 defines the role of the Qualified Person (QP),333 making it pivotal in the preparation of the technical reports to be disclosed. Other key aspects of the NI 43-101 that make it relevant to the Group’s recommendations are that it covers disclosure of the following aspects: __________________ 328 https://www.itsci.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ITSCI-Incident-Summary-Jan23-to-Dec23_EN.pdf. 329 ITSCI. Incidents remain opened for a period of six months, before being dismissed. The 51 ongoing incidents thus only account for those opened after October 2024. 330 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2020.101896. 331 MONUSCO, economic actors, researchers, geologists. 332 For the JORC Code: https://www.jorc.org/. For NI 43-101: https://www.bcsc.bc.ca/-/media/PWS/New-Resources/Securities- Law/Instruments-and-Policies/Policy-4/43101-NI-July-25-2023.pdf?dt=20230720163240 333 A QP is defined as an engineer or geoscientist with at least five years of experience in drafting technical reports and who is in good standing with a professional association. <!-- page 211 --> S/2025/446 211/254 25-07401 1) Definition of Standards: The instrument incorporates by reference the definitions and categories of mineral resources and mineral reserves as set out in the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum (CIM) Definition Standards, which is the industry reference. 2) Accuracy and Transparency: NI 43-101 requires clear, accurate, and balanced information to be provided to investors, avoiding promotional language and ensuring consistency in terminology and definitions. 3) Risk Disclosure: Issuers are required to identify any known legal, political, environmental, and other risks that could materially affect the potential development of mineral resources or reserves. 4) Economic Analysis: NI 43-101 provides guidelines for disclosing the results of economic analyses, including preliminary economic assessments (PEAs), pre-feasibility studies (PFSs), and feasibility studies (FSs). 5) Historical Estimates: NI 43-101 restricts the disclosure of economic analyses of historical estimates. <!-- page 212 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 212/254

Annex 54 (para. 113) Mining areas controlled by AFC/M23 Zones minières sous contrôle de l’AFC/M23 AFC/M23 controlled the entire mining area of Rubaya, extending over North Kivu (first picture) and South Kivu (second picture). Source: Courtesy of https://dfp-pee.org/assets/docs/rubaya.pdf The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations <!-- page 213 --> S/2025/446 213/254 25-07401 Source: IPIS basemap from https://ipisresearch-dashboard.shinyapps.io/open_data_app/, annotated by the Group The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations After the seizing of Rubaya area in April 2024, AFC/M23 appointed Joël Mbarusha Semanza to manage mining and trading operations in Rubaya.334 Joël Mbarusha Semanza was a former agent of the North Kivu tax directorate (Direction provinciale des recettes du Nord-Kivu – DGRNK) in Rubaya who was suspended for financial embezzlement and imprisoned in Goma. After serving his prison sentence, he settled in Kampala before returning to the DRC with the arrival of AFC/M23. Since AFC/M23’s takeover of Rubaya in April 2024, he oversaw all aspects of mining exploitation and trade in Rubaya area. On 19 March 2025, AFC/M23 further assigned Lievin Mukingi as the purported “responsible of mines” (see also annex 16). __________________ 334 Rubaya diggers, traders and dwellers, researchers, civil society, economic actors. <!-- page 214 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 214/254

Annex 55 (para 117) DRC complaint to the ICGLR regarding smuggling of DRC minerals to Rwanda, and ICGLR response Plainte de la RDC auprès de la CIRGL à propos de la contrebande de minerais vers le Rwanda et réponse de la CIRGL On 21 March 2025 the Ministry of mines of the DRC submitted a complaint to ICGLR under their Regional Certification Mechanism to denounce the looting of 3T minerals by AFC/M23 in Goma. The document provided only a partial estimate of the minerals looted (186,660 Kg) which did not account t for the total 294,582 kg of tagged 3T minerals reportedly looted by AFC/M23 in Goma, nor for the 30,000 kg of minerals looted from the warehouses of SMB.335 __________________ 335 Confidential reply to the Group on file with the Secretariat. <!-- page 215 --> S/2025/446 215/254 25-07401 Document received from the DRC Ministry of Mines On 28 March 2025 the ICGLR replied, through its Executive Secretary, informing the DRC that the matter would be discussed during upcoming key meetings, notably the ICGLR Audit Committee scheduled for 23–25 April 2025, and the Regional Committee against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, set to convene from 28–29 April 2025, both in Nairobi. The Audit Committee concluded that the situation described by the DRC was “systematic” and decided to appoint an ad hoc Committee to investigate the matter.336 This regional response aligns with the welcoming of regional efforts by the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the ICGLR, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in UNSC Resolution 2773 (2025) to restore peace and security in Eastern DRC. The UN Security Council also underscored the need to address the root causes of the conflict, including the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The UN Security Council has repeatedly condemned the offensives of AFC/M23 and the foreign backing behind them. __________________ 336 Confidential reply to the Group on file with the Secretariat. <!-- page 216 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 216/254 <!-- page 217 --> S/2025/446 217/254 25-07401 <!-- page 218 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 218/254 Document received from confidential sources. The ICGLR announced its decision to appoint an ad hoc Commission to investigate the matter, which the ICGLR defined as “systematic” of smuggling of minerals from the DRC to Rwanda. The Commission would be composed of two members from the ICGLR regional Committee, three members from the ICGLR audit Committee, one Expert and a civil society representative, both appointed by the ICGLR Executive Secretary. The Commission would start investigating 14 days after having been appointed, and would submit an interim and final reports respectively 45 days and 90 days after the beginning of its work. <!-- page 219 --> S/2025/446 219/254 25-07401

Annex 56 (para. 125) ADF assault type rifles Armes de type fusil d'assaut des ADF During the reporting period, several ADF combatants surrendered or were captured. The FARDC military prosecutor’s office in Beni recovered a total of 16 AK-type assault rifles from these captured or surrendered ADF combatants. Several assault rifles could not be exploited since markings had disappeared due to the conditions of use or storage or had been erased. Still, inspection of the assault rifles disclosed that 8 out of the 16 assault rifles originated from the FARDC stockpile. Sixteen AK-type assault rifles were recovered by the Beni Military Prosecuting office (Auditorate).The Group was authorized to access and analyze them. These arms were surrendered and/or seized from ADF. Some of the weapons were completely unexploitable due to their age or conditions of use. The Group was able to establish that eight out of 16 rifles formally originated from FARDC stocks due to their apparent domestic markings. As previously documented, ADF had stolen FARDC weapons and supplies during attacks on FARDC positions (S/2024/969, annex 6). Picture of the markings of two seized weapons showing the “CDF” domestic marking <!-- page 220 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 220/254

Annex 57 (para. 127) Additional information on the CODECO/URDPC Brigades Information complémentaire sur les brigades de CODECO/URDPC • Headquarters: at Dyaro, Dhendo groupement, Walendu Pitsi Sector • Chief of Staff: Kiza Charité • Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of Defense: Désire Londroma • Spokesperson: Bassa Zukpa Guersom • First Brigade commander, based at the headquarter: Kiza Charite • Second Brigade commander: Maki Kasongo • Third Brigade commander: Alfred, with Maki (from Landjo) acting as his deputy • Fourth Brigade commander: Rehema. Note: Rehema replaced Lango when the latter was killed during internal CODECO/URDPC clashes • Fifth Brigade commander: Logo Delo, with Agenong’a Maneno serving as his deputy • Sixth Brigade commander: Songe <!-- page 221 --> S/2025/446 221/254 25-07401

Annex 58 (para. 131) The statutes of CRP/FRP and the signatories Les statuts du CRP/FRP et les signataires The CRP/FRP statutes (see document below) outline the group’s objectives, as well as its membership and leadership structure. CODECO-URDPC, FPIC, FRPI, who had been assigned roles in the military structure of FRP according to the document, have contested signing the document as well as their membership in CRP/FRP. CRP/FRP Political Leadership • President: Thomas Lubanga Président (Djugu) • First Vice-President: ⁠Charles Kakani Bungamuzi (Irumu) • Second Vice-President: ⁠Tabani Aiki Ibrahim (Aru) • Executive ⁠Secretary: Hon. Jokaba Lambi (Djugu) • Secretary in charge of finances: Wedhunga Niara Baudoin (Mahagi) • Secretary in charge of Diplomacy and International Relations: Éric Kahigwa (Irumu) • Secretary in charge of communication and Spokesperson: David Unyerto (Mahagi) • Secretary in charge of mobilisation: Dr. Vital Tungulo <!-- page 222 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 222/254 <!-- page 223 --> S/2025/446 223/254 25-07401 <!-- page 224 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 224/254 Documents received from an armed group combatant <!-- page 225 --> S/2025/446 225/254 25-07401 Documents received from an armed group combatant <!-- page 226 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 226/254 CRP/FRP Military Command: Document obtained from civil society <!-- page 227 --> S/2025/446 227/254 25-07401

Annex 59 (para. 132) Zaïre Commander Maki Baraka Amos’s communique of 15 January 2025 Le communique du Commandant Zaïre Maki Baraka Amos du 15 janvier 2025 Document received from intelligence source <!-- page 228 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 228/254

Annex 60 (para. 133) Attacks on the FARDC Naval Base in Nyamamba Attaques sur la base navale des FARDC à Nyamamba On 24 February 2025, armed elements attacked the FARDC naval base in Nyamamba, Ngbavi groupment, Chiefdom of Tchomia, Djugu territory. The attacks were initially attributed to Zaïre elements. Several sources confirmed that the attacks on the FARDC positions were staged by the newly created CRP/FRP led by Thomas Lubanga.337 The assailants were led by Baraka Nguna, former Zaïre commander and currently member of CRP/FRP.338 Several sources indicated that the attackers included Zaïre combatants who had recently returned to Ituri from training with AFC/M23 in Tshanzu. Since the CRP/FRP has absorbed combatants from several armed groups, mainly from Zaïre – through the leadership of commanders like Logo Marine and Pharaon, who remained loyal to Thomas Lubanga – it remains a plausible scenario that former Tchanzu trainees did indeed participate in the attacks. Although the Group was yet unable to confirm this element, it continues investigating this matter. The Group’s prior investigations in fact revealed that Thomas Lubanga had facilitated the training in Tchanzu of hundreds of recruits from Ituri (S/2024/969, para. 91 and annex 48) and remained engaged in efforts to facilitate their return to Ituri to join his cause.339 The attacks were meant to be a demonstration of force and an attempt to gain control of strategic locations along the shores of Lac Albert. Zaïre and CRP/FRP insiders and intelligence sources claimed that material support from certain elements in the Ugandan army, as well as political backing from Uganda were conditional on proven successes on the ground. The attacks and rumors that CRP/FRP was about to take control of Nyamamba caused panic among the population. FARDC retaliated, repelled the assailants, and maintained its control and presence. Meanwhile, the attacks and FARDC intervention resulted in two FARDC elements and two civilians killed, four civilians injured, and the kidnapping of a PNC commander. The creation and launching of the CRP with its armed wing, the FRP, perpetuated the use of violence for political purposes. The politico-military movement emerged at a time when the DRC was embroiled in the worst security and humanitarian crisis, due to the violent activism of armed groups including the AFC/M23 backed by the Government of Rwanda. Prior to the launching of the CRP/FRP, Thomas Lubanga, who served as the leader of the DRC Presidential Taskforce, a mediation mission established in 2021-2022 to promote peace in Ituri (S/2022/479, Annex 48), was an influential figure in the activities of the Zaïre armed group. He was forging alliance with AFC/M23 and sought to reconcile dissident MAPI and Zaïre (S/2024/969, paras.91-96) as his launching pad. Thomas Lubanga also sent several combatants for training to Tchanzu in North Kivu in preparation to launching his armed rebellion in Ituri. CRP/FRP not only contributed to internal divisions within the Zaïre armed group, but also among local communities. __________________ 337 FARDC, PNC, UN, intelligence, civil society and Zaïre sources. 338 FARDC, intelligence, civil society, and Zaïre sources. 339 Ibid. <!-- page 229 --> S/2025/446 229/254 25-07401

Annex 61 (para. 139) Public statements by General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) Déclarations publiques du Général Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Chef d’état-major des Forces de défense du peuple ougandais (UPDF) Series of “X” posts by General Muhoozi Kainerugaba defending the Hema community and threatening CODECO: <!-- page 230 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 230/254 Screenshots from “X” account of General Muhoozi Kainerugaba https://x.com/mkainerugaba?s=21&t=_n75XfLAIYYaxKQtM7ZzVg <!-- page 231 --> S/2025/446 231/254 25-07401

Annex 62 (para. 142) Humanitarian impact of the recurrent cycles of violence in Djugu territory, hindering access to healthcare, education, and aid delivery Impact humanitaire des cycles récurrents de violence dans le territoire de Djugu, entravant l'accès aux soins de santé, à l'éducation et à l'aide humanitaire The ongoing armed conflict in Djugu territory has continued to result in severe humanitarian consequences, notably through the disruption of access to essential services, including healthcare, education, and humanitarian assistance. These impacts have further worsened since the beginning of 2025, affecting both displaced populations and host communities. Humanitarian actors have characterized the humanitarian situation in Djugu territory as “catastrophic”. New waves of population displacement As of late 2024, Ituri Province hosted over 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), of whom approximately 660,000 were in Djugu territory. Numerous villages in Djugu territory have been abandoned, while major IDP sites were operating beyond their intended capacity, with many newly displaced persons lacking adequate shelter and access to basic services.340 By the end of 2024, nearly half of Djugu’s population was experiencing chronic food insecurity.341 Renewed fighting since February 2025 has caused a significant wave of new displacement. Between February and March 2025 alone, approximately 97,000 additional individuals were newly displaced within Djugu territory. Near Fataki, thousands of civilians have sought refuge at informal sites such as Djaiba, where around 2,000 individuals have been sleeping in the open without shelter. IDPs who had initially sought refuge at the Catholic church near the FARDC base in Fataki were reportedly threatened by CODECO/URDPC and subsequently relocated to Bule for safety. Additional movements of displaced populations have been reported towards former IDP sites in Rety, Bunia, and Nizi.342 Destruction of health care services and hospital closures Since 2020, nearly half of all the health centres in the Drodro area— home to some of the largest IDP sites in Djugu territory— have been either fully or partially destroyed and looted. This widespread damage has critically undermined access to medical care for thousands of civilians, particularly among displaced and host populations.343 The attack on Drodro Hospital on 6-7 March 2024 (see S/2024/432, para. 159 and annex 94) further contributed to the trauma of the civilian population, with many civilians becoming reluctant to seek medical care during episodes of violence due to fear of further attacks targeting health facilities.344 On 16 September 2024, CODECO/URDPC elements looted the Gina health centre (see annex 63 below). In late February 2025, the main reference hospital in Fataki (Hôpital Général de Référence - HGR), which provided specialized medical services to an estimated 160.000 civilians within the Fataki health zone, was forced to cease operations amid escalating insecurity and repeated attacks and threats against the hospital and its staff, attributed to CODECO/URDPC. 345 The hospital remained closed at the time of writing. The deteriorating security situation also led to the evacuation of staff and patients from HGR Fataki to alternative locations, including Bule, Bunia, and Mahagi. Prevailing security concerns and heightened community tensions further required the separation of patients based on community affiliation, with patients from the Lendu community referred to Pimbo, and __________________ 340 UN and humanitarian sources; OCHA. 341 MSF 342 UN and humanitarian sources. 343 Humanitarian sources. See MSF report Risking their lives to survive, published March 2025. 344 Humanitarian and civil society sources. 345 OCHA, humanitarian, medical and security sources. <!-- page 232 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 232/254 patients from the Hema community to Bule. This fragmentation continued to pose a major challenge for humanitarian actors, who faced significant obstacles in assessing and responding to the medical needs of affected populations.346 Impact on access to education The education sector has also experienced widespread disruptions as a result of sustained violence. Between January and February 2025, a total of 78 schools in the Fataki and Drodro area were closed, affecting access to education for nearly 30,000 children. On 27 February 2025, renewed armed clashes between FARDC and the armed wing of the CRP group in Nyamamba (para. 133), along the shores of Lake Albert, resulted in the closure of approximately 30 additional schools. In Mahagi territory, violence impacted the schooling of over 3,000 children. Across IDP sites in Djugu territory alone, over 40,000 children have been deprived of access to education.347 Disruption to humanitarian aid delivery The delivery of humanitarian assistance has been severely impeded by the ongoing conflict in Djugu territory. With organizations unable to conduct needs assessments or deliver aid, displaced populations faced escalating humanitarian risks in an already highly volatile environment. In the Drodro health zone, nearly 92,000 individuals residing in IDP sites and host communities have experienced interruptions or delays in receiving essential services due to restricted humanitarian access. This situation was exacerbated by a lack of funding that impacted several organizations since January 2025, which has forced several humanitarian actors to scale down or suspend their operations altogether.348 Following recent clashes between CODECO/URDPC elements and the UPDF in March 2025 (paras. 137-139), humanitarian operations in the Fataki health zone have been severely disrupted. Several humanitarian organizations based in Fataki have either closed or relocated—one to Bunia and another to Ngote (in the Rimba health zone in Mahagi territory). While initially some continued operating remotely, they subsequently opted for the full suspension of humanitarian activities in the Fataki area after fighting renewed on 18-19 March 2025, largely due to the heightened insecurity and direct threats from CODECO/URDPC. Organizations operating remotely from Bunia were no longer able to access Fataki, as movement along the RN27 road has been suspended after 18 March. All six NGOs that were active in the Fataki health zone have halted their operations, including the distribution of medicines, affecting over 300,000 civilians.349 Access along the RN27 – a critical humanitarian corridor linking Bunia, Fataki, and Mahagi – has been suspended since 18 March, as the UPDF sought to secure control of this route (para. 137). This has also halted all UN agency movements between Fataki and Mahagi.350 __________________ 346 Humanitarian sources. 347 Humanitarian sources. See OCHA report dated 17 March 2025 348 Humanitarian sources. 349 OCHA, humanitarian, medical and security sources. 350 Idem. <!-- page 233 --> S/2025/446 233/254 25-07401

Annex 63 (para. 144) Cycle of reprisal attacks by CODECO/URDPC and Zaïre since September 2024 Cycle d'attaques de représailles menées par CODECO/URDPC et Zaïre depuis septembre 2024 Between September 2024 and March 2025, Djugu territory experienced recurrent cycles of violence, with large-scale retaliatory attacks primarily led by CODECO/URDPC against Hema civilians, following provocations by Zaïre combatants. Despite brief lulls following dialogue efforts, sustained insecurity resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and significantly disrupted humanitarian access along key routes and IDP sites.351 CODECO/URDPC frequently targeted civilians living in IDP sites, while civilians seeking food or livelihood items faced physical assault, abduction, rape, and killings. Civilian homes were systematically burned or destroyed during attacks. Ambushes on major roads — including the RN27 between Mahagi to Bunia – by both CODECO/URDPC and Zaïre remained frequent, restricting access to essential services and markets. Isolated and opportunistic acts of violence were also frequent.352 Surge of tit-for-tat attacks in September 2024, predominantly affecting Gina and Fataki In September 2024, over 50 civilians were killed across several villages in Djugu territory by CODECO/URDPC combatants originating from the Walendu Djatsi sector, as well as by Zaïre combatants, as a result of tit-for-tat attacks between the two groups. CODECO/URDPC was responsible for the majority of the reported fatalities. The cycle of retaliatory attacks was triggered on 14 September by the abduction and subsequent execution of three Lendu youths 353 by Zaïre combatants who had just returned from military training in Bini (see S/2024/969, paras. 83-86). In retaliation, CODECO/URPDC established roadblocks along the RN27 and abducted eight Alur civilians traveling to Mahagi. The hostages were later released, but on the same day CODECO/URPDC killed a Hema motorcyclist who was heading to Gina, along the same road.354 Two days later, on 16 September, Zaïre combatants at the Gina market decapitated a Lendu civilian from Sesele, Walendu Djatsi. CODECO/URDPC fighters originating from Sesele and Mbau 355 responded by storming Gina to recover the body, firing indiscriminately, and killing two Hema civilians, burning 13 homes, causing mass displacement, and looting the Gina health center. Seven CODECO/URDPC fighters including a commander were killed in the fighting. CODECO/URDPC vowed to attack RN27 road users and villages belonging to other communities, to avenge their members killed by Zaïre. The incident triggered the mass displacement of Gina’s population towards Iga and Lopa.356 On 18 September, Zaïre elements established an informal checkpoint along RN27 near Gina, extorting money from travelers and screening passengers for Lendu identity. A Lendu man was severely beaten; his life was saved due to the timely intervention of MONUSCO. In response, CODECO/URDPC elements threatened to erect their own roadblocks unless Zaïre fighters were ordered to withdraw. The same day, CODECO/URDPC from Walendu Djatsi raided a farming area, killing a Hema farmer from Lala IDP camp.357 The worst incident occurred on the night of 16 to 17 September 2024, when CODECO/URDPC combatants converging from various locations 358 in the Walendu Djatsi and Walendu Pitsi 359 sectors, armed with machetes and guns, launched a coordinated attack on households in the Fataki area. They massacred with machetes and knives 10 Hema civilians – two women and eight children, the youngest five years old – members of two families living in the same compound, decapitating one victim who tried to flee.360 Below is the list of victims, containing their names, gender, and age: __________________ 351 UN, FARDC, intelligence, civil society and humanitarian sources. 352 Ibid. 353 Near Lodjo, in Bahema Nord chiefdom, Djugu territory. 354 UN, FARDC, intelligence, civil society sources. 355 Intelligence and military sources. 356 Intelligence source, UN sources, civil society and humanitarian sources. 357 Ibid. 358 From Likpa and Kodoni, Loranu groupement. 359 From Lobu in Ndjukpa groupement. 360 Intelligence source, UN sources, civil society and humanitarian sources ; Djugu : au moins 20 morts dans une double attaque des miliciens de la CODECO | Radio Okapi <!-- page 234 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 234/254 Civil society source On 19 September, URDPC/CODECO combatants established an illegal checkpoint along RN27 south of Pimbo (Walendu Djatsi sector), where they extorted money and sought to identify Hema individuals. Later the same morning, URDPC/CODECO combatants from the Gokpa and Ndjaudha groupements, Walendu Djatsi sector, split into two units and launched coordinated attacks on Hema civilians living in the Lala and Plaine Savo IDP sites, near Bule. Elements of the 3201st FARDC battalion prevented the incursion of the assailants into the IDP sites. The same CODECO/URDPC combatants subsequently blocked the road to Bule at Lidda, in the Bahema Badjere sector, before launching an attack on Zaïre positions under the command of self-proclaimed 'General' Lotsima, who exerted control over the Largu–Blukwa area in the Bahema Nord sector. Two Zaïre elements were killed and the civilian population fled to the nearby Rhoo IDP site for protection. During these operations, CODECO/URDPC also killed nine Hema civilians – five women and four men - in the agricultural fields surrounding the villages Mbudjona, Gbombu, Ukpakli and Ngle, approximately 4km east of Bule. Several of the victims were IDPs living at the Plaine Savo displacement site.361 October – November 2024 October and November 2024 saw a relative decrease in incidents – following provincial-level dialogue with CODECO/URDPC and Zaïre leadership, and a high-profile visit by the Deputy Minister of Defense – although sporadic killings, ambushes, and abductions continued. Banyali Kilo and Walendu Djatsi sectors were most affected.362 __________________ 361 Intelligence source, UN, civil society, and humanitarian sources. 362 Ibid. <!-- page 235 --> S/2025/446 235/254 25-07401 Daily attacks in December 2024 By December 2024, violence once again worsened across Djugu territory with daily attacks. The RN27 along the Bunia– Fataki–Mahagi axis became a hotspot for systematic ambushes, lootings, and kidnappings. Incidents were also frequent along the Katoto–Largu–Drodro–Bule and Djugu–Fataki–Kpandroma axes – hosting the majority of IDP sites in Djugu – as well as in Banyali Kilo sector, where CODECO/URDPC and Zaïre continued to fight over mining resources, in the absence of effective state control.363 COEDCO/URDPC frequently targeted IDPs, farmers and traders around Bule. Bahema Nord sector (chefferie), predominantly inhabited by Hema civilians, became a hotspot of the conflict between CODECO/URDPC and Zaïre, notably around Logo Takpa and Largu, with a heavy impact on civilians, notably due to frequent killings and mass displacement. 364 Logo Takpa attacks 365: - On 1 December 2024, Zaïre combatants from Logo Takpa 366 – a Hema village in the Lossa Ndrema groupement, Bahema Nord chiefdom – attacked the Lendu population in Djailo village, Gobi groupement, in the Walendu Tatsi sector. Three civilians were shot and killed, including a woman and her 14-year-old child. CODECO/URDPC combatants clashed with Zaïre and considered this incident as provocation by the latter. - On 12 December, URDPC/CODECO elements from Tcheybi village, Gobi groupement, Walendu Tatsi sector, attacked a Zaïre position in Logo Takpa village. The attack resulted in the killing of a Zaïre commander and youth leader of the village, Liripa Maki. Three others were seriously injured and evacuated to Drodro general hospital. Several properties and harvested goods were looted, and multiple homes were set on fire by URDPC/CODECO assailants. - Later the same day, Zaïre elements, Hema youths from Joo Gbii—a lakeside village in the Lossa Ndrema groupement, Bahema Nord chiefdom—retaliated following the killing of Zaïre commander Liripa, killing a Lendu fisherman and mutilating his body by cutting off his genitals. CODECO/URDPC threatened to retaliate. - The same day, CODECO/URDPC elements killed a civilian working in the fields near Logo Takpa. Tensions between the two groups and the two communities continued to mount. - On 13 December, CODECO/URDPC elements, reinforced by the self-proclaimed “generals” Alfred and Charité Cobra—coming from CODECO strongholds in Laudjo and Laddedjo, in the Walendu Pitsi sector, and from the Gobi groupement in Walendu Tatsi sector, respectively—launched a coordinated attack on Logo Takpa. The village, which had been under Zaïre control and where residents had been displaced for five years to the Rhoo IDP site, was overtaken by the attackers. CODECO/URDPC elements began looting and destroying homes and the local market. Zaïre combatants retreated northwards to the villages of Ngazba and Blukwa. Attacks on Largu (16 km from Logo Takpa)367: - On the morning of 17 December, several CODECO/URDPC militiamen originating from Laudjo and Laddedjo (Walendu Pitsi sector) and Tcheybi (Gobi groupement, Walendu Tatsi sector) attempted to attack displaced Hema populations sheltering at the Rhoo IDP site. MONUSCO's contingent stationed at the site prevented the attack. Local sources reported on that day that the assailants had plans to extend their attacks to nearby Hema villages, including Ndjachulu, Ogbo, Koli Dyada, Ndogbe, and the Largu trading center. 368 On the same day, CODECO/URDPC elements carried out coordinated incursions in the villages of Dzudha, Buku, and Largu, and surrounding areas in the Bahema Nord sector. Between 11:00 and 13:00, the assailants systematically looted goods and merchandise at the Largu trading center before withdrawing from the area. The toll from the attacks by the URDPC/CODECO militias was as follows: o At 08:00 in a field at Dzudha, near the Rhoo site, an elderly woman and her 14-year-old granddaughter were injured by gunfire. __________________ 363 Military authorities, intelligence sources, UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, community members, researchers. 364 Intelligence sources, UN, civil society, local civilian sources, photographic evidence. 365 Ibid. 366 Aproximately 16km south of Largu. 367 Intelligence sources, UN, civil society, local civilian sources. 368 Alert shared by intelligence sources with the Group on 17 December. <!-- page 236 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 236/254 o At 09:00 in Ndjachulu, in the Buku group, there was looting of agricultural products in the fields, and 37 Hema houses were set on fire. o At 11:00 in the center of Largu, CODECO/URDPC elements carried out systematic looting of goods and property. Three civilians were killed, including two men – Mr. Manassé, a market official at Largu, and Mr. Lonu Olivier, a street vendor - as well as a female vendor, all Hema civilians. A soldier from the 3202 regiment of the EM SV (Masumbuko) was also killed, and his AK type assault rifle was taken. Two officers from the 3202 regiment, including a lieutenant colonel and a captain, were seriously injured. The Group received video footage documenting the attack on Largu by CODECO/URDPC fighters on 17 December 2024. In the video, armed combatants, wielding machetes, are seen entering a civilian home. They are depicted dragging the body of a woman, who had been killed inside her residence, and continued to inflict machete blows across her body. Additionally, the video captured the attackers, armed with firearms, machetes, and displaying fetishes, celebrating, shouting “CODECO” and “Largu has fallen!”. Below are screenshots from the video, received on 19 December 2024: <!-- page 237 --> S/2025/446 237/254 25-07401 Screenshots from video depicting CODECO/URDPC combatants celebrating at Largu on 17 December 2024, armed and wearing fetishes. Video received by the Group on 19 December 2024 from a confidential source. Screenshot from the same video depicting CODECO/URDPC combatants at Largu on 17 December 2024, armed with machetes, as they were entering a civilian home. A few seconds later the video depicted the combatants dragging the body of a woman outside, continuing to inflict machete blows across her body [graphic images omitted]. Video received be the Group on 19 December 2024 from a confidential source. <!-- page 238 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 238/254 The following day, on 18 December in the evening, CODECO/URDPC militia combatants, coming from Jipi village in the Gokpa groupement, Walendu Djatsi sector, attacked the displaced Hema population at the Plain Savo IDP site in Bule, Ng'le groupement in the Bahema/Badjere chiefdom. The attackers fired shots targeting the displaced population. However, the majority of the Hema population living in the displacement site, warned of an imminent attack, had already relocated. The assailants proceeded to destroy and tear apart over 400 shelters made from tarpaulins using machetes. A woman was severely injured and has been hospitalized at the Bule Health Center. Photograph of one of the over 400 destroyed shelters in the Plaine Savo IDP site, on 19 December 2024. Photograph provided by a confidential source On 20 December at 9 am, the same CODECO/URDPC militia fighters originating from Jipi village in the Gokpa groupement, Walendu Djatsi sector, joined by other fighters originating from Ndjaudha groupement, launched a coordinated attack on the displaced population in the agricultural fields around the Lala IDP site. However, the attack was thwarted by a strong intervention from the FARDC and MONUSCO forces protecting the IDP site.369 Spike in violence between January and March 2025 In January–February 2025, a new wave of clashes erupted between CODECO/URPDC and Zaïre elements in Djugu, spilling over to neighbouring Mahagi territory. Retaliatory CODECO/URDPC attacks once again targeted displaced communities. This wave of violence between January and March has left over 150 civilians dead.370 For example, on 4 January 2025, Zaïre elements from Katsu and Baimani (5 km from Nizi centre), Mambisa chefferie, attacked Wabi village, Dz’na – Mbau groupement, in Walendu Djatsi sector. They killed a Lendu civilian and burned down civilian homes. The Lendu population fled to Dz’na centre and neighboring areas. CODECO/URDPC promised to seek vengeance.371 Several isolated attacks in the region were reported, including the killing by CODECO/URDPC originating from Walendu Pitsi of a man and a woman at Rule, Sambuso groupement in Bahema Nord chefferie.372 On 16 January, Zaïre combatants ambushed Lendu civilians along the RN27 near Lidda, in the Bahema Badjere chiefdom, killing one man and injuring two others. In retaliation for the Lidda ambush, on 17 January CODECO/URDPC attacked Dzadhu village in Bahema-Nord chiefdom, wounding two Hema IDPs and abducting their village chief. A ransom of 2 million Congolese Francs (FC) was demanded. On 19 January, CODECO/URDPC released the kidnapped village chief after a 2.2 million FC ransom was paid.373 Isolated incidents of ambushes and killings throughout Djugu territory continued on a daily basis. __________________ 369 Intelligence, UN, and civil society sources. 370 UN and humanitarian sources, intelligence sources 371 Intelligence and FARDC sources, civil society. 372 Ibid. 373 Ibid. <!-- page 239 --> S/2025/446 239/254 25-07401 Between 9 and 12 February 2025, CODECO/URDPC elements carried out one of the deadliest massacres in recent years, killing over 80 civilians in a coordinated attack on Hema villages around Djaiba IDP camp, in retribution to the killing of five Lendu civilians by Zaïre in Ar’r village, near Fataki (see annex 64 below). On 23 February, CODECO/URDPC originating from Njaudha, Walendu Djatsi collectivité, attacked Camp Platon locality in Djugu, near the residence of the territorial administrator’s (AT) residence, killing seven people with machetes, including two women and two children. Two of the victims were agents working at the territorial administration. Among the victims six were Hema and one Lendu. Several houses were also burned, and the assailants promised to return, causing panic among Hema civilians who fled towards Bule and Iga.374 Through mid-March, despite the deployment of UPDF forces (see paras. 134 and 137), violence persisted. CODECO/URDPC carried out further incursions in Djugu territory and regularly ambushed travelers along the RN27, particularly around Djugu and Fataki. In turn, Zaïre elements launched sporadic retaliatory attacks on Lendu-populated areas, causing casualties and burning homes – although on a much smaller scale than CODECO/URDPC.375 On 24 March, CODECO/URPDC attacked the Loda IDP site, located merely 2 km from the Djaiba IDP site, killing eight Hema civilians with machetes (see annex 65 below).376 On 23 March, Zaïre elements originating from Djaiba and Bule attacked Sanduku village, burned down 12 homes and killed two civilians, including an elderly Lendu woman. This attack was perpetrated in revenge for the killing by CODECO/URDPC of two Hema civlians two days earlier, on 21 March, at Lenge village near Djaiba. On 26 March, CODECO/URDPC elements originating from Kondoni and Likpa 2 villages from the Walendu Djatsi sector attacked Talikpa and Golu villages in Fataki, burning down 45 Hema houses. No fatalities were reported.377 Following the February 2025 violence in Djugu territory, MONUSCO reinforced its presence in the area. Peacekeepers engaged in multiple exchanges of fire with assailants and successfully averted several attempted attacks. Temporary operating bases were established in Lodda and Aa’r to deter further intercommunal violence and to secure the nearby Djangu IDP site. Joint MONUSCO-FARDC patrols have intensified around displacement sites.378 __________________ 374 Ibid. 375 Ibid. 376 Security and intelligence sources, UN sources 377 Intelligence source, civil society and local leaders. 378 UN and humanitarian sources, intelligence sources. <!-- page 240 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 240/254

Annex 64 (para. 146) CODECO/URDPC attack on Djaiba IDP site and surrounding Hema villages, between 9 to 12 February 2025 Attaque de la CODECO/URDPC contre le site de déplacés de Djaiba et les villages Hema environnants, du 9 au 12 février 2025 A horrific peak in violence was reached in February 2025, when CODECO/URDPC carried out one of its deadliest massacres in recent years, targeting displaced Hema civilians in reprisal for an earlier attack on Lendu civilians by Zaïre elements. Zaïre attack on Buchama locality in Ar’r village, on 9 February 2025 379 During the night from 8 to 9 February, Zaïre elements originating from Djaiba village, Djaiba groupement, Bahema Badjere chefferie, attacked Buchama locality in Ar’r village, 5 km from Fataki centre, in Walendu Djatsi sector. The assailants killed five Lendu civilians – two girls, two women, and one man – pillaged, and burned down over 31 homes. One Zaïre assailant was arrested by FARDC. The Lendu community and CODECO/URDPC reportedly perceived this attack as a deliberate provocation – despite knowing that any retaliation by CODECO/URDPC would likely result in disproportionate harm – in an attempt to further destabilize the security situation in Ituri and to create conditions that could justify the intervention of the UPDF (paras. 134- 138).380 Revenge attacks by CODECO/URDPC CODECO/URPDC promised to seek vengeance for the attack on Ar’r.381 The following morning, on 9 February, CODECO/URDPC combatants were seen moving from Ar’r towards Lodda and Djaiba IDP sites. During the night of 9 to 10 February, around midnight, CODECO/URDPC attacked the Djaiba IDP site and raided the nearby Sanduku village. The attackers have set shelters on fire, killed two civilians, and injured at least ten civilians (women and the majority children) who suffered bullet and machete wounds. MONUSCO intervened to prevent a large-scale massacre, repelling the attackers, and dispatched patrols to protect the nearby Lodha IDP site. Five severely wounded were evacuated to Bunia, with MONUSCO support.382 After MONUSCO thwarted the initial attack on Djaiba IDP site – and concentrated its forces and patrols to protect other IDP sites in the area and respond to reports of suspicious movement – the following night of 10 to 11 February, CODECO/URDPC combatants bypassed the Djaiba IDP camp and instead launched coordinated attacks on several Hema villages in and around Djaiba, notably on Djaiba centre, Lindo, Laudjo, Ubeni and Lodja.383 CODECO/URDPC elements originating from the villages of Ar’r, Djidda, Kondoni, and Likpa 2 384 from the Walendu Djatsi sector joined forces with CODECO/URDPC combatants coming from the Ndjukpa groupement, Walendu Pitsi collectivité. 385 According to CODECO/URDPC spokesperson Basa Zukpa Gershom,386 Lendu civilians from Ar’r, including family members of the victims, armed with machetes, have joined the attackers. The attack began around 11 pm, catching the population by surprise, and lasted until approximately 3 am. The assailants have set houses with civilians in it on fire, while shooting, stabbing, and beheading other residents.387 Witnesses described __________________ 379 Intelligence sources, UN sources, civil society, local leaders, humanitarian sources, photographic evidence. 380 UN and intelligence sources, Lendu community leaders. 381 Intelligence and UN sources. 382 UN sources, civil society, local leaders, and humanitarian sources. 383 Localities in the Djaiba groupement, Bahema Badjere chiefdom. 384 Localities in the Loranu groupement, Fataki sector. 385 Along the Lobu forest axis, a CODECO/URDPC stronghold. 386 Interviewed by the Group on 13 March 2025. 387 Local leader, eyewitness accounts, civil society, intelligence souce, humanitarian and UN sources. <!-- page 241 --> S/2025/446 241/254 25-07401 entire families perishing in flames.388 Initial reports indicated that at least 58 civilians were killed that night, including 28 children,389 with many victims burned alive in their homes. At least 34 homes were burned. The Hema population from Djaiba and surroundings have fled to Fataki and Bule center.390 Between 12 to 15 February, CODECO/URDPC elements continued to raid villages in the area and were responsible for the killing of 16 additional civilians in the localities of Lodja, Bassa, Gina, and Ar’r. MONUSCO systematically deployed to patrol and secure these areas, as further threats of attacks were identified in Drodro, the Lodha IDP site and Bule.391 The total death toll of all these attacks between 9 to 15 February raised to over 80 civilians killed, and at least 23 gravely injured.392 The majority of victims were killed using bladed weapons and firearms, and many have been burned inside their homes. The majority of victims were women and children. Local sources reported that many men had fled the area prior to the attacks, following warnings of imminent reprisals by CODECO/URDPC, leaving their women and children behind. Most victims were buried in mass graves in Ubeni locality – 51 victims in one mass grave, and four in another grave. The five victims of the Zaïre attack in Buchama were buried in a mass grave in Ar’r.393 Comments by Basa Zukpa Guershom, CODECO/URDPC spokesperson,394 on the Djaiba massacre Basa Zukpa Guershom, spokesperson and the most influential member of CODECO/URDPC’s Chief of Staff (para. 153), deflected accountability for the February massacre in and around Djaiba by framing it as a product of uncontrollable reprisals, driven by long-standing ethnic tensions. He emphasized that these acts of vengeance were not organized or directed by CODECO/URDPC but instead emerged spontaneously, often involving not only combatants but also the families of the victims – as in this case. According to Basa, the cycle of violence was rooted in the unresolved, decades-long conflict between the Hema and Lendu communities, where killings prompted immediate retaliations. Civilians, he argued, were drawn into these reprisals, often using machetes rather than taking up firearms, and engaging in looting. He claimed that the lawlessness has escalated beyond control, and even the government has been unable to mediate between the two communities and resolve the crisis through peaceful dialogue. In his view, the violence was an inevitable consequence of a deeply entrenched ethnic conflict that no one was able to effectively manage. Paragraphs 152-157 document the absence of accountability for grave violations within CODECO/URDPC ranks. Aftermath and consequences of the massacre In the aftermath of the massacres, the Vice Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sammy Adubango, accompanied by senior military officials from Ituri province, conducted a visit to Djaiba. During the visit, on 15 February, the delegation paid tribute to the victims and emphasized the importance of community dialogue and peaceful coexistence. However, these appeals were largely perceived as symbolic by affected populations.395 The cycle of attacks continued in the coming days and weeks, severely affecting Djugu and Fataki area. Between February and March, an estimated 97,000 individuals were newly displaced across Djugu territory due to ongoing violence. The general security situation in Djugu territory has led to a near-total collapse of essential services and public infrastructure. Following the recent violence in Djaiba, residents—including teachers and healthcare workers—fled en masse, resulting in the closure of all schools and state-run health facilities in Fataki, Djugu, and Djaiba. Most of the medical staff, predominantly of Hema origin, have been forced to flee. Movement between Djugu and Bule remained extremely limited due to the lack of proper roads and the pervasive presence of CODECO/URDPC elements, who have reportedly established multiple __________________ 388 Idem. 389 Intelligence source, humanitarian sources. 390 UN sources, civil society, local leaders, and humanitarian sources. 391 Intelligence and UN sources, local leaders, eyewitness accounts, civil society, humanitarian sources. 392 Intelligence and humanitarian sources. MONUSCO reported 65 civilians killed between 9 and 12 February 2025, including 28 women, 13 men and 24 children. 393 Intelligence and UN sources, local leader, eyewitness accounts, civil society, humanitarian sources. 394 Interviewed by the Group on 13 March 2025. 395 UN sources, civil society, local leaders, and humanitarian sources. <!-- page 242 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 242/254 checkpoints and were actively targeting Hema civilians. As a result, many Hema civilians no longer slept in their homes at night, instead seeking refuge at police stations, FARDC and MONUSCO positions.396 On 30 March 2025, MONUSCO reported that since 12 February 2025, around 5,000 civilians from the Djaiba IDP site and surrounding villages – including Djaiba, Laudjo, Dhego, Lindu, Fataki and nearby settlements – have been sheltering outside its Permanent Operating Base (POB) in Fataki every night, from 6 pm to 6 am, in search of protection. The IDPs did not have adequate shelter, as depicted in the photographs below. Images of the MONUSCO POB premises in Fataki, 30 March 2025. UN source __________________ 396 UN sources, civil society, local leaders, and humanitarian sources. <!-- page 243 --> S/2025/446 243/254 25-07401

### Annex 65 (para. 147) ### CODECO/URDPC threats, ambushes and attacks on humanitarian convoys and humanitarian staff ### Menaces, embuscades et attaques de la CODECO/URDPC contre les convois et le personnel humanitaires During the reporting period CODECO/URDPC elements have been implicated in several incidents involving threats, ambushes followed by robbery, and the temporary abduction of humanitarian personnel in Djugu territory. The Group has documented similar incidents in the past, involving CODECO/URDPC attacks on humanitarian vehicles and personnel (see S/2024/432, para. 159 and annex 93). On 21 June 2024, URDPC/CODECO assailants from the villages of Kombu, Jipi and Ndjaudha, Walendu-Djatsi sector, carried out an ambush along the Bule–Maze–Drodro road, near Lidda in the Dhedja groupement, Bahema Badjere chiefdom. During the incident, an OCHA Land Cruiser en route to Bunia, carrying humanitarian staff, was intercepted. The armed group threatened the passengers with death and forcibly took them and the vehicle toward the village of Jipi. The assailants stole $55 in cash, three Android phones, three bags, and a laptop. One of the attackers fired a shot into a tire of the vehicle before fleeing. Following community intervention, including negotiations led by local Lendu leaders from the Walendu- Djatsi sector, the hostages were released unharmed. Their bags and laptop were returned, but the phones and money remained confiscated. Later that day, the CODECO/URDPC État-Major based in Dyaro, including Basa Zukpa, deployed along with several fighters from the 1st URDPC Brigade to apprehend the perpetrators in Gokpa, who were led by commander Chura. An exchange of fire broke out. The clash resulted in the deaths of four assailants, including commander Chura.397 Commander Chura was responsible for the massacre at the Lala IDP site perpetrated on 11 June 2023 (S/2023/990, paras. 78–80), for which he was not punished at the time. On 4 December 2024, CODECO/URDPC ambushed the vehicle of an international humanitarian organization 398 along the RN27 road near Pitso. Six staff travelling on board the vehicle was robbed, and one injured.399 Following the recent deployment of UPDF – perceived by the Lendu as supporting the Hema community (paras. 135-139) – humanitarian actors operating in CODECO/URDPC-controlled areas have faced heightened mistrust and access constraints. This perception has led CODECO/URDPC elements to suspect aid workers of collusion with UPDF, demanding to inspect identification documents and screening individuals based on ethnic affiliation. These developments have increased risks for humanitarian personnel, and further impeded the delivery of assistance to affected populations.400 Direct threats, ambushes and attacks on humanitarian convoys and humanitarian staff, such as the incidents attributed to CODECO/URDPC, are sanctionable acts. __________________ 397 Intelligence sources, CODECO/URDPC source, Lendu community leader, UN, and humanitarian sources. 398 The humanitarian organization affected by the ambush wished to remain anonymous in order to safeguard its operations and the safety of its staff. 399 UN and humanitarian sources. 400 Confidential sources. <!-- page 244 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 244/254

Annex 66 (para. 150) Conflict-related sexual violence in Ituri Province Violences sexuelles liées au conflit dans la province de l’Ituri Challenges in investigating incidents of sexual violence in Ituri The Group encountered significant challenges in investigating cases of sexual violence in Ituri Province, primarily due to restricted access to survivors and a troubling pattern of victims being killed after rape to prevent them from seeking help or testifying. This issue was further exacerbated by the geographical isolation of many affected communities, particularly those from the Lendu community, who were less likely to seek medical or legal assistance. In contrast, survivors from the Hema community, residing in large numbers in IDP camps supported by humanitarian and medical organizations, were more likely to report incidents of rape and access post-violence medical care. This disparity may explain the significantly lower reporting of rape cases within the Lendu community. Lendu areas were also much harder to access due to logistical constraints and ongoing insecurity. Additionally, the stigma surrounding sexual violence silenced many survivors, who fear social isolation or further violence. Given the significant challenges outlined above, opportunities for in-person interviews have been rare and difficult to conduct due to the ongoing insecurity, geographical isolation, and the reluctance of survivors. Survivors were often unreachable, due lack of connectivity. Therefore, the majority of cases included in this report did not result from interviews directly conducted by the Group, but rather from cases reported by trusted UN partners, as well as other reputable humanitarian organizations, known for following rigorous standards for data collection, survivor protection, neutrality and confidentiality, following established protocols for investigating and documenting sexual violence cases, ensuring that the information gathered was reliable. Other cases were reported by Congolese authorities, and were included in the report following independent verification from additional sources, notably local civil society organizations, community leaders or protection actors. Across all documented cases, the consistent and alarming common denominator was the complete impunity granted to perpetrators, underscoring a systemic failure to deliver justice. Cases documented by the Group In September 2024, following CODECO/URDPC attacks on Gina (see annex 62 above), four women were raped near Pitso. Three of the victims, all from the Hema community, were subsequently killed by strangulation. One was found impaled with a blunt object. The fourth victim, a 16-year-old from the Ndo Okebo community, was released. The assailants were identified as CODECO/URDPC fighters from Sesele and Mbau, involved in the Gina attack – but individual perpetrators were not identified.401 The Group received photographic evidence of three victims, all partially unclothed, exhibiting defensive wounds on their arms. Cases of rape perpetrated by armed actors, reported by Congolese authorities: - On 15 September 2024, at 5 am, a group of CODECO/URDPC combatants passing through Camp Nyali avenue in the Zubula neighborhood of Mongbwalu (Banyali Kilo sector) collectively raped a 57-year-old woman, a farmer from the Baradje village, Tchudja groupement of Walendu Djatsi sector. After committing the rape, the attackers strangled her, before retreating. Local witnesses could not identify the assailants, and none of them were arrested. The case was reported by local police and intelligence services, who investigated and reported the incident. - On 10 January 2025, at Kpandroma village in Walendu Pitsi sector, a 17-year-old girl was abducted by six combatants armed with AK type assault rifles and taken to the home of CODECO/URDPC commander Kanda Deogratias, where she was raped by the latter. The local Lendu notability intervened to negotiate the girl’s release so she could seek medical attention. Commander Kanda was neither arrested nor otherwise punished. __________________ 401 Lendu community leader, intelligence, and civil society source. <!-- page 245 --> S/2025/446 245/254 25-07401 - On 22 January 2025, at approximately 8 pm, a 23-year-old Lendu woman from Nyamassa village in the Limani groupement, Walendu Djatsi sector, was sexually assaulted in Lilo village, Mayalibo groupement in the Mambisa chefferie, along the RN27 to the north of Bunia. The victim was attacked by four young men, presumed to be of Hema ethnicity. The assailants escaped and the survivor was transported to a health center in Pimbo to receive medical care and support. - On 12 March 2025, a young Lendu woman was raped and subsequently killed in Soni village, Gokpa groupement, Walendu Djatsi sector (15 km from Pimbo center). The suspect was a CODECO/URDPC element called Kpambe Justin. At time of drafting, the suspect was not arrested. - On 29 March 2025, at approximately 3 am, at the IDP site in Nyamusasi village, located in the Tchomia groupement, Bahema Banywagi chiefdom along Lake Albert, a 43-year-old female vendor residing in Block 10 of the IDP site was forcibly removed from her home and murdered by armed assailants wielding machetes. She was found approximately ten meters from her home, deceased, nude, and bearing signs of sexual violence and fatal machete wounds. During the attack, her infant sustained injuries, while her husband, who appeared to be a target, managed to escape by hiding beneath the bed. This incident was corroborated by local civil society sources. Cases documented by a trusted UN partner The UN documented seven different cases of collective rape by CODECO/URDPC elements in the Djaiba area in February 2025, although most these incidents were not directly linked to the massacre in the same locality (see para. 146). Several of the women were assaulted while working in their fields, others during CODECO/URDPC incursions or ambushes on their villages. The documented incidents occurred in: o Lokpa village, Gali groupement, Bahema Badjere sector, on 5 February 2025; o Lodja village, Djaiba groupement, Bahema Badjere sector, on 5 February 2025; o Lodja village, Djaiba groupement, Bahema Badjere sector, on 6 February 2025; o Lodja village, Djaiba groupement, Bahema Badjere sector, on 7 February 2025; o Lokpa village, Gali groupement, Bahema Badjere sector, on 7 February 2025; o Lindu village, Djaiba groupement, Bahema Badjere sector, on 10 February 2025; o Lodja village, Djaiba groupement, Bahema Badjere sector, on 10 February 2025. The UN also documented three separate cases of gang rape—two involving minor girls—committed by elements of the 3202nd FARDC regiment based in Bule (see para. 151). <!-- page 246 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 246/254

Annex 67 (para. 160) Failures in the implementation of sanctions Échecs dans la mise en œuvre des sanctions The Group liaised with authorities in the DRC – notably the Central Bank – BCC, Financial Intelligence Unit – CENAREF, Migration Police – DGM, Customs – DGDA, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice), financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) – to promote a conducive environment for sanctions implementation. In particular, the Group sensitized these interlocutors on the Financial Action Task Force interpretative note to the Special Recommendation III of October 2001, which refers to asset freeze “without delay in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions”, encompassing all UN sanctions regimes.402 Among the different sensitization actions, the Group informed the authorities of the DRC that any emoluments paid to sanctioned individuals who receive payments from the government, such as those in active service with the FARDC or members of elected bodies, must be subject to asset freezing. Failures by DRC and Uganda to implement sanctions Sanctioned individual Floribert Ngabu Njabu (CDi.021) was authorized to travel to Kampala, in violation of the travel ban, under a mission order signed by the Ituri Governor, General Johnny Luboya N’kashama (see document below). The mission order included meetings with the “Ituri diaspora in Uganda”, which included leaders and supporters of armed groups active in Ituri, such as Yves Khawa Panga Mandro (CDi.009) and Thomas Lubanga (CDi.007). 403 According to available information, Ngabu travelled on 10 March on a direct flight from Bunia to Entebbe, operated by MAF airline, and returned on 18 March 2025 via a flight from Aru to Bunia, operated by Busy Bee airline.404 The Group met with sanctioned individual Yves Khawa Panga Mandro in Kampala on 25 March 2025. He informed the Group that he regularly travelled, including to India for medical reasons in September 2025. He refused to provide details on the travel documents he used in order to circumvent the travel ban. Khawa also traveled from Uganda to Tchomia, in Ituri, in April 2025. He also informed that his assets were not frozen in Uganda, where he ran several businesses, including an aquaculture venture that generated over $5,000 in monthly income. The Group had credible information that sanctioned individual Thomas Lubanga has been residing in Uganda since at least July 2024. In February 2025, Lubanga appeared in public in Kampala including with representatives of the DRC Episcopal Conference (Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo – CENCO). Innocent Kaina aka India Queen (CDi.004), with established residence in Uganda since he fled from DRC in November 2013, has again been linked to armed group activities as reported in S/2024/969, para 91. In April 2025, Kaina announced the creation of a new politico-military group opposing the DRC government (para. 126). The Group wrote to the Ugandan authorities in 2024 to ask about the measures it took to ensure sanctions were implemented regarding individuals residing under its jurisdiction, notably Thomas Lubanga, Ywes Kahwa Panga Mandro, and Innocent Kaina. Ugandan authorities replied that they were oblivious to their presence on their soil. Uganda did not reply to a subsequent letter following up on this matter, sent by the Group on 1 April 2025. During its last visit to Uganda in March 2025, the Group had initially scheduled a meeting with Ugandan authorities to discuss, amongst other matters, sanctions violations related to Yves Khawa Panga Mandro, Thomas Lubanga and Innocent Kaina. However, this meeting did could not take place due to conflicting agendas of the Group and the Ugandan authorities and actors. __________________ 402 https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/FATF%20Standards%20- %20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf.coredownload.pdf. 403 In his meeting with the Group on 25 March 2025, Khawa confirmed that Ngabu and the rest of his delegation asked to meet him and Thomas Lubanga. 404 Intelligence sources. <!-- page 247 --> S/2025/446 247/254 25-07401 Mission order signed by Ituri Governor, Lieutenant-General Luboya N’Kashama Johnny, received from intelligence sources. <!-- page 248 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 248/254

Annex 68 (para. 164) Non-exhaustive list of mining cooperatives working with CODECO and Zaïre Liste non exhaustive des coopératives minières qui travaillent avec CODECO et Zaïre Most mining companies active in gold mining in Ituri worked in areas controlled by CODECO in Banyali Kilo, or by Zaïre in Mambisa chefferie, in Djugu and Mahagi territories. The most important are the following: (i) Co.Mi.Sa.Ra. (Coopérative Minière Saint Raphael), which belonged to Raphael Mambo Kamaragi, alias “Rof” or “MK”. Co.Mi.Sa.Ra. worked in Mambisa sector under the protection of Zaïre commander Baraka Maki Amos (see annex 59). (ii) Coopérative Umoja, which belonged to Robert Ucaya, alias “Pacifique” and Aime Mbanga alias “Kirikou”, who worked in Mambisa sector, under the protection of Baraka Maki Amos.405 Umoja is a separate entity from Umoja Gold, which exploited gold as a subcontractor of Chinese businessmen on placer deposits in Mambasa territory. (iii) Co.Mi.Nde.F. (Coopérative Minière Ndele et frères), which belongs to Ndele Bachebandey (S/2021/560, para. 98), exploited multiple sites in Mongbwalu under the protection of CODECO.406 In late 2024, FARDC expelled CODECO from the Lodjo mining site, also exploited by Co.Mi.Nde.F. Ndele also owns construction company Sous les Palmiers, which was granted a contract by Governor Luboya to improve the road between the mining areas of Iga Barriere, Nizi, Mongbwalu, and Lodjo. (iv) Coopérative El Jireh, which belongs to David “Kirikou” Mbanga, operates sites in Banyali Kilo under the protection of CODECO.407 __________________ 405 Bunia and Mabanga economic actors, civil society, researchers, intelligence sources. Ucaya is the main importer in Ituri of excavators used in mechanized gold mining, locally called “poklin”. 406 Bunia and Mongbwalu economic actors, civil society, researchers, intelligence sources. 407 Ibid. David is the brother of Aime Mbanga. Their a.k.a. comes from the name of the hotel they own in Bunia. <!-- page 249 --> S/2025/446 249/254 25-07401

Annex 69 (para. 165) Proofs of salongo (jetons) imposed by elements under the control of Zaïre’s Baraka Maki Preuves du salongo (jetons) imposé par les éléments sous le contrôle de Barak Maki de Zaïre Zaïre commander Baraka Maki Amos imposed forced community labor called “salongo” in the areas under his control in Mambisa sector. Failure to show proof of the executed salongo was punished with whipping and the payment of fines.408 __________________ 408 Mabanga dwellers, Zaïre combatants, civil society, researchers. <!-- page 250 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 250/254 Proof of payments received from confidential sources <!-- page 251 --> S/2025/446 251/254 25-07401

### Annex 70 (para. 170) AFC/M23 communiqué of 10 February 2025 Communiqué AFC/M23 du 10 février 2025 AFC/M23 communiqué received from AFC/M23 source <!-- page 252 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 252/254

Annex 71 (para. 171) Illustrations of the alliance of political and influential figures with AFC/M23 in Bukavu Illustrations de l'alliance de personnalités politiques et influentes avec l'AFC/M23 à Bukavu • Thirty-five individuals, including several politicians, seeking to position themselves for upcoming AFC/M23 appointments, and identifying as “Forces vives et acteurs politiques”, signed a declaration expressing gratitude to the AFC/M23 politico-military movement for "liberating the province of South Kivu” on 20 February. • Nicolas Kyalangalilwa Mulondani, the Federal President of the political party “Leadership et Gouvernance pour le Développement” (LGD) in South Kivu, officially announced his allegiance to the AFC/M23 on 22 February. • Samy Jean Takimbula, the Vice-President of the “Bureau de Coordination de la Société Civile of South Kivu (BCSC/SK)”, pledged support for AFC/M23 on 23 February. Thereupon, Samy Jean Takimbula was disavowed by the President of the BCSC/SK. • Crispin Kashale, the Director of the Communication Cell of the Panzi Foundation, resigned from his position for "personal reasons" and officially joined AFC/M23. • Amangu Bahombwa Boaz, a former provincial Deputy of Fizi territory, claimed to represent the Babembe Babondo elite of Fizi and expressed support of the Babembe Babondo for AFC/M23. He also called on Babembe youth from Fizi to mobilise and join AFC/M23 and resist the GoDRC. <!-- page 253 --> S/2025/446 253/254 25-07401

Annex 72 (para. 179) Additional information on FDNB deployments in the DRC Informations complémentaires sur les déploiements de FDNB en RDC In December 2024 and January 2025, AFC/M23 and RDF operations in Kalehe territory triggered a build-up of Burundian troops to contain AFC/M23 and RDF expansion southwards. Several hundred FDNB troops were deployed north of Bukavu, in Katana and Nyamukubi, to contain AFC/M23 and RDF from taking Bukavu and Kavumu. On 31 January, an additional 2,000 Burundian troops were sent to Kamanyola in the Ruzizi Plain, near the tri-border area between Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. Following the takeover of Bukavu and Kavumu by AFC/M23 and RDF early February 2025, FDNB troops repositioned. In March and April 2015, FDNB were deployed in two major areas, i.e. in the Ruzizi Plain along the DRC-Burundi border and in the Hauts Plateaux, near Minembwe. Early April 2025, approximately 14 FDNB battalions operating under the “Task Force Congo” (or “TAFOC”) umbrella were still present on DRC territory (S/2024/432, annex 53). While 10 TAFOC battalions were reportedly deployed in the Ruzizi Plain, two were deployed in and around Uvira, and two others in the Hauts Plateaux, close to Minembwe. While a fully organic FDNB battalion consists of 650 soldiers, it is unlikely that deployed battalions were fully constituted, particularly in light of capacity limitations. However, FARDC, FDNB and intelligence sources estimated that early April 2025, at least 7,000 troops were deployed in South Kivu. <!-- page 254 --> S/2025/446 25-07401 254/254

Annex 73 (para. 180) Statement of President Ndashimiye on 1 February 2025 Déclaration du Président Ndashimiye le 1er février 2025 • During a ‘New Year 2025’ diplomatic gathering at the presidential palace in Bujumbura on 7 February 2025, President Ndashimiye accused Rwanda of intending to invade Burundi, including through its backing of the RED Tabara rebel group, and stated the readiness of his country to fight back. • Excerpt of the statement by President Ndashimiye published on 1 February 2025 on Youtube: “Do you see what is happening right near us? Why this silence? Does the international community not see the consequences? I am telling you, if this continues, war is likely to spread throughout the region. Because the people will not stand by and do nothing. If Rwanda continues its conquests, even entering our country, I know it will eventually reach Burundi. Because it is currently training young refugees, arming them, and hardening them through the war in Congo. One day, it will come to Burundi. We will not accept this—the war will spread. We know its plan: it is preparing something against Burundi. Fortunately, Burundians are aware of this. If the international community allows this to happen, then here in Burundi, we will not sit idly by. Once again, I call on the international community to take this seriously. We are facing a regional threat. This is not just about Burundi.”409 (unofficial translation) • On 26 March, President Ndashimiye, during an interview with the BBC stated: “Burundi will not accept to be killed as Congolese are being killed. Burundians, we are fighters, we are mobilized, and together we know that we will respond if they attack us (…). The people who did the coup were organized by Rwanda. They are living in the hand of Rwanda. If Rwanda accepts to bring them to the justice, the problem would be finished (…) They have a bad plan, they want to do what they are doing in the DRC. We ask to the people who want to help to advise Rwanda, to continue to advise not to aggress the neighbouring countries”. • The Government of Rwanda did not respond to the specific claims made by Ndayishimiye on 26 March, but Yolande Makolo gave the following statement, published by BBC: “These comments are surprising because Rwandan and Burundian defence and security institutions have actually been meeting”. __________________ 409 Unofficial translation from French to English